Electronic Voting Machine

ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE
(EVM)
Presentation for Improved, Fool-proof Ballot/EVM
System
MALFUNCTIONING-HACKING IN EVM?
Dr. Kirit Somaiya Ex Member of Parliament
All India Convenor BJP Committee on EVM
22 July 2009
2
ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)
Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) has become a issue of
national debate. Experts have been continuously
expressing their concern about the malfunctioning of EVM
since Lok Sabha 2004 results. Satinath Choudhary
approached the Supreme Court in 2004.

Development has taken place in the developed countries
since last couple of years and the issue of malfunctioning
demands healthy debate and corrective measures.
Leaders belonging to all major political parties BJP,
Congress, CPM, TDP, ADMK, RJD, LJP, INLD, MDMK,
Trinamool Congress have expressed concern about the
malfunctioning of EVM.
3
Activists, NGOs, experts, authorities have expressed
concern about the present EVM system in India. Several
examples have also been put forward regarding unusual /
abnormality and also mal-functioning.

Developed countries like USA, Germany, Netherlands,
Finland, Ireland, Brazil have either disposed of EVM or
have come out with fool-proof system.

We feel there is a necessity of national debate on Fool-
proof Ballot/EVM System in India.

Here is the Presentation on the same.

Dr. Kirit Somaiya Ex MP
All India Convenor BJP Committee on EVM
4
History of EVM in India
Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) used / introduced in the
world since 1970s. During the 70s, Election Commission of
India consider to use EVM in India. An Expert Committee
was appointed in 1990 to review the designs, etc. An expert
moved the Supreme Court in 2005 about the mal-functioning
of EVM system in India. It was referred to the Election
Commission of India.

The Election Commission appointed the Expert Committee
on 29
th
December 2005, which submitted Report in 2006. The
Committee suggested major measures for security,
protection, upgradation. It also emphasized to use EVM only
after providing security measures suggested by the
Committee.

5
Introduction, Progress of EVM in India
Introduction of the concept in India 1970
First use in 11 constituencies 1982-84
First Expert Committee 1990
Use of EVM in few Lok Sabha Constituencies 2004
Appointment of another Expert Committee 2005
Committees Report with emphasis on
protection
2006
100% use of EVM Lok Sabha
2009
6
India concern
Lok Sabha 2009 elections
Dr. Subramanian Swamy, former Law Minister, alleged in
April 2009 that a group of people who had been convicted in
the US for hacking bank accounts and credit cards had been
recruited by a certain political party to possibly rig the
elections
The Shiv Sena alleged that EVM malfunction caused its
candidate Mohan Rawale to lose in South Mumbai. Said
Rawale: I wonder how I got only five votes from an area that
is a Shiv Sena stronghold.
Journalist Cho Ramaswamy discussed how in MDMK leader
Vaikos constituency, Virudhunagar, Tamil Nadu, while
counting, the votes increased by 23,000 more than the polled
votes.
7
POLITICAL PARTIES & EVM
BJP L.K. Advaniji demanded transparent fool-proof
ballot/EVM system
L.K. Advaniji demanded EVM with Paper Backup in
future elections
CPM, TDP, ADMK, RJD, LJP, INLD, MDMK of Vaiko,
Trinamool Congress have raised issues about
malfunctioning of EVM
Mr. Gulam Nabi Azad, Union Minister has charged EVM
malfunctioning in the recently held Orissa elections. He
made the statement before the Press at Bhubaneshwar
in JuneJuly 2009
Mr. Amrinder Singh, Punjab Congress President has
made public demonstration with EVM and charged

8
FORMER BUREAUCRATS / EXPERTS
RAISE CONCERN
Omesh Saigal ex-Chief Secretary, Delhi Govt. & ex-
Secretary, Govt. of India has submitted representation
to the Election Commission
Issue raised is malfunctioning of EVM.
Other former bureaucrats Dr. Krishan Saigal ex-Chief
Secretary, Assam, Ravi Kathpalia Ex Controller
General of Accounts, GOI, Ms Asha Das Ex Secretary,
GOI, K.P. Fabian former Ambassador, S.K. Agnihotri
ex-Chief Secretary, Assam, A.R. Lall Advocate,
Supreme Court have also raised this issue.
9
Observations, objections regarding the
present EVM system in India
2005 An IT Expert filed a Petition on EVM
Supreme Court sent the Petition to the Election
Commission
2006 Expert Committee appointed by the Election
Commission submitted report with several
recommendations to plug loopholes on manipulation,
mal-functioning
BEL and ECIL were asked to make corrections
EC has not implemented the recommendations, security
measures

