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The distinguishing point here is the locus of the

authorship of the law. In any given scenario


where a person complies with the law, we ask
where the author is, whether it is external or
internal. If the author of the law is external, the
will is subjected to an external authority, thus
heteronomous will. In contrast, if the author was
the will itself, imposing the law unto itself, then
we describe the will as autonomous. For the 25
years old. versions of Ryan and Liza who brush
their teeth before going to bed without any
prompting from their parents, their adoption of
the childhood law about toothbrushing makes
However, trivial actions such as brushing on
e's teeth can hardly be considered "moral". Real
moral issues often involve actions like stealing, l
ying, and murder, in that they have a certain gra
vity, insofar as those actions directly harm or be
nefit the well- being of persons. Reggie's case, se
en in this light, is clearly a moral issue.
Let us remember that alternative scenario t
hat we imagined earlier: What if Reggie did not r
eturn the suitcase, destroyed the lock, then took
and sold its valuable contents? Is this not an act
of rational will? Can we not claim that Reggie's
rational will determines for itself how it enacts it
s duty in this alternative scenario? Is Reggie not,a
fter all, acting as an autonomous agent? Reggie c
ould have easily come upon the odious principle
that he should benefit from Trent's loss because
people who lose their things are careless, and th
us do not deserve to keep those things. Therefor
e, Reggie may have concluded, " I am entitled to
benefit fron this lost suitcase. I am the author of
this principle. I am acting autonomously." He ma
y conclude this since no external authority is legis
lating laws for him by using rewards or
punishments. However, this kind of reasoning is
mistaken from a Kantian understanding as we wil
l show below.

Kant claims that there is a difference betwee


n rational will and animal impulse. Take a close l
ook at how he describes the distinction in this pa
ssage:
The choice that can ve determined by pure r
eason is called free choice. That which is determi
nableb only by inclination (sensible, impulse, sti
mulus) would be animal choice
(arbitrium brutum). Human choice, in contrast, is
a choice that may indeed be affected but not det
ermined by impulses, and is therefore in itself (w
ithout an acquired skill of reason) not pure, but c
an nevertheless be determined to do actions fro
m pure will.
Thus, there is difference between what deter
mines a choice or decision, whether it is caused
by sensible impulse or by pure reason. On one h
and, sensible impulses are usually bodily and em
otional. Bodily instincts abd desires, such as the
urge to eat, drink, sleep, or have sexual intercour
se, comprise the set of human compulsions for s
urvival and propagation of the species. Emotions
and sentiments also make up what kant consider
s sensible impulses. Practical examples are jealo
usy from seeing your girlfriend or boyfriend mak
e eyes at someone, and the rage from being pus
hed foully by your opponent in a basketball gam
e. As we previously claimed, when we discussed
the difference between animals and humans, th
ere is immediacy to sensible impulses. There is h
ardly anything that comes between the stimulus
and the
reaction. Kant calls this set of actions that are c
aused by sensible impulse animal choice or arbi
trium brutum.

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