HAZARD AND

OPERABILITY STUDY

Brainstorming, Multidisciplinary Team Approach

Structured Using Guide Words
Problem Identifying
Cost Effective

When to Use?
Optimal from a cost viewpoint
1.when applied to new plants at the point where
the design is nearly firm and documented or
2.to existing plants where a major redesign is
planned.
It can also be used for existing facilities.

Results
Types: The results are the team findings.
Which include: (1) identification of hazards
and operating problems, (2) recommended
changes in design, procedure, etc., to
improve safety; and (3) recommendations
for follow-on studies where no conclusion
was possible due to lack of information.
Nature: Qualitative.

Requirements
Data: The HazOp requires detailed plant descriptions,
such as drawings, procedures, and flow charts. A
HazOp also requires considerable knowledge of the
process, instrumentation, and operation, and this
information is usually provided by team members who
are experts in these areas.
Staff: The HazOp team is ideally made up of 5 to 7
professionals, with support for recording and
reporting. For a small plant, a team as small as two or
three could be effective.

Time and Cost

The time and cost of a HazOp are directly related to the
size and complexity of the plant being analyzed. In
general, the team must spend about three hours for
each major hardware item. Where the system
analyzed is similar to one investigated previously,
the time is usually small. Additional time must be
allowed for planning, team coordination, and
documentation. This additional time can be as much
as two three times the team effort as estimated above

HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION

A Team Leader, an expert in the HAZOP Technique
Technical Members, for example
New Design

Existing Plant

Design or Project Engineer

Plant Superintendent

Process Engineer

Process Supervisor (Foreman)

Commissioning Manager

Maintenance Engineer

Instrument Design Engineer

Instrument Engineer

Chemist

Technical Engineer

Principles of HAZOP
Concept
Systems work well when operating under design conditions.
Problems arise when deviations from design conditions occur.
Basis
a word model, a process flow sheet (PFD) or a piping and
instrumentation diagram (P&ID)
Method
use guide words to question every part of process to discover what deviations
from the intention of design can occur and what are their causes and
consequences may be.

PRINCIPLES OF HAZOPS
GUIDE WORDS*
NONE
MORE

OF

LESS OF
PART OF
MORE THAN
OTHER
CAUSE

difficulties

DEVIATION
(from standard
condition
or intention)

CONSEQUENCES
(trivial, important,
catastrophic)
-hazard
-operating

*COVERING EVERY PARAMETER RELEVANT TO THE SYSTEM

UNDER REVIEW:
i.e. Flow Rate. Flow Quantity, Pressure, Temperature, Viscosity, Components

STUDY NODES
The locations (on P&ID or procedures) at which the process parameters are investigated
for deviations. These nodes are points where the process parameters (P, T, F etc.) have
an identified design intent.

INTENTION
The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of deviations
at the study nodes.

DEVIATIONS
These are departures from the intension which can be discovered by systematically
applying the guide words.
Process conditions
activities
substances
time
place

GUIDE WORDS
Guide Words

Meaning

No, None

Negation of Intention

More Of

Quantitative Increase

Less Of

Quantitative Decrease

As Well As (More Than)

Qualitative Increase

Part Of

Qualitative Decrease

Reverse

Logical Opposite of Intention

Other Than

Complete Substitution

Deviations Generated by Each Guide Word

Guide word
NONE
MORE OF
LESS OF
PART OF
MORE THAN
OTHER THAN

Deviations
No forward flow when there should be, i.e. no flow.
More of any relevant physical property than there should
be, e.g. higher flow (rate or total quantity), higher
temperature, higher pressure, higher viscosity, etc.
Less of any relevant physical property than there should be,
e.g. lower flow (rate or total quantity), lower temperature,
lower pressure, etc.
Composition of system different from what it should be,
e.g. change in ratio of components, component missing, ect.
More components present in the system than there should
be, e.g. extra phase present (vapour, solid), impurities (air.
Water, acids, corrosion products), etc.
What else can happen apart from normal operation, e.g.
start-up, shutdown, uprating, low rate running, alternative
operation mode, failure of plant services, maintenance,
catalyst change, etc.

