Sei sulla pagina 1di 61

Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA)

A Great Tool to Improve Product and Process


Reliability and Reduce Risks
Anthony Tarantino
PhD, Six Sigma Master Black Belt, CPIM, CPM,
Sr. Advisor to Ciscos Six Sigma Center of Excellence
Adjunct Professor of Finance, Santa Clara University
May 23, 2011
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

A Leading Six Sigma Authority:


To me Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) is a versatile, powerful,
process centered tool that belongs in
every Process Owners and Six Sigma
practitioners toolbox."

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

A Leading Operational Risk Authority:


Catastrophic failures in operational risk
management are rarely caused by a single and
major point of failure. Rather they are the
cumulative effect of smaller and inter-related
failures. FMEA is the tool of choice to address
these complex operational risk failures at any
level of an organization, whether tactical,
strategic, or enterprise-wide. It works in every
type of organization.

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

Objectives
The objectives for this session include:
Understand what a FMEA is, why it is used, and when it
can it be deployed
Understand the different components, definitions, and
calculations used in a FMEA
Learn the steps to developing a FMEA
Use examples and Case Studies to showcase FMEA in
action:
Purchasing Process in Finance
Sample High Tech Project to Reduce RMA Rates
San Bruno Gas Pipeline Explosion
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

Reliability Defined
Product reliability is one of the qualities of a product. Quite simply, it
is the quality which measures the probability that the product or
device will work.
As a definition:
Product reliability is the ability of a unit to perform a required
function under stated conditions for a stated period of time.
And, correspondingly, quantitative reliability, as a definition, is:
Quantitative reliability is the probability that a unit will perform a
required function under stated conditions for a stated time.
Source: Fergenbaum, A. V. (1991). Total Quality Control. New York: McGrawHill, Inc.

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

When Reliability is Lacking - Categories of Failure Mode


Safety
Any failure mode that directly affects the ability of a product to meet Federal
Safety Standards, or creates a potential product liability issue, or can result in
death or extensive property damage.
Major (Hard)
Any failure mode that stops the operation of a product or system which requires
immediate repair.
Evidenced by a catastrophic event, i.e, TEPCO Nuclear Plant Meltdown
Failure mechanism might be due to a shock to the system or an accumulation
of shocks to the system
Minor (Soft)
Any failure mode that results in a product from meeting one of its intended
functions, but does not preclude it from satisfying its most important functions.
Any failure mode which results in a gradual but not complete ability of the
product to meet its intended function.
Degradation of performance over time, wear are examples of soft failures.
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

FMEA Defined
What is a Failure Modes & Effects Analysis?
A FMEA is a systematic method to:
1. Recognize, evaluate, and prioritize (score) potential failures
and their effects
2. Identify actions which could eliminate or reduce the chance
of potential failure occurring
3. Document and share the process
FMEA generates a living document that can be used to anticipate
and prevent failures from occurring.
In DMAIC and Design For Sigma Projects, FMEAs can be used in
various stages and revised as the project moves forward.

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

Why Use a FMEA


Use of quality tools such as Statistical Process Control (SPC)
encourage the use of FMEA(s) to help problem-solve quality
problems
ISO/QS 9000 and product liability directives of the EC 1985
strongly encourage its use.
Helps select alternatives (in system, design, process, and service)
with high reliability and high safety potential during the early phases
(Blanchard 1986)
Ensures that all conceivable effects on operational success have
been considered.
Many risk management regimens and standards, such as ISO
31000/31010 used in finance and operations are based on FMEA
logic probability vs. severity scoring and matrix.

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

Why Use a FMEA - Continued


Improves the quality, reliability and safety of
products and processes in a proactive manner.
Helps to increase customer satisfaction, by
proactively addressing failures that keep us from
meeting critical customer requirements in
processes or products.
Reduces product development timing and cost
Reduces operational risk
Documents and tracks actions taken to reduce
risk; Prioritize areas of focus

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

FMEA is a Team Process


Team Formation

Team Roles

Product Development

Facilitator

Design

Champion

Manufacturing

Recorder/librarian

Quality
Sales/Marketing

6-10 members is optimal

Suppliers
Reliability and testing

What are your experiences in FMEA Teams?


Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

10

Why Use a Team for FMEA


Team decision-making takes time. For a team to reach consensus:
100 percent active (express agreement/disagreement) participation.
Participants must be open to new ideas/to influence others.
100 percent agreement not the goal. Majority does not rule.
Sometimes a single individual may be on the right track.
Need a formal system for voting.
Need effective facilitator (leader).
Team process check (how did we do?)
Difficult individuals
Facilitator must resolve such instances.
Effective meeting skills
Planning the meeting
Effective problem-solving skills
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

Soft Skills
Are Critical
11

The Primary Driver for FMEA - What does 99.9% Quality Mean?
One hour of unsafe drinking water

268,500 defective tires shipped per year

291 incorrect pacemaker operations per year

500 incorrect surgical operations

12 babies given to the wrong parent each day


Two unsafe landings at OHare Airport per day
Your heart fails to beat 32,000 times per year
6,000 lost pieces of mail per hour
20,000 incorrect drug prescriptions per year
107 incorrect medical procedures performed
daily

performed each week


Two million documents lost by the IRS
per year
880,000 credit card magnetic strips with
the wrong information
19,000 newborn babies dropped at
birth by doctors each year
22,000 checks deducted from the wrong

14,208 defective personal computers shipped

account each hour

each year

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

12

Elements of a Successful FMEA


1. All problems are not the same. This is perhaps the most
fundamental concept in the entire FMEA methodology. Unless a
priority of problems (as a concept) is recognized, workers are likely to
be contenders for chasing fires. They will respond to the loudest
request and/or the problem of the moment. (In other words, they will
manage by emergency.) - Does this sound like your organization?

2. The customer must be known. Acceptance criteria are


defined by the customer, not the engineer.

3. The function must be known.


4. One must be prevention (proactively) oriented. Unless
continual improvement is the force that drives the FMEA, the efforts of
conducting FMEA will be static. The FMEA will be conducted only to
satisfy customers and/or market requirements to the letter rather than
the spirit of the requirements. Unfortunately, this is a common
problem in implementation of an FMEA program.)

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

13

Sample FMEA Form

Describe
the impact
Process
Step

Describe how the


process step
could go wrong
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

What could
What actions
cause the
will you take?
failure?
Is there anything in place
to detect or stop this from
happening?

Rankings (1-10)

14

Sample FMEA Process - Adding Milk to a Cake Mix

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

15

History of the FMEA


1940s - First developed by the US
military in 1949 to determine the
effect of system and equipment
failures
1960s - Adopted and refined by
NASA (used in the Apollo Space
program)
1970s Ford Motor Co. introduces
FMEA after the Pinto affair. Soon
adopted across automotive industry
Today FMEA used in both
manufacturing and service
industries
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

16

Types of FMEAs
Design FMEA - examines the functions of a
component, subsystem or main system.
Potential Failures: incorrect material choice, inappropriate
specifications.
Example: Air Bag (excessive air bag inflator force).

Process FMEA - examines the processes used to


make a component, subsystem, or main system.
Potential Failures: operator assembling part incorrectly, excess
variation in process resulting in out-spec products.
Example: Air Bag Assembly Process (operator may not install
air bag properly on assembly line such that it may not engage
during impact).

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

17

Definitions
Failure Mode
The way in which the product or process
could fail to perform its intended function.
Failure modes may be the result of upstream
operations or inputs, or may cause
downstream operations or outputs to fail.

Failure Effects
The outcome of the occurrence of the failure
mode on the system, product, or process.
Failure effects define the impact on the
customer.
Ranking is translated into Severity score

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

18

Definitions
Failure Causes
Potential causes or reasons the failure
mode could occur
Likelihood of the cause creating the
failure mode is translated into an
Occurrence score

Current Controls
Mechanisms currently in place that will
detect or prevent the failure mode from
occurring
Ability to detect the failure before it
reaches the customer is translated in
Delectability score
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

19

Linking Causes to Effects

One to One, One to Many, Many to One, or Many to Many


Cause 1

Effect 1

Cause 2

Effect 2

1:1
1:M
Effect 1
Cause 1
Effect 2

M:1
Cause 1
Effect 1
Cause 2

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

20

Calculations
Risk Priority Number
The Risk Priority Number (RPN) identifies the greatest
areas of concern.
RPN is the product of:
(1) Severity rating
(2) Occurrence rating
(3) Detection rating

