Sei sulla pagina 1di 35

PENALTIES IN GENERAL

Penalty, defined.

• Penalty is the suffering that is inflicted by the


State for the transgression of a law.
Different juridical conditions of penalty:

• 1. Must be productive of suffering, without however affecting


the integrity of the human personality.
• 2. Must be commensurate with the offense — different
crimes must be punished with different penalties.
• 3. Must be personal — no one should be punished for the
crime of another.
• 4. Must be legal — it is the consequence of a judgment
according to law.
• 5. Must be certain — no one may escape its effects.
• 6. Must be equal for all.
• 7. Must be correctional.
Theories justifying penalty:
• (a) Prevention — The State must punish the criminal to
prevent or suppress the danger to the State arising from the
criminal acts of the offender.
• (b) Self-defense — The State has a right to punish the criminal
as a measure of self-defense so as to protect society from the
threat and wrong inflicted by the criminal.
• (c) Reformation — The object of punishment in criminal cases
is to correct and reform the offender.
• (d) Exemplarity — The criminal is punished to serve as an
example to deter others from committing crimes.
• (e) Justice — That crime must be punished by the State as an
act of retributive justice, a vindication of absolute right and
moral law violated by the criminal.
The penalty under this Code has three-fold purpose.

• (a) Retribution or expiation — The penalty is


commensurate with the gravity of the offense.

• (b) Correction or reformation — as shown by the


rules which regulate the execution of the penalties
consisting in deprivation of liberty

• (c) Social defense — shown by its inflexible severity


to recidivists and habitual delinquents.
Constitutional restriction on penalties.

• The Constitution directs that "excessive fines shall not


be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted."

• The punishment is "cruel and unusual" when it is so


disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock
the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is
right and proper under the circumstances.

• Example: Those inflicted at the whipping post, or in


pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
and the like. (People vs. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908)
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed.
• No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed
by law prior to its commission.
• Art. 21 simply announces the policy of the State as regards
punishing crimes.
• This article is general in its provisions and in effect prohibits
the Government from punishing any person for any felony
with any penalty which has not been prescribed by the law.
• Reason for the provision.
• An act or omission cannot be punished by the State if at the
time it was committed there was no law prohibiting it,
because a law cannot be rationally obeyed unless it is first
shown, and a man cannot be expected to obey an order
that has not been given.
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.

• Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so


far as they favor the person guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.
• General Rule: Penal laws are applied
prospectively.

• Exception: When retrospective application is


favourable to the accused, provided that:
– The offender is not a habitual delinquent.
– The new amendatory law does not provide against
its retroactive application.
• Reason for exception: The sovereign, in
enacting a subsequent penal law more
favourable to the accused, has recognized the
greater severity of the former law is unjust.

• Note: This favourable application of laws


applies equally whether the crime violated the
Revised Penal Code or a special penal law.
Habitual delinquent

• A person shall be deemed to be a habitual


delinquent if within a period of ten years from
the date of his release or last conviction of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical
injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification,
he is found guilty of any said crimes a third
time or oftener.
Ex Post Facto Law
• Giving a law retroactive effect, if unfavorable
to accused, will violate the constitutional
inhibition as to ex post facto laws.

• An act which when committed was not a


crime, cannot be made so by statute without
violating the constitutional inhibition as to ex
post facto laws. (People vs. Carballo, 62 Phil.
651, 653)
• An ex post facto law is one which:

• 1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
• 2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed;
• 3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime when committed;
• 4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense;
• 5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful; and
• 6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection
to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (Mejia vs.
Pamaran, Nos. L-56741-42, April 15,1988, 160 SCRA 457, 472)
• The favorable retroactive effect of a new law
may find the defendant in one of these three
situations:
• 1. The crime has been committed and
prosecution begins;
• 2. Sentence has been passed but service has
not begun;
• 3. The sentence is being carried out.
(Escalante vs. Santos, supra)
• Not applicable to civil liability.

• The principle that criminal statutes are


retroactive so far as they favor the culprit does
not apply to the latter's civil liability, because
the rights of offended persons or innocent
third parties are not within the gift of arbitrary
disposal of the State.
• Criminal liability under the repealed law
subsists:

• (1) When the provisions of the former law are


reenacted; or
• (2) When the repeal is by implication; or
• (3) When there is a saving clause. (U.S. vs.
Cuna, 12 Phil. 241, supra; Wing vs. U.S., 218
U.S. 272)
• No retroactive effect of penal laws as regards
jurisdiction of court.

• The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is


to be determined by the law in force at the time of
instituting the action, not at the time of the
commission of the crime. (People vs. Romualdo, 90
Phil. 739, 744)

• The jurisdiction of the courts in criminal cases is


determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and not by the findings the court may
make after trial. (People vs. Mission, 87 Phil. 641,
642)
Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party.

