NATIONAL SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Department of International Relations and European Integration

Master’s Degree Program: “Security and Diplomacy”

Theory of International Relations

- World Politics -

Professor Vasile Secăreş, Ph.D.

SNSPA
Bucharest, 2018
I. Theory of International Relations:
An Introduction
1. Intentions and objectives

• My intention today: to present the topics, the main

ideas and concepts I intend to discuss during my
lectures
• Of course: this is about theory and this is an effort
to shape up a theoretical framework of world
politics
• But this is not an abstract or general discussion
about IR
→ an effort to capture the real dynamics of world
politics, the present changes and the new challenges
2. Where are we now?

• A revolution in international affairs may have begun at

the beginning of the 21st century: a watershed!
→ The collapse of the previous world order + important
political, economic and military evolutions + the present
economic crisis + globalization have been judged to have
shaken the existing foundations of international stability /
of international security
→ The present watershed represents both the culmination of a
logic that had developed during the ’90s and the departure
point for a new era in the evolution of the international
society
• This is a challenge for the theory of IR in connection with its
capability to understand and explain the present developments
and even more important: to make predictions / forecasts!
→ In the late ’80s and early ’90s we were witnessing an early
warning of this situation: the discipline of IR failed to predict
the collapse of communism and the implosion of the Soviet
Union and the collapse of the Soviet imperial system. This was a
severe setback!
→ During the Cold War period: Western governments found that
they could rely on academic institutions for conceptual
innovation, hard research, practical proposals and eventually
willing recruits for the bureaucracy of foreign policy and
security and defense! NB: McNamara, Kissinger, Brzezinski
→ Decreasing confidence in the predictive utility of international
studies: especially the discipline of “strategic studies” was
undermined
• Aside from this credibility gap, the discipline of IR – the practitioners
of this domain – faced an even more serious problem: the sudden lack
of the political or strategic conflict (was it real? what about the
fundamentals of the political dynamics of the international system?)
→ The absence of the great power conflict produced evidence of
disorientation!
a) in the idealist tradition: the “end of history” approach (Fr.
Fukuyama) → the primacy of economics / economic conflict and
the shrinking role of the state.
b) the realist tradition: the attempts to recast international conflict
in terms of a clash of great civilizations rather than great powers;
or replacements for the last Soviet threat: China, Russia or/and
Germany or?
• There is a clear need of change and of some amount of retooling =>
new “instruments” in IR
3. The real context: how to understand the
present transition?

