Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
IN
ZIMBABWE
INTRODUCTION
From 1991 to 1996, the Zimbabwean Zanu-PF government of president Robert Mugabe embarked on an
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), designed by the IMF and the World Bank, that had
serious negative effects on Zimbabwe's economy. In the late 1990s, the government instituted land reforms
intended to evict white landowners and place their holdings in the hands of black farmers. However, many of
these "farmers" had no experience or training in farming.[citation needed] From 1999 to 2009, the country
experienced a sharp drop in food production and in all other sectors. The banking sector also collapsed, with
farmers unable to obtain loans for capital development. Food output capacity fell 45%, manufacturing output
29% in 2005, 26% in 2006 and 28% in 2007, and unemployment rose to 80%. Life expectancy dropped.
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe blamed the hyperinflation on economic sanctions imposed by the United
States of America, the IMF and the European Union. These sanctions affect the government of Zimbabwe,
and asset freezes and visa denials targeted at 200 specific Zimbabweans closely tied to the Mugabe regime.
There are also restrictions placed on trade with Zimbabwe, by both individual businesses and the US
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control.
CAUSES
A monetarist view is that a general increase in the prices of things is less a commentary on the
worth of those things than on the worth of the money. This has objective and subjective
components:
Economic mis-steps by government can create shortages and occupy people with workarounds
rather than productivity. Though this harms the economy, it does not necessarily undermine the
value of the currency, but may harm confidence in the future. Widespread poverty and violence,
including government violence to stifle political opposition, also undermines confidence in the
SELF PERPETUATION
As hyperinflation accelerated, the value of the Zimbabwe dollar declined fast against other
currencies, yet official exchange rates published by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe were
infrequently updated; this made it impossible to tell from an official source how much the
Zimbabwe dollar was really worth against other currencies on a particular day, which in turn
disrupted international business transactions involving Zimbabwe dollars. Staff from WM/Reuters
devised an indirect means of measurement that was termed the Old Mutual Implied Rate (OMIR).
This took the daily price of shares in the insurance company Old Mutual that traded in the London
and Harare stockmarkets and derived from it a notional daily exchange rate between the
Zimbabwe dollar and the pound. Shares had much less strict capital controls than through the
Zimbabwe banking system, so the shares were used as a vehicle for moving capital between
currencies by buying stock in either London or Harare and then selling in the other location.
The Old Mutual Implied rate was widely adopted benchmark rate for unofficial currency exchange
until intervention by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in May 2008 to prohibit the transfer of
shares in Old Mutual, ABC and Kingdom Meikles Africa out of the country, therefore stopping their
fungibility.
ADAPTATAIONS
In December 2008, the Central Bank of Zimbabwe licensed around 1,000 shops to deal in foreign currency.
Citizens had increasingly been using foreign currency in daily exchanges, as local shops stated fewer prices in
Zimbabwe dollars because they needed foreign currency to import foreign goods. Many businesses and street
vendors continued to do so without getting the license.
In January 2009, acting Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa lifted the restriction to use only Zimbabwean
dollars[citation needed]. This too acknowledged what many were already doing. Citizens were allowed to use
the US dollar, the euro, and the South African rand. However, teachers and civil servants were still being paid
in Zimbabwean dollars. Even though their salaries were in the trillions per month, this amounted to around
US$1, or half the daily bus fare. The government also used a restriction on bank withdrawals to try to limit the
amount of money that was in circulation. It limited cash withdrawals to $Z500,000 which was around US$0.25.
THE BLACK MARKET
Official, black market, and OMIR exchange rates 1 Jan 2001 to 2 Feb 2009. Note the logarithmic scale.
Prices in shops and restaurants were still quoted in Zimbabwean dollars, but were adjusted several times a
day. Any Zimbabwean dollars acquired needed to be exchanged for foreign currency on the parallel market
immediately, or the holder would suffer a significant loss of value. For example, a mini-bus driver charged
riders in Zimbabwean dollars, but different rates throughout the day: The evening commute was highest-
priced. He sometimes exchanged money three times a day, not in banks but in back office rooms and
parking lots.
Such business venues constituted a black market, an arena explicitly outside the law. Transactors could
evade the price freezes and the mandate to use Zimbabwean dollars.
The black market served the demand for daily goods such as soap and bread, as grocery stores operating
within the law no longer sold items whose prices were strictly controlled, or charged customers more if they
were paying in Zimbabwean dollars. At one point, a loaf of bread was Z$550 million in the regular market,
when bread was even available; apart from a trip to another country, the black market was the only option
for almost all goods, and bread might cost Z$10 billion.
SOLUTIONS
A solution effectively adopted by Zimbabwe is to adopt some foreign currency as official. To
facilitate commerce, it is less important which currency is adopted than that the government
standardise on a single currency. The US dollar, the euro, and the South African rand were
candidates; the US dollar had the most credibility and was the most widely traded within
Zimbabwe.[42] Zimbabwe could have joined the nearby nations of Lesotho, Namibia, South
Africa, and Swaziland, which constitute the Common Monetary Area, or "Rand Zone"[4] by
formally deciding to use the rand to promote trade and stability.[43]
In 2009, the government abandoned printing Zimbabwean dollars at all.[42] This implicitly solved
the chronic problem of lack of confidence in the Zimbabwean dollar, and compelled people to use
the foreign currency of their choice. Since then Zimbabwe has used a combination of foreign
currencies, mostly US dollars.
In 2014, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe unveiled "convertible" coins in denominations of US$0.01
through US$0.50. The Bank said that 80% of Zimbabweans use the U.S. dollar, and said the local
lack of coins induces retailers to round prices up to the next higher dollar. The coins extend the
use of the dollar as a de facto currency, and indeed the National Bank has repeatedly assured
that it does not intend to bring back a national currency.[44] As of May 2016 the liquidity of the
USD had rapidly decreased and John Mangudya, the governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,
DEMONETIZATION
BY-
PANSHAYANA K.N
SAI SUNDER
SHARATH KUMAR
SACHIN GOWDA
GANGDHAR .V