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

21

Calculations - FMEA Variables


Severity
A rating corresponding to the seriousness of an effect of a potential
failure mode. (scale: 1-10. 1: no effect on the customer, 10: hazardous
effect)

Occurrence
A rating corresponding to the rate at which a first level cause and its
resultant failure mode will occur over the design life of the system, over
the design life of the product, or before any additional process controls
are applied. (scale: 1-10. 1: failure unlikely, 10: failures certain)

Detection
A rating corresponding to the likelihood that the detection methods or
current controls will detect the potential failure mode before the product
is released for production for design, or for process before it leaves the
production facility. (scale: 1-10. 1: will detect failure, 10: almost certain
not to detect failures)

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

22

Calculations - Risk Priority Number (RPN)


Severity x Occurrence x Detectability =
Risk Priority Number (RPN)
For a given potential failure mode, how bad
the outcome is multiplied by how likely it
would actually happen multiplied by what
things are in place today to prevent or notice
it before it happens.

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

23

FMEA Process
1

Start with the


process map

For each step,


brainstorm
potential failure
modes and effects

Determine
severity
3

Determine the
potential causes to
each failure mode

Determine
likelihood of
occurrence
Determine
detectability

Evaluate current
controls
5

Identify actions
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

Determine RPN
24

When is a FMEA Started?


As early as possible; that is, as soon as some
information is known (usually through a QFD).
Practitioners should not wait for all the information. If
they do, they will never perform a FMEA because they
will never have all the data or information.
When new systems, designs, products, processes, or
services are designed.
When existing systems, designs, products, processes,
or services are about to change regardless of reason.
When new applications are found for the existing
conditions of the systems, designs, products,

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

25

When is a FMEA Completed?


Only when the system, design, product, process, or service is
considered complete and/or discontinued.
A System FMEA may be considered finished when all the hardware has
been defined and the design is declared frozen.
A Design FMEA may be considered finished when a release date for
production has been set.
A Process FMEA may be considered finished when all operations have
been identified and evaluated and all critical and significant
characteristics have been addressed in the control plan.
A Service FMEA may be considered finished when the design of the
system and individual tasks have been defined and evaluated, and all
critical and significant characteristics have been addressed in the
control plans.
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

26

FMEA Tips
No absolutes rules for what is a high RPN number.
Rather, FMEA often are viewed on relative scale (i.e.,
highest RPN addressed first)
It is a team effort
Motivate the team members
Ensure cross-functional representation on the team
Treat as a living document, reflect the latest changes
Develop prioritization with the process owners!
Assign an owner to the FMEA; ensure it is periodically
reviewed and updated
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

27

FMEA & The DMAIC Lifecycle


Q: At what phase can/should the FMEA be used in a DMAIC project?
A: A FMEA can be used in most phases of the DMAIC lifecycle for
various purposes

How it can be
used:
Project
selection
Project
scope

How it can be
used:

Understand
the process
(w/ process
mapping)

How it can be
used:
Identify
process
variables /
root cause
analysis

How it can be
used:
Assist with
new process
development /
understand
failures in
design

How it can be
used:
Manage
and control
the process
on an
ongoing
basis

FMEA can also be used in each stage of


Design for Six Sigma - DMADV
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

28

FMEA Example
Purchasing Requisition to Purchase Order

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

29

Example

Start

Complete
Purchase
Requisition
(PR)

Send PR to
Purchasing
Dept.

Presentation_ID

Incorrect
PR
Returned

Correct and
Send Back

Receive
Goods

No
Form
Correct

Receive
PR

Supplier

Purchasing
Department

customer
Focus
Team

Purchasing Dept.

Confirm
receipt of
P.O.

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

Yes

Complete
P.O.

Complete
Commit
Process

Send P.O.
To supplier

Ship
Goods

30

Example

Purchasing Dept.

From the
process map,
list the process
steps

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Brainstorm the
various ways the
step could fail

Cisco Confidential

31

Example

Purchasing Dept.

Determine the
potential effects

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

Determine the
severity ranking
using the scale

32

Severity Rankings

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

33

Example

Purchasing Dept.

Determine the
potential causes

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Determine how
likely the failure
would occur due
to this cause

Cisco Confidential

34

Occurrence Rankings

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

35

Example

Purchasing Dept.

