PROTEST: collision is one of the cases when protest is necessary.

• Art. 835. The action for the recovery of losses and damages arising from
collisions cannot be admitted if a protest or declaration is not presented
within twenty-four hours before the competent authority of the point where
the collision took place, or that the first port of arrival of the vessel, if in the
Philippine territory, and to the consul of the Republic of the Philippines if it
occurred in a foreign country.

Prerequisite to bring an action for damages.

US vs. Smith Bell & Co.
An action for the recovery of loss and damages arising from the
collision of boats engaged in traffic upon the waters of the Philippine
Archipelago, can not be admitted if a sworn statement or declaration is
not presented within twenty-four hours to competent authority of the
point where the collision took place or of the first port of arrival of the
vessel. (Art. 835, Commercial Code.)
This statutory rules applies even though the injury was done to a boat
operated by the Government.
Non-filing of protest is excused when:
• Art. 836. With respect to damages caused to persons or to the cargo,
the absence of protest may not prejudice the persons interested who
were not on board or were not in a condition to make known their
wishes.
LIMITED LIABILITY RULE
• Art. 837. The civil liability incurred by the shipowners in the case
prescribed in this section, shall be understood as limited to the value
of the vessel with all its appurtenances and freightage earned during
the voyage.
> It is understood that abandonment is also necessary in order to
benefit from this limited liability.
Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. CA
• The Supreme Court ruled that “since the petitioner has not
abandoned the vessel, the petitioner cannot invoke the benefit of the
provisions of Art. 837 of the Code of Commerce to limit its liability to
the value of the vessel, all appurtenances and freightage earned
during the voyage.”
Two vessels directions collided with each other due to fault imputable
to both. What are the liabilities of the two vessels with respect to the
damage caused to them and their cargoes?

 Each vessel must bear its own damage. Art. 827 of the CoC provides:
“if the collision is imputable to both vessels, each one shall suffer its
own damages, and both shall be solidarily responsible for the losses
and damages occasioned to their cargoes.”
Vessel “U” and “V” collided with each other causing damage to both vessels. Vessel
“U” had the last clear chance to avaoid the collisions but failed to do so. Is the
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance in tort applicable to collisions of vessels at sea under
the CoC? Which vessel should shoulder the liability for the damage suffered by
both vessels and by the cargo?

 The doctrine of last clear chance in tort is not applicable to collisions

of vessels at under the CoC, and the case is deemed as if the collision is
imputable to both vessels; thus, each one of the vessels shall suffer her
own damage, and both shall be solidarily liable for the damages
occasioned to their cargoes.
Vessel “U” and “V” collided with each other causing damage to both
vessels. Vessel U had the last clear chance of avoiding the collision but
failed to do so. Assume that the negligence of the captain of vessel “U”
was the proximate cause of the collision, while the negligence of the
captain of vessel “V” was merely contributory. To which vessel should
the collision be deemed imputable?
 The collision should be deemed imputable also to both vessels.
Since the doctrine of “contributory negligence” in tort is also not
applicable to collisions of vessel at sea under the Coc, the case is
deemed as if the collision is imputable to both vessels.
If it cannot be determined which of the two vessels was at fault
resulting in the collision, which party should bear the damage caused
to the vessels and the cargoes?

