Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
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Outline of Presentation
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In the Beginning ...
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More Recently ...
Attitudes to Hazards
and Risks are
constantly evolving
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Trends in Occupational Safety
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Incidents per 200,000 work hours
API
Bayer
BP
3 Chevron Texaco
Concawe
ConocoPhillips
2 Dow
DuPont
ExxonMobil
OMV
1
Shell
Trend Line
0
93
95
97
99
01
03
05
19
19
19
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20
20
20
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Unrevealed Safety Issues
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Trends in Refinery Damages
25.00
Damage $/1000 bbl refinery production at 2000 prices
Raw data
20.00
5-year average
10.00
5.00
0.00
64
66
68
70
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80
82
84
86
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90
92
94
96
98
00
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Trends
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An Increasing Complex world …
Nimrod 2006
Aircraft exploded
Uninsulated Bellows
Why Did it Happen?
Probable cause was fuel coming into contact with extremely hot surfaces;
an overflow due to the Air to Air Refuelling, ignited by the cross-feed /
Supplementary Cooling Pack (SCP) duct,
which could be at up to 400ºC,
and was not properly insulated
–This information never fed back to the design or safety case teams
Why Did it Happen?
Missed key dangers, should have been the best opportunity to prevent
the accident
Financial pressures and cuts led to there being distraction from safety
as an overriding priority
Hazard and Risk Management ...
A crucial ...
LIMITED
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Hazard and Risk Management Paradigm
What could
happen?
So what?
What
do I do?
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Hazard and Risk Management
Risk
Analysis
Hazard
Identification
Frequency Consequence
Analysis Analysis
Risk
Assessment Evaluation of
Hazard & Risk
Manage
Risk
Risk Residual Risk
Management
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Event Sequences
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Safe?
“
“
We identified the Hazards and ensured there
were adequate Safeguards, consistent with
the ALARP principle
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The SEA GEM – The First Rig to Find Hydrocarbons in the NS
The Alexander Keilland Semi Sub Drilling Rig
Adjacent to a Production Platform
Alexander Keilland – Structural Arrangement
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Piper Alpha
Metocean Conditions - Foreseeable ?
The Ocean Ranger – Capsized off Newfoundland February 1982 – 84 lost
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Principles of Inherent Safety
Eliminate
Simplify Minimise
Inherent
Safety
Principles
Moderate Substitute
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Examples - Minimise
Hot
Gas Water
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Examples - Moderate
• Use PFP coatings that resist water ingress so avoid Corrosion Under Insulation
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Examples of Equipment Level ISD in
Brownfield & Operations Development 2
• Position pipe work, including flanges and rodding points, so that service
leaks will be caught, and not by operators!
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Inherently Safer Design – Why Bother?
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A Case Study ...
Mumbai High
How the cook cut his finger ... and the platform fell into the sea ...
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Mumbai High North (27 July 2005)
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Mumbai High North –
Background
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Mumbai High North –
Sequence of Events (1)
A cook onboard the Samudra cut off the tips of two fingers
Monsoon conditions onshore had grounded helicopters
The cook was transferred from the Samudra to the Mumbai
High platform complex by crane lift for medical treatment
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Mumbai High North –
Sequence of Events (2)
The close proximity of other risers and lack of fire protection caused
further riser failure - the fire engulfed the Samudra and heat
radiation caused severe damage to the Noble Charlie Yester jack-up
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Mumbai High North (27 July 2005)
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Mumbai High North (27 July 2005)
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Mumbai High North – Aftermath
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How could a Would it be possible
better design to eliminate the
have avoided this hazard altogether?
disaster or
reduce its
• Position risers inside jacket structure
impact?
• Location of boat landing on lee side of
platform
• Larger separation distance between
platforms
• Subsea Isolation Valves to reduce
hydrocarbon inventory during release
• Relocation and fire proofing of risers to
prevent escalation
• Improved availability of evacuation means
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Inherently Safer Design – How do we do it?
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Inherently Safer Design – How do we do it?
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Success or Failure of ISD –
Some Factors
All engineers and project personnel provided with ISD Awareness
training as part of Induction
Often “ISD design features” do not receive the credit and attention
they should, or are only known amongst a few
Inherently
Safer Design
Residual Risk
Control
(Hazard & Risk
Management
Process)
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Integrating ISD & Existing Safety Processes
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AMEC Several Years On – A Summary of Findings
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An ISD Workshop Process
IDENTIFY HAZARDS
BRAINSTORM OPTIONS
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ISD Goals - Examples of High Level Goals
LAYOUT EXAMPLES
Minimise explosion overpressure potential
Minimise frequency of occurrence of explosion overpressures
Minimise escalation potential from fire and explosion events
Minimise vulnerability of Emergency Escape and Rescue systems to fire and
explosion; including Temporary Refuge
PROCESS EXAMPLES
Maximise simplicity of plant
Minimise hydrocarbon inventories and pressures
Minimise leak potential
Maximise integrity of containment envelope from internal and external loadings
and hazards
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An ISD Output
Minimal inventory
fuel gas for GTs
Both jackets
designed for a
minimum Reserve
Strength (RSR) of 2.5
Designed so as to
minimise HP / LP
interfaces
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Strategy for Hazard Management -
UK HSE (OTH 96 521)
Identify Hazards
Inherently
Safer Avoid Hazards
Design (ISD)
Reduce Severity
Reduce Likelihood
Additional
Engineering Apply Passive Safeguards
Controls
Apply Active Safeguards
No
Risks ALARP
Yes
OK
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In Summary
ISD when integrated with Hazard and Risk Management changes the
emphasis on how safety is driven within design and planning processes
This change of emphasis is not only beneficial to safety but to other project
and operational parameters including cost and maintenance burden
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That’s all for now ... ?
Hindenberg