Identify what controls


or measures are
currently in place

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

Determine how likely


the controls in place
will detect or prevent
the failure mode from
occurring
36

Detectability Rankings

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

37

Example

Calculate the RPN

Severity

Occurrence

Detectability

5 x 4 x 3 =

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

RPN

60

38

Example

Purchasing Dept.

Brainstorm
potential actions
that will lower the
RPN
Presentation_ID

Assign
specific
owners

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

Occurrence Reduced
from 4 to 3.
PRN cut in half.

FMEA owner &


team update
the document
as actions are
complete

Recalculate
the RPN after
actions are
complete
39

Case Study:
FMEA Logic in Scoring the Risk of Problems

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

40

Case Study: Using a FMEA Hybrid


Adding Project Prioritization Index (PPI)
PPI can be used in combination with FMEA to score problem solving
projects by balancing potential savings against project costs, and project
effort/duration against project risks (chance of success).
PPI consists of four metrics:
Project Costs ($)
Project Benefits ($)
Project Probability of Success (Percent)
Project Duration (Years)
The PPI formula balances:
Project Benefits versus Project Costs
Project Probability of Success versus Project Duration
The formula looks like this:

PPI = (Benefits/Costs) x (Probability of Success/Project Duration)


Source: Praveen Gupta, Total Quality Management, in Anthony Tarantino, Risk Management
in Finance: Six Sigma and Other Next Generation Techniques (Wiley and Sons, 2010)
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

41

Case Study: Using a FMEA Hybrid - Adding


Project Prioritization Index (PPI)

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

42

Case Study: Using FMEA+PPI


To Score Potential Problem Solutions

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

43

Case Study:
San Bruno Gas Pipeline Explosion

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

44

Play the Youtube VOD from CBS News

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZ6YbUrnxVM

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

45

San Bruno, CA - September 10, 2010


The ruptured natural gas
pipeline created a crater
approximately 72 feet long
by 26 feet wide.
A pipe segment
approximately 28 feet long
was found about 100 feet
away from the crater.
The released natural gas
was ignited sometime after
the rupture; the resulting
fire destroyed 37 homes
and damaged 18.
Eight people were killed,
numerous individuals were
injured, and many more
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Source: http://www.ntsb.gov/surface/pipeline/preliminary-reports/sanbruno-ca.html
Cisco Confidential

46

Loss of Power at Control Terminal


Just before the accident, PG&E was working
on their uninterruptable power supply (UPS)
system at Milpitas Terminal, which is located
about 39.33 miles SE of the accident site.
During the course of this work, the power
supply from the UPS system to the supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system
malfunctioned so that instead of supplying a
predetermined output of 24 volts of direct
current (VDC), the UPS system supplied
approximately 7 VDC or less to the SCADA
system.
Because of this anomaly, the electronic signal
to the regulating valve for Line 132 was lost.
The loss of the electrical signal resulted in the
regulating valve moving from partially open to
the full open position as designed.
The pressure then increased to 386 psig. The
Presentation_ID
2008 Cisco
Systems, Inc.
All rights reserved.
Cisco Confidential
over-protection
valve,
which
was pneumatically

Source: http://www.ntsb.gov/surface/pipeline/preliminaryreports/san-bruno-ca.html
47

Case Study: San Bruno Gas Pipeline Explosion

There were longitudinal fractures in the first and second pup of the
ruptured segment and a partial circumferential fracture at the girth
weld between the first and second pup. There was a complete
circumferential fracture at the girth weld between the fourth pup in the
ruptured segment and the fifth pup in the north segment.
Source: http://www.ntsb.gov/surface/pipeline/preliminary-reports/san-bruno-ca.html
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

48

Case Study: San Bruno Gas Pipeline Explosion

The longitudinal fracture in the first pup continued south into the pipe
ending in a circumferential fracture in the middle of the pipe.
Source: http://www.ntsb.gov/surface/pipeline/preliminary-reports/san-bruno-ca.html
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

