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VASUDEO PANDYA P.E. ; S.E.

Family Status: Married


Educational Qualification :
B.E. (Civil) Birla Engineering College (BITS), Pilani
MS (Structural) University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

Professional Career Summary:


I have worked on large Oil Refinery and Thermal
Power Plant Projects for last 25 years in USA.

Professional Achievement/special
knowledge:
License Professional Engineer (P.E.)
License Structural Engineer (S.E.) in U.S.

Special Interest:
Peer Review/Checking (Structural ) of projects
designed in house or designed by out side
consulting companies. Sharing my experience with
you Young Engineers (Mentoring).

LESSONS LEARNED FROM FAILURE OF


CONCERETE STRUCTURES
Introduction

Studying structural failure case studies is a way of studying the history


of the engineering profession. Typical calculations for design are based
on predicting and avoiding failure. The factor of safety is used to avoid
failures, but knowledge of past failures will better equip an engineer to
steer clear of future failures. It is not only important to know what
caused the failure, but also to understand how it occurred and how to
avoid the problem in the future.
This failure study will make you a better Structural Engineer.

Professionalism in Engineering
Here I produce Professionalism as defined in
"Recommended Guidelines For The Practice Of Structural Engineering in California". Fifth
Edition September 1999. By Professional Practice Committee of Structural Engineers
Association Of California (SEAOC), Section 2 , Pages 1-2 thru 1-4.
2. PROFESSIONALISM
2.1 General: The essence of professionalism is integrity and honesty. Engineers should maintain ethical
and professional standards when performing structural Engineering Services.
2.2 Obligation to the Public: When performing structural engineering services, an engineer should:
2.2.1 Endeavor to protect the general health and safety of the public, as well as fulfill obligations to clients.
2.2.2 Perform services only within the engineers area of expertise.
2.2.3 Perform services in an objective, honest, and impartial manner, basing decisions on education,
analysis, knowledge, experience, and sound engineering judgment
2.2.4 Issue public statements in an objective and a truthful manner.
2.2.5 Refer deceit, misrepresentation, violation of contract, fraud, negligence, or incompetency of others
performing Structural Engineering services to the Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land
Surveyors. An objective and unbiased approach to referring such acts to the Board of Registration is
important.
2.3 Obligation to the Client: When performing structural engineering services, an Engineer should:
2.3.1 Act faithfully and honestly in the clients best interest, and respect the confidentiality of information
obtain from, and on behalf of, the client.

Professionalism in Engineering ..

Continue

2.3.2 Disclose to the client real and potential conflict of interest prior to
performing services for the client, thus offering the client the opportunity to
decide whether a conflict of interest would be detrimental to the interest of the
client.
2.3.3 Solicit professional assignments in an ethical and professional manner.
2.3.4 Accurately represent the engineers qualifications and experience.
2.4 Obligation to the Profession:
When performing Structural Engineering services, an Engineer should:
2.4.1 Uphold the integrity and dignity of the profession.
2.4.2 Perform professional services with honesty and fairness.
2.4.3 Actively support professional societies and organizations dedicated to the
advancement of knowledge within the profession.
2.5 Obligation to Colleagues, Employers , and Employees:
When Performing Structural Engineering services, an engineer should:
2.5.1 Act with fairness, honesty, objectivity, and respect in relationship with
other engineers.
2.5.2 Recognize and respect the professional contributions of Colleagues,
employers, and employees.
2.5.3 Render an opinion of the work of another engineer based upon an
unbiased, comprehensive evaluation of the work, recognizing that there may be
alternate methods used to achieve acceptable results.

Emerging Issues in Structural Engineering


Emerging Issues
Structural engineers have a uniquely significant responsibility for
protecting the public relative to the other design disciplines.
Architectural, mechanical, and electrical system failures usually result
in unattractiveness, poor functionality, discomfort and/or
inconvenience. A structural system failure almost always has more
serious consequences, even in the best cases, there are often
substantial costs associated with correcting what is or could become a
life-threatening situation. As a result, professional liability insurance
rates for structural engineers have been increasing, leading to the
creation of the Risk Management Program (RMP). In addition, efforts
are underway to establish board certification at the national level and
expand separate licensure at the state level to "raise the bar" of
qualifications to practice structural engineering.
Blast resistance , Progressive/Disproportionate collapse, of structures.
Fire resistance design of structures.
Learning from failure/ collapse of structures.

