WLANI2005

Wireless LAN Insecurity Update 2005
Robert C. Jones, M.D. LtCol, USAF, Medical Corps Staff Anesthesiologist Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
E-mail: rob--at--notbob.com Web site: http://www.notbob.com
Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.
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Network Abuse Costs $$$: 2003 Data from U.S. FBI
Wheres Wireless???
WLAN Abuse 2004: Number 5 with a Bullet
Multiple Winblows XP/2000 vulnerabilities
The Basic Network Security Pyramid
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Wireless Security 2003

Robs 2003 WLAN Security Pyramid
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What this talk is about
Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP Step 4: Toward 802.11i/WPA2 for Home/SOHO use
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP Step 4: Toward 802.11i/WPA2 for Home/SOHO use Step 5: CSE: OS Updates, Vulnerability News
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP Step 4: Toward 802.11i/WPA2 for Home/SOHO use Step 5: CSE: OS Updates, Vulnerability News Future Wireless Security Topics
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Dusko and Vlado Say: Be Responsible with your WLAN-kwon-do!
This talk is not a WLAN Cracking HOWTO; this is HOWNOTTO on getting 0wn3d
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You cant afford perfect security
The only secure computer is one that is unplugged, locked in a secure vault that only one person knows the combination to, and that person died last year.
Eckel, G and Steen, W., Intranet Working, New Riders, 1996, p. 419
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech
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Introduction to Wireless vs. Wired Networking
Wired Networking
Inexpensive infrastructure (CAT5 cable + NICs) Expensive deployment (drilling through walls) Reconfiguring network topology difficult Difficult (not impossible!) to intercept communication Worldwide exposure to intruders if connected to Net Fast! (10/100 Mbps Ethernet Gigabit ethernet) Negligible interference from environment
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Basic Wired Network Topology
Firewall
Router
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Introduction to Wireless vs. Wired Networking
Wireless Networking
Expensive infrastructure (clients+APs=cha-ching!) Inexpensive deployment (protocols supported in OSes) Reconfiguring network topology trivial (?too trivial?) Ridiculously easy to intercept communication Geographically constrained exposure to intruders* Relatively Slow (11Mbps marketingspeak = 5 Mbps) Massive environmental interference (ISM, path loss)
*ad hoc intranetworks
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Quick Review of WLAN Security Terminology
SSID (ESSID): Service Set Identifier = name for WLAN network; sent out as plain text in every packet; broadcast by default by most access points AP: Access point: WLAN router that talks to client cards WEP: Wired Equivalent Protocol; broken and easily crackable encryption scheme; not Wired Equivalent Privacy, et al. MAC: Unique Media Access Control ID number hard-coded into every networking device; spoofable via software WPA: Upgrade to WEP security; uses TKIP to rotate encryption keys for each packet and generate different keys for each computer 802.1x (not to be confused with 802.11x): User authentication mechanism using EAP protocol; separate from encryption 802.11i/WPA2: Major upgrade to security; uses new AES crypto algorithm vs. RC4; part of RSN: Robust Security Network
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Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. TSN = transitional security network with RSN + TKIP instead of CCMP with AES; more on this later
Basic Wireless Network Topology

Infrastructure Mode (using AP)
Firewall
Access Point
Advantages: AP security; isolated net connection Disadvantages: AP cost, complexity; broadcast range
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Basic Wireless Network Topology

P2P Ad Hoc Networks
Firewall
Advantages: no addtl hardware; geographically constrained Disadvantages: unmanaged P2Pnet issues; geo. constrained
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Authentication
Default: Open authentication (+/- MAC/SSID filtering)

granted give me access
Shared
Key Auth (WEP, WPA PSK)

granted
Authentication response Authentication challenge
give me access
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Generic Wireless Security Exploits

Physical Theft Eavesdropping Data Modification Identity Spoofing/Masquerading Denial of Service (DoS) Theft of Internet Service Injection of Bad Things via Wireless WLAN as new modem (network soft spot)
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Generic Wireless Network Exploits