• We are witnessing the historic transition from the world

in which we have been living from 1500 to 2000 into a
different one.
→ this transition has already begun and it will be a “dark
period”: in the sense of being one of great violence, of
acute political, economic and even military struggle:
a) a political and social transition = 50 years
b) an economic transition? = the present crisis is a
crisis of post-war capitalism
c) a power / systemic transition = 25 years
• There is no doubt that the great struggle of the 20th century over ideas
is over. The militant visions of class, nation and race which promised
utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited
→ But: the world evolution at the end of the 20th century and the
beginning of the 21st century is not that simple!
→ Fukuyama’s vision (in line with Hegel) is not based in a real
understanding of the world evolution. The world continues to be a
dangerous place
→ The world is changing but not in a linear way
→ We live in a very complex world and in an era of contradictions:
globalization and fragmentation, peace and conflict, prosperity and
poverty
→ The victory of liberal democracies versus new tensions based on
nationalistic or religious beliefs
• What is very important is the fact that we live in a period
of transition.
→ The bipolar system has disappeared and a new
international system still has to emerge from its ashes.
→ The present transition: “same huge tectonic plates of
history are moving” – Thomas L. Friedman
→ Now we are present at the creation of some kind of new
global structure; let me put it this way:
a) a transition towards a new power cycle
b) a transition towards a new distribution of power at the
world level
c) a transition towards a new hegemonic structure
d) a transition towards a new political and security
architecture, new global institutions = a new world order
• This transition started with the collapse of
communism: ’89.
→The world is changing not only in terms of
communication, markets or trade → but in terms
of geopolitics: new world and regional power
structures, a new geopolitical map.
→We need to understand all these dimensions of
change.
• The main issues:
a) What kind of global structure:
− is it going to be unipolar, centered on the US?
− or a multipolar international system, based on some sort of balance of
power?
→ Amid the present uncertainty is the stark reality that the US is the most
powerful country in the world
→ But: the US superiority will not last for ever. As power diffuses
around the world, America’s position relative to others will erode!
→ Other nations and non-state actors are rising. The world is becoming
more multipolar!
→ But the question is: is this process producing results in 10, 20 or 50
years from now on?!
→ What kind of hegemonic structure is going to evolve for the next 50-
70 years?
b) What kind of new security architecture?
→ the issues and preoccupations of the 21st century present new and
often fundamentally different types of challenges (new actors,
violent political Islam, intra-state warfare, failed states, WMD
etc.).
→ the terrorist attacks of 9/11: the war against terrorism is one like
no other war before it.
→ a new vision on security: broadening the concept; hard and soft
security; “cooperative security”.
→ the mandates and capacity of international institutions have not
kept pace with the present needs.
=> The current debate on international intervention for human
protection purposes reflects new sets of issues and new types of
concern
4. Change and theory: what kind of impact on the
discipline of IR
• Saying this: we seem to assume that general evolution of human
society somehow must influence and change international relations
and the IR discipline (Keohane, Nye, Weaver).
→ Realism (the dominant tradition in IR) is denying progress in IR =
progress has no place in IR. Martin Wight: international politics = the
realm of repetition.
• But this is not about progress: it is about the consequences of this new
phase in the evolution of the international system: of this transition
towards a new international system or of this revolution in
international affairs.
→ the events in the ’90s and early 2000 transformed an international
system that had evolved over a period of more than three centuries
(1648!) to ensure the security of states!
→ what are the consequences, what do we have to change in order to
capture the new realities?
• Let me mention 10 important evolutions or
changes affecting IR / International Affairs at the
beginning of the 21st century:
1) the evolution of the structure of IR (the
principles of arrangement of the parts in a
system and how the parts are differentiated from
each other).
2) changes transforming the political and legal
framework of the international system (the
impact of the so-called “three revolutions”).
3) a growing cultural and civilization divide and a wealth and
poverty divide.
4) changes in the structure of power = transition towards a new
global structure of power.
5) a geopolitical revolution: new geopolitical systems / regions →
a new geopolitical map.
6) changes determining the “revolution in military affairs”.
7) changes transforming the nature of risks and threats → a
new agenda, with some very important consequences .
NB: Thomas Schelling provided a framework for thinking about how
two sides might pursue competing interests without losing sight
of shared interests (USA and USSR); what about now? USA and
Al Qaeda?
8) changes transforming the strategic culture: America vs.
Europe; strategic culture and preemptive and preventive
approach (USA; Russia).
 and 10) changes in the paradigms of the use of force and changes
9)
transforming the management of violence.
→ the impact of the present RMA; proliferation of military technology;
high technology weapons and terrorism.
→ the present trends in asymmetric warfare, together with the
security vulnerabilities of the industrial states mean that
conventional military approaches to maintaining western and
international security will not succeed.
→ new trends:
a) at the center: increased use of private security organizations;
subcontracting of different defense and security components;
b) periphery: paramilitary forces, mercenary forces employed by
local elites or even governments.
NB: changes affecting the monopoly of the state in this domain (the
use of force).
5. The theoretical perspectives on IR and the Post
Cold War Security Order: the need for a new
synthesis
• How to use the contribution of neorealism (structural realism),
neoliberal institutional approach and constructivism = a
multidimensional approach
• Levels of analysis:
a) the international system: the bipolar structure vs. multipolar structure;
b) the nuclear / strategic level;
c) the political power frame (domestic politics);
d) the institutional level and the bureaucratic process
e) ideological and cultural patterns;
f) individual level: psychological and cognitive style; individual
decisions
g) perceptions: errors
h) “randomness”
II. International Relations: actors,
relations, principles and structure
1. A series of events during the ’90s and early 2000:

• The war in the former Yugoslavia (especially the war in

Kosovo) and the independence of Kosovo
• The terrorist attacks of 9/11 2001 and the US-led war on
terrorism
• The so-called right to intervention
• Evolutions in national security strategies and military doctrines
(pre-emptive and preventive war)
• The Georgian war of August 2008 and Moscow’s subsequent
extension of diplomatic recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia as independent entities
represent a marker of a radical change in the structure of the
international system
→ a challenge for many mainstream theories = new concepts!
2. Changes in the structure of International Relations

• New actors: post-modern entities (EU); the anti-state (the global

terrorist network); protectorates; failed-states; rogue states
Consequences: do they have the same status (political and legal)? non-
viable entities; the dilemmas of the UN: the case of the East Timor =
the responsibility “to protect”(humanitarian intervention) vs. power
politics
• Fragmentation and deterritorialization
→ the right to self-determination: an endless process?
→ what kind of deterritorialization: terrorism and security; the EU: a
new political entity?
• Modern and post-modern entities: the present dilemmas of the EU
→ federalism vs. intergovernmentalism and the EU as a global power
→ the Treaty of Lisbon: the death of the dragon (the European super-
state)?
• A new political and legal framework?
Changes affecting the arrangement of the parts (political
entities) in the structure and the way they are differentiated
from each other
→ the case of Irak, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Georgia may be
viewed as indicative of the fact that constitutive norms of
the international society (see Bull, Buzan) are changing
with the norms of global capitalism and neo-liberalism,
coming in place of those of state sovereignty etc.
→ the present crisis of global capitalism: consequences =
different models in competition?
3. The impact of the so-called “three revolutions”
in International Relations

• The sovereign revolution: sovereignty was

“internationalized”; domestic jurisdiction and non-
interference became conditional on international
accountability

Consequences: who decides on what?