RESPONSIBILITY OF A STRUCTURAL
ENGINEER OF RECORD (SER)
For a time being think that you have your consulting firm in some city in USA. In USA as
compared to India, Liability Laws are very strong. Thats my opinion. You firm designed
one of the three recently failed structures (See recent postings in SEFI) in India.
1) A Chimney Failure.
2) A Coal Bunker Failure.
3) Jalandhar Factory Collapse. 20 died, 75 Injured.
Client ( Owner) of these Plants will sue your firm. There will be expert witnesses in the
court. Finally Court decides that this was a Design/Detailing flaw. Court will order Heavy
penalties (Money awards for damages). Also you as a HOD(Civil/Structural) or MD of your
firm will loose your P.E. or S.E. license to practice Structural Engineering. With this, my
best guess is you will not be in business of Structural Engineering anymore .
Sorry to point such a bleak picture but this is the way Structural Engineering is practice
in USA. Liability, taking responsibility of mistakes and when required paying heavy court
fines are always expected from us engineers.
So my advice to you is when you submit a project proposal have enough Man Hrs to
implement Quality Assurance using these Industry Standards from USA.

Failure of Structures Education in India


FAILURE OF STRUCTURES EDUCATION.
With the attached web link and attach file see need for such FAILURE
OF STRUCTURES EDUCATION in Indian Universities for B.E. (Civil) and
M.E (Civil) and also for professional/working civil engineers like us.

http://www.structuremag.org/article.aspx?articleID=
336

Failure of Structures Education (Courses) and


Problems in India

4th April 2012


Learning from failures is a very
important facet of engineering
education. Unfortunately, this is
ignored in all our engineering
colleges, the IITs included. It's high
time this gap is bridged.

Indrajit Barua.

Failure of Structures Education (Courses) and


Problems in India
From a posting in SEFI by Prof. Arc.

I agree with you 100% that it is very useful to know why


a structure has failed as important results are learnt from
such studies.
The problem [definitely in INDIA] is such information may
not be available for wide circulation fearing witch hunt.
There has to be legal immunity
If you have access to any information on failure of
structures in INDIA, please provide web link.

Failure of Structures Education(Courses) and


Problems in India

Dear SEFIANs,i tried to get hold of a failure


report of one of the chimney failures in
India. The report is in the safe hands of
police and judiciary but is never allowed
to be seen by engineering fraternity. And
everybody expects failures should be
mitigated.

regards
murali

Failure of Structures Education (Courses) and


Problems in India

The bunker of the 6th unit of the Kahalgaon


Thermal Power Station in Bhagalpur district
collapsed on Sunday halting power
generation from the unit with 500 MW
capacity.
Source : News Report
regards
bijay sarkar

Delhi Metro Concrete Pier Failure


I found this important recent failure in India from Google web search.
This DMRC failure was also published in ENR (Engineering News Record) of USA.

Delhi Metro Mishap: DMRC, Gammon Responsible.


The four-member panel that went into the July 12 Metro mishap has fixed responsibility on the DMRC and
contractor Gammon for the accident and recommended the reconstruction or modification of four pier caps
near the Zamrudpur construction site.
In a 11-page report, the panel headed by IIT Professor A K Nagpal said, there was a departure at site from the
requirements of the design in the application of grout to the interface between the end plates of the steel strut
and the face of the pier/pier cap to which the plates are attached.
"The drawings followed on site for construction of Pier 67 were advance copies and not authenticated by
DMRC's design section. On enquiry, it was found that on occasions work commences without 'Good for
Construction' signed drawings to avoid delayed construction," the report said.
It also recommended the "reconstruction of or modifications to pier caps 54, 66, 67 and 68 to a revised design
configuration."
The July 12 incident at Zamrudpur where an under-construction metro bridge collapsed due to "design fault" in
pier 67 killed seven people.
The panel also asked the DMRC to strengthen its design review system to ensure that rigorous checking of
special structures is carried out in future and that certified drawings are made a prerequisite for construction to
proceed.

Delhi Metro Concrete Pier Failure


continue
The report also said that unconditional "no objection" was not obtained for the permanent
works drawings prior to construction, which should have been the practice for structures of
such a special nature.
"The contractor (Gammon India) did not ensure that 'good for construction' status with
appropriate certification by DMRC was achieved prior to constructing the works," the report
said and added that there is concern regarding the sample test recording by the contractor
and witnessing of the same by DMRC.
"The consistency of concrete sample test results is highly abnormal. This raises doubts
over the authenticity of the records submitted," the report said.
The panel concluded that deficiencies in material, design and failure to carry out material
testing at the time of appearance of the first cracks and deferral of the load test were the
causes of the accident.
It also said both the temporary works and permanent works designers should be required
to check the material and workmanship of special structures at site to certify compliance
with design intent prior to application of loads on temporary works assemblies and prior to
pouring concrete at permanent works locations.
Show Reliance Industries Slides.

Earthquakes and Structural


Engineers
Relate this to Bhuj Earthquake of 2001 in Gujarat:
http://www.pptnetwork.net/? query=bhuj+earthquake+ppt
Dear SEFIN'S:
I watch "NDTV" documentary today 23/09/2011 evening "Agar Delhi Hili
Hoti". That was for a Structural Engineer like me walking through a
dangerous land. That was riveting. Work is cut out for us. What else to
say. We should all ask for a copy of it and see it. Delhi is Seismic Zone IV
and that TV documentary scare's me, a Structural Engineer like nothing
else.
TIMES OF INDIA " Editorial " on Earthquake preparedness says it
all,
Titled. WAKE UP CALL:
Sep 21, 2011, 12.54am IST

Earthquakes and Structural Engineers..

Continue

TIMES OF INDIA " Editorial " on Earthquake preparedness says it


all,
Titled. WAKE UP CALL:
Sep 21, 2011, 12.54am IST
Himalayan Earthquake
With the death toll climbing to at least 80, the recent Himalayan earthquake is an
urgent wake-up call for all concerned the government, policymakers and law
enforcers. The effects of the 6.8 magnitude earthquake were felt across as many as
six northern and eastern Indian states. The scale of devastation in its trail has raised
critical concerns about India's preparedness to deal with quakes of much greater
intensity. That Japan experienced earthquakes this year measuring 8.9 on the
Richter scale releasing energy a thousand times greater than the current
Himalayan quake should serve as a sober reminder.
Given that over 58.6% of land in India is vulnerable to tremors, the National Disaster
Management Authority (NDMA) has identified quakes as a major issue of concern.
As many as 38 of India's cities, including Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai, Chennai, Pune and
Ahmedabad, fall within moderate-to-high risk seismic zones. Put simply, an
earthquake on the scale that Japan experienced would lay waste whole cities here. It
is well known that quakes do not kill people, buildings do. Safety essentially lies in
ensuring quake-resistant construction of buildings. There already exists a host of
safety regulations on paper. The NDMA has mandated all new constructions to be
earthquake-resistant, especially in seismic zone cities.

Earthquakes and Structural Engineers..


Continue
Earthquake engineering codes and quake-safe construction guidelines have been laid
down by government bodies. But the real worry is about their enforcement.
Illegal and poor quality constructions continue to be the bane of urban India, coupled
with a crippling lack of awareness regarding safety norms. Structural engineers have
criticized city authorities for flouting regulations and risking lives. Behind the shoddy
construction is murky collusion between real estate and municipal authorities, mired in
corruption and rule bending.
India needs to draw lessons from Japan, which has stringently enforced strict building
codes, put into effect a functional warning system and conducted regular drills among
people. The Himalayan quake is a reminder to get our act together. Besides enforcing
building codes, important infrastructure such as arterial roads and airports needs to be
fortified. Community-level preparedness could drastically reduce the loss of lives and
property. Education and information are two vital conduits for spreading awareness.
The government`s resource material on quakes should be widely disseminated and
discussed at every forum, starting with schools. Disaster management is already part of
the social sciences school syllabus. Regular drills can help prepare children to deal with
sudden situations. It is the extent of disaster preparedness which will help India protect
itself from quake devastation.

Failure of concrete Structures.. Tower of


Pisa
Introduction
The Leaning Tower of Pisa is the freestanding bell tower of the
cathedral of the Italian city of Pisa. It is situated behind the
Cathedral and is the third oldest structure in Pisas Cathedral
Square. The tower is about 60 m (200 ft) tall from foundation to
belfry, 19.6 m in (66 ft) in diameter and weighs approximately 145
MN (14,500 tons). Its foundation is inclined at almost 5.5 degrees to
the south; the tower overhangs the ground about 4.5 m (20 ft) out of
plumb. Today its inclination is about 10%; the value corresponding to
the eccentricity on the loads on the foundation is 2.3 m.

Lessons
The failure of the Tower of Pisa is without doubt unique for a number
of reasons ranging from the fact that it is a failure that has been
occurring essentially on a continuous basis for more than 800 years.
Despite the extensive investigations and analyses conducted over
the past 60 years, there is still no consensus on the cause of failure.
What is significant however is that finally, after 8 centuries, the
condition of the tower has been improved.
For more details use web link

http://
matdl.org/failurecases/Building_Collapse_Cases/Tower_
of_Pisa

Failure of concrete Structures..


Introduction
Studying structural failure case studies is a way of studying the history of
the engineering profession. Typical calculations for design are based on
predicting and avoiding failure. The factor of safety is used to avoid failures,
but knowledge of past failures will better equip an engineer to steer clear of
future failures. It is not only important to know what caused the failure, but
also to understand how it occurred and how to avoid the problem in the
future.
In the collapse at 2000 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts on
January 25, 1971, punching shear failure is believed to have triggered the
collapse of two thirds of the 16-story concrete building during construction.
But an investigation called for by the mayor proved that there were many
flaws in the design of the apartment building. It is important to remind
engineers about past failures, such as this one, so that history does not
repeat itself.

2000 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston Massachusetts


(January 25, 1971)

Failed Building

Designed Building

2000 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston Massachusetts


(January 25, 1971)
SHEAR MECHANISMS AND FAILURES
Shear in reinforced concrete can be a complex subject for students to grasp. First of
all, the flow of forces can be difficult to visualize. Second, while the need to use
stirrup reinforcement to enhance shear strength is straightforward, the need to
provide minimum stirrups when the calculated forces show that they arent
necessary is not so obvious.
Two case studies illustrate the collapse of buildings under construction due to
punching shear and similar mechanisms. The first of the two was the January 25,
1971 collapse of the 2000 Commonwealth Avenue apartment building under
construction in Boston. Four workers were killed in this collapse. The project was
characterized by an almost total lack of construction control and inspection.
The floor plan and the extent of collapse are shown in Fig 1.

2000 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston Massachusetts (January 25, 1971)


This building used flat plate construction. A plate is a slab of uniform thickness supported on columns.
This is a very economical type of construction for short spans and light loads because formwork is very
simple and
the absence of beams reduces the floor-to-floor height (p. 606, Wight and MacGregor, 2009) 3. However,
the
problem with the system is that it is subject to two-way or punching shear of the slabs, which can be a
brittle failure
mechanism. Despite the importance of this failure mechanism, textbooks often suggest that the material
not be
covered in an introductory course but be deferred to an advanced course.
Prof. Delatte
The punching shear mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 2. The slab breaks away and the column punches
through the slab. The resistance to punching shear depends on the strength of the concrete, the effective
depth of the
slab, and the perimeter of the failure plane around the column. Clearly, the loads applied to the slab and
the removal
of shoring under the slab are also important. In the collapse at 2000 Commonwealth Avenue, the strength
of the
concrete was low and strength development was impaired by cold weather. Some of the reinforcement was
improperly placed and poorly developed. The roof slab of the building held heavy mechanical equipment,
and there
was evidence that shoring had been removed prematurely.

2000 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston Massachusetts (January 25, 1971)


Lesson learned:

Unfortunately, 2000 Commonwealth Avenue would not be the last project that suffered from
faulty construction practices leading to a punching shear failure and progressive collapse of
the
building. Skyline Plaza was one of the first major failures to follow Commonwealth Avenue.
Similar to the collapse in Boston this 30 story concrete structure failed due to early removal
of
shores, insufficient concrete strength, and improper construction planning. Harbour Bay
Condominium was another case of a building project that resulted in a collapse during
construction. Again procedural errors were largely to blame leading to a punching shear
failure
and progressive collapse during construction. Immediately following the collapse a summary
of
the failure at Commonwealth Avenue was available but the details were not widely known.
Skyline Plaza and Harbour Bay both could have benefitted from the timely dissemination of
information about this failure. For a further discussion of similar failures please review
Concrete
System Collapses and Failures During Construction.
For more details use web link
http://matdl.org/failurecases/Building_Collapse_Cases/2000_Commonwealth

