Hazard Analysis of a Turret

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RECAP
Core functions of a Turret System on an FSO:
Maintaining the vessel on station through single point
mooring;
Allowing weathervaning or rotation of the vessel to
adjust to climatic conditions;
Fluid transfer from the risers to the process plant; and
Transfer of electrical, hydraulic and other control signals.

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Figure 1.0: Main components of a Internal Turret System

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Figure 2.0: Internal Passive Turret in Petrobras 31 FPSO

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Turrets System and related Safety

Concerns
30 years of Operation in North Sea without major
incident.
Turret System equipment is designed for Zone 1
operation.
Turret System is recognized to be a Safety Critical
Element on an FPSO.

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Safety Critical Elements of a Turret

System
1. Swivel Stack

2. Dynamic Seals in the Swivels

3. Main flexible riser connections
4. Mooring Lines and connection
5. Main Turret Bearings

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Type of Turret and Its Safety Concerns

Internal Passive Turret
Prime concerns are with turret bearings and ability to
weathervane. Below are other damage mechanisms:
Progressive degradation of bearings
Excessive friction of turret
Leakage of flexible risers and connections in the
turret and at the point of connection to the
turntable manifolding.
Cracking of elastomeric bend-stiffners
Figure xx: Overview of IPT

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Figure xx: Bearing ring for main Turret bearing of an

IPT

Type of Turret and Its Safety Concerns

Internal Active Turret
Operational experience has indicated the
following as the most safety critical areas:
The upper bearings which takes all the loads
The flexible riser hang-off connections to the
turntable
The mooring line connection

Figure xx: Location of vertical and horizontal bearing

pads and Flexible risers
Figure xx: Bearing pads used for axial and vertical bearings

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Type of Turret and Its Safety Concerns

External Cantilevered Turret (ECT)
Areas of concern for the ECT system are as
follows:
Corrosion of the manifolding pipework
Damage and failure of flexible risers and its
associated connections.
Progressive damage to mooring chains and
connections.
Integrity of cantilever support structure
Figure xx: Overview of the External Cantilevered
Turret

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Integrity of ESD valves on individual risers

Type of Turret and Its Safety Concerns

Submerged Turret Production (STP)
Main concerns identified in the Safety Cases for
STP buoys are:
Anchor failure
Turret Seizure
Hydrocarbon Leakage From flexible risers
connections, top and bottom.

Figure xx: Overview of the External Cantilevered

Turret
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Figure xx: Overview of the External Cantilevered

Turret

Type of Swivels and Its Safety Concerns

Figure xx: Overview of the External Cantilevered Turret

Multipath Swivel
Main concerns regarding the above mentioned is:
Failure of dynamic seals
Cracking off bearing housings
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Figure xx: Overview of the External Cantilevered

Turret

Type of Swivels and Its Safety Concerns

Compact Swivel
Main safety concerns for the above mentioned are integrity of dynamic seals, flexible
risers and connections.
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Figure 1.0: Main components of a Internal Turret System

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Potential Hazards and Its Consequence

Hazard

Marine Accidents on FPSO

Sub-Category

Mooring Failure

Consequenc
e

Critical failure of two or more mooring lines

resulting in vessel drifting off station

Escalation

Riser Damage

Consequenc
e of
Escalation

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Release from risers

Marine Accident on FPSOs Mooring

Failure
Causes:

Poor Design, Material failure, Severe weather, fouling of anchor lines,

Turret seizure.
Prevention:
Material
Control:
Take vessel under tow
Mitigation:
Shutdown, Oil Spill response.

Frequency of Mooring Failure leading to loss of station keeping and

damage to risers is 1.0 x 10-4 per year.
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Potential Hazards and Its Consequence

Hazard

Hydrocarbon Release on FPSO

Swivel Leak
Sub-Category

Consequenc
e

Direct release of spilled oil to the sea, Fire at

the Swivel, Explosion at Swivel

Damage to cargo area

Escalation

Consequenc
e of
Escalation

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Loss of Some or all cargo to

the sea

Marine Accident on FPSOs Mooring

Failure
Causes:

Swivel seizure, Human Error, Rotating equipment failure, Excessive

vessel motion, Process upsets, Poor maintenance, Helicopter crash.
Prevention:
Hydrocarbon boundary integrity, Impact protection, Natural ventilation,
Operator competency, Passive fire protection, Pressure relief
Control:
Emergency shutdown, blowdown, process segregation
Mitigation:
PFP, Limited ignition sources, full flow drainage, ffire and blast walls, Inert
gas in cargo tanks

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Available Leak Frequency for Swivels

Frequency of release of gas within Turret enclosure is estimated to be 2x10-2/year.

Overall leak frequency for Swivel is 0.1 per year with hole size distribution that was
suggested by SBM that was documented in Frequency Analysis of Accidental Oil Release
from a generic FPSO Operations in GoM, Ref xx (dnv) :

Table xx: Summary of Release Size, Scenario Description with respective leak frequency

Release Size

Scenario Description

Large (30kg/s)

Production fluid or export gas release

1%
at swivel with potential results
including spill to sea, fire or explosion,
and escalation to cargo tanks or FPSO.

1x10-3

Medium
(3-30kg/s)

Hydrocarbon release at swivel with

potential results including spill to
sea, fire or explosion, and escalation to
cargo tanks or FPSO.

9%

9x10-3

90%

9x10-2

Small
(0.3-3 kg/s)

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Size
Distribution

Leak Frequency
(per year)

Potential Hazards and Its Consequence

Hazard

Hydrocarbon Release on FPSO

Explosion in turret
Sub-Category

Consequenc
e

Damage to the hull

Release from Cargo area

Escalation

Consequenc
e of
Escalation

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Loss of some or all cargo to

the sea

Marine Accident on FPSOs Mooring

Failure
Causes:
Material defects, dropped object, Excessive vessel motion, Various
ignition sources, Poor maintenance
Prevention:
Impact protection, Operator competency, Passive fire protection,
Corrosion protection, DO protection, Pressure relief
Control:
Emergency shutdown, blowdown, process segregation
Mitigation:
PFP, Limited ignition sources, full flow drainage, ffire and blast walls, Inert
gas in cargo tanks
Frequency of explosion in turret that may lead to leak in the cargo tank is
1x10-5 per year. HSE GOV UK provided a different frequency of turret
explosion of approximately 2x10-4/year.
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Consequence of a Turret Explosion

Structural damage or plastic deformation of the turret.
Missile generation is not considered credible. No
potential for escalation to the gas injection manifold
Fatality to all individuals involved in the initial blast
Serious injury confined to turret and immediate
surrounding area. High number of serious casualties
Local escape and evacuation routes potentially
destroyed or damaged
Process area inventories potentially vulnerable to
escalation but not envisaged

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Incident Reports
Gryphon FPSO, Aberdeen. (4th February 2011)
Incident :
Vessel lost control and went beam-on to the weather causing windward
anchors to break and damage to the subsea infrastructure.

Root Cause (Maersk Oil Investigation Report):

Risk Management: The basis of design and FMEA did not include loss of
heading.
Competence: Personnel using the SDPM system had not refreshed or
revalidated their initial training. ED did not routinely include Simrad
Dynamic Positioning and Position Mooring system (SDPM) system
malfunctions.
Management of Change: The Performance Standard for the mooring
system was too reliant on the anchor chains ability to maintain position.
Operational Control: Lack of proceduralised mechanism
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The End

Questions?

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