10
Observations, objections regarding the
present EVM system in India (Contd)
Several instances found in Lok Sabha 2009 about mal-
functioning of EVM
Various petitions in High Courts and Supreme Court
about mal-functioning of EVM
Various technocrats, IT experts have expressed doubt
about the fool-proof EVM system in India
Concern expressed by the experts and authority about
the mal-functioning of EVM used in India
11
EVM MALFUNCTIONING OBSERVED IN
LOK SABHA 2009 ELECTION
Any button pressed, light/vote registered to one
particular candidate
EVM could not be opened on the counting
Seal found open
EVM malfunctioning on polling day
12
EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL
FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
Malfunctioning of EVM seen during the Lok Sabha 2009
elections
EVM could not start
EVM got jammed and did not open on counting day
EVM stopped functioning during the poll/in between the
polling process
When button of one candidate pressed, light on another
candidate got flashed
Polling staff was not at all updated or aware about the
security measures
EVMs lying/ was used in previous elections in a
particular district were used in the same district in the
Lok Sabha 2009
13

In a EVM, an independent candidate with no base/logic,
got/shown 500+ votes and major political parties
candidate got 0 or 1 vote
EVM result in many booths shows 100% votes against
one candidate (more than 200 votes polled in that area)
Differences between the polling figures declared by the
Election Commission in the booths and the outcome /
result shown in EVM in those booths
State Election officials/Election Commission for reasons
known to them, have not collected all such information /
data, process, study, research them
No special follow up undertaken of EVM till todate.
14
EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL/UNUSUAL
FUNCTIONING / BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
Chandrapur Maharashtra

EVM in Booth No.176 Nutan School Votes
given/button pressed for Candidate No.1 but vote/light
flashed against another candidate
EVM replaced around 2.30 pm in between the polling
process on 16
th
April 2009
No further study, action till today
15
61 NOIDA ASSEMBLY
An Independent candidate got 415 votes in Booth No.61.
He got 0 to 1 in other booths
How it is possible for an Independent who has no
connection, concern with that area?
Sector 25 Jalvayu Vihar, Noida In this area, main
contest observed between BJP, Congress
In Booth 61, BJP and Congress got one vote each and
BSP 7 votes
Is it not EVM mal-functioning?
16
Boot
h No.
Name of the
Area
BJP BSP Congres
s
SP Others No. of
votes
polled
60 Sector 25 282 7 145 2 1 437
61 Sector 25
Jalvayu Vihar
Block M
1 0 0 1 415 417
62 Sector 25
Jalvayu Vihar
Block L,K,M,N
264 19 158 3 5 449
63 Sector 25 Block
N,K,L,K,QJ
247 27 125 1 1 401
64 Sector 25 Block
N
241 24 102 3 9 379
ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL BEHAVIOUR
OF EVM 61 NOIDA ASSEMBLY
17
GHAZIABAD UP
Abnormality observed in Muradnagar segment of Ghaziabad
Contest was mainly between BJP, Congress, BSP
Rajnath Singh won by 80,000+ votes
Mr. Satish, an independent candidate, who has no base, no
background, in all got 2719 votes
Mr. Satish secured 998 votes in 24 rounds. He got 507 votes in
Round No.19 in Muradnagar Vidhan Sabha
Mr. Satish has no locus standee in Booth No.247
All 507 votes were given/allotted/counted by EVM in Polling
Booth No.247 alone
In Booth No.247, BJP Candidate Rajnath Singh and Congress
Candidate got 0 votes each and BSP candidate Amar Pal Sharma
got 1 vote.
18
Cuttack Orissa

EVM Booth No.160 Any button pressed, light/vote
flashed against BJD
Congress, BJP people in Nimasahi Booth of Cuttack
drew the attention of the Polling Officer
Presiding Officer/polling officials have no explanation
for the same
Election Commission had to accept the manipulation /
Repolling was held in Nimasahi Booth No.160.
19
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM
REVIEW REPORT
Few facts

Voting pattern in Parliament and Assembly elections in
Rellivalasa village is worth noting. Voting pattern shows
vast difference

Voting not recorded by the Electronic Voting Machine
accurately to which candidate voters voted.

