MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA 93 SCRA 462 No. L-26702, October 18, 1979
Presented by: MA. RHEA C. OLEDAN LLB-IB JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN,
MAYOR PEREZ, POLICE CHIEF SUYAT, JUDGE SERRANO, AND PATROLMAN ANDRADA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS . I. SYLLABUS: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
1. To be valid, an ordinance must not contravene the
statute. 2. Requisites necessary for a municipal to pass a valid ordinance regulating a traffic highway. 3. Regulatory ordinances must be clear and certain. 4. Can a writ of injunction can restrain the proceedings in a criminal case? II. FACTS:
On February 8, 1965 Juan Augusto B. Primicias,
plaintiff appellee, was driving a car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was asked to stop by Urdanetas Municipal Police. He was told that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No.3, Series of 1964 and more particularly, for overtaking a truck. His license was surrendered to the authority and he was issued a temporary operators permit. Thereafter, a criminal complaint against him for violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series II. FACTS: (CONT)
of 1964. Due to the criminal case filed against
him, he initiated an action of annulment of said ordinance with the prayer of the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants from enforcing the ordinance. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered the questioned decision holding that the ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by RA No. 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. II. FACTS: (CONT)
Now defendants, appellants herein, alleged that the
lower court erred in and contending that the Ordinance is valid, as it was patterned after and based on Section 53, par 4 of Act No.3992 as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law). The appellants failed to note that this act has been superseded by RA No. 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. III. ISSUES:
1. Whether the Municipality Ordinance No.3, Series of
1964 is valid. 2. Whether there are requisites necessary for a municipal to pass a valid ordinance regulating a traffic in a highway. 3. Whether regulatory ordinance must be clear and definite. 4. Whether a writ of injunction can restrain the proceedings in criminal case No. 3140. III. RULINGS:
1. Municipal Ordinance No.3, Series of 1964 was
declared null and void by the CFI by reason that it has been repealed by RA 4136 otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. As essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is must not contravenethe statute, for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior on status and subordinate to the laws of the statute. Following III. RULINGS:
This general rule, whether there is conflict between an
ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way.
2. The lower court also found out that the Municipal
Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its thoroughfare, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, RA4136 which is mandatory and all be approved by the Land Transportation Commissioner. Ordinance No.3, Series of 1964, showed nothing III. RULINGS:
done with the approval of the Land Transportation
Commission, thus on this ground alone the said ordinance is not valid.
3. Ordinance is not clear and definite terms.
Considering that this is regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness, and certainty are all the more important so that an average man should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand III. RULINGS:
and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for
particular acts or courses of conduct.
4. The CFI made the preliminary injunction issued
to the defendants and later on was issued to be definite and permanent by the Court. In general rule, writ of injunction ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction; however, the local statute III. RULINGS:
or ordinance at bar falls in one of the exceptions of
the rule.
Appealed decision is therefore, AFFIRMED.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. for the orderly administration of justice;
2. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; 3. to avoid multiplicity of actions; 4. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; 5. in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid. III. RULINGS:
Kenneth Dean Austin v. Howard Ray, Warden, Jackie Brannon Correctional Center and Attorney General of The State of Oklahoma, 124 F.3d 216, 10th Cir. (1997)