The Literal Rule

• By the literal rule, words in a statute must be

given their plain, ordinary or literal meaning.
• The objective of the court is to discover the
intention of Parliament as expressed in the
words used.
• This approach will be used even if it produces
absurdity or hardship, in which case the remedy
is for Parliament to pass an amending statute.
• One of the leading statements of the literal rule was
made by Tindal CJ in the Sussex Peerage Case (1844)
11 Cl&Fin 85
“… the only rule for the construction of Acts of
Parliament is, that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which
passed the Act.
If the words of the statute are in themselves precise
and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary
than to expound those words in their natural and
ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in
such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.”
• Lord Esof in R v Judge of the City [1892] 1 QB
273 said:
• “If the words of an Act are clear then you
must follow them even though they lead to a
manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to
do with the question whether the legislature
has committed an absurdity.”
Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd [1998] 4 All ER 417, House of
Lords
Facts
• In the case Mr C, the Claimant, was injured in a
car.
• The Defendant’s insurance only covered him
under the Road Traffic Act 1988 for the use of
his car ‘on any highway and any other road to
which the public has access’.

Issue
• The question for the court to determine,
therefore, was whether the multi-storey car
park was a road?
Held
• The HL held that the car park was not a road
because a road provides for cars to move
along it to a destination.
• Therefore, the insurance company was not
liable to pay out on the driver’s policy because
the claimant had not been injured due to the
use of the car on a “road”.
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Hinchy
(1960) aka Tax penalty case
Issue
• Concerned the construction of s.25 (3) of the
Income Tax Act 1952

• The Act stated that anyone convicted should be

subject to a fixed penalty and treble the tax which
he ought to have been charged under the Act

• The Court had to decide whether the amount

should be based on the whole amount that was
liable under the statute of just the unpaid amount
• The Court decided that on the literal rule he
was liable to pay the whole amount, even
though this was a harsh decision
Midland Trust Co Ltd v Green [1981] 1 All ER
153 aka Green hill case
Facts:
• In 1961 Mr. Walter Green(Father) granted an option to
purchase Gravel Hill farm to his son Geoffrey
Green(Son). The option, although registrable as a land
charge under the Land Charges Act 1925, was not
registered. 
• In 1967 there was a disagreement in the family and
Mr. Walter (Father) sold the farm to his wife for £500
(it was worth around £40,000) in a deliberate attempt
to defeat the option granted to his son.
• The wife then changed her will so as to leave the farm
to all five of her children including Mr. Geoffrey.
• Geoffrey learnt of the sale and sought to enforce the
option. 
Issue
• The question for the court was whether the option was
binding on the wife or whether she took the farm free of
the option. 
Provision
• S 13 (2) of the Land Charges Act 1925 provided that a
land charge would be void against a purchaser of the
land unless registered and where an estate contract was
under consideration it would only be void against a
purchaser of a legal estate for money or money’s
worth.  
• Purchaser was also defined in s.20(8) as a purchaser
who for valuable consideration takes any interest in
land.
• The trial judge found for the wife and held that
the option was not binding on the wife
• This was reversed by the Court of Appeal  with
Lord Denning holding that the sale was not for
money or money’s worth and that the protection
of the Act was not available in cases of fraud
where there was a deliberate attempt to defeat
an interest.
• The wife’s representative appealed to the House
of Lords.
Held
• Lord Wilberforce stated that the decision of Lord
Dennings as 'muddying clear waters'.
• Delivering a unanimous reversal of the Court of
Appeal's majority decision, he said:
'Thus the case appears to be a plain one . . . In
my opinion this appearance is also the reality.
The case is plain; the Act is clear and definite.
Intended as it was to provide a simple and
understandable system for the protection of title
to land, it should not be read down or glossed;
to do so would destroy the usefulness of the
Act.'
• The appeal was allowed. There was no
requirement of good faith for a purchaser
under the Land Charges Act 1925.
• The options should have been registered
under the Land Charges Act 1972
• Good faith was irrelevant to the Land Charges
Act 1972.
Whiteley v Chappell (1868) LR 4 QB 147 aka
Dead person case
Facts:
• Defendant was arrested for impersonating a
dead person in order to cast an extra vote
Provision:
• A statute aimed at preventing election rigging
made it an offence to impersonate “…any
person entitled to vote” at an election.
Issue:
• Was he guilty or not guilty of casting an extra
vote?
Held
• He was found not guilty as dead people are
clearly not entitled to vote!
London and North Eastern Railway
v Berriman [1946] AC 278
Facts
• A railway worker was knocked down and killed
by a train whilst oiling parts of the line. His wife
was trying to claim compensation for his death.
Provision
• The relevant statute said that compensation
was available for workers who were ‘..killed
whilst repairing the line…’
Issue
• Whether the widow is entitled for the
compensation.
• The court held that in the ordinary sense of
the word, ‘repairing’ did not include oiling as
this was merely maintenance.
Maqbool Hussain v. St of Bom.(AIR 1953 SC325) aka Gold
Confiscated case
Facts
• A citizen of India, on arrival at an airport did
not declare that he had bought gold with him.
• Gold found in his possession during search in
violation of govt. notification, was confiscated
u/s.167(8) of Sea Customs Act, 1878.
• The appellant could be proceeded against under section
167(8) of the Sea Customs Act as also under section 23 of
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in respect of the said
act.
• Proceedings were in fact taken under section 167(8) of the
Sea Customs Act which resulted in the confiscation of the
gold.
• Further proceedings were taken under section 23 of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act by way of filing the
complaint aforesaid in the Court of the Chief Presidency
Magistrate, Bombay.
Issue
• whether by reason of the proceedings taken by the
Sea, Custom Authorities the appellant could be said
to have been prosecuted and punished for the same
offence with which he was charged in the Court of
the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay.
• The plea which was taken by the accused in bar of
the prosecution in the Court of the Chief Presidency
Magistrate, was that he had already been prosecuted
and punished for the same offence and by virtue of
the provisions of article 20(2) of the Constitution he
could not be prosecuted and punished again.
Held
• The Customs Officers are not required to act judicially on
legal evidence tendered on oath and they are not
authorised to administer oath to any witness.
• Sea Customs Authorities are merely constituted
administrative machinery for the purpose of adjudging
confiscation, increased rates of duty and penalty
prescribed in the Act.
• We are of the opinion that the Sea Customs Authorities
are not a judicial tribunal and the adjudging of
confiscation, increased rate of duty or penalty under the
provisions of the Sea Customs Act do not constitute a
judgment or order of a court or judicial tribunal necessary
for the purpose of supporting a plea of double jeopardy.
Shriram v. St. of Mah.(AIR 1961 SC 674) aka Witness Case
Facts
• The Magistrate framed charges against the
appellant on the basis of documents produced
before him.
• The Magistrate did not examine any eye
witness cited by the prosecution.
• The session court convicted the appellant and
the HC confirmed the conviction.
Issue
• Now the appellant urges the SC that the act of Magistrate
committing him for trail was illegal because the Mag. had
not examined the eye-witness as was required u/s.207-
A(4) of CrPC.

Provision
• 207-A(4)- The Magistrate shall then proceed to take the
evidence of such persons, if any, as may be produced by
the prosecution as witnesses to the actual commission of
the offence alleged, and if the Magistrate is of opinion
that it is necessary in the interests of justice to take the
evidence of any one or more of the other witnesses for
the prosecution, he may take such evidence also.
Held
• SC rejected the argument and held that the
use of the word shall imposes a duty on the
Mag. but that duty is limited to the witnesses
produced by the prosecution .
Motipur Zamindary Company Pvt. Ltd. V. St of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC
660)
Facts
• Green vegetable are exempted of the sales
tax within Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947
Issue
• Whether sugarcane fall within the term green
vegetable?
Held:
• That sugar cane was not a green vegetable
and was not exempted under the notification.
• The word "vegetables" in taxing statutes was
to be understood as in common parlance i.e.
denoting class of vegetables which were
grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and
were used for the table.
• The dictionaries defined sugar cane as a
"grass."
State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Washi Ahmed
(AIR 1977 SC 1638)
• Whether Green ginger is a vegetable?

• The Sales Tax Authorities levied sales tax on

"green ginger" sold by the respondents, taking
the view that green ginger is used to add
flavour and taste to food.
Held:
• Green ginger is included. within the meaning
of the words "vegetables---commonly known
as subji, tarkari- or sak."
 Advantages Disadvantages
Respects Parliamentary Supremacy and There can be disagreement as to what
leaves law making to those elected to the amounts to the ordinary or natural
job meaning

Provides no scope for judges to use their Creates awkward precedents which
own opinions or prejudices require Parliamentary time to correct

Fails to recognise the complexities and

Restricts the role of judges to applying the
law to the facts of the case limitations of English language and
assumes every Act is perfectly drafted

Undermines public confidence in the law

Creates loopholes in the law

Leads to injustice
• The Facial Whiskers (Fictitious) Act 2010
states that:
“Men with beards and moustaches are prohibited
from being in the park”
Pandey has been arrested in the park, is he guilty of
the offence?
Pandey
What about
Imtiaz?

What about Gorra

Veerapan?
• What about Mr.Jon?
• Under the Animal Registration (Fictitious) Act
1987 it is a requirement that “…all domestic
animals are registered with the local animal
authority.”
• Consider the following and whether they need
to be registered:
Domestic Animal:

a relatively docile animal kept by humans for 
work or food or as a pet.
 
Dempsey aka Pitt Bull Case
The Dangerious Dogs Act ,1991,
• It is illegal to own any Specially Controlled Dogs without
specific exemption from a court.
• The dogs have to be muzzled and kept on a lead in
public, they must be registered and insured, neutered,
tattooed and receive microchip implants.
• The Act also bans the breeding, sale and exchange of
these dogs, even if they are on the Index of Exempted
Dogs.
• Four types in particular were identified by the Act:
– Pit Bull Terrier
– Japanese Tosa
– Dogo Argentino
– Fila Brasileiro
 Pit Bull Terrier Dogo Argentino

Japanese Tosa Fila Brasileiro

• Dempsey was a female American Pit Bull Terrier who was
owned by Dianne Fanneran and lived in London.
• While being walked one evening in April 1992, muzzled and
kept on a leash in accordance with the law, she began acting
sick and her muzzle was removed, allegedly to allow her to
vomit.

• Two passing police officers noted the unmuzzled dog, and

charged the caretaker under the Dangerous Dogs Act. Three
months later, at Ealing Magistrates' Court, Dempsey was
ordered to be euthanized for failing to be muzzled in a public
place.
• Appeals took three years before the Crown
Court, the High Court and the House of Lords, during
which time the media covered the story, leading
activist Brigitte Bardot offered the dog sanctuary at
her home in France, to avoid British law.
• The case was dismissed in November 1995 on a legal
technicality, as it emerged that Dempsey's owner,
not involved in the original incident, was unaware
the court hearing was taking place. This legal
loophole meant the case was thrown out.
• Dempsey was reprieved, and died at the age of 17 in
2003.