Best Practices in SIS

Documentation
Ed Marszal, President, Kenexis
Presenters

 Ed Marszal

 Gary Hawkins
Introduction

 Safety Instrumented System Design per “ISA S84”* is

becoming a common practice
 Poor documentation is being generated due to
“safety case” mentality
 Current practices ignore audience of documents and
“good practices” for specifications in general

 * ANSI /ISA 84.00.01-2004 (IEC 61511-Mod)

FEED Phase SIS Documents
 List of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)
 Grouping of Instrumented Protective Functions (IPF)
– Group by equipment or process
• Compressors
• Reactors
• Fired Heaters
 P&ID representation of SIF
 Logic description
– cause and effect tables
– Boolean logic diagrams
– Narrative (“plain English” description of operation)
 Testing procedures (with documentation of results)
Preliminary Design Steps

 SIF List should be precursor to SIL selection

 HAZOP/LOPA without knowledge of typical SIF leads
to errors
 HAZOP is a final check on a good design, not a
design task
 Typical SIF based on experience, standards, codes,
and judgment
Instrumented Protective Function Groups

 Group instruments together that are functionally

related
 Typically based around major equipment
– Compressors
– Fired Heaters
– Reactors
 Typically contains multiple SIF
 Also can contain non-SIF instruments and logic
Typical Plant Groupings

PSV
104B
D A
FV 10"-A
OBL
8"-A 104 TO FLARE SYSTEM
PSV OBL 10"-A
TO FLARE SYSTEM
101
14"-A
OBL
A TO FLARE SYSTEM A D
B A
D
PV PSV
101B 104A
6"-D
2
PSHH
101D B A
FT
12"-A H-105
PSLL PSV OBL 104
TO FLARE SYSTEM (Trim: B)
101D 102 10"-B
7 OBL
TO EXPORT
PV SDV PV GAS PIPELINE
104 SDV
101A 106 D B
LSHH 106
6
6"-D 101B PSLL
OBL 1 V-101 6"-B
4
106
LSLL PSHH
FROM PRODUCTION LSLL TSHH
HEADER (NOTE 1) 101B 102B
SDV 101B 104
101 PSLL
102B PSHH PSLL
104C 104C

ST
1 STAGE
SDV LSHH
102A 102B
4"-D
F A
3 V-102
LSLL C-104
LV 102B (Trim: B)
D A 4"-F
101 8 OBL
PSV TO EXPORT LIQUID
103 PIPELINE
PSLL
FV
103C
FT 103C
103C

SDV FV
103 103A

FT FT
103B 103A
PSHH F A
103A

PSLL
103A A F

P-103
(Trim: F)
SDV
102B

4"-A
5

4"-A
IPF Grouping for Separator

H
PT A
PIC H
101A 101A D PIC
L
PV 101B L
101B
PT
101B

USC PT
Detail “A”
101 101D

H
PI
101C

PT
101C

V-101

PV
101A
LG LT USC
Detail “A”
101B 101B 101

LG LT
101A 101A
Advantages of IPF Grouping

 Compact information with minimal duplication

 Facilitates programming – programmer shielded for
single instruments in multiple SIF
 Facilitates design and I/O counting
 Facilitates test plan development and testing
P&ID representation

 Symbology for SIS, specifically tag naming in

inconsistent (I, X, UC, USC)
 Use of “S” is technically correct, but leads to more
confusion (PSV is always a relief valve??)
 Use of typicals to minimize clutter
Typical SIS I/O Details

Detail “A” - SIS Inputs

Detail “B” - SIS Outputs

XT USC XI
XXX XXX XXX Indicator

Output
XV USC XI
XAHL
XXX
Pre-Alarm
XXX XXX XXX
Command
Status
XAHHLL Trip Alarm
XXX
XA Output
XXX
Activated
HS Bypass
XXX Switch

HS
HA Bypass XXX Reset
XXX Alarm

XDA Deviation
XXX Alarm
Safety Requirements Specs

 Specifications (emphasis on ‘s’)

 Limit information to what is required for audience (SIL
not required on C&E or P&ID)
 Use “general requirements” statements for common
features such as bypassing
 Refer to other documents for non-critical information
 Typical Bypass Note

1.1 Bypass / Override SIS Logic Solver

Each of the functional groups that are described in this Safety Requirements
Specification shall require a shutdown bypass function for maintenance and testing. The
bypass functionality described in this note shall not be used for normal operations. If a
bypass is required for normal operations such as start-up, a dedicated hard-wired
bypass facility shall be provided.

The SIS shall be configured so that bypasses are implemented using a two-step process
that includes activation of a unit-specific “bypass enable” switch and activation of an
input-specific BPCS bypass soft switch. Only when both of these items are activated
shall the input be bypassed. When an input is placed in “bypass”, the SIS logic solver
shall hold the input in the non-trip state, regardless of the status of the bypassed input.
Reference External Documents
Conclusions

 Room for improvement in SIS documentation

practices
 Consider the audience for the documents
 Use good engineering practice
 Minimize data duplication
 Leads to shorter preparation time and fewer errors
Business Results Achieved

 Decreased implementation time and cost

– Compact documentation is easier to prepare and more
accurate
– Use of standard modules instead of custom development
– Minimal clarification and rework
 Decreased ongoing maintenance effort and cost
– Updates only occur in one document
– Likelihood of inconsistent data in multiple documents
decreased
 Safer processes
– Lower probability of systematic errors in system resulting
from poor documentation
Summary

 SIS design can be made safer and more cost

effective through documentation method
improvements
 Specification preparation time can be reduced by as
much as 50%*
 Please fill out comment cards and e-mail any feed
back you have to the authors
 Questions?!?
Where To Get More Information

 ISA Bookstore – Safety Integrity Level Selection

 Kenexis Web Site
– HTTP://www.kenexis.com/resources
 Emerson SIS Lifecycle Workbook
– At Delta V SIS Booth during EGUE
– Contact Emerson After EGUE