Institutions and Environmental

Cooperation
Today

Types of global environmental problems

The role of international institutions
(regimes): realist vs. institutionalist
perspectives
Analyzing international environmental
regimes
Types of Cooperation Dilemmas

Tragedy of the commons (Garrett Hardin

1968). Common resources:
non-excludable (cannot exclude additional users)
Subtractable (use by one actor reduces
availability to others)
individual utility of each additional use greater
than the disutility of overuse, which is shared by
all. Strong incentives to overuse.
Tragedy of the Commons

Each man is locked into a system that

compels him to increase his herd without
limit in a world that is limited. Ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush
(Hardin 1968, p. 41)
Externalities

Activity within one state affects the

environment in other states

Examples?
Shared Resources

Resources that extend across the jurisdiction

of several states:

Examples?
Linked Issues

When environmental regimes have

unintended consequence on other issues
and vise versa.

Examples?
Solutions

Garrett Hardin:
Privatization
Government regulation/ mutually agreed
coercion.

Are these feasible in international relations?

Cooperation

Coordination of polices, rules, and norms by

national governments.

International institutions and regimes are

instruments of cooperation
Instruments:

Framework convention
Set of principles, norms, goals and mechanisms for cooperation,
but no major obligations
Conference of parties
Protocols
Specific obligations (most intense negotiations)
Implementation provisions.
Reporting; monitoring (rare); trade sanctions (rare); assistance.
Norms (soft rules)
Voluntary codes of conduct
Public-private partnerships
Realism: Assumptions

Anarchic system: no central authority

States want to survive
States potentially dangerous (military
capability)
Uncertain about intentions of other states
Rational: make strategic calculations how to
survive
Realism
Implications about state behavior

Maximize power
Fear each other
Follow own interest defined as security and
maximization of RELATIVE power
War is means not an end
Non-security issues (particularly environment,
human rights) of secondary, if any, importance
Cooperation unlikely (although not impossible)
Institutions irrelevant b/c reflect distribution of
power
Neoliberal Institutionalism
Assumptions

States unitary, rational actors

Anarchy: no government, but governance possible
States seek to maximize utility, follow own interests
Interests can be issue specific (e.g. economy, environment,
security, etc.)
Cooperation possible governance without government
Institutions facilitate cooperation, can contribute to peace
Role of Institutions

Facilitate Cooperation:
institutionalize iteration (long-term calculations and
reciprocity conducive to cooperation)
-provide information (monitor, change of strategy)
-credible commitments
-issue linkage
-reduce transaction costs (make agreements and
monitoring less costly to administer)
-resolve distribution conflicts
Key Differences

Definition of power

Definition of interests

Prospects for international cooperation

Role of institutions
Interpreting environmental
cooperation:

Realism?
-focus on hegemon, interests, power relations

Liberal institutionalism?
-focus on interests, power, institutions, bargaining

Constructivism?
-focus on norms, ideas, networks that spread ideas

Other factors?
-domestic politics; non-state actors; transnational actors
Regime Effectiveness:

How can we tell if cooperation was

successful or not?
States change policies and behavior;
Non-state actors change behavior (business,
consumers, non-profit organizations, etc.);
Change in values?
Change in environmental conditions.
Analyzing Cases:

What contributes to, or thwarts regime creation?

Why do some regimes grow stronger over time,
while others do not?
What instruments are used in different regimes?
Is the regime effective?
Use Shreks rule: layers of explanation.
Which explanation is more convincing? Why?