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An Overview
FIN-6137
What is Corporation?
Other stakeholders
Four Pillars
of Corporate Governance
Accountability
Fairness
Transparency
Independence
Accountability
Control Environment
Transparent disclosure
Board commitment
Why Corporate Governance?
Better access to external finance
Improved company performance –
sustainability
Stakeholders’ trust
Reduced risk of corporate crisis and
scandals
Corporate Governance System
Self Interested Executives
Executives that can take actions to benefit
themselves without detection and therefore
avoid the cost of punishment.
1. Market Forces
2. Agency Cost
Market Forces
It is of two types:
Monitoring
Bonding
Opportunity
structuring
Cont’d…
Monitoring Expenditures
It relates to the payment for audit and
control procedures to ensure that
management is working for maximizing
owners wealth.
Bonding Expenditures
The firm pays to obtain fidelity bond from
a third party bonding company to
compensate for financial losses due to
dishonest acts.
Cont’d….
Opportunity Cost
The cost which results from the inability of
the firm to respond to new opportunities.
Structuring Expenditures
Relates to structuring managerial
compensation to maximize owners wealth.
It is of two types:
Incentive Plans and
Performance Plans
Relationship with CG & Firms
Performance
According to a 2002 survey by McKinsey &
Company, nearly 80 percent of institutional
investors responded that they would pay a
premium for a well governed company. The size of
the premium varied by market, ranging from 11
percent for a company in Canada to around 40
percent for a company in Morocco, Egypt, or
Russia. These results imply that investors perceive
well governed companies to be better investments
than poorly governed companies. They are also
consistent with the idea that governance systems
are more important in certain countries than in
others.
Best Practice or Best Practices?
Does one size fits for all?
Applying a “one-size-fits-all” approach to
governance can lead to incorrect
conclusions and is unlikely to substantially
improve corporate performance.
A set of governance mechanisms that
works well in one setting might prove
disastrous in another. This situation
becomes apparent when considering
international governance systems.
For example, Germany requires labor
union representation on many corporate
boards. How effective would such a
system be in the United States? Japanese
boards have few outside directors and
many of those who are outside directors
come from banks that provide capital to
the firm or key customers and suppliers.
What would be the impact on Japanese
companies if they were required to adopt
the independence standards of the United
States?