Physical Theft (Before)
Firewall
Access Point
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Physical Theft (After)
Firewall
Access Point
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Eavesdropping Case 1: Wardriving
Firewall
Access Point
Gotcha!
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Eavesdropping Case 2: Office Building
Tabloid
Firewall
Access Point Terrorist
Your Competitor
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Eavesdropping Case 3: Rogue APs
Firewall
Access Point
Rogue Access Point
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The 100 meter myth
Increasingly powerful 802.11x clients available 200 mW PCMCIA cards advertise 6000+ ft range
http://products.wi-fiplanet.com/wifi/pc_card_16-bit/1058052117.html
Many WiFi adapters have external antenna connections; even homemade antennas work well
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Identity Spoofing
MAC Address: 0000deadbeef; SSID: default
Looks like your companys IP to the FBI!
Bob
Firewall
Access Point
Alice
Cats
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Spoof MAC Address: 0000deadbeef; SSID: default

Denial of Service (DoS)
microwave
oven
Cell phone
Firewall
Access Point
Bluetooth device
2.4 GHz jammer

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Wild Wild WiFi: WiFi Hog

Designed to hijack open (public) nodes
Could easily be used to hijack commercial or home access points with inadequate security Only traffic originating from the Wifi-Hogger's IP address may access the connection, otherwise the PVJ (portable video jammer) is switched on, blocking others from accessing the open node.
http://www.mle.ie/~jonah/projects/wifihog.html
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004
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Wardriving Update late 2004
Mid Sept 04 (same area wardriven in Sep 03); 30 minute drive Residential neighborhoods/business district 5 dBi omnidirectional, magnetic, car-mounted antenna
TCP/IP disabled on card purposely unable to connect/get IP address (thus legal)
126 APs located; 1 Peer located 97 APs with no security (77%) Of 30 with security, only 13 (43%) 802.11g (likely WPA compliant out of box) 62 APs with default SSID bespeaking ignorant owners (49%) one FAKE-AP (first time: counterfeit AP signals) http://www.blackalchemy.to/project/fakeap/ Worldwide Wardrive 4 (http://www.worldwidewardrive.org/): of 228,537 APs logged, only 61.6% enabled WEP (or better) security; 31.4% used default SSID (note: Lots of smart non-Merkins included)
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Disable prior to wardrive to prevent autoconnection to discovered APs
Note!

Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy
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Locking It Down: Step 1.1
Physical Security
Secure your laptop/PDA physically
Windoze XP stores WPA PW and automagically reconnects on startup
BIOS password at least in case WLAN device is stolen! Secure your access points (locked closets vs. desk)
Remember, reset button on back of AP = Poof! No Security
Wise placement of APs/directional antennas to minimize RF leak If possible, minimize AP RF power output to least useful Audit your coverage: Warwalk/drive/sit yourself!
Reference: http://techrepublic.com.com/5100-6329-5054057.html?tag=hdi
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Wireless Policy
(Authority) will be in charge of establishing and enforcing WLAN standards; any implementation that deviates from standard must be approved by (authority) (Authority) will be the only one(s) installing/modifying/ maintaining APs; (Users) will not install APs Only (authorized user type list) can use the WLAN; all others require explicit permission from (authority) All WLAN devices must be secured according to standards set by (authority) All communications must be encrypted using (standard) All (users) must register WLAN devices with (authority)
For good example: http://www.ksu.edu/policies/ppm/3480.html
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID
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OS/Firmware Updates
Windows XP Service Pack 2 (SP2) Apple Macintosh: Need firmware upgrade to AirPort Extreme 11g (b sol)
WPA requires an AirPort Extreme base station and AirPort Extreme or AirPort clients running Mac OS X v10.3 (Panther), or later. Use of Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) reduces the maximum number of network users. Computers with wireless cards that only support WEP cannot join an AirPort network that has WPA enabled. Client: http://www.apple.com/support/downloads/airportupdate.html AP: http://www.apple.com/support/downloads/airportextremefwupdate.html Linux: Support depends on chipset; http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/ also see http://www.linux-sec.net/Wireless/WPA/#WPA for mondo links Until Sep 04, very cumbersome process to implement WPA (see notbob.com) Now, SP2 incorporates new WZC and WPA functionality (finally)
Make sure you are running latest version of your APs firmware; visit manufacturers website every few months at least
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WPA under WinXP SP1 vs. SP2
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MAC/SSID Vulnerability
MAC = media access control address

Hardcoded in all NICs Easily Spoofed under Win 9x, Linux; New! WinXP spoofing via freeware Mac Makeup app: http://www.gorlani.com/publicprj/macmakeup/macmakeup.asp
SSID = Service Set Identifier

Used to define networks By default, broadcast in the clear by access points Will be given out by AP if client configured with any or blank SSID
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MAC Address Spoofing

edit /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-eth0 (assuming it's your eth0 network card that you want to change the MAC for), and add a line like this: MACADDR=AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF (Obviously you want to substitute the MAC address you want in place of AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF) Then "/sbin/ifdown eth0", "/sbin/ifup eth0", and you should be up and running with the new MAC address. You can use "/sbin/ifconfig eth0" to verify that the new MAC address is in effect -- it shows up in the 'HWaddr' entry on the first line that ifconfig prints
(YMMV RTFM HTH)
Orinoco Gold on Win 98SE
Red Hat Linux
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=bb8vft%24lma%241%40news01.intel.com&oe=UTF-8&output=gplain CIA XXV Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.
Locking It Down Step 2.2
MAC Filtering
Better than nothing; will keep out your neighbors To find your adapters MAC addresses, under Windows: start | run | cmd | ipconfig/all ; listed as physical address Best to explicitly allow only your own MACs; explicit deny is for open APs that are subject to annoying users (without the sense to spoof their MAC addys)
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Default SSIDs
3Com: comcomcom Cisco: 2, tsunami, WaveLAN Network Compaq: Compaq With AP manufacturer, trivial to determine default DLink: WLAN Administrator Intel: 101, 195, xlan, intel username/password! Linksys: linksys, Wireless Netgear: Wireless Zcomax: any, mello, Test
http://www.cirt.net/cgi-bin/ssids.pl http://www.iss.net/wireless/WLAN_FAQ.php
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Locking It Down Step 2.2 (contd)
SSID Rules
Change from default Dont broadcast if possible (WPA flaky sometimes) Dont make it your family/business name Dont make it interesting to h@X0rS; boring is good: ex: thisAP Make it hard to guess (e.g., not Default1)
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP
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Change yer freakin default AP password!

Every script kiddie and her dog knows the default passwords for major manufacturers! Pick a new, secure PW Disable remote router administration and Universal Plug and Play (if router doesnt have nice check box, get Steve Gibsons UnPlug n Pray here: http://grc.com/UnPnP/UnPnP.htm ) While youre at it, enable routers firewall function: block anonymous WAN reqests & filter NAT redirection to keep local LAN users from accessing port-forwarded services on router
http://www.linksys.com/download/vertxt/befsr81v2_ver.txt
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Use Encryption
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Encryption Basics
XOR Logic Gate
Need to hide message (plaintext) = needle Generate random stuff (encryption key) = piece of hay Multiply random stuff (keystream) = haystack Hide message in haystack (XOR) needle+haystack (ciphertext)
http://www.mesda.com/files/infosecurity200309.pdf; http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/electronic/xor.html Intro to Encryption: http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto/jscrypt.htm CIA XXV
WEPwhat is WEP?
Wired Equivalent Protocol (NOT Wireless Encryption Privacy) First defined in 1999 ANSI/IEEE Std. 802.11, section 8.2
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-1999.pdf
Never intended to provide strong security; Goals:
Reasonably strong (dependent on key length) Self-synchronizing (for best effort delivery) Efficient (low processor overhead) Exportable (pre-1999 ITAR climate [Phil Zimmerman]) Optional (so lusers dont whine to hardware manufacturers when they mess up WEP on their networks DISABLED out of the box by all OEMs as of 2004 AFAIK*)
*AFAIK= As far as I know
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How is WEP supposed to work?
Secret key combined with IV, run through WEP cipher PRNG (RC4)
Plaintext XORed with key sequence (irreversible without key) Ciphertext output sent over airwaves after encapsulation into IP packets
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-1999.pdf
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What is RC4?

One encryption algorithm (many others: DES, IDEA, Blowfish, AES, etc.) Efficient streaming cipher (low overhead)-- used in SSL encryption (online banking, etc.) Proprietary trade secret of RSA Inc. http://www.rsasecurity.com Presumed RC4 source code uploaded to Usenet newsgroup sci.crypt 13 Sep 1994all open source RC4 implementations based on this anonymous post (including WEP)!
From: nobody@vox.xs4all.nl (An0nYm0Us UsEr) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: RC4 ? Date: 13 Sep 1994 21:30:36 GMT Organization: Global Anonymous Remail Services Ltd. Lines: 83 Message-ID: <3555ls$fsv@news.xs4all.nl> NNTP-Posting-Host: xs1.xs4all.nl X-Comment: This message did not originate from the above address. X-Comment: It was automatically remailed by an anonymous mailservice. X-Comment: Info: usura@xs4all.nl, Subject: remailer-help X-Comment: Please report inappropriate use to <admin@vox.xs4all.nl> SUBJECT: RC4 Source Code I've tested this. It is compatible with the RC4 object module that comes in the various RSA toolkits. /* rc4.h */ http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=35gtd7%24404%40ccu2.auckland.ac.nz&oe=UTF-8&output=gplain
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Why is WEP Broken?