• The protection-of-order revolution: from the basic rule of
the westphalian system (non-intervention and mutual
respect) to the right to intervention (responsibility to
protect) and judicial measures (ad hoc international
tribunals) + international protectorates (BIH, Kosovo, East
Timor)
→ the new use of Chapter VII powers of the UN Charter: the
Security Council resolutions of the ’90s = essential
departures in terms of the management of international
peace and security; redefining the notion of threat to
international security
• The self-defence revolution: a new definition of self-
defence = defence of the state has to embrace the range of
new risks, in order to protect from disorder and disruption
emerging from within some other states!
→ defence against instability
→ Kosovo campaign of NATO vs. Russian intervention in
Georgia
→ new security and defence strategies (US:2002, 2006;
NATO and the EU; Russia): preventive and pre-emptive
war
4. Old and new concepts on International Relations

• The “westphalian” definition: a system of sovereign states;

no supra-national authority / government
→ the realist assumptions on how IR work:
a) The state-centric assumption (states are the most
important actors)
b) The unitary rational – actor assumption (rational pursuit
of self-interest)
c) The anarchy assumption (the security dilemma and help-
yourself principle)
→ the Hobbesian forces of war and struggle for power among
states vs. the Kantian forces of transnational solidarity and
conflict
• The impact of globalization and interdependence:
→ “it is increasingly problematic to distinguish
between international system, international society
and world society” - see Dunne
→ “international system”, “international society”
and “world society” are distinct systemic
structures and consecutive stages in the evolution
of a culture of anarchy, reaching (in the stage 4)
“collective security” and the end of anarchy = the
world state (stage 5) – see Wendt: now we are
witnessing an “incomplete international society”
• The international law vs. the role of great powers
→ the reshaping of the global structures of power: the
role of force (the use of force) and the habitual
disregard of the international norms of interstate
behavior
→ a new hegemonic structure and the great power
principle
→ the strategic deficit of global governance (see G20
and G8 and the present economic and financial crisis)
NB: the world politics = still “modern”!
 III. The Nation-State:
National Interest and National
Security
1. The main realist and neorealist assumptions
on how IR work:

a) The state-centric assumption: the nation-state is

the most important actor
b) The unitary rational-actor assumption: the
nation-state behavior is based on the rational
pursuit of self-interest (the national interest)
c) The anarchy assumption: no supra-national
authority; sovereignty and non intervention are
major boundary conditions; the nation-state has
the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence;
the offensive capacity of states and the security
dilemma
2. The role of the nation-state as the fundamental
political unit of current IR has been seriously
questioned
→ The impact of globalization: new challenges and new
actors
→ The right of peoples to self-determination and political
fragmentation; ethnic boundaries never coincide with
political ones
→ The replacement of westphalian sovereignty: the
sovereignty as responsibility and the right to intervention
→ The failed state: the threat of anarchy and human values
under threat
→ Military technology and terrorism
3. Still: IR are dominated by the nation-state and
its foreign policy

→The foreign policy of the nation-state as a public

policy: the role of the government
→What kind of public goods? Sovereignty and national
identity: protection, support and security
→The foreign policy as a political process: the
government and the political pluralism; the need for
public support
→The starting point of foreign policy: the national
interest
→The instruments and resources of foreign policy:
power and influence
4. The National Interest:

→ Definition: fundamental conditions for the independent

and sovereign existence of a community and its nation-
state
→ Survival and independence; material and status
conditions; protection and support
→ The National Interest and power status: the “imperial”
dimension
→ The National Interest and the hegemonic structure of the
international system (the power ratio)
→ The National Interest and the membership in the EU and
NATO
5. The National Security as a critical dimension of
the ”sovereign independence” of the nation-state
→ The anarchy assumption: the security dilemma as a
fundamental dimension
→ The “state-centric” approach versus “human security”
approach: how to operationalize the new perspective;
collective or individual security?
→ From the “military” definition of security to a “multi-
level/dimension” approach: B. Buzan et al. (1998)
→ “Sustainable security” and “cooperative security”
→ What kind of threats to security: domestic and external
risks and threats; from military to systemic risks; diffuse
and opaque risks
→ Security and violence (the use of force): the lethal
dimension of foreign policy
6. The National Security: reality and perception

→ Security and insecurity: vulnerabilities and risks;

capabilities and intentions = threats
→ Security and perception: cognitive structures, concepts and
images
→ Security and “securitization”: “security issues are made
security issues by acts of securitization” (Buzan et al.,
1998); the “raison d’état” factor: the starting point of a
“special policy”, with special rules and prescriptions
→ New security risks and challenges, transcending national
borders and capabilities: the preemptive approach and the
international dimension
→ Security and the RMA
7. National Security and the Euro-Atlantic integration

→The EU as a political entity and the autonomy of

the EU member states’ foreign policy: the semi-
failure of European political unification
→The ineffectiveness of the EU decision-making
mechanism and the emergence of the EU-3
(Germany, France, Great Britain): in some cases
they play as “national driven realists”
→The Euro-Atlantic frontier and the Euro-Atlantic
security and defence policy
→The shifting of the US priorities
IV. Power: Power Structure,
Power Politics, Power Cycles
1. How to explain or understand the role of power:
the realist perspective on IR and power
• Realism (Political Realism): a school of thought that explains
International Relations (both conflictual & cooperative) in terms of
power
→ Neorealism: the role and consequences of the international power
structure
• A long tradition:
→ Sun Tzu (the “warring states” period): advised the rulers of state how
to use power in order to advance their interests & protect their survival
→ Thucydides: the first systematic study of war ( the Peloponesian War,
431 - 404 B.C.)
→ Niccolo Machiavelli (about 1500): leadership and the logic of power
→ Thomas Hobbes (17th century): “the state of nature” or “the state of
war” in International Relations
→ Karl von Clausewitz (19th century): “war is a continuation of politics by other
means”
→ Edward Hallet Carr (20th century): the realist critique of “the natural harmony of
national interests” (“The Twenty-Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the
Study of International Relations”, 1939)
→ Hans Morgenthau (after the World War II): international politics is governed by
objective laws based on national interest defined as power.
Other authors: Kenneth Waltz, Raymond Aron, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Henry
Kissinger & Zbigniew Brzezinski
• Please remember the realist assumptions on how International Relations work:
a) the state-centric assumption: states are the most important actors and the
distribution of power in the international system is essential.
b) the unitary rational-actor assumption: rational pursuit of self-interest
c) the anarchy assumption: they act in a system of sovereign states, lacking
central government
2. POWER: the central concept in International
Relations; surprisingly difficult to define or measure
• Defining power: the ability to influence the behavior of others: to get
another actor to do what it would not otherwise have done (or not to do what it
would have done) (Robert A. Dahl) or
→ actors are powerful to the extent that they affect others more than others affect
them (Kenneth Waltz), or
→ Power is the capability to prevail in conflicts, or
→ Power is the capability to control events (influence probabilities)
• All these dimensions should be treated together
• These definitions treat power as influence. Power is not influence in itself, but
the capability or potential to influence others.
→ This potential is based on specific (tangible or intangible) characteristics or
possessions of states: size, territory and population, level of economic
development (GDP); industrial development; military expeditures and armed
forces etc. This is power as capability.
→ Capability = the differential possession of some characteristics or attributes or
resources. Capabilities are easier to measure. GDP is a useful estimator of
material capabilities.
→ The use of geography as an element of power = a component of geopolitics
→ Power also depends on intangible elements: national will, diplomatic
skill; popular support, domestic mobilization, often through religion,
ideology or nationalism.
→ International influence is gained by promoting its own values, by being
the one to set agenda, to form rules of behavior, to change images (the
way others see the world or even their own national interests) = soft
power (Joseph S. Nye, Jr.)
• As a conclusion: Power is a mix of many “ingredients”: population,
territory, geography, natural resources, economic development and
industrial capacity, administrative capacity, scientific & technical/logical
base, moral legitimacy, military force, political culture, education, popular
support of government etc.
→ Power resources = elements that an actor can draw on over the long term
to develop particular capabilities, plans and actions.
→ Power capabilities = allow actors to exercise influence in the short term
(e.g.. military forces; military-industrial capacity; the quality of state’s
bureaucracy etc.)
3. Power as a relation / interaction

• Power is a relation, existing in a system of interaction, involving two or more

parties, each trying to influence the other more than it is itself influenced = the
exercise of power = power politics
→ Relative power = the ratio of the power that two states can bring to bear against
each other
→ Power strategies = plans actors use to develop & deploy power capabilities to
achieve goals (choosing the kinds of capabilities to develop; or to use in situations
etc.) → coherent strategies can help a state to make the most of its power
• Power distribution (structure) = the most important characteristic of an
international system → the asymmetric distribution of power among states in the
world or in one region; most often it refers to the great-power system
• The structure of power → a pyramid or hierarchy of power in the international
system
Conclusion: The international distribution of power = the system structure →
patterns of international behavior
4. Power and polarity

• The international distribution of power can be described in terms of polarity

(the member of independent power centers): a multipolar system (5 or 6
centers of power, not grouped into alliances); a bipolar system (2 powers or
great rival alliances); a unipolar system (hegemony)
• The power status: Great Powers, Middle Powers, Regional Powers
• The Balance of Power: the most reliable brake on the power of one state is
the power of other states; = balancing the power of another state or group of
states in order to maintain stability (recurring wars to adjust power relations)
→ alliances play a key role
→ In the Post-Cold War era of US dominance, balance of power theory would
predict closer relations among Russia, China, France and Germany (?)
• Hegemony: the holding by one state (the hegemon) of a preponderance of
power in the International Relations system; Great Britain in the 19th century
and the US after the World War II and now
5. Power transition theory: world powers & long cycles

