European Economic Issues

The European Monetary System

Reading: Sloman Chapter 25 Baldwin & Wyplosz 2003 Ch 10 & 12

Swann Chapter 7

A Brief Monetary History of Europe Pre 17th C.

Money originally based on metals Costly and dangerous to engage in long distant trade. Problems with quantity and divisibility Even then no guarantee that value is true Emergence of bills of exchange Essentially guaranteeing that goods to the value of x could be purchased in A

17th & 18th Century

Amsterdam set up Public bank to weigh coins and therefore warranty deposits
Which could be transferred between merchants AND which could be lent onwards

1694 Bank of England established

to facilitate the King - with the right to issue promissory notes to others on the Kings behalf. Complemented by private banks (former goldsmiths) issuing notes

Paris - Banque Royal and the Mississippi Company

A Brief Monetary History of Europe 19th C.

Bills of exchange still backed by (some?) metal Uncertainty as to true value Trade between cities as difficult as between nations Sorted in UK by 1844 designation that notes of the Official Bank Bank of England - were legal tender and guaranteed But internationally problem remained

A Brief Monetary History of Europe

Currencies issued by governments of different perceived stability No agreement on how currency should be backed gold or silver often both circulating simultaneously and fluctuating in relative value Trade involved frequent movements of commodity gold or silver

A Brief Monetary History of Europe

Golden age of Gold Standard UK: 1821-1914 Paris Conference 1867 Latin European Monetary Union-1865-1926, F,B,I, Switz, & 1867 Gr & Bul. Scandinavian monetary union 1873-1924 Dn, Sw & Nor Essentially a quasi-monetary union or set of unions www.euromove.org.uk/publications/europe anhistories/chron2

A Brief Monetary History of Europe

Not so Golden Really Frequent revaluations, devaluations and currency crises Need strict monetary discipline, particularly on growth of monetary supply for this to work. Did not exist. 1914 UK came off the Gold Standard at outbreak of war.

A Brief Monetary History of Europe

After WWI attempt to return to Gold Standard But huge interwar debts had devalued currencies But UK returned to Gold at Pre-war rate French expected Germans to pay Frances war debts Germans could not raise enough taxes, printed money at home, causing hyper-inflation Result was interwar chaos

A Brief Monetary History of Europe

After WWII international attempt to restore monetary order Breton Woods system A Gold Standard based on the dollar. Worked well for a time. Currencies allowed to fluctuate by 1% around parity Some devaluations and revaluations but reasonably well behaved until Vietnam War. US paid for deficits by printing more dollars Eventually foreign governments lost faith and system started to collapse.

A Brief Monetary History of Europe

Agreed to widen the band vis-a- vis the dollar from 1% to 2.25. But if DM 2.25 above & FF 2.25 below then 4.5% difference And if FF 2.25 above & DMF 2.25 below then total fluctuations of DM/FF is 2 x 4.5% = 9% difference. Response: Werner Report in 1970 forerunner of EMS The (original) six Member States set up a snake in the tunnel mechanism to narrow the fluctuation margins between the Community currencies (the snake) in relation to fluctuations against the US dollar (the tunnel).

Snake in the tunnel: Commitment to keeping European rates within narrower band compared with Breton Woods System
+4.50% +2.25%

Exchange rate

- 2.25%

-4.50%

No intervention

Central bank buys domestic currency

No intervention

Central bank sells domestic currency

No intervention

Time

A Brief Monetary History of Europe

1973 First Oil Crisis Snake outside the tunnel link with dollar broken Governments responded by trying to reflate economies spending and issuing (forging) money expansionary fiscal and monetary policy Differences across countries meant exchange rates unsustainable Collapsed, and then revived in 1979

The EMS-1: Key Features

A parity grid: bilateral central parities associated margins of fluctuations. Mutual unlimited support: exchange market interventions short-term loans. Realignments: tolerated, if not encouraged require unanimity agreement. The E.C.U.: not a currency, just a unit of account took some life on private markets.

The ECU
A basket of all EU currencies.

Source: Baldwin & Wyplosz 2003

The EMS: Interpretation and Assessment

Improving on the Snake to stabilise intraEuropean exchange rates: mutual support realignