CASE STUDY ON OMPRAKASH &

ORS. V/S RADHACHARAN & ORS

&
DEBABRATA MONDAL AND ANR.
VS STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND
ORS
 PRINCIPLES USED BY THE JUDGES IN BOTH THE CASES:

Armchair Rule
A rule of interpretation that a judge, called upon to interpret an
otherwise unclear legal document, shall take into account the
circumstances in which the document was created
ON OMPRAKASH & ORS. V/S RADHACHARAN & ORS
S.B.Sinha, SC

PARTIES TO THE CASE:

Appellants before us are her brothers, the original applicant being

the mother of the deceased having died.

Respondents are the sons of sister of the Narayani's husband.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

One Smt. Narayani Devi was married to one Dindayal Sharma in

the year 1955. She became widow within three months of her
marriage. Concededly, she was driven out of her matrimonial home
immediately after the death of her husband. After that she never
stayed in her matrimonial home. She died intestate on 11.7.1996.
She had various bank accounts; she left a huge sum also in her
provident fund account. Ramkishori, mother of Narayani, filed an
application for grant of succession certificate in terms of Section
372 of the Indian Succession Act.n
Respondents herein also filed a similar application.

It now stands admitted that all her properties were self acquired.
QUESTION OF LAW:

The question which arose for consideration before the courts below
as also before us is as to whether sub-section(1) of Section 15 of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 or sub-Section(2) thereof would be
applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.

Section 15

It provides for the general rules of succession in the case of female Hindus.
It lays down the mode and manner in which the devolution of interest of a female
shall take place.

15. General rules of succession in the case of female Hindus.

(1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the
rules set out in section 16,
(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased
son or daughter) and the husband;
(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;
(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;
(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and
(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),

(a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall
devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the
children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in
sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father; and
(b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-
law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including
the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred
to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the
husband.
SECTION 16
This section provides for the order of succession and manner of
distribution amongst the heirs of a female Hindu, stating that the same
shall be according to the rules specified therein. It has not been disputed
that the respondents are the heirs and legal representatives of Dindayal,
husband of Narayani.

16. Order of succession and manner of distribution among heirs of a

female Hindu.The order of succession among the heirs referred to in
section 15 shall be, and the distribution of the intestates property among
those heirs shall take place according to the following rules, namely:
Rule 1.Among the heirs specified in sub-section
(1) of section 15, those in one entry shall be preferred to those in any
succeeding entry and those included in the same entry shall take
simultaneously. Rule 2.If any son or daughter of the intestate had pre-
deceased the intestate leaving his or her own children alive at the time of
the intestates death, the children of such son or daughter shall take
between them the share which such son or daughter would have taken if
living at the intestates death. Rule 3.The devolution of the property of
the intestate on the heirs referred to in clauses (b), (d) and (e) of sub-
section (1) and in sub-section (2) to section 15 shall be in the same order
and according to the same rules as would have applied if the property had
been the fathers or the mothers or the husbands as the case may be,
and such person had died intestate in respect thereof immediately after
the intestates death.
ARGUMENTS OF THE CASE

Mr. N.R. Choudhary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant would contend that in a case of this nature where the
husband of the deceased or her in-laws had not made any
contribution towards her education or had not lent any support
during her life time, sub-Section of Section 15 of the Act should be
held to be applicable.

It was urged that the Parliamentary intent as contained in clause

of sub-Section of Section 15 of the Act should be the guiding factor
for interpreting the said provision.

Mr. Arvind V. Savant, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of

the respondent would support the impugned judgment.
Narayani during her life time did not visit her in-laws' place.

The self-acquired property of a female would be her absolute

property and not the property which she had inherited from her
parents. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that sub-
Section of Section 15 of the Act would apply and not the sub-
Section thereof.

The law is silent with regard to self-acquired property of a women.

Sub-section of Section 15 apart from the exceptions specified in
sub-section thereof does not make any distinction between a self-
acquired property and the property which she had inherited.
JUDGEMENT

This Court held: "22. The court would not determine a question
only on the basis of sympathy or sentiment. Stricto sensu equity as
such may not have any role to play." If the contention raised by Mr.
Choudhury is to be accepted, we will have to interpret sub-section
of Section 15 in a manner which was not contemplated by the
Parliament.

For the aforementioned purpose, the golden rule of interpretation

must be applied. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the
court held that they couldnt find no merit in this appeal. The
appeal is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and
circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Debabrata Mondal And Anr. vs State Of West Bengal And Ors.
J.K.Biswas CALH

FACTS OF THE CASE

The two petitioners in this writ petition dated April 15th, 2004 are aggrieved by the decision of
Land Manager and Ex-officio Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Urban
Development Department dated May 26th/28th, 2003, which is: I am directed to refer to your
letter dated 29-1-2003 on the subject noted above and to inform you that the Department.

Regrets its inability to consider the prayer for mutation of the subject plot of land since the
stepsons are not to be treated as legal heirs for the purpose of inheritance to the property of
Step-mother.