49

Poor Document and Records Retention


SAN FRANCISCO (AP) March 5, 2011
Facing a state Public Utilities Commission
order to produce records on its pipelines by
March 15. the utility has been shipping pallets
loaded with boxes of documents to the Cow
Palace in Daly City, where PG&E employees
are pouring through the paper records.
This effort is an example of the level of
commitment the company is putting forward to
make sure this process is thorough and
complete, PG&E spokesman Paul Moreno
said. it was part of a 24-hour search by
more
than 300 search
employees.
The document
comes after investigators found a seam with inferior welds that was
believed to be the origin of the blast.
PG&Es computer records had shown the pipeline did not have a seam, but PG&E
officials have acknowledged problems when the old paper records were incorporated into
the utilitys computer system.
PG&E President
Chris Johns said
last month the utility had been unable to find
2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
Cisco Confidential

Presentation_ID

50

DOT to Issue New Pipeline Regulations in August


SAN FRANCISCO (Dow Jones)-The U.S. Department of
Transportation will issue new safety
rules for the nation's oil and gas
pipeline operators in August, the
agency's top official said Thursday.
"We and the Obama administration
will redouble our efforts on pipeline
safety," Transportation Secretary
Ray LaHood said, speaking at a
press conference in San Francisco.
LaHood earlier visited the site in
San Bruno, Calif., where a PG&E
Corp. (PCG) gas pipeline exploded
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

51

Mode of Failure - Pipeline Rupture followed by Explosion


Potential Causes of Failure:
1. Faulty Weld (1/2 thickness spec)
2. Pipe Corrosion (Over 50 Years Old)
3. Corrosion of Girth/Lateral Weld

Causes 1-5

Tactical in Nature
Six Sigma Tool
Design of Experiments

4. Corrosion of Circumference Weld


5. Failure of Monitoring Station UPS
6. Lack of Automatic Shut Off Valves
7. Faulty Maintenance Documentation
8. Faulty Maintenance Procedures
9. Lack of Tone-at-the-Top Management
10. Weak Oversight by Calif. PUC

Causes 6-11

Systemic in Nature
Enterprise-wide
Operational Risk Mgt.

11. Weak Federal Regulations by DOT


Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

52

FMEA Advantages Over RCA and 5 Whys


A robust FMEA will consider each
of the 5 tactical modes of failure
and combination of modes of
failure.
Design of Experiments (DOE) can
be used to test the most likely
combination of modes and
causes.
A typical Root Cause Analysis
(RCA) may focus on one or more
of the failure modes and causees,
but would not score their risk
profiles.
A typical 5 Whys will focus on only
one of the failure modes, and may
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

53

FMEA Suggested Tests


Design of Experiments (DOE)
Potential Tests & Combination
of Tests:
1. Faulty Weld
2. Corrosion of Pipe
3. Corrosion of Girth/Lateral Weld
4. Corrosion of Circumference Weld
5. Rise In Pressure
6. Faulty Weld (Remove Half Weld)
+ Accelerated Corrosion Test of
Pipe and Welds + Rise in
Pressure
Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

54

Additional Information

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

55

FMEA & Other Risk Analysis Tools

FMEA

Cause & Effect Diagram

Bottoms-up approach
to failure analysis

Examines a certain
failure mode or event
and identifies all the
possible causes

Systematic method
for identifying all the
potential failure modes
of a process or
product

Causes are grouped


into several logical
categories

Creates prioritized
ranking of failure
modes within a system

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Fault Tree Analysis


Top-down approach
to failure analysis
Starting point is a
failure or undesired
state

Drill down into lower


level events leading
up to the undesired
state

Similar to the 5 Whys


method
Cisco Confidential

56

Backup

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

57

For Further Information


Anthony Tarantino, PhD, MBB
Sr. Consulting Support
agtarantino@hotmail.com, 562-818-3275

Carl Ashcroft, MBB


Ciscos Six Sigma Training and Education Programs
cashrof@cisco.com, 408-525-3929

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

58

Published FMEA Guidelines


J1739 - From the SAE for the automotive industry.
AIAG FMEA-3 - From the Automotive Industry Action Group for the automotive industry.
ARP5580 - From the SAE for non-automotive applications.
EIA/JEP131 Provides guidelines for the electronics industry, from the JEDEC/EIA.
P-302-720 - provides guidelines for NASA GSFC spacecraft and instruments.
SEMATECH 92020963A-ENG - for the semiconductor equipment industry.

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

59

Rankings

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

60

Presentation_ID

2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Confidential

61

Potrebbero piacerti anche