20
REVIEW REPORT
VOTING PATTERN PARLIAMENT RELLIVALASA VILLAGE
Booth
No.
Village TDP BS
P
INC BJP PRP Pyramid
Party
Lok
Satta
BS
SP
Indep
enden
t
Total
votes
polled
70 Rellivasala 320 06 140 08 57 04 01 14 09 559
71 Do 289 14 169 16 50 09 07 08 07 569
72 Do 313 10 223 14 90 05 07 27 12 701
73 Do 133 07 11 319 71 07 02 03 03 556
74 Do 369 10 288 21 68 11 07 24 15 813
For the same booth, voting for Assembly is total contradiction (see next Table)
21
REVIEW REPORT
VOTING PATTERN ASSEMBLY RELLIVALASA VILLAGE
Boot
h No.
INC BJP BS
P
TDP PRP Pyrami
d Party
Lok
Satta
Ind.
I
Ind. II Ind
III
Ind.
IV
Total
votes
polled
70 129 7 5 332 79 4 2 0 1 0 0 559
71 170 10 8 308 41 9 6 1 4 4 8 569
72 227 23 16 326 77 9 3 3 4 6 6 700
73 332 3 115 10 71 4 3 15 3 0 0 556
74 276 31 8 370 91 7 6 2 7 6 11 815
22
REVIEW REPORT
In Khammam Constituency, Polling Station 198,
Electronic Voting Machine could not read data and the
voters were discounted by the EC officer. As per booth
data collected from the Dist. Collector office, this
particular booth data is missing
Manipulated Electronic Voting Machines can
misbehaveand corrupt the entire memory as well as
hang the Control Unit and rendering E2PROM
unreadable

23
REVIEW REPORT
In Pedakurapadu (Guntur Dist) Constituency Booth
No.2, 122 votes were polled in the First Electronic
Voting Machine. As the EVM malfunctioned and was
replaced by a second EVM
Electronic Voting Machines are not stable

S.NO. PARTY VOTES
1 INC 186
2 TDP 176
3 PRP 34
4 IND 18
Total 414
24
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
List of Booths where the machines could not read data
Assembly Code Booth Code Assembly Name Booth Name
23 60 Ramagundam Medipalli
23 61 Ramagundam Medipalli
70 197 Secunderabad Osmania University
80 60 Alampur (SC) Leeza
80 69 Alampur (SC) Leeza
84 128 Shadnagar Kesampet
104 185 Parkal Katrapally
104 197 Parkal Nallabelly Yelugur
104 209 Parkal Semgem
104 212 Parkal Gavicharla
104 221 Parkal Bollikunta
104 224 Parkal Ramachandrapuram
112 198 Khammam Kothagudem
198 142 Vijayawada West Mallikarjuna Petta
231 31 Giddalur Kandulapuram
240 250 Sullurpeta (SC) MPP School Ramapuram
Kuppam
257 44 Panyam Bollavaram
257 45 Panyam Bollavaram
25
Table showing polling booths where there was particular pattern of voting
SNo Assembly Mandal Panchayath Booth TOL TDP % INC %
1 Rajam (SC) Vangara Vangara 30 11 0 0 11 100
2 Yerragondapalem Dornala Dornala 135 27 0 0 27 100
3 Jammalamadugu Jammalamadugu Gandikota 120 555 0 0 555 100
4 do do Goriganur 75 712 0 0 712 100
5 do do Dharmapuram 74 458 0 0 457 99.8
6 do do Devagudi 69 776 0 0 774 99.7
7 do do K. Sirigepalli 119 782 0 0 780 99.7
8 do do Devagudi 70 920 0 0 917 99.7
9 do do Peddandlur 118 822 0 0 818 99.5
10 do do Jammalmadugu 73 398 0 0 396 99.5
11 do do
P.Sugumanchipalle
72 391 0 0 389 99.5
12 Mydukur Khajipet Khajipet 144 776 0 0 772 99.5
13 Punganur Sadam
Yarrathivaripalle
166 640 0 0 635 99.2
14 Jammalamadugu Jammalamadugu Goriganur 76 695 0 0 685 98.6
15 Kamalapuram Kamalapuram Kokatam 3 445 0 0 437 98.2
The data suggests EVMs used in these booths have been manipulated.). Congress candidate got
almost 100% votes in various booths
26
Table showing difference between actual votes polled and votes counted by EVM
11 BHANDARA GONDIA LOK SABHA
LAC Total Voters Total Votes
polled
Votes counted
on EVM
Difference
60-Tumsar 251813 177786 177116 670
61-Bhandara 294139 201173 201171 2
62-Sakoli 265588 198450 198343 107
63-
Arjuni/Morgaon
199932 154757 155037 280
64-Tiroda 195340 141411 141299 112
65-Gondi 241090 155496 155698 202
TOTAL 1447902 1029073 1028664 1373
27
PETITIONS IN INDIA
Retired computer science professor Satinath Choudhary,
producing doctored EVMs is childs play, as early as
2004
Banwarilal B. Purohit vs. Election Commission of India
filed in 2004
Shailendra Pradhan filed a PIL in 2009 in the Madhya
Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur
The PMK, which suffered a shock defeat in Virudhunagar
constituency in 2009 Parliamentary election, has filed an
appeal to the Election Commission
The MDMK has filed a PIL in Madras High Court against
EVMs.
28
PETITIONS IN INDIA
Various PILs have been filed at High Courts and Supreme
Court
Supreme Court Jana Chaitanya Vedika (NGO) has moved the
Apex Court regarding authenticity and credibility of EVM
system.
In the Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution the
Petitioners are seeking directions from the Honble Court to
ensure that the votes cast by the voters, which are part of their
constitutional right of free expression under Article 19(1)(a), are
registered properly and without any tampering/manipulation of
the Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) which are used in the
election
Supreme Court - NetIndia, renowned Company in EVM
technology, has submitted an affidavit in the Supreme Court
regarding lack of security measures, transparency and hacking
of EVM in India

29
PETITIONS IN INDIA
Supreme Court Mr. Mohan Rawale 5-time Shiv Sena
MP has filed a Petition in the Supreme Court on EVM
malfunctioning
Mumbai High Court Dr. Jagtap and Dr. Jadhav have
moved the Mumbai High Court regarding malfunctioning
of EVM
Orissa High Court Activists have moved the Orissa
High Court regarding malfunctioning of EVM
Hyderabad Issues raised at Andhra Pradesh High
Court
Tamil Nadu EVM malfunctioning issues raised at the
High Court

30
IT SECURITY
EXPERT VIJAY MUKHIS SUGGESTIONS
After spending years in the security industry, we believe
that in principle all technology can be tampered with.
There is no such thing as 100%.
As a EVM is a technology machine it can be tampered with
in principle.
The world has realized that there is only one way to
prevent misuse of technology and that is by having a open
process where the whole world can participate in trying to
break security.
What we recommend to the Government and the Election
Commission is to make public the entire EVM eco-system,
which includes the hardware schematics and the software
that control the EVM.
31
IT SECURITY
(contd.)
Today, we cannot say that the EVM is safe or unsafe from
being tampered with because like the rest of the country,
as we have no information whatever on the EVM. The
entire EVM ecosystem is a state secretary inaccessible to
just a few.
The GSM world introduced a SIM card that had a
password stored within it. Years ago, it would take hours
to clone a SIM card, today it takes about 15 minutes max.
There is no way to undo the damage as there are over a
billion users of GSM today.
We want EC/Government to follow international best
practices in securing the technology used to public
governance and welfare.
32
IT SECURITY
(contd.)
We recommend that in the din of politics a reason
edvoice will not be heard at all and hence to put an
end to this controversy it would be better to have a
paper trail of the vote caused. As people do not
understand technology, tempers get frayed and by
introducing paper, something that people understand,
would put an end to a controversy.
33
EVM around the world
There is a veritable tsunami of negative reports about
Electronic Voting Machines from all over the world.
There is no country in which EVMs have been welcomed
so enthusiastically as they have been in India, and
perhaps this is with good reason.