• In terms of time, the modern world system has existed for 500 years, first
emerging when certain European states developed a capacity for global options
• The global political system = institutions & arrangements for the management of
global problems & relations and a hegemonic structure
→ entities that dominate the system for a generation or more and whose
influence pervades an entire century = world powers
→ the history of world politics = a succession of world powers; each period
associated with a world power = one cycle
→ a series of long cycles of about one hundred years.
• The global political system has displayed a recurring or cyclical pattern: since
1494: 5 full systemic cycles → the transition into the 6th
• Transition: global war or hegemonic war = long lasting, averaging 25 years in
length; a war that changes the international system; a mechanism of “selection”; a
war fought over succession to world leadership, when a rising power is surpassing
the most powerful state → a new hegemonic structure (filling the essential
global needs - public goods - for global governance, order, security, stability,
innovation, trade) (Organski, Modelski, Gilpin, etc.)
NB: Since 1494 there have been 5 full systemic cycles and the global system is now in
a transition phase into the 6th. or the first of a new international system
LONG CYCLES (Systemic)

LONG CYCLE WORLD POWER GLOBAL WAR

I 1494 – 1579 Portugal Italian & Indian Ocean Wars
(1494 - 1516)
II 1580 - 1689 Netherlands Spanish Wars
(1580 - 1689)
III 1689 - 1792 Britain I Wars of Louis XIV
(1688-1713)
IV 1792 - 1914 Britain II Wars of Napoleon
(1792 - 1815)
V 1914 - 1989/91 USA I World Wars I & II

VI 1989/91 - USA II ?
V. The Geopolitical Perspective
1. What Does the Map say?

• It is not possible to understand the world of the early

21st Century or the present world politics without a
geopolitical perspective.
• There is a very simple question in connection with the
geopolitical approach: What does the map say ?
→ As a matter of fact: this question is not that simple!
• The map is not only geography
→ The map is of course geography: it is space; it is land &
sea, mountain passes or straits, islands etc. = “numbers and
figures”
→But on the geopolitical map we see the asymmetries of the
international environment in terms of power & power
politics in connection with all the characteristics of space or
geography.
2. What Kind of Asymmetries?

• We can put or mark on the map a long list of different kind of numbers
& figures, dealing with the asymmetric distribution of:
a) resources - the importance of strategic resources, of access, of
transportation, etc.
b) population - including its ethnic, demographic, cultural & other
characteristics: languages, religions, etc.
c) technology – R&D potential and results
d) economic potential/structures/ development (see the economy based
on knowledge)
e) military structures & capabilities
f) political & administrative institutions (are they mature or weak?)
g) political & cultural patterns: security perceptions!
3. What is Geopolitics?

• What we see on the map is a complex interaction of:

- space
- power distribution / structure
= GEOPOLITICS
- power politics
- world images and security perceptions

• The geopolitical map: “a huge sandwich” mixing together (on the map, in
space) the power structure & power politics in connection with the political &
cultural patterns & security perceptions & objectives

→ The map shows the importance of different regions/areas; strategic locations

& directions; the meaning of control: of straits, islands, mountain passes; or of
resources and markets; or of minds & ideas!
→ It shows the real meaning of strategic interests

• The importance of geopolitics is greater during transition periods.

4. What is the map saying now?

• A new power structure is in the making = a new political geography = a new

geopolitical map
→ a new geopolitical map of the Euro-Atlantic area = the central component of a
new strategic & security environment
→ the reshaping of the geopolitical map of the Euro/Asian space
→ the new geopolitical map of Africa (Latin America?)
• This is not a very simple process: the unipolar world is only a component of the
present international landscape; the over-whelming US military, economic &
political superiority does not equate with a new hegemonic structure or a
unipolar world order already in place.
→ this new world power structure & the new geopolitical map = political, military,
economic, ideological actions of the main centers of power
→ new visions, new concepts, new institutions:
- the new or the enlarged Black Sea region
- the new or greater Middle East region
• New security frontiers of the Euro-Atlantic area = for the EU & NATO  this
means a transformation process of a wider area starting at the new E-A
frontier: the Black Sea region, the Caspian Sea, the Middle East, the Central
Asia
This should be the starting point of our discussion about the new political,
strategic and security environment of the early 21st Century
VI. International political and security
environment: a strategic perspective
1. Objectives and guidelines

• The aim of this lecture is to enhance understanding of the present transition and
the main characteristics of the current international system, the implications of
globalization in world politics, the key elements shaping contemporary security
environment and the impact of the information age on the security sector; to
examine a number of security challenges and risks which by their very nature
transcend national borders and capabilities
• The bipolar system has suddenly disappeared as a consequence of the
dismantling of the Soviet bloc and of the Soviet Union itself and a new
international system still has to emerge from its ashes. Is it going to be a uni-
polar, centered on the US or a multi-polar international system, based either on
the classical or a new, 21st Century type of balance of power? What is almost
clear is that the hinge of the new balance of power would be in what Z.
Brzezinski calls the Euroasiatic Balkans, that is Central Asia, in his most
famous book: "The Grand Chessboard”, where a huge security vacuum
overlaps with enormous oil and gas reserves, needed by the developing
economies of two Great Powers: China and India
• Globalization and the technological revolution of the last 20 to 30 years have
essentially influenced the basis of the distribution of power in the global
system, as well as the conditions for preserving peace and conducting wars in
contemporary world. As a consequence, the role of the nation state as the
fundamental political unit of current international relations has been seriously
questioned
• NB: Please, keep in mind that during the last centuries, nationalism has become
the political, moral and even the legal basis of international relations (the
Westphalian system of states). The principle of self determination and the
concept of inviolability of physical borders have become international norms. ▪
There are two major difficulties with the concept of the nation-state. The first is
that it could mean that every one of the thousand of nationalities on Earth
should have its own state, which would have huge political consequences. The
other problem is that a pure nation-state does not exist in nature. Ethnic
boundaries almost never coincide with political ones. ▪ What are the
alternatives to the ideology of nationalism and what is the alternative to the
nation state? What is the interaction between people of different background
(ethnic, religious, cultural) within pluralistic societies? ▪ Pluralism lies at the
heart of modern democratic system and societies. This entails a strong degree
of tolerance and understanding of differences. But how can one explain the real
basis of support for some contradictory trends, even in Europe? What are the
consequences and potential dangers to international security of the rise of
radicalism in its various forms (ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism,
xenophobia)? It is clear from events on a global scale, especially from those
recently witnessed in the Balkans, Caucasus and some parts of Africa and Asia,
that intolerance for the “others” (in terms of tribe, religion, nationality etc.) is a
dangerous phenomena that must be rejected.
• Since the profound changes of 1989-91, the security environment has changed
almost beyond recognition. Security no longer focuses on just military power.
Part of this transformation has been connected to the absence of a defining
threat and a significant move from military and defense-related issues to
economic, developmental and societal ones. The concept of security has been
widened, encompassing political, social and economic stability, while violence
and threats to physical security no longer concern exclusively national,
territorial defense. Now security ceased to mean simply defense. Defense is a
component of a comprehensive security policy, including a broad spectrum of
missions ranging from preventive diplomacy to peace keeping and peace
enforcement to rebuilding state and societal institutions after a conflict. Some
of the differences between international and domestic security have been
eroded. International affairs now involve non-state actors such as global
terrorist networks.
• Transnational security risks and threats, such as: terrorism, WMD proliferation,
organized crime, illegal immigration, ethnic and religious conflicts have
emerged and the international community had to define ways and find means
and resources to cope with them. New potential sources of future conflicts, like
inequity and poverty generated by the growing economic and technological gap
between rich and poor, access to scarce natural resources, the need to preserve
ethnic and religious identities in a globalized world (“clash of civilizations”)
have replaced the geopolitical and ideological Cold War struggle between the
US and the Soviet Union.
• The imbalance between the developed and developing world is growing, with
the population growth concentrated overwhelmingly in those countries least
able to support it. The 48 least developed countries are expected to nearly triple
their population. In 1950, Europe accounted for almost a quarter of the world’s
population and Africa only 8%, In 2050, Africa will have tree times as many
people as Europe. ▪ This trend will have an impact on the age structure of the
world population. In the developing world (outside China), an explosion in the
work force is projected and these countries will be unlikely to absorb it. ▪ In the
aftermath of the Cold War, international borders have become porous and
relatively easier to penetrate. Deteriorating economic circumstances, as well as
political turmoil and regional conflicts have created a significant trend of mass
movements of people that has resulted in the emergence of multiethnic
societies of a new type. There should be a proper management of migration to
ensure the differentiation between refuge (asylum) seekers and economic
migrants. Migration has also an impact on the societies of origin. ▪ Illegal
immigration has come to the forefront as an important phenomenon. In addition