• A pardon by the offended party does not


extinguish criminal action except as provided
in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability
with regard to the interest of the injured party
is extinguished by his express waiver.
• General Rule: "A pardon by the offended
party does not extinguish criminal action.“

• Reason: A crime committed is an offense
against the State. In criminal cases, the
intervention of the aggrieved parties is limited
to being witnesses for the prosecution. (People vs.
Despavellador, 53 O.G. 21797) Only the Chief Executive can pardon the offenders.
(Art. 36)
• Compromise does not extinguish criminal
liability.

• A contract stipulating for the renunciation of


the right to prosecute an offense or waiving
the criminal liability is void. The consideration
or subject-matter is illegal. (See Arts. 1306, 1352 and 1409 of
the new Civil Code.)
• Exception:
• The offended party in the crimes of adultery
and concubinage cannot institute criminal
prosecution, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders. (Art. 344, par. 2)
• The pardon here may be implied, as continued
inaction of the offended party after learning
of the offense.
• The second paragraph of Art. 344 requires
also that both offenders must be pardoned by
the offended party.
• "But civil liability with regard to the interest
of the injured party is extinguished by his
express waiver."

• Since personal injury is repaired through


indemnity, which is civil in nature, the
offended party may waive it and the State has
no reason to insist in its payment.

• The waiver, however, must be express.


EFFECTS OF PENALTIES ACCDG TO
THEIR RESPECTIVE NATURE
Art 31 Art 32
Effects of the penalties of perpetual Effects of the penalties of
or temporary special disqualification perpetual or temporary special
for public office, profession, or disqualification for the exercise of
calling are the ff: the right of suffrage are the ff:
1. Deprivation of the office,
employment, profession or
1. Deprivation of the right to
calling affected. vote in any election.
2. Disqualification for holding 2. Deprivation of the right to be
similar offices or employments elected to any public office.
either perpetually or during the 3. Cannot hold any public office
term of the sentence, accdg. To during the period of
the extent of such disqualification.
disqualification.
Art 33
Effects of the penalties of suspension from any
public office, profession, or calling, or the right of
suffrage:
1. Disqualify the offender from holding such office
or exercising such profession or calling or right
of suffrage during the term of sentence.
2. The person suspended from holding public
office shall not hold another having similar
functions during the period of his suspension.
Art 34
Civil interdiction shall produce Application of civil interdiction:
the ff. effects: 1. Death penalty which is not
1. Deprivation of the rights of carried out;
parental authority or 2. Reclusion perpetua; or
guardianship of any ward. 3. Reclusion temporal.
2. Deprivation of marital
authority.
3. Deprivation of the right to
manage his property and
the right to dispose of
such property by any act
or any conveyance inter
vivos (General Rule).
• Art 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace. – It shall be the duty of
any person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present
two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will
not commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case
such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined
by the court in its judgement, or otherwise to deposit such
amount in the office of the court to guarantee said undertaking.

The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period


of duration of the bond.

Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he


shall be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six
months, if he shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave
felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if for a light felony.
Bonds to keep the peace
• The offender must present two sufficient sureties (a
person who takes responsibility for another’s
performance of an undertaking) that the offender will
not commit the offense sought to be prevented or else,
pay a fine determined by the court which the offender
must deposit to the clerk of court.
• Bond to keep the peace is not bail bond. A bail bond is
posted for the provisional release of a person accused
or arrested for a crime. A bond to keep the peace is a
commitment to the court to keep the peace for a
specific period.
Art 36. Pardon; its effects
• A pardon shall not work the restoration of the
rights to hold public office, or the right of
sufferage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit


from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence.
Effects and limitations of pardon
• It shall not restore the right to hold office or the
right to suffrage (does not include
extinguishment of accessory penalty).
Except: when it is expressly restored by pardon.
It shall not exempt culprit from civil indemnity.

Limitations:
1. Only exercised after conviction
2. Does not extent to cases of impeachment
Pardon by chief executive
distinguished from pardon
• Presidential pardon extinguishes criminal
liability
• Presidential pardon cannot include civil
liability. Offended party may waive the civil
liability that the offender must pay.
• Pardon by executive is granted after
conviction. Pardon by offended party is given
before the institution of criminal prosecution
Art 37. Costs – What are included
• Costs shall include fees and indemnities in the
course of the judicial proceedings, whether
they be fixed or unalterable amounts
previously determined by law or regulations in
force, or amounts not subject to schedule.
The following are included in costs:
• Fees
• Indemnities, in the course of judicial
proceedings
Costs are chargeable to the accused in
case of conviction
• Expenses of litigation are chargeable to the
accused only in cases of conviction. In case of
acquittal, the costs are de oficio, each party
bearing his own expenses.

• No cost against the republic unless provided


by law
• Payment of costs is discretionary
Art 38. Pecuniary Liabilities – Order of
payment
• In case the property of the offender should
not be sufficient for the payment of his
pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in
in the following order:
1. The reparation of the damage caused
2. Indemnification of the consequential
damages
3. The fine
4. The cost of the Proceedings
• If the offender has sufficient or no property,
there is no use for Article 38

Potrebbero piacerti anche