Hardly any major developed country uses EVMs to any
extent; indeed, despite the fuss over hanging chads
and other arcana in their 2000 elections, even
Americans who are partial to technological solutions
have resisted the siren-song of voting machines after
due consideration.
34
EVM around the world (Contd)
United States (California)

In April 2004, California banned 14,000 EVMs because the
manufacturer (Diebold Election Systems) had installed
uncertified software that had never been tested and then lied
to state officials about the machines. The machines were
decertified and criminal prosecution initiated against the
manufacturer.
EVM gadbad in US 2004 Presidential elections. In Gahanna,
Ohio, only 638 votes were cast, but EVM result declared Bush
received 4,258 votes to Kerrys 260.
A study by UC Berkeleys Quantitative Methods Research
Team reported that irregularities associated with EVMs may
have awarded 130,000-260,000 votes to Bush in Florida in
2004.
35
United States

Various bills proposed in House/Senate
HR 550: Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2005
HR 774 and S 330: Voting Integrity and Verification
Act of 2005
HR 939 and S 450: Count Every Vote Act of 2005
HR 533 and S 17: Voting Opportunity and Technology
Enhancement Rights Act of 2005
HR 278: Know Your Vote Counts Act of 2005
HR 5036: Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections
Act of 2008
36
Germany (2009)
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany declared EVMs
unconstitutional.

The Netherlands ( 2006)
The Interior Ministry withdrew the licences of 1,187 voting
machines because it was proven that one could eavesdrop on
voting from up to 40 metres away. The suit was brought by a
Dutch citizens group named We Do Not Trust Voting
Machines. This group demonstrated that in five minutes, they
could hack into the machines with neither voters nor election
officials being aware of it.

37
Finland (2009)
The Supreme Court declared invalid the result of a pilot
electronic vote in three municipalities.

United Kingdom (2007)
The Open Rights Group declared it could not express
confidence in the results for the areas that it observed.
Their report cites problems with the procurement,
planning, management and implementation of the
systems concerned.
38
Ireland (2006)
Ireland embarked on an ambitious e-voting scheme, but
abandoned it due to public pressure.

Brazil (2006)
There were serious discrepancies in the Diebold
systems predominantly used in Brazils 2006 elections.
39
EVM STORY
We understand very clearly the complete process of
development, manufacturing and rollout of EVMs across
India. ECIL & BEL have done the research and development
in-house and shipped the software to their vendors Renesas
in Japan, Microchip in US respectively for the software to be
fused into the Chips. The mode of shipment goes through
many layers before it reaches the vendor and similarly back to
the manufacturers. The security adopted in the transfer of the
software is not known, as well there is ambiguity on the Prof.
Indiresan Expert Committee review report 2006 on whether
an OTP or a Masked ROM chips are used. As a layman
wecan consider OTP to be a Blank CD in which you can write
what you want at your location and Masked ROM is like
buying a Movie CD which is pre-written.

40
EVM STORY
A chance but still there exists the opportunity to swap the
chips while shipment and the manufac-turers have no method
of verification. The only way to verify the EVMs is putting
them to a Mock Poll, and we have already demonstrated how
properly functioning EVM while in Mock Poll can be
manipulated to favour a candidate in the actual poll.
Further as there is no precise verification tool to check
whether the EVM is manipulated opens up several different
opportunities of tampering the EVM.

41
CLARIFICATION EXPECTED FROM
THE ELECTION COMMISSION
Is it true
EVM in the same area is repeatedly used in the same
area/periphery
2006 Indiresan Expert Committee Report
implemented partially
Expert measures about security remain unaddressed
Election Commission itself does not know what is
inside the EVM, chip, hardware, software
Expert Committee of 1990 and 2006 had Prof.
Indiresan as member and Chairman
No consultation with any other bright IT experts done
42
90% of the Report of 1990 and 2006 is same including the
language
EVM used in India hardware, software is same since 1990
EC refused to share any information on software, hardware,
etc., with any political party, candidate or anybody else
Non-transparency creates suspicion
EC has never studied the issue of malfunctioning
EC refused to accept modern technology, i.e. EVM with
paper back up
No audit pre-poll, during poll, post poll of EVM has been
done till today
43
No records of when, how what about the failure of EVM
machines maintained, checked, studied
Repairs, maintenance, storage, transportation to be
foolproof
The polling staff is purely temporary, on deputation for the
election day and counting day, has no knowledge and
concern or trained about the EVM technology, security
measures, etc.
No standard guideline, programme, procedure implemented
by EC
EVM code is installed by a private company/MNC of a
foreign country and not at a Government PSU, i.e.
BEL/ECIL
44
Observations about EVM
Manufacturing faults
Manufacturing faults in the hardware may result in
malfunctions. More sinister issues arise from malicious
and intentional tampering. The programs used are
proprietary and not open for inspection, unlike, say, open
source programs which any individual can test out.
45
Fraudulant way of tampering
Tampering with the software to add malicious code to
alter vote totals or favour any candidate
Tampering with the hardware of the machine to alter
vote totals or favour any candidate
Intentional mis-configuration of the ballot design to
misidentify a candidates party
Abusing the administrative access to the machine by
election officials might also allow individuals to vote
multiple times.

46
TROJAN HORSE
In-built Trojan Horse in software
Programming code available to few selected
No provision for checking, inspection of software,
hardware by anybody including the Election Commission
Leakage, corruption can make hacking feasible
New EVMs purchases in January 2009 182,000 from
BEL and 78,000 from ECIL
Coding, decoding of these new machines
Imported chips are used
No transparency about the chips, hardware, software
47
TROJAN HORSE (Contd)
No political party or candidate taken into confidence
about the software, hardware, etc.
Even the Election Commission do not have any system
to check the transparency and security
Chips can be corrupted
EVM used can be corrupted
Hacking, etc., can take place during transportation,
handling, Polling Station, storing places, repair,
maintenance
So many individuals, private persons involved in EVM
handling
48
Technical details about the EVMs
used in India
2 PSUs BEL and ECIL are the suppliers of EVM in India
Chip used in EVM imported from Japanese company
Software designed in India and sent to Japanese company
Transportation of EVMs, chips are handled by private
contractors/sub-contractors
Repairs and maintenance done by BEL/ECIL engineers
BEL, ECIL is also outsourcing the work to private
people/contractors
No system of control, security measures about
transportation, delivery, handling by private people /
contractors, persons involved in repair and maintenance
and also supervision on the day/eve of polling
EXPERT COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE
ELECTION COMMISSION
REPORT OBSERVATIONS &
RECOMMENDATION
50
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION
COMMISSION REPORT
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
2009 EC appointed an Expert Committee with reference to
suggest amendment and additional features
EC noted EVM of 1990 has become outdated to be
replaced
Committee headed by Prof. P.V. Indiresan with Prof. A.K.
Agarwala and Prof. D.T. Shahani as Members.
51
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION
COMMISSION REPORT
Observation
It was agreed by the manufacturers that these could be
implemented and that it primarily involved some alterations in
the software, while hardware design would remain the same.
Once the software was modified by the manufacturers to meet
the above recommendations, only a detailed check of
functional working of the modified EVM would be needed,
which EC as the user could do on its own or get done before
inducting the upgraded EVMs
The Committee notes with satisfaction that the entire cable is
in the public view with all the time, any such tampering
becomes self-evident. Further, in case any such device
52
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT

has been attached to the cable, it will leave telltale punch
marks which can be recognized easily. Therefore, this
probability also is ruled out by the Committee

Altering the results of the polls before, during and after the
poll duration provided, due security pre-cautions already in
force and additional modifica-tions suggested by the
committee are enforced and the sealing at various stages is
adhered to. In case for any reason the Unit has been
tampered, it immediately gives an indication that the system
has malfunctioned and this remain as a permanent record on
the Machine and this record can be checked at any time later.

53
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
The Committee recommends that before every election the
manufacturers may be asked to check (this can be done very
fast through a very simple exerciser) and ensure that all the
units are functioning as designed. Incidentally, this method
will be checked, by what is called the self test signature of
Machine and thereby the Manufacturers will be able to certify
that the Machine is identical to what they have supplied and it
has not been modified or replaced by any other.
54
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
Election Commission to maintain a register of the voters in the
sequence of their voting, not only the process of recount is
possible but also verification of the recount against any
possible tampering is also possible. Each role and key press
is time/data stamped
Further as each key press in EVM units whether valid or
invalid is date-time stamped and recorded no activation of a
possible Trojan Horse by any specific key press sequence
on EVM during poll can possibly go unnoticed.
55
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
Any system can be tested randomly by mock poll to prove this
performance. Further as each key press in EVM units
whether valid or invalid is date-time stamped and recorded no
activation of a possible Trojan Horse during poll can possibly
go unnoticed.
56
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
Recommendation