By a deed dated September 11th, 1970 the State Government leased the land at plot No. 268
in AB block of sector I of the Salt Lake City to one Jyoti Chowdhury for 999 years.
In the recitals of the deed it was stated that the expression 'lessee' would include Jyoti's heirs,
executors, administrators, representatives and assigns.

In the habendum, Clause 2(12), it was stated that on her dying intestate her heirs would hold
the property jointly without having any right to have a partition thereof by meets and bounds or
they would nominate one person from among their number in whom the property should vest.
In 1972 Jyoti married the petitioners' widowed father, Durgapada, who died on January 8th,
1991.
Widowed Jyoti died issueless and intestate on July 25th, 2002.

On her death the petitioners, her stepsons, claiming to be her heirs, applied to the appropriate
authority of the government for mutating the records showing them as the lessees of the
property.
ARGUMENTS OF THE CASE
Counsel for the petitioners argued that the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956,
Section 15(1)(b), the petitioners were entitled to seek mutation of the records as only heirs of
Jyoti's predeceased husband. Here the petitioners are Jyoti's stepsons, and Jyoti died issueless
and intestate.

Counsel for the State has referred me to Lachman Singh v. Kirpa Singh and Ors. Holding that the
word 'sons' used in Section 15(1)(a) does not include a stepson of a female Hindu dying
intestate.

Counsel for the State has further said that by a representation dated December 24th, 1991 Jyoti
expressed her last desire to the government that on her death her stepsons should not get the
property. He does not go to the extent of saying that the representation is to be treated as a
will, which it was not, as rightly said by counsel for the petitioners; and hence it has no effect in
the eye of law.

Counsel for petitioners argued that In Clause 2(12) it was specifically stated that on Jyoti's dying
intestate the property should devolve on her heirs. Hence there cannot be any doubt that the
petitioners were entitled to claim that the property left by Jyoti would devolve on them.

A feeble argument was made by counsel for the State that in view of Jyoti's last desire
expressed in her representation dated December 24th, 1991 the property would devolve on the
government by operation of the provision in Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

In response counsel for the petitioners has referred State of Punjab v. Balwant Singh and Ors.
AIR 1991 SC 2301 holding that question of escheat would arise only in the absence of any heir
left by the female Hindu dying intestate.
JUDGEMENT

In view of the provisions in Section 15(1)(b), the petitioners are

qualified to succeed to Jyoti's property, since, admittedly, she died
intestate, and without leaving anyone mentioned in Section 15(1)(a).

The judgement pointed out her heirs were specifically included in the
recitals part and also in the habendum clause, Clause 2(12), of the
operative part of the deed making the lease.

For these reasons, the impugned decision is set aside, allow the writ
petition, and order that within a fortnight from the date of
communication of this order the authorities, and in particular the
authority that gave the impugned decision, shall take necessary steps
for mutating the records by incorporating the petitioners' names as
lessees of the property, provided they comply with all necessary
formalities and pay the requisite charges, if any.
CONCLUSION:

Will drafters are not perfect. Sometimes the language the drafter uses in a will just isnt clear
enough or has some ambiguity that requires interpretation. Madam Justice Dardi's decision in
Re: Theimer Estate 2012 BCSC 629 does a great job in looking at the many principles that
Courts use in trying to interpret ambiguous or unclear will provisions. The Armchair Rule is
one of the main rules judges will use in will interpretation.

Under the Armchair Rule the Court tries to put itself in the armchair of the testator so they
can see the Will andunderstand its wording through the testator's eyes.

In construing a will, the objective of the court is to ascertain the intention of the testator as
expressed in his or her will when it is read as a whole in light of any properly admissible
extrinsic evidence;

The testator's intention is to be gathered from the will as a whole and not solely from those
provisions which have given rise to the controversy;

The subjective approach to interpreting wills, where the objective is to ascertain the actual
meaning the testator ascribed to the words he or she used in the will, is the modern approach
to will interpretation;

Courts have adopted the Armchair Rule" which requires that the court to put itself in the
position of the testator at the point in time when he or she made the will (not at the time of
death), and from that vantage point construe the language in the will in light of the surrounding
facts and circumstances known to the testator at that time;

The main source of evidence should come from the four corners" of
the will (meaning you simply look at the writing in the will), but the
armchair rule entitles the court to look to extrinsic evidence to identify
the surrounding circumstances known to the testator at the time the
will was made which might reasonably be expected to influence the
testator in thedisposition of his or her property. For example, the court
can look at the occupation of the testator, the state of his property and
the general relationship of the testator to his or her immediate family
and other relatives.

The modern judicial approach to interpreting a will is to admit all the

evidence regarding the surrounding circumstances at the start of the
hearing and then to construe the will in the light of those surrounding
circumstances.

As it can be seen, the real key for anyone looking to have a will
interpreted is putting before the Court a clear picture of who the
testator was and what made him or her tick (the arm chair rule might
be called the walk a mile in my shoes rule). It is through this
understanding that Courts will be able to best interpret what a testator
meant by the words used in his or her will.