to drugs and arms trafficking, human trafficking has entered the portfolio of
organized crime networks and terrorist organizations as a high profit activity.
• Terrorism and organized crime have been recognized in the post Cold War
environment as potential sources of risk and threat to the development of
liberal, open and democratic societies governed by the rule of law. The
Strategic concept of NATO adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 and the
Security Strategy of the EU refer, inter alias, to these phenomena, as risks that
could affect the E-A Community’s security interests. ▪ Contemporary terrorism
reveals new trends and dangers, which were tragically demonstrated by the
unprecedented attacks on 11 September 2001. Not only did this show the
terrorists’ ability and willingness to use new methods of killing and destruction
but also that the nature of terrorism is changing in terms of organization and
operational approach. The current (fourth) wave of terrorism gives evidence
that religion now provides more hope and driving force than revolutionary
ethos does. ▪ The Security Council of the UN has issued Resolution 1373
(2001) aimed at eliminating all forms of support for terrorists and to take the
measures needed to implement it. Now in line with this resolution the
international community is elaborating the relevant global framework to
combat terrorism in a wide-raging scope, including suppression of the
financing of terrorism, police and intelligence cooperation.
• The triumph of democracy in many parts of today’s world doesn’t mean “The End of
History”, as Francis Fukuyama was suggesting in August 1989, in his most famous
article, but the emergence of new challenges posed by totalitarian alternatives to
democratic systems, by the growth of religious fanaticism and the need to find
appropriate ways to cope with the destabilizing effects of laissez faire capitalism and the
technological revolution.
• The role of the UN as the only global organization able lo legitimize the creation, the
change and implementation of the international law has been seriously questioned, most
obviously in 1999 during the Kosovo crisis and again in 2003 during the war against Iraq.
The existing tension between the right of states to national sovereignty and international
community’s right to humanitarian intervention into the internal affaires of rogue states
is the most challenging task for adapting current international law to the challenging
global power structure.
• September 11, 2001 meant a new turning point in contemporary world politics. It is not
only because the war against global terrorism has become the central theme of current
international security debate, but it is since it reinforced the movement of the center of
the global geo-strategic game into Central Asia and the Middle East; it dramatically
reshaped the power relations between US, Europe, Russia, China and India, given their
common interest to fight against political Islam; it reinforced the anti-globalization
movement by displaying the vulnerability of US to asymmetric threats, fed by
unrestrained political individual freedoms and the existence of a global financial and
economic system: and it created favorable conditions that strategic coercion becomes the
main tool for reshaping the new world order. That last trend has been reinforced by the
war against a rogue state, Iraq, conducted by the US-led international coalition against
Saddam Hussein in March-April 2003
• The decline of the relevance of strategic nuclear weapons
for coping with current international security risks and
threats combined with rapid technological development in
the area of conventional weapons systems have led to the
emergence of what one may call Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) That allowed a steep increase in the
precision of military strikes, the ability to better and safer
communicate, while denying the potential adversary the
same ability, better intelligence through enhanced
reconnaissance capabilities, as well as the capability to
rapidly deploy and sustain forces in whatever place in the
world. That requires new military structures and doctrines,
as well as gradual transition to professional armies.
2. Critical coordinates of the present strategic
environment
• The world is changing: we are witnessing a profound process of change (technological,
economic, political and military): a new systemic cycle is about to begin.
→ The 20th century ended with the decisive victory for the forces of freedom and a single
sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy & free enterprise.
→ The present moment: a watershed → a transition (20-25 years) → a new political &
security architecture of the world.
→ The world is going to become global: it is not possible to analyze this transition without
taking into consideration the present process of globalization: its characteristics & its
consequences.
• We are in a period of transition in terms of power :
→ a new cycle of power
→ a new world structure of power /a new distribution of power at the world level
→ geopolitics is relevant; the present process is reshaping the geopolitical map of the world
→ new coalitions, new positions
→ a new hegemonic structure & a new world order: especially new political & security
arrangements and institutions
• We are witnessing a very complex strategic process with two interrelated components:
→ the West’s enlargement eastward into Eurasia – a real reshaping of Eurasia
→ the effort to extend the West’s strategic reach and control on the adjacent regions
• The world politics during this period: a clash of
world visions, of global interests, strategic
positions and objectives, political and military
actions.
→all the main actors challenging the US approach
are positioning themselves
→they are promoting their political, economic,
military and commercial interests and, maybe even
more important, their world visions
→we are witnessing a new configuration of strategic
interests and positions = Germany & France;
Russia; China; India; Brazil
3. Transition & global governance