Post-Poll
Carrying out on a sample basis, recounting of votes in certain
booths post poll at an appropriate administrative level, to act
as a deterrent against potential mischief-makers so as to
generate a climate of confidence about the infallible nature of
electoral process
57
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
Conclusion
The Committee after a review of the material presented to it
has felt it necessary to highlight certain very key conclusions
and recommendations as below :
(i) The basic Electronic Voting Machine developed by
M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) and M/s. Electronics
Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) is a secure system. The
security emanates from two very important basic factors :
(a) The fixed program nature of the software which is
fused into the processor and which is effectively
unalterable

58
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
(b) The faithful recording of all events in the processor
(electronically) and the possibility of recalling the same
with the added (manual) administrative procedures on
BU, CU at various stages in public view prescribed by
the Election Commission which make available the
sequence of voters voting rendering it possible
tampering.
(ii) With the provision of non-volatile memory, any physical
interruption leads to the retention of all voting information till
that point.
59
(iii) With the system as designed by the above agencies having
built-in security, the Election Commission and the
Government only need to ensure the security of the
equipment, to safeguard the sanctity of the electoral process.
The procedural safeguards as stated in Section 6.0 should be
implemented

(iv) The Committee wishes to place on record the high level of
accomplishments of the Engineers and Scientists of M/s.
Bharat Electronics Ltd and M/s. Electronics Corporation of
India Ltd. In developing an Electronic Voting Machine using
the latest technology.

EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
60
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
(v) The Committee unanimously recommends the use of the
upgraded EVMs in elections after due modifications stated in
this report

(vi) Committee also recommends strongly that bio-metric method
of voter identification is pursued by EC and tested for
feasibility in large population and integrating this sub-system
with EVM in future.
INDEPENDENT
TECHNICAL TEAM
REVIEW REPORT
62
REVIEW REPORT
Independent Technical Committee has studied in depth
and presented its report/observations
Experts were requested by activists, NGOS to study
healthy EVM system in India
The engineers were involved in developing a simulated
product in similar lines with the features of the Electronic
Voting machine with a Control Unit, and a Ballot Unit and
have performed extensive research to understand how
vulnerable the Electronic Voting Machines are.
63
REVIEW REPORT
The following questions are the outcome of the
Evaluation done.

Questions On Process
Questions On Expert Committee Report
Questions Technical
64
REVIEW REPORT
Issues on Expert Committee Report
All through the executive committee report the major
issue raised by most of the people i.e. tampering of
the Electronic Voting Machine has not been
technically addressed. Further we have noted that
the answers provided to the abovementioned problem
are not technical clear
Source code was not fused in India at the
manufacturers premises under stringent security but
it was sent over to the vendor outside the country and
delivered through various delivery channels to the
manufacturer and so can be prone to any kind of
tampering at various stages of the shipment

