Article 30 the Civil Code

When a separate civil action is brought

to demand Civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall
likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.
 A civil action to enforce the civil liability of the
accused arising from the crime charged as a
felony may be filed ahead of the criminal action.
In that case, the plaintiff is required to prove his
case by preponderance of evidence. The law
allows the filling of a civil action; but the
moment a criminal action is filed, the civil action
is suspended. Thus rule 111, Section 2 (a) of the
Rules of Court provides that:
“ Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the
civil action as provided for in the first paragraph of
Section 1 hereof before the filling of the criminal action
and the criminal action is subsequently commenced, the
pending civil action shall be suspended, in whatever
stage before final judgment it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal action has been rendered.
However, if no final judgment has been rendered by trial
court in the civil action, the same may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the criminal action. If the application is granted,
the evidence presented and admitted in the civil action
shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal
action, without prejudice to the admission of additional
evidence that any party may wish to present. In case of
consolidation, both the criminal and the civil actions be
tried and decided jointly.”
 Law recognizes an alternative and
separate action
In People v. Bayotas, 55 SCAD 140, 236 SCRA 239 (
September 2, 1994), it was observed that what
article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate
civil action which may be brought to demand civil
liability arising from criminal offense independently
of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of
said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to
proved the criminal act will have to be that which is
compatible with civil liability, and that is
preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
 It must be remembered that if the accused dies
during the proceedings or on appeal, there is
extinguishment of the criminal liability and the
civil liability arising from the crime charged as
felony. In the case of People v. Sendaydiego, 81
SCRA 120, the supreme court held that claims
for civil liability ex delicto survive the death of the
accused, thereby ipso facto treating the civil
action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as
one filed under article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a
separate action.
The Supreme Court observed that the ruling had
the effect of converting such claims from one
which is dependent on the outcome of the
criminal action to an entirely new and separate
one, the prosecution, of which does not
necessitate the filling of criminal proceedings.
One would have had to be put to pinpoint the
statutory authority for such a transformation. It
is to be borne in mind that in recovering such
civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to
be determined in the criminal action, rooted as
it is in the court’s pronouncement of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
 This is but t render fealty to the intendment of
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that “ every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.” In such cases,
extinction of the criminal action due to death of
the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies
the concomitant extinction of the civil liability.
Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolve all things. (
See People v. Bayotas, 55 SCAD 140, 236 SCRA
239).
 Doctrine in Bayotas reiterated
What was said in Bayotas was the death of the
accused extinguished the criminal liability of the
accused and the civil liability arising from the
crime charged as a felony. It was reiterated in
Mansion Biscuit Corp., et al, v. CA, et al, G. R.
No. 94713, November 23, 1995, 65 SCAD 604.
 Facts: Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as
president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation
ordered numerous cartons of nutria-wafer
biscuits from Mansion Buiscuit Corporation.
Checks were paid, but the same were
dishonored when presented for payment. Ty and
Siy Gin, a co-signer of the checks were sued for
violation of B. P. Blg. 22 also known as Bouncing
Checks. Ty was convicted, but on appeal, he
died. One basic issue was whether the civil
liability can be enforced against Ty’s heirs.
 Held: No. The civil liability for non payment of the
nutria-wafer biscuits delivered by Mansion Biscuit to
Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforce
against the private respondents because the said civil
liability was not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to
Mansion Biscuit Corp. Rather, it was the contractual
liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corp. of which Ty Teck
Suan was president, to Mansion Biscuit Corp. This is
borne out by the records of the case as it reveal that the
checks were issued “ in payment of the cartons of nutria-
wafer biscuits purchased from Mansion Biscuit Corp. ,
The petitioners admitted that the contract was executed
by and between Edward Ty Brothers Corp. and Mansion
Biscuit Corp. The law speaks of a civil action arising from
the act or omission complained of. It does not refer to a
civil action which is based on other sources of obligations
like contracts, quasi- contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts.