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EMPLOYEES
Articles 130-
CHAPTER I
EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN
Jeromy B. Villarba
Constitutional Provisions Recognizing Women
(e) That the maternity benefits provided under this Section shall
be paid only for the first four deliveries after March 13, 1973;
(f) That the SSS shall immediately reimburse the employer of one
hundred percent (100%) of the amount of maternity benefits
advanced to the employee by the employer upon receipt of
satisfactory proof of such payment and legality thereof; and
(g) That if an employee should give birth or suffer abortion or
miscarriage without the required contributions having been
remitted for her by her employer to the SSS, or without the
latter having been previously notified by the employer of the
time of the pregnancy, the employer shall pay to the SSS
damages equivalent to the benefits which said employee would
otherwise have been entitled to, and the SSS shall in turn pay
such amount to the employee concerned.
The Senate approved the Expanded Maternity Leave Act on
third and final reading, granting working mothers 60 additional
days of maternity leave.
The bill will also amend Republic Act 7322, granting 30 days of
paid leave to fathers instead of the former seven days.
Facts:
Respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but
were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners
failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting
Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the
Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations.
Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in
the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the
Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper
in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold
the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can
create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived
danger at the expense of an employees right to security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one
employee marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry
persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not
facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a
disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the
only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it
is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate,
effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business
concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the
employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based
upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one
company.
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, ET AL vs RONALDO D. SIMBOL,
WILFREDA N. COMIA &LORNA E. ESTRELLA (April 12, 2006, G.R. No. 164774)
The courts that have broadly construed the term marital status rule
that it encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of
one's spouse. They strike down the no-spouse employment policies
based on the broad legislative intent of the state statute. They
reason that the no-spouse employment policy violate the marital
status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all
spouses of present employees without regard to the actual effect
on the individual's qualifications or work performance.
These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for
failure of the employer to present any evidence of business
necessity other than the general perception that spouses in the
same workplace might adversely affect the business. They hold that
the absence of such a bona fide occupational
qualification invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse
due to the current employment of the other spouse in the same
office.
Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove that the
reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on
marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy
which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer
may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of
the employees spouse. This is known as the bona fide occupational
qualification exception.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational
qualification justifies an employers no-spouse rule, the exception is
interpreted strictly and narrowly by these state courts. There must
be a compelling business necessity for which no alternative exists
other than the discriminatory practice. To justify a bona fide
occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1)
that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the
duties of the job.
Article 135. Prohibited Acts
It shall be unlawful for any employer:
To deny any woman employee the benefits provided for
in this Chapter or to discharge any woman employed by
him for the purpose of preventing her from enjoying any
of the benefits provided under this Code.
Hazardous Work
-the employable age is 18 and up
Nonhazardous Work
Where the employee is not imposed to any risk
which constitutes an imminent danger to his safety and
health.
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall apply to all
persons under eighteen (18) years of age."
Sec. 2-A. Hours of Work of a Working Child. - Under the exceptions
provided in Section 12 of this Act, as amended:
(1) A child below fifteen (15) years of age may be allowed to work
for not more than twenty (20) hours a week: Provided, That the
work shall not be more than four (4) hours at any given day;
(2) A child fifteen (15) years of age but below eighteen (18) shall
not be allowed to work for more than eight (8) hours a day, and in
no case beyond forty (40) hours a week;
(3) No child below fifteen (15) years of age shall be allowed to work
between eight o'clock in the evening and six o'clock in the morning
of the following day and no child fifteen (15) years of age but below
eighteen (18) shall be allowed to work between ten o'clock in the
evening and six o'clock in the morning of the following day."
Sec. 12-D. Prohibition Against Worst Forms of Child
Labor. - No child shall be engaged in the worst forms of
child labor. The phrase "worst forms of child labor"
shall refer to any of the following:
e) Exposes the child to physical danger such as, but not limited to
the dangerous feats of balancing, physical strength or contortion,
or which requires the manual transport of heavy loads; or