65
REVIEW REPORT
Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
As the entire lot shall have the same Unique ID and
this also has to be sent along with the source code to
the vendor for fusing into the Chip, there is always a
possibility of Trojan being added into the chip with the
ID already existing. The E2PROM being replaced
while polling operations being conducted due to
E2PROM malfunctioning, this should have made
EVM inoperative.
No evidence of how many number of EVMs upgraded
with modifications suggested by the Experts
Committee and how many odl EVMs were reused for
this elections
66
REVIEW REPORT
Software modification not possible due to hardware
design as the chips used are Masked Chips and
technically unalterable and require a complete new
Circuit Board with a new chip mounted on it with
proposed modifications to the software
Even if few EVMs were upgraded with Dynamic Key
Coding, programme is incapable of recording every
key pressed and key sequence when pressed
activates the Trojan. Also to test each of the
Electronic Voting Machines with such a number of
key sequences would be highly impossible.
67
REVIEW REPORT
None of the Control Unit Circuit Boards were sealed
and there is no mention of a modification to the
existing Ballot Units.
Technically not clear how any embedded device
without any processor or micro controller or any chip
transfer data with encryption
The Committee to the best of its ability has looked
into all possibilities of tampering with the EVM and
has come to the conclusion that there is no way of
altering the results of the polls before, during and
after the poll duration provide due to security
precautions already in force and additional
modifications suggested by the Committee are
enforced
68
REVIEW REPORT
No evidence to support the fact that the suggestions
made by the expert committee were followed
subsequently
Suggestions are not completely followed by the
manufacturers leaving enough room for security
breach, which was the main cause of concern
Knowing the time of the first voter from the EVM and
mapping to the register can actually bring out the
detail of vote cast by every citizen thus putting
democracy into a major threat
69
REVIEW REPORT
There was no diagnostic check available for
checking the sanctity of the embedded program
in the EVM. Neither the technicians, who prepare
the EVMs for elections, understand the
recommendations made by the technical
committee
No evidence to support the fact that the
suggestions made the expert committee were
implemented subsequently
70
REVIEW REPORT
Possible Manipulations
Software developed for the EVM locally by the
manufacture was either uploaded through inernet or sent
through courier to the concerned distributor of the chip
vendor in form of CD. No secured methodology adopted
for the transfer of developed source code/programme
software to be fused in to the chip
Chips delivered from warehouse picked by a courier, etc.
provides grave opportunity of replacing and manipulating
thus procured chips at various levels of shipment.
71
REVIEW REPORT
Possible Manipulations (contd)
No verification program developed to cross check every
chip for genuine code before mounting on to the circuit
board of EVM. No manufacturer in a position to define
whether chips are original due to lack of thorough
verification tool
Ballot unit can be swapped at any point of time as there is
no encrption between Ballot Unit and Control Unit. A new
Ballot Unit can be attached to the Control Unit throwing
immense opportunity for running Trojans
72
REVIEW REPORT
Possible Manipulations (contd)
Pre-poll After the withdrawal of candidates for a
constituency, the allotment of keys on the Ballot Unit is
done through the Control Unit by pressing the
CANDIDATE SELECTION button. Trojan can be
activated to favour a particular key by means of adding
percentage over other key or by deducting a set of votes
polled for all other keys and adding to the favoured key. It
cannot be detected.
While Poll Trojan can be activated by anybody going in
as a voter entering the sequential key code on the Ballot
Unit. This can go absolutely undetected as the buttons
pressed in that sequence cannot be captured because of
the functional behaviour of the Trojan.
73
REVIEW REPORT
Remedies proposed
Standard Verification tool can be developed
A Printer added to the EVM can give print out of every
vote to the voter which he/she can verify whether the
vote was cast properly
EVM should be part of E-governance of Government of
India
74
Ways to reduce EVM Frauds
No IT technology/software/hardware in the world is
foolproof. According to security experts, in a short
time, hackers find out the ways of hacking :
EVM frauds can be reduced
Parallel testing to have independent set of results
EVM with paper back up
Testing tool made available to all candidates/political parties
Open, transparent software, hardware system
Implementation of e-governance policy of India
Pre-poll, during poll and post-poll fullfledged test, audit test
of EVM

75
Ways to reduce EVM Frauds (Contd)
All EVMs which found malfunctioning in Lok Sabha 2009
should be checke, verified and studied by independent
machinery/experts
BEL, ECIL and any Government person, staff of election duty
including the Election Commission should not be allowed to
touch all these machines
Reason for malfunctioning should be studied by independent
experts and should be published
Logic and accuracy testing before elections
Independent software verification and certification. Can use
code signatures to ensure software is identical. Open source
may also be a good idea.

76
Conclusion
In light of all the above discussions, it is clear that there is
reasonable doubt about the reliability of EVMs.

Given the poor experience with Electronic Voting Machines
worldwide, it is difficult to believe that India EVMs are
somehow far superior to those used elsewhere, and somehow
immune to fraud.

This has to be demonstrated. A priori, the evidence suggests
that Indias EVMs are susceptible to fraud in a number of
dimensions.
77
Conclusion (contd)
It appears that both technical and procedural measures must
be put in place to allay the concerns about the reliability, or lack
thereof, of electronic voting machines.

It is entirely possible that the election machinery has taken
every possible step in good faith, but that clever criminals have
subverted the system for their own ends. Improved
transparency, and public scrutiny of the system, including an
analysis of ways in which it can be made more secure, are
urgent and imperative before any future elections.

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