First paper: Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir (encryption flaws) http://www.securityfocus.com/data/library/rc4_ksaproc.pdf WEP attack using FMS method: Stubblefield, Ionnidis, Rubin http://www.cs.rice.edu/~astubble/wep/ WEP standard implements RC4 improperly
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/technotes/wep.html
Flaws in key scheduling algorithm Large number of weak keys encryption easily cracked IV is sent in the clear with each chunk subtract 24 bits of IV from encryption key length
http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/foldoc.cgi?RC4
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Enabling WEP
Orinoco Gold on Win 98SE

Linksys pic modified from: http://www.timhiggins.com/Reviews/images/scrnshots/linksys_wap54g_setup.jpg CIA XXV
Advanced WEP
Freeware key generators create pseudorandom keys for you to enter Rotate keys frequently (weekly for business, monthly for home at minimum) Make sure highest key-length WEP is enabled (remember, 64 bit WEP key is really just 40 bits long [thanks, marketing!]) Upgrade WEP to WPA as soon as possible (look for WPA support for all new hardware)
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Bbbbutisnt WEP broken?

Yes, butjust because your front door can be picked, doesnt mean you shouldnt lock it! Never be low hanging fruit for attackers Lots of old hardware (pre-2004) cant support WPA, let alone WPA2: WEP is the only option If you just enable WEP more secure than 60-75% of WLAN users (according to wardriving data) If you enable WEP + change SSID from default + change AP logon/pw: more secure than 95% of lusers
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Quick Fix for WEP: WPA

WPA = WiFiTM Protected Access Available as software/firmware upgrade for most chipsets/manufacturers now or soon Subset of new (Jun 04) 802.11i security architecture Patches major vulnerabilities in WEP:
TKIP fixes IV weakness, adds MIC, key mixing, rekeying Supports enterprise user authentication via EAP and 802.1X SOHO mode: Pre-Shared Key (PSK): autorotates key for you
http://www.newswireless.net/articles/021123-protect.html
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TKIP
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Look for the WPA label
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Enabling WPA PSK in Windoze XP SP2
Make sure wireless connection works with WEP first Have wired connection to prevent disconnection with changes Upgrade Windows XP SP1 to SP2 (Windoze Update) Pick a good pre-shared key (PSK)! http://wifinetnews.com/archives/002452.html Upgrade client firmware to support WPA Implement WPA PSK on router (may need to upgrade firmware) Implement WPA on Windows XP using WZC (Wireless Zero Configuration)
See my separate step-by-step guide on WPA in XP: http://www.notbob.com/wlani
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Step 4: Step Implement Step 3: Make 2: Step Implement WPA 1: sure Upgrade PSK supplicant WPA under XP on to network supports AP SP2 router connections WPA
Take Home Message

Everyone in this room should be using WPA instead of WEP at all times right now! Definitely worth upgrading hardware to support WPA Hospitals/Medical Offices: Legal risks of NOT using WPA (due diligence) given WEP vulnerabilities
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Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP Step 4: Toward 802.11i/WPA2 for Home/SOHO use
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WPA Upgrade: IEEE 802.11i/WPA2

