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Epistemological Issues in
the Social Sciences
LECTURE I: THE VALIDITY AND LEGITIMACY OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCED IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES
‘EPISTEME’ – KNOWLEDGE
Epistemic values:
Justification – concerned with arriving at certainty
Knowledge is considered as “Justified-true-belief”
Methods of justification: demonstrating logical proof / consistency / validity; providing
empirical evidence; etc.
In response to dogmatism or skepticism.
The state of knowing is a state that puts us in cognitive contact with reality.
Knowledge is something that humans naturally desire to have.
Knowing is a form of believing. When we know, there is an object of
thought to which we assent. (Most of the time, this object of thought is a
proposition.)
Knowledge is something the subject is aware of. (Knowledge about
knowing something.)
Epistemology
Epistemic Demands:
Knowledge must be true for it to be valuable.
Knowledge must either have justificatory / explanatory power or predictive
ability.
Knowledge in relation to believing must be something conscientiously arrived at.
Knowledge requires self-trust and a community of epistemic trust.
What counts as knowledge in the
social sciences?
Social Science – the main source and object of knowledge is the Society
Natural Science – the main source and object of knowledge is Nature
Knowledge in the Social Sciences
“Hobbes defines a naked and calculating citizen who constitutes the Leviathan, a mortal
god, an artificial creature. On what does the Leviathan depend? On the calculation of
human atoms that leads to the contract that decides on the irreversible composition of
the strength of all in the hands of a single one. In what does this strength consist? In the
authorization granted by all naked citizens to a single one to speak in their name. Who is
acting when that one acts? We are, we who have definitively delegated our power to
him. The Republic is a paradoxical artificial creature composed of citizens united only by
the authorization given to one of them to represent them all. Does the Sovereign speak in
his own name, or in the name of those who empower him?...It is indeed the Sovereign
who speaks, but it is the citizens who are speaking through him. He becomes their
spokesperson, their persona, their personification. He translates them; therefore he may
betray them. They empower him: therefore they may impeach him. The Leviathan is
made up only of citizens, calculations, agreements or disputes. In short, it is made up of
nothing but social relations. Or rather thanks to Hobbes and his successors, we are
beginning to understand what is meant by social relations, powers, forces, societies.”
Natural and/or Social
“But Boyle defines an even stranger artifact. He invents the laboratory within which artificial
machines create phenomena out of whole cloth. Even though they are artificial, costly and
hard to reproduce, and despite the small number of trained and reliable witnesses, these
facts indeed represent nature as it is. The facts are produced and represented in the
laboratory, in scientific writings; they are recognized and vouched for by the nascent
community of witnesses. Scientists are scrupulous representatives of the facts. Who is
speaking when they speak? The facts themselves, beyond all question, but also their
authorized spokespersons. Who is speaking, then, nature or human beings?...In themselves,
facts are mute; natural forces are brute mechanisms. Yet the scientists declare that they
themselves are not speaking; rather, facts speak for themselves. These mute entities are thus
capable of speaking, writing, signifying within the artificial chamber of the laboratory or
inside the even more rarefied chamber of the vacuum pump. Little groups of gentlemen
take testimony from natural forces, and they testify to each other that they are not
betraying but translating the silent behavior of objects. With Boyle and his successors, we
begin to conceive of what a natural force is, an objects that is mute but endowed or
entrusted with meaning.
Natural and/or Social
“Boyle is not simply creating a scientific discourse while Hobbes is doing the
same thing for politics; Boyle is creating a political discourse from which
politics is to be excluded, while Hobbes is imagining a scientific politics from
which experimental science has to be excluded. In other words, they are
inventing our modern world, a world in which the representation of things
through the intermediary of the laboratory is forever dissociated from the
representation of citizens through the intermediary of the social contract.
Natural and/or Social
“In their common debate, Hobbes’s and Boyle’s descendants offer us the
resources we have used up to now: on the one hand, social force and power;
on the other, natural force and mechanism. On the one hand, the subject of
law; on the other, the object of science. The political spokespersons come to
represent the quarrelsome and calculating multitude of citizens; the scientific
spokespersons come to represent the mute and material multitude of objects.
The former translate their principals, who cannot all speak at once; the latter
translate their constituents, who are mute from birth.” (Latour, 1991)
Natural and/or Social
“In the seventeenth century James Harrington modeled his theory of society on
William Harvey's new physiology. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the
economist William Stanley Jevons proposed a new economics based to some
degree on the model of Newtonian rational mechanics. In three examples from the
last hundred years it was the scientists themselves who designated an area of the
social sciences in which their work might be fruitfully applied. The German physical
chemist, Wilhelm Ostwald, endeavored to create a new form of social science
based on energetics; he called this science "Kulturwissenschaft" instead of the
accepted "Sozialwissenschaft." In a somewhat similar fashion the American
physiologist Walter Bradford Cannon essayed an extension of his research on self-
regulating processes of the human body to social theory, attempting to transform
and revitalize the traditional concept of the body politic. In our own time we have
seen E. O. Wilson develop sociobiology by generalizing his studies of evolutionary
biology and of the group behavior of ants.
Natural and/or Social
“Hugo Grotius, whose intellectual ideal was Galileo's new physics of motion, displayed
the influence of the mathematical way of thinking in his celebrated treatise on
international law. In this climate the French engineer Vauban saw the need for a
numberbased statecraft. Perhaps the most easily discerned effect of this mathematical
climate is the development by Graunt and Petty and their eighteenth-century
successors of a numerical approach to the problems of government which Petty
named political arithmetic.
Natural and/or Social
“In the late eighteenth century, the scientific climate was in some respects even
more mathematical. In this era mathematics had two different implications for the
natural sciences: to apply actual mathematical procedures in order to derive
principles of science from sound axioms and to base science on numbers or on
quantitative considerations. Even natural history, that least mathematical subject
within the natural sciences, began to incorporate some quantitative features, as we
may see in Buffon's celebrated Histoire naturelle, where the discussions of
anthropology featured the statistical studies of mortality made by Jean-Pierre Emile
Dupre de Saint-Maur.27 The development of a mature science of probabilities,
remarkably advanced by Laplace's Theorie analytique des probabilites of 1812, was
another very significant aspect of the quantitative scientific climate at this time. It
had a notable counterpart, of course, in the collection of all sorts of demographic
data and social statistics. (Cohen, 1994)
Natural and/or Social
Ever since the Scientific Revolution, a high value has been set on giving social
science the solid foundation of the natural sciences. This goal has traditionally
had two very different aspects.
One, the subject of this chapter, has been of a limited kind: to make use of the
concepts, principles, methods, and techniques of some one of the physical or
biological sciences.
The other has been greater than merely constructing social theories by
introducing analogues or homologues of a particular natural science at a
particular time. Adopting the metaphor of the natural sciences traditionally has
meant taking on certain features of what was known as the scientific method -
supposedly characterized by healthy skepticism, reliance on experiment and
critical observation, avoidance of pure speculation, and in particular a specific
ladder of steps that would lead (usually by induction) from "facts" to "theory," to
a knowledge of the eternal "truths" of nature.
Natural and/or Social
This second goal, which might from one point of view seem a more
obviously useful aim, has actually become increasingly problematic.
Twentieth-century philosophers and historians of science, aided by
scientists themselves, have dispelled any belief in "the" scientific method.
Moreover, it is widely recognized today that continuous change (usually
characterized as "advance") is a principal feature of the natural sciences.
The result is that the particular aspects of any natural science being
emulated by social sciences will, often without warning, undergo a radical
transformation.
Natural and/or Social