• Who is going to manage the present process of change, to address the

political agenda & especially, the new security risks?
→ the role of NATO & the security needs of the Euro-Atlantic region.
→ NATO & UN; NATO & EU.
• Our security environment has undergone profound transformation: new
risks & threats = asymmetric & difuse threats.
→ we are menaced less by fleets and armies; now shadowy networks of
individuals can bring chaos & suffering for less than it costs to
purchase a single tank
→ the enemy is now terrorism: groups organized to penetrate open
societies & to turn modern technologies against them.
• A new vision on security & defense
→ security as a comprehensive concept; a dynamic concept of defense;
→ military deterrence does not guarantee against the full spectrum of
security threats;
→ The necessity to act against emerging threats before they are fully
formed: proactive & preemptive security engagement.
• A changing NATO in a changing world:
→ the new NATO & a new political & security agenda for NATO: an
enlarged & transformed alliance, able to provide the foundations of a
stable Euro-Atlantic security environment and to develop new
structures & upgrade the operational capabilities necessary to meet the
new security threats of the 21st Century
→ the alliance must be able to act whenever our interests are threatened:
a) Creating coalitions under NATO’s own mandate
b) As well as contributing to mission-based coalitions
• Today the world’s great powers find themselves on the same side:
→ trying to develop cooperative strategies
→ trying to build on their common interests to promote global security.
→ agendas for cooperative action amongst the main centers of global
power.
→ competition & cooperation?
VII. The New South-East Europe:
Reshaping the Geopolitical Map on
the E-A Frontier
1. The structure of international security: power and
regions
• The regional level of security.
→ the reshaping of the geopolitical map & the new importance of
regions
→ the ending of the Cold War: the regional level of security has
become both more autonomous & more prominent in
international politics
→ the US & the other great powers (China? Russia? EU?) had less
incentive, and displayed less will, to intervene in security affairs
outside their own regions, except for quite specific (narrow?)
purposes: Afghanistan? Iraq?
• The relative autonomy of regional security constitutes a pattern
of international security radically different from the rigid
structure of superpower bipolarity of the Cold War
→ security interdependence is patterned into regionally based
clusters: security complexes = regional security complexes
theory (Buzan & Weaver)
2. The impact of the institutionalized West’s
enlargement
• The massive enlargement of NATO & the EU: a real “geopolitical
revolution”, changing the region’s destiny.
→ a new political geography of SEE: most analysts agree that SEE
includes the Black Sea and the Caucasus areas = new concepts (the
Wider Area of the Black Sea)
→ a new frontier of the E-A community & a new security frontier for
NATO&EU
→ a new security problematique: a new strategic perspective of SEE
security is needed
• The new political geography of this area and its concrete security
coordinates will be based on:
→ the new challenges & security risks after 9/11
→ the new geopolitical map of the Euro-Atlantic area
→ the new characteristics & role of NATO → towards a global role
→ the new posture of NATO (a proactive & offensive posture): NATO
extends its area of intervention towards Central Asia & the Middle East;
Afghanistan as a test of this new posture
→ the new geopolitical interests, objectives & relations among the three
large strategic players: US, Europe and Russia; China?
3. South-East Europe: a very important area for the
E – A community
• Five main factors for a sharpened focus on South East Europe:
→ a growing awareness that the Black Sea region is strategically linked
with the South Caucasus & the oil & gas rich Caspian basin and
connected or even indivisible in terms of security
→ It is clear that the major challenges we face today, as well as those we
are likely to face in the future, are consequences of problems in regions
on Europe’s southern and south-eastern flanks: this vast area extends
from the Balkans to Afghanistan, including the Mediterranean, the
Greater Middle East, the Black Sea and Caucasus, and Central Asia
→ the region’s strategic value to US-led current and planned antiterrorist
operations
→ the American political vision & initiative on the new strategic &
security environment (including the need to re-consider US military
bases’ deployment in the world)
→ the new political status & posture of Russia: the impact of the Georgian
war
4. The new SEE & the security agenda of the
new E – A frontier
• WBSA: a new geopolitical region? (a geopolitical region in
the making?).
• NATO & the EU are changing / transforming, in close
relation to the characteristics of the new strategic &
security environment; the impact of the present economic
crisis.
• NATO & the EU cannot ignore extra – European risks =
the necessity to promote stability & address security risks
in peripherial areas.
• NATO & the EU: the necessity of a concerted Euro-
Atlantic political strategy.
• The new SEE: the new security agenda of the E – A
frontier!
→ Is this the final frontier?
→ Who is going to do what?
5. The necessity to address the new political & security
agenda & the new security problematique of SEE
• Stabilizing the Balkans at the beginning of the 21st Century: unresolved
status issues, conflict prevention & the role of NATO & the EU = the
delicate balance of peace is still fragile
→ encouraging good neighborly relations, increase confidence & mutual
security by regional cooperation
→ Initiatives to encourage the countries of the region to cooperate in
countering transnational security risks (arms & drug trafficking,
organized crime & international terrorism, civil-military emergencies
etc.)
→ A wide range of regional cooperation initiatives in SEE: the Stability
Pact, South-Eastern Defense Ministerial (SEDM), NATO’s SEE
Initiative (SEEI), SE Cooperation Initiative (SECI), the Royammont
Process (SEECP) etc. → the necessity of a structured “division of
labor” between NATO & the EU
• The new agenda of the Eastern frontier & South Caucasus after the
Georgian war of 2008.
→ Ukraine & Moldova?
→ South Caucasus & Central Asia?
6. New visions: new ideas & new policies

• Do we need some form of new geopolitics in SEE?

→George Friedman: Intermarium?
• The necessity to consider security implications & to
develop solutions for the larger Black Sea region: the US,
NATO & the EU can & should initiate a long-overdue
transformation of conflict-management in the Black Sea –
South Caucasus region (Vladimir Socor)
→How to really engage Russia in a cooperative way?
→What role for Turkey?
• The Mediterranean dimension.
• The Middle East strategic connection: security implications
for NATO & the EU.
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