802.1X port-based authentication requires dedicated authentication server (or server process in AP) RADIUS authentication: for enterprises only IEEE 802.11i = WPA + RSN; finally ratified Jun 04 Uses CCMP (counter mode with cipher block chaining [CBC] message authentication code protocol) for enhanced privacy, data integrity, and authentication RSN: Robust Security Network 802.1X + EAP + AES (non-RC4 encryption protocol) will likely need hardware upgrade to run RSN without major hit on throughput; likely available in mature form in 2005-6
802.11i (excellent): http://www.commsdesign.com/design_library/cd/wl/OEG20021126S0003 802.11i (advanced): http://csrc.nist.gov/wireless/S10_802.11i%20Overview-jw1.pdf RSN: http://www.nwfusion.com/news/tech/2003/0526techupdate.html CIA XXV
CBC: http://pedia.nodeworks.com/C/CI/CIP/Ciph er_Block_Chaining/
AES
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Rijndael (Reign-Dahl) is AES
Rijndael is a symmetric block cipher, designed by Belgian/Flemish cryptologists Joan Daemen (Yo-ahn Dah-mun) and Vincent Rijmen (Rye-mun ) Time to crack @ 255 keys/sec: 149 trillion years Basic advantage of AES is its efficiency and low overhead: easier to implement than its competitors for AES standard For WiFi, requires dedicated chip to process cipher in real time
Official NIST AES Specs: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf Intro to AES: http://www.nwfusion.com/details/597.html?def Very High Level AES mathematical explanation: http://islab.oregonstate.edu/koc/ece575/aes/intro.pdf
How is that pronounced ? If you're Dutch, Flemish, Indonesian, Surinamer or South-African, it's pronounced like you think it should be. Otherwise, you could pronounce it like "Reign Dahl", "Rain Doll", "Rhine Dahl". We're not picky. As long as you make it sound different from "Region Deal".
http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/
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from: http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/pdf/Wi-Fi_ProtectedAccessWebcast_2003.pdf
Do you really need WPA2?

WPA fixes all known problems with WEP If you avoid choosing weak passphrase subject to dictionary attack, WPA should suffice for most home/SOHO users for now (2005) As of Oct 04, WPA has not been broken RC4 will eventually succumb to Moores Law will need to move to AES in the future AES support in WPA2 probably involves upgrading your hardware: business decision (risk/benefit ratio)
See Q&A section here: http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/protected_access.asp

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Advanced WLAN Security: Topology Options

Safe Side Unsafe Side
Firewall Treat all wireless communication as insecure Put AP on unsafe side of firewall Use VPN (private tunnel) through internet to reach internal network Impractical for SOHO networks (expensive; throughput hit)
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Step 5: CSE Continuing Security Education

All users should keep up with major security developments, including WLAN security Excellent resources:
Internet Storm Center http://isc.sans.org News.com http://www.news.com Wireless News Factor http://wireless.newsfactor.com WiFi Planet http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/ NetworkWorldFusion http://www.nwfusion.com/topics/security.html
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Future Wireless Security Issues 2
Privacy: Sniffing your cars radio stations Red Means Stop, Ya Moron!: 802.11p DOS: Wireless Jammers for Jesus Wireless Viruses: Dont get stung by Mosquitoes RFIDS: The Next Security Threat?
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Privacy: Sniffing your cars radio
Device sniffs what radio station you are listening to

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60013-2004Oct24.html
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Hey, buddy, Im talking to you

802.11p is a new IEEE spec to implement WiFi for vehicles Emergency vehicles might use broadcast via wireless to change traffic signals in order to speed themselves along. Cars might also "communicate" with one another, as an exchange of Wi-Fi signals makes it possible to sound proximity alerts when two vehicles come too close to one another. Just imagine the potential for chaos when criminals can change traffic lights remotely, or when pranksters activate all the proximity alerts simultaneously
http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/columns/article.php/3422251
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DOS: Wireless Jammers for Jesus
Mexico: Cell phone jammers installed in churcheswould likely nuke nearby WiFi as well
http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/ptech/10/19/cellphonejammers.ap/
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Dont Get Stung

Copy protection built into smart cellphone game Mosquitoes rewritten as Trojan to call expensive premium numbers using embedded Symbian OS Sooner or later, I expect I will be advising people not to run unknown applications for their refrigerators and cars, he says. It is becoming more of a danger as we embed OS into more of our lives. --Panda Software CTO Patrick Hinojosa
http://wireless.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_title=Mosquito-Trojan--Copy-Protection-Gone-Wrong&story_id=26310&category=wlssecurity
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RFID Security: Brave New World?

RFIDs are poised to become ubiquitous RFIDs have no security and can be hacked The thinking is, security is a secondary issue right now that will be fixed once deployments are underway Jeff Woods, Gartner Research Director Ya, that strategy has worked so well for Windows XP, WEP, Iraq
http://enterprise-security-today.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_title=RFID--The-Next-Security-Nightmare-&story_id=26104&category=mobsec
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Patch OS frequently to plug security holes; read media for new WLAN exploits
WPA2= 802.1X, 802.11i, RSN; VPN + RADIUS for enterprises only if no WPA; rotate keys manually Implement now; choose secure PSK Change default; dont broadcast Implement MAC filtering
Change default admin logon/pw; disable remote admin Weekly or automatically Got WPA? Prevent theft; BIOS pw; encrypt files; backup data; disaster plan
Implement and enforce wireless security AUP/TOS
WLAN Security Basics Checklist
Pay attention to geographical location of AP (parking lot coverage) Disable file & print sharing if not needed; never share root Disable SSID broadcasting (default = enabled for most products) Change the SSID to something non-default and boring Upgrade firmware of AP/client to increase security (WPA) Change default admin login/password for AP; disable remote admin Configure AP to enable MAC address filtering (not perfect, yes) Enable WPA PSK now! For enterprises: RADIUS, WPA2 Only use WEP as last resort (legacy hardware; rotate keys often) Wardrive yourself to audit your security (got rogue teenager AP?)
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The Tao of Network Security
1994-1999: Information Access
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The Tao of Network Security
1994-1999:
Information Access
2000-2005: Information Denial
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Addendum: Its the Basics, Stupid
http://www.canada.com/technology/story.html?id=80bc4cc6-f3e3-4960-9b70-91c260e63931
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Remember: Common Threats Are Common!

Wired attacks are still much more common than WLAN exploits:
Buffer Overflow attacks based on Windoze vulnerabilities (increasingly zero-day exploits): Sasser, CHM, etc. Phishing for passwords, bank accounts ( sophistication) M$ Outlook/OE exploits: worms, viruses, blended threats Hostile websites: spyware, malware, browser hijacking Keystroke loggers: disgruntled employees, spouses, kids IM attacks: embedded malign URLs, spim, predators
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Are Most Users too Stupid for the Internet?
Why not require a license for internet access?

Wired Article: Are You Too Stupid to Surf?
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,60416,00.html
Several Downsides:
People dont trust the Gummint (look at TIAO Initiative furor) Money Your Grandma wouldnt pass the testever. If stupid Merkins are kept offline, how about the rest of the world we havent liberatedyet?
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Are Most Users too Stupid for the Internet?

How to get H@cked and 0wn3d in 7 easy Steps:
Never update your Anti-virus programs definitions

In fact, let the free version on your new computer expire
Click on all e-mail attachments with wild abandon Never use a firewall (equivalent: Windoze fw only) Keep thinking that OS security updates are for girlie men Go to naughty sites and install all required programs Use insecure, older versions of apps due to nostalgia Ignore computer security alerts in the news (news.com)
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References
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Online Resources
WLAN Specifications
WiFiTM Alliance (formerly WECA): http://www.wi-fi.org/ IEEE 802.11: http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/portfolio.html IEEE 802.11i: restricted: http://standards.ieee.org/reading/ieee/std/lanman/restricted/802.11i-2004.pdf
Lots of interesting unrestricted IEEE documents: http://www.ieee802.org/11/Documents/DocumentHolder/
Bluetooth:
https://www.bluetooth.org/
HIPERLAN/2: Official Specs: http://www.hiperlan2.com HiSWAN: http://www.arib.or.jp/mmac/e/index.htm
IEEE Communications Overview: http://www.ihpffo.de/systems/Doc/Vorlesung/MC/ %DCbung/Gruppe7-Hiperlan/0130khun.pdf
Avian IP Transport Protocol (RFC 1149): http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1149.txt?number=1149

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Wardriving Software
NetStumbler http://www.netstumbler.com/ MacStumbler http://www.macstumbler.com/ BSDAirtools http://www.dachb0den.com/projects/bsd-airtools.html AirSnort http://airsnort.shmoo.com/ Kismet http://www.kismetwireless.net/ Wellenreiter http://www.wellenreiter.net/
Lots of other tools: http://wardrive.net/wardriving/tools
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Online Resources
Basic 802.11 Security
WLAN Security FAQ (ISS): http://www.iss.net/wireless/WLAN_FAQ.php (old) WEP Specifications: http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-1999.pdf WEP Insecurity: http://ftp.die.net/mirror/papers/802.11/wep_attack.html (no longer on:
http://www.cs.rice.edu/~astubble/wep/wep_attack.html )
WPA/WPA2: http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/protected_access.asp Wardriving: http://www.wardriving.com ; www.sans.org/rr/papers/68/174.pdf Netstumbler: http://www.netstumbler.com Wireless Glossary: http://www.devx.com/wireless/Door/11333 (heh heh)
Build your own Cantenna: http://www.turnpoint.net/wireless/cantennahowto.html
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Online Resources
Advanced WLAN Security/Continuing Security Education
SANS: http://www.sans.org Internet Storm Center http://isc.sans.org Wireless LAN Security Site: http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/ News.com http://www.news.com Wireless News Factor http://wireless.newsfactor.com WiFi Planet http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/ NetworkWorldFusion http://www.nwfusion.com/topics/security.html Google it: search Google for WLAN security and/or WiFi security Cool list of WLAN Security Links: http://www.corecom.com/html/wlan.html Still More whitepapers: http://www.wlana.org/learning_center.html
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Online Resources
AFH Topics
People are stupid: Wireless Equivalent Privacy:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=%22Wireless+Equivalent+Privacy%22&btnG=Google+Search
People are stupid 2: Wireless Encryption Protocol:

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=%22Wireless+Encryption+Protocol%22
HAARP: http://www.haarp.alaska.edu/haarp/ ; http://www.vs.afrl.af.mil/Factsheets/haarp.html ECHELON: http://www.europarl.eu.int/tempcom/echelon/ pdf/rapport_echelon_en.pdf TEMPEST: http://www.cwrl.utexas.edu/~benjamin/316kfall/316ktexts/tempest1.html
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Offline Resources
Books/Articles: Computer Security Essentials
Skoudis, Ed, Counterhack, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall PTR 2002. ISBN 0-13-033273-9 (amazing book! dozens of black hat techniques with countermeasures) Cheswick WR, Bellovin SM, Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker, New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company 1994. ISBN 0-201-63357-4 (a classic) Chapman, D. Brent and Zwicky, Elizabeth D., Building Internet Firewalls, Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly & Associates, 1995. ISBN 1-156592-124-0 (first edition includes excellent appendix on basics of ISO/OSI TCP/IP stack) Anonymous, Maximum Security, Fourth Ed., Indianapolis: SAMS Publishing Dec 2002 (excellent resource)
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Offline Resources
Books/Articles: WLAN Security
Duntemann J, Jeff Duntemanns Drive-by WiFi Guide, Scottsdale: Paraglyph Press, 2003. ISBN 1-932111-74-3 (very readable & entertaining; most practical 3-space reference thus far) Peikari C, Fogie S, Wireless Maximum Security, Indianapolis: Sams Publishing, 2003. ISBN 0-672-32488-1 (contains some errors [er, Wireless Equivalent Privacy? To paraphrase the song, 1/3 aint good.]) Edney J, Arbaugh WA, Real 802.11 Security: WiFi Protected Access and 802.11i, Boston (etc.): Addison-Wesley, 2004 (almost incomprehensible at times, but good reference) Vladimirov A, Gavrilenko K, Mikhailovsky A, Wi-Foo: The Secrets of Wireless Hacking, Boston (etc.), Addison-Wesley, 2004 (Good overview of WLAN security from Black Hat perspective; grammatical issues)
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WLANI2005

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Wireless LAN Insecurity Update 2005

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Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

Network Abuse Costs $$$: 2003 Data from U.S. FBI

WLAN Abuse 2004: Number 5 with a Bullet

Multiple Winblows XP/2000 vulnerabilities

The Basic Network Security Pyramid

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

Wireless Security 2003

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

CIA XXIV XXV

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

What this talk is about

Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

What this talk is about

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

What this talk is about

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

What this talk is about

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

What this talk is about

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

What this talk is about

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

What this talk is about

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

What this talk is about

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

Dusko and Vlado Say: Be Responsible with your WLAN-kwon-do!

You cant afford perfect security

What this talk is about

Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

CIA XXIV XXV

Introduction to Wireless vs. Wired Networking

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

Basic Wired Network Topology

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

Introduction to Wireless vs. Wired Networking

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

*ad hoc intranetworks

Quick Review of WLAN Security Terminology

Basic Wireless Network Topology

Basic Wireless Network Topology

Default: Open authentication (+/- MAC/SSID filtering)

Key Auth (WEP, WPA PSK)

Generic Wireless Security Exploits

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

Generic Wireless Network Exploits

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

Generic Wireless Network Exploits

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

Generic Wireless Network Exploits

Generic Wireless Network Exploits

Generic Wireless Network Exploits

Rogue Access Point

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

The 100 meter myth

Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved.

Generic Wireless Network Exploits

Looks like your companys IP to the FBI!

Spoof MAC Address: 0000deadbeef; SSID: default