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Strategy Game

Nagender Singh Yadav


S-46
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Chess is one of the most well-known and frequently
played strategy games.
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Strategy game

A strategy game or strategic game is a game,


not necessarily played for fun, in which the
players' autonomous decision-making skills
have a high significance in determining the
outcome. Almost all strategy games require
internal decision tree style thinking, and
typically very high situational awareness.
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Basic Concepts

The term "strategy" comes ultimately from


Greek, !"#$"%&'$ or strategia( meaning
generalship. )t differs from "tactics" in that it
refers to the general scheme of things,
whereas "tactics" refers to organi*ation and
e+ecution.
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Basic Concepts

All games have three ,asic elements-


.
/layers
.
0trategies
.
/ayoffs

/layers can make ,inding agreements in


cooperative games, ,ut can not in
noncooperative games, which are studied in
this chapter.
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Payers

A player is a decision maker and can ,e


anything from individuals to entire nations.

/layers have the a,ility to choose among a


set of possi,le actions.

Games are often characteri*ed ,y the fi+ed


num,er of players.

Generally, the specific identity of a play is not


important to the game.
!
Strategies

A strategy is a course of action availa,le to a


player.

0trategies may ,e simple or comple+.

)n noncooperative games each player is


uncertain a,out what the other will do since
players can not reach agreements among
themselves.
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Payo##s

/ayoffs are the final returns to the players at


the conclusion of the game.

/ayoffs are usually measure in utility although


sometimes measure monetarily.

)n general, players are a,le to rank the payoffs


from most preferred to least preferred.

/layers seek the highest payoff availa,le.


$%
&'(ii)ri(m Concepts

)n the theory of markets an equili,rium


occurred when all parties to the market had no
incentive to change his or her ,ehavior.

1hen strategies are chosen, an equili,rium


would also provide no incentives for the
players to alter their ,ehavior further.

The most frequently used equili,rium concept


is a Nash e'(ii)ri(m*
$$
Nash &'(ii)ri(m

A Nash e'(ii)ri(m is a pair of strategies


a2,,2( in a two-player game such that a2 is an
optimal strategy for A against ,2 and ,2 is an
optimal strategy for 3 against A2.
.
/layers can not ,enefit from knowing the equili,rium
strategy of their opponents.

4ot every game has a 4ash equili,rium, and


some games may have several.
$2
+n ,(strative +dvertising Game

Two firms A and 3( must decide how much to


spend on advertising

5ach firm may adopt either a higher 6( ,udget


or a low 7( ,udget.

The game is shown in e+tensive tree( form in


8igure 9:.9
$3
+n ,(strative +dvertising Game

A makes the first move ,y choosing either 6 or


7 at the first decision ;node.<

4e+t, 3 chooses either 6 or 7, ,ut the large


oval surrounding 3=s two decision nodes
indicates that 3 does not know what choice A
made.
$4
7,5
L
L
H
L
H
H
B
B
A
5,4
6,4
6,3
-,G./& $2*$0 1he +dvertising Game
in &2tensive -orm
$5
+n ,(strative +dvertising Game

The num,ers at the end of each ,ranch,


measured in thousand or millions of dollars,
are the payoffs.
.
8or e+ample, if A chooses 6 and 3 chooses 7,
profits will ,e > for firm A and ? for firm 3.

The game in normal ta,ular( form is shown


where A=s strategies are the rows and 3=s
strategies are the columns.
$6
1he +dvertising Game in Norma
-orm

Bs Strategies
L H
L 7, 5 5, 4
As Strategies
H 6, 4 6, 3