Under the doctrine of “inscrutable fault”, if it cannot be determined

as to which vessel is at fault, each of them should bear their respective
damages.
There was a severe typhoon when the vessel M/V fortuna collided with
M/V Suerte. It is conceded that the typhoon was a major cause of the
collision, although there was a strong possibility that it could have been
avoided if the captain of the M/V Fortuna was not drunk and the
captain of M/V Suerte was not asleep at the time of the collision. Who
should bear the damages to the vessel and the cargoes?
Under the doctrine of inscrutable fault, neither of the carriers may
go after the other. The shipper may claim damages against the ship
owners and the captains of both vessels, having been both negligent.
The ship owners have the right to recover damages from the masters of
the vessels who were both guilty of negligence. The presence of
typhoon in the area warranted a greater degree of alertness on their
part.
In a collision between M/V Manila, a Tanker Don Claro, an inter-island vessel, M/V
Don Claro sank and many of its passengers drowned and died. All its cargoes were
lost. The collision occurred at night time but the sea was calm, the weather fair and
visibility was good. Prior to the collision and while still four nautical miles apart,
M/V Don Claro sighted M/T Manila on its radar screen. M/T Manila had no radar
equipment. As for speed, M/V Don Claro was twice as fast as M/T Manila.
At the time of the collision, M/T Manila failed to follow Rule 19 of the International
Rules of the road which requires two vessels meeting head on to change their
course by each vessel steering to star board (right) so that each vessel may pass on
the port side (left) of the other, M/T Manila signified that it would nturn to port
side and steered accordingly, thus resulting in the collision. M/T Claro’s captain was
off-duty and was having a drink at the ship’s bar at the time of the collision. Who
would be liable for the collision?
The two vessels are liable. Whether on the basis of the factual
settings or under the doctrine of inscrutable fault, both vessels can be
said to have been guilty of negligence. The liability of the two carriers
for the death or injury of the passengers and loss of or damage to the
goods is solidary.
Neither carrier may make the doctrine of last clear chance which can
only be relevant, if at all, between the two vessels but not on the
claims made by the passengers or shippers. (Litojua Shipping v.
National Seamen Board)
In the morning of April 2, 1977, the southbound FS-190 belonging to
William Lines, Inc. reached the waters of the Verde Island Passage.
About the same time, the M.S. General del Pilar, another inter-island
vessel owned by General Shipping was likewise in the same waters,
steaming northward to Manila. The vessels, coming from opposite
directions and towards each other, suddenly collided at a certain point
of the passage which resulted in the sinking of FS-190, together with all
its cargoes, part of which belonged to Tanya who was a paying
passenger and Rafael, who was a shipper. Tanya and Rafael brought
action in court to recover for their losses and for damages arising from
the collision. Were they under obligation to file a maritime protest?
 No. Tanya and Rafael are not under obligation to file a maritime
protest. Art. 835 of the CoC states that “the action for recovery of
damages and losses arising from collisions cannot be admitted without
a previous protest or declaration presented by the captain within
twenty-four hours before the competent authority of the point where
the collision took place, or of the first port of arrival.” Therefore, a
maritime protest is required to be made by the master of the vessel
not by the passenger or shipper.
National Development Co. v. Court of Appeals
On September 13, 1962, defendant NDC as the first preferred mortgagee of three ocean
going vessels including one with the name “Doña Nati” appointed defendant MCP as its
agent to manage and operate said vessel for and in its behalf and account.
On February 28, 1964 the E. Philipp Corporation of New York loaded on board the vessel
'Doña Nati' at San Francisco, California, a total of 1,200 bales of American raw cotton
consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila and the People's Bank and
Trust Company acting for and in behalf of the Pan Asiatic Commercial Company, Inc., who
represents Riverside Mills Corporation. Also loaded on the same vessel at Tokyo, Japan,
were the cargo of Kyokuto Boekui, Kaisa, Ltd., consigned to the order of Manila Banking
Corporation consisting of 200 cartons of sodium lauryl sulfate and 10 cases of aluminum
foil
En route to Manila the vessel Doña Nati figured in a collision on April 15, 1964 at Ise Bay,
Japan with a Japanese vessel 'SS Yasushima Maru' as a result of which 550 bales of
aforesaid cargo of American raw cotton were lost and/or destroyed, of which 535 bales as
damaged were landed and sold on the authority of the General Average Surveyor for Yen
6,045,-500 and 15 bales were not landed and deemed lost
On April 22, 1965, the Development Insurance and Surety Corporation filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the recovery of the sum of P364,915.86
plus attorney's fees of P10,000.00 against NDC and MCP.
1. What laws will apply?
2. IS LCP liable?
3. MCP argues that the law on average should be applied in
determining the liability, is the argument tenable?
1. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability
of the common carrier. It is evident that the laws of the Philippines will apply, and it is
immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters.
Since collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil code, Arts. 826
to 839 of the CoC which deals exclusively with collision of vessels apply.
2. Both the owner and agent of the offending vessel are liable for the
damage done where both are impleaded that in case of collision, both the
owner and the agent are civilly responsible for the acts of the captain; that
while it is true that the liability of the naviero in the sense of charterer or
agent, is not expressly provided in Article 826 of the Code of Commerce, it is
clearly deducible from the general doctrine of jurisprudence under the Civil
Code but more specially as regards contractual obligations in Article 586 of
the Code of Commerce. Moreover, the Court held that both the owner and
agent (Naviero) should be declared jointly and severally liable, since the
obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a tortious act
and did not arise from contract Consequently, the agent, even though he
may not be the owner of the vessel, is liable to the shippers and owners of
the cargo transported by it, for losses and damages occasioned to such
cargo, without prejudice, however, to his rights against the owner of the
ship, to the extent of the value of the vessel, its equipment, and the freight.
3. MCP’s contention is without merit. The declared value of the goods
was stated in the vill of lading and corroborated no less by invoices
offered as evidence. As held in Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Barrete, et al,
“one cannot limit its liability for injury to a loss of goods where such
injury or loss was caused by its own negligence.” Negligence of the
captains of the colliding vessel being the cause of the collision and the
cargoes not being jettisoned to save some of the cargoes and the
vessel, the law on averages is not applicable.”
C. B. WILLIAMS vs. TEODORO R. YANGCOG.R. No. L-8325. March 10, 1914
The steamer Subic, owned by the defendant, collided with the launch
Euclid owned by the plaintiff in Manila Bay, and sank thereafter. The
defendant filed an action to recover the value of the Euclid. The court
held from the evidence that the vessel was worth P10,000 and that
both vessels were responsible for the collision; and that the loss should
be divided equally between the owners, P5000 to be paid to the
plaintiff by the defendant and P5000 to be borne by the plaintiff
himself.
ISSUE: Is the decision of the trial court correct?
No. In cases of a disaster arising from the mutual negligence of two parties,
the party who has a last clear opportunity of avoiding the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is considered wholly
responsible for it under the common-law rule of. Under the English rule
which conforms nearly to the common-law rule, it has been held that the
fault of the first vessel in failing to exhibit proper lights or to take the proper
side of the channel will relieve from liability one who negligently runs into
such vessels before he see sit; although it will not be a defense to one who,
having timely warning of the danger of collision, fails to use proper care to
avoid it. (Pollock on Torts, 374.). In the case at bar, there was negligence on
the part of the officers on defendant's vessel in failing to recognize the
perilous situation created by the negligence of those in charge of plaintiff's
launch, and that had they recognized it in time, they might have avoided the
accident. But since it does not appear from the evidence that they
discovered the perilous situation of the launch in time to avoid the accident
by the exercise of ordinary care, it is clear that the plaintiff cannot escape
the legal consequences of the contributory negligence of his launch, even
were we to hold that the doctrine is applicable in the jurisdiction, upon
which point we expressly reserve our decision at this time.