Building Collapse Cases/Skyline Plaza at Bailey's Crossroad

Building Collapse Cases/Skyline Plaza at Bailey's Crossroad


Introduction:
On March 2, 1973, the Skyline Plaza apartment building in Baileys Crossroads, Virginia
collapsed while under construction. The collapse extended vertically through the building from
the 24th floor to the ground, leaving an appearance of the structure as two different high rise
buildings with a gap between them. The collapse tore a sixty-foot (18 m) wide gap through the
building all the way to the ground. At the time of the collapse, two practically identical
reinforced concrete towers had already been built (Kaminetzky 1991, p. 64). The collapse
occurred at about 2:30 pm (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977 pg. 2).
Structural Analysis:
At the time of the collapse, three dimensional elastic finite element (FE) analysis using
computers was still a relatively new technology. The NBS investigation team used FE analysis
to evaluate the slab stresses in the region where the collapse occurred, using beam and plate
elements. Stresses were compared to the provisions of ACI 318-71 (ACI 1971). Three different
cases were analyzed, with different shoring and concrete conditions. Yield line analysis was
also used. The results showed that even with low concrete strength, a flexural failure of the
slab would be unlikely. However, under any of the cases where shores had been removed, a
punching shear failure of the slab would probably occur. Once punching shear occurred at any
one column, the collapse would rapidly propagate as other slab-column joints became
overstressed. There was no indication that the crane was a contributing factor to the collapse
(pp. 65 83, Leyendecker and Fattal, 1977).
It should also be noted that by the ACI code (ACI 1971), sand-lightweight concrete has a 15 %
lower shear strength than conventional concrete for the same compressive strength. The most
critical locations for punching shear were found to be at columns 67, 68, 83, and 84 (Carino et
al., 1983)

Building Collapse Cases/Skyline Plaza at Bailey's Crossroad

Lesson learned:
The NBS investigation concluded that the probable cause of the
collapse was a punching shear failure of the 23rd floor The premature
removal of forms supporting the 23rd story slab when the concrete of
that slab had a relatively low strength produced shear stresses in excess
of the concrete capacity at the time of the incident Most of the
eyewitness reports indicated deflection in the 23rd and 24th story slabs
[varying from 6 in. to 2 ft. (152 mm to 0.6 m)] which increased over a 15
or 20 min time period before failure The loss of support from any one
of these columns led to overstressing of the slab around the remaining
columns and the failure propagated through the 23rd floor until a stable
configuration remained. The accumulation and impact of falling debris
from the collapsing 23rd and 24th floors overloaded the 22nd floor slab
and induced the progressive collapse of successive floors down to the
ground (Carino et al. 1983, p. 41).

Building Collapse Cases/Skyline Plaza at Bailey's Crossroad


Lesson learned: (continued.)
Kaminetzky (1991, p. 67) cites six lessons from this case:
The contractor should be responsible for preparing formwork drawings, including shores
and reshores
The contractor should prepare a detailed concrete testing plan for stripping forms,
including cylinder tests
Inspectors and other quality control agencies should verify that the contractor performs
the above two items
The EOR should make sure he/she provides the contractor with all necessary design load
data and other unique project information
Uncontrolled acceleration of formwork removal may cause a total or partial collapse
Continuous top and bottom slab reinforcement is necessary around the columns.
Continuous reinforcement provides overall ductility.
If the contractor uses cylinder tests to determine when to strip forms during cold
weather, the cylinders should be stored at the same ambient temperature as the
structure. This will prevent overestimation of the in-place concrete strength.
For more details use web link
http://matdl.org/failurecases/Building_Collapse_Cases/Skyline_Plaza_at_Bailey%27s_Cros
sroad

WEB LINK FOR MORE FAILURE CASES

WEB LINK FOR MORE FAILURE CASES :


SELECT THE FAILURE CASES AND STUDY WELL. Will make
you a better Structural Engineer. Try to collect reliable
information on Failure of Structures in India (Chimneys ,
Coal Bunkers, Buildings) and learn from them.

http://matdl.org/failurecases/

Show ACI SP-284-4 slides. Learning from Failures in


Concrete Design and Construction. By Dr. Norbert
Delatte .

Thanks.

Thanks for listening. Best wishes for


your career.

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