REVERSE: reverse flow

EXAMPLE
C

The flowsheet shows that raw material streams A and B are transferred by
pump to a reactor, where they react to form product C. Assume that the
flow rate of B should not exceed that of A. Otherwise, an explosion may
occur. Lets consider the flow of A in line 1:

FB FA

NONE
MORE
LESS
AS WELL AS
PART OF
REVERSE
OTHER THAN

No flow of A
Flow of A greater than design flow
Flow of A less than design flow
Transfer of some component additional to A
Failure to transfer a component of A
Flow of A in a direction opposite to design direction
Transfer of some material other than A

Beginning

Select a vessel

Explain the general intention of the vessel and its lines

Select a line

Explain the intention of the line

Apply the first guide words

Develop a meaningful deviation

Examine possible causes

Examine consequences

Detect hazards

10

Make suitable record

11

Repeat 6-10 for all meaningful deviations derived from first guide words

12

Repeat 5-11 for all the guide words

13

Mark line as having been examined

14

Repeat 3-13 for each line

15

Select an auxiliary system (e.g. Heating system)

16

Explain the intention of the auxiliary system

17

Repeat 5-12 for auxiliary system

18

Mark auxiliary as having been examined

19

Repeat 15-18 for all auxiliaries

20
21
22
23
24
25
End

Explain intention of the vessel

Repeat 5-12
Mark vessel as completed
Repeat 1-22 for all vessels on flow sheet
Mark flow sheet as completed

Figure 8.9 Hazard and operability studies : detailed sequence of examination

Repeat 1-24 for all flow sheets

(Chemical Industry Safety and Health Council, 1977 Item 6)

HAZOP DISPLAY
Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes

Consequences Action Required

No

System Over- Shutdown

Heated
System

No Flow Pump Fail

Line Blockage
Operator
Stops Pump

More

More
Flow

Excessive
Over-Cooled
Pump Speed
Product
(Control System) (Incomplete
Reaction)

Product
Unacceptable;
Dump

EXAMPLE
An alkene/alkane fraction containing small amounts of
suspended water is continuously pumped from a bulk
intermediate storage tank via a half-mile pipeline into a
buffer/settling tank where the residual water is settled out prior
to passing via a feed/product heat exchanger and preheater to
the reaction, is run off manually from the settling tank at
intervals. Residence time in the reaction section must be held
within closely defined limits to ensure adequate conversion of
the
alkene and to avoid excessive formation of polymer.

Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine

dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank

(1)

Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine

dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank

(2)

Results of hazard and operability atudy of proposed olefine

dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank

(3)

HAZOP PREPLANNING ISSUES

Preplanning issues addressed in a typical refinery unit HAZOP include
the following:
Verification of as-built conditions shown on the P&IDs
Line segment boundaries set; markup of P&IDs
List of support documents compiled
P&IDs (base study document)
Process flow diagrams (PFDs)
Process description
Operating manuals/procedures
Processing materials information
Equipment and material specifications
Tentative schedules of time to be spent per P&IDs sheet
Recording technique (computer program or data sheet) determination
List of standard abbreviations and acronyms compiled
Criticality rankings devised
HAZOP training given to all team members (one day)
Arrange for system or process briefings for team before work begins.

HAZOP STUDY LOGISTICS

Logistical development of this refinery unit HAZOP included the
following:

Preplanning issues were addressed the prior week.

The team include three core team members and four part-time members.
The study included 16 moderately busy P&Ids.
The study took three and one-half weeks.
The team met 4 hours per day in morning review sessions and spent 2 hours per day on
individual efforts for reviews, follow-ups, and field checks.
Dedicated space was required for storing the large number of documents.
The study resulted in 170 data sheets.
The team recorder used a personal computer to record, sort, and retrieve data. The Stone
& Webster proprietary program PCHAZOPa was used.
The plant operator was the key contribution plant member of the team.
Key operating procedures were reviewed relative to the P&Ids and safe engineering
practices.