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1/14/2015
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Goal:
detect vulnerabilities of the
power network
Include contingency analysis
as a constraint in systems
planning
Combinatorial complexity
Defender-attacker-defender
games lead to problems where
an optimization problems is a
constraint for another.
Uncertainty
2/2
2/3
Capacity=7
3/3
1/5
s
5/7
4/4
4/6
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-3
10
-2
2
-1
-3
-2
k =0, max-flow= 11
k =1, max-flow= 7
k =2, max-flow= 5
k =3, max-flow=1
5
Cut min. number of lines, k, so that max flow is below a
specified bound.
Shown to be NP-complete (Phillips 1991).
The classical min-cut problem is a special version of network
inhibition, where max-flow is set to zero.
Can be formulated as MILP with |V|+|E| binary variables.
1/14/2015
The Bad
Flow of power is different, and thus
the results are not applicable.
The Beautiful
Understanding the combinatorial structure
can guide heuristic techniques that model
the power flow more accurately.
Further analysis will show that the gap
between the two models is smaller than it
looks.
(V j , j )
BijViV j sin( i j )
V: voltage
: phase angle
B: susceptance
BijViV j cos( i j )
i j
2
Vl V Vu
Active power
Reactive power
) p 0
F (A, , p) A Bsin(A
Simplified model
Fix voltages at 1; work only on active power
equations.
A
P1
for vulnerabilities.
10
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P2
1
Add integer (binary) line parameters, , to identify
broken lines
Measure the blackout severity as the distance to feasibility boundary
Bilevel-MINLP problem
cut minimum number of lines so that
shortest distance to feasibility (i.e. severity) is at least as large as a
specified target
Mangasarian Fromowitz constraint qualification conditions are satisfied for
a slightly modified system.
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,z, , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5, 6
s.t.
| |
F (AD(1 ),, p z) 0
/2 AD(1 ) /2
eT zg S
0 pg zg pg
pl pl zl 0
e g 4 3
0
0 l 2 1
F
T
AT D(1 )(6 5 ) 0
1zl 0; 2 ( pl zl ) 0
4 zg 0; 3 ( pg zg ) 0;
5 ( /2 AD(1 ) ) 0;
minimize number of
lines cut
feasible power flow
severity above threshold
feasible load shedding
6 ( /2 AD(1 ) ) 0;
1,..., 6 0
{0,1}
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1
4
5
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117
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4
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7
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113
31
40
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18 19
114
115
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20 35
54
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49
24
72
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64
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106
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J AT BD((1 )cos(A )A
Node-arc
incidence matrix
Node-arc
incidence matrix
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-1
-2
2
What is missing?
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10
2
5
-1
k =0, max-flow= 11
-2
-3
-2
k =1, max-flow= 7
k =2, max-flow= 5
k =3, max-flow=1
19
min
s.t.
ij
(vi ,v j ) E
ij ij
(vi ,v j )E
T
Pi=1
sij dij 1
c s
sij dij 1
pi pj sij dij 0
pi pj sij dij 0
ps 0;
pt 1
pi ,dij {0,1}; sij [0,1]
0 vi S
pi
1 vi T
1 if eij is cut.
dij
otherwise
0
1 dij 0 pi pj
sij
otherwise
0
C. Burch, R. Carr, S. Krumke, M. Marathe, C. Phillips and E. Sundberg, A decomposition-based approximation for network
inhibition, Network Interdiction and Stochastic Integer Programming, D.L. Woodruff, eds., (2003), pp. 5166.
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21
10
-2
3
2
-3
-1
-2
2
22
10
2
5
-1
-2
-3
-2
2
Load corridors
Initiating
events
2nd Level
Infrastructure
Augmenta on
Infrastructure
Disrup ons
Solution approaches:
A single problem with a separate set of
constraints for each contingency
forms a giant problem
Benders decomposition
3rd Level
Infrastructure
Opera ons
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Delayed contingency
generation
Optcut(s)
Restricted
Master Problem
Sub-Problemk
Sub-Problem
3
Sub-Problem1
xt
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K=1
K=2
K=3
K=4
20
18
Cost (Billion $)
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0
8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
%load loss
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Cost of perfectness
Infrastructure investment cost can be reduced
by~50%if 1%lossof load isacceptable
22
20
18
Cost (Billion $)
16
K=1
K=2
K=3
K=4
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0
8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
%load loss
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Benefits of humbleness
22
20
18
Cost (Billion $)
16
K=1
K=2
K=3
K=4
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0
8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
%load loss
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Source: http://saferenvironment.wordpress.com
Full link
Source: http://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/?p=5393
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Realization
of demand
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Var(f)/sqrt(S)
Accurate estimations render
optimization problems impractical.
Proposed Solution: Polynomial chaos
expansion
Commonly used for uncertainty
quantification in CSE applications
Core idea: preprocess the random
variables to build a surrogate that
represents random variables
compactly
33
Concluding remarks
Essentially all models are wrong, but some are useful.
George E. P. Box
Graph models are useful.
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Acknowledgements
Richard Chen, Amy Cohn, Vaibhav Donde, Neng
Fan, Yonatan Fogel, Bernard Lesieutre, Vanessa
Lopez, Juan Meza, Habib Najm, Adam Reichert,
Sandip Roy, Cosmin Safta, Jean-paul Watson, and
Chao Yang contributed to this work.
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Announcements
We always try to create positions for talented
researchers.
Please contact me
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Related Publications
Chen, Cohn, Fan, and P., ``Contingency-Risk Informed Power System Design, IEEE T. Power
Systems Vol. 29, No. 5, pages: 2087-2096; preprint available as arXiv:1305.0780
Chen, Fan, P., and Watson, ``Contingency-Constrained Unit Commitment with PostContingency Corrective Recourse," to appear in Annals of Operations Research, preprint
available as arXiv:1404.2964
Safta, Chen, Najm, P., Watson, ``Toward Using Surrogates to Accelerate Solution of Stochastic
Electricity Grid Operations Problems, Proc. NAPS 2014; preprint available as
arXiv:1404.2964
Chen, Cohn, Fan, and P., `N-k-epsilon Survivable Power System Design, in 12th International
Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems (PMAPS12) arXiv:1201.1530
Chen, Cohn, and P., An Implicit Optimization Approach for Survivable Network Design, Proc.
2011 IEEE 1st International Network Science Workshop (NSW 2011) arXiv:1109.1801
Lesieutre, P., and Roy, Power System Extreme Event Detection: The Vulnerability Frontier," in
Proc. 41st Hawaii Int. Conf. on System Sciences, p. 184, HI, 2008.
P., Reichert, and Lesieutre, Computing Criticality of Lines in a Power System, Proc. 2007
IEEE Int. Symp. Circuits and Systems, pp. 6568, New Orleans, LA, May 2007.
Lesieutre, Roy, Donde, and P., Power system extreme event analysis using graph partitioning
, Proc. the 39th North American Power Symp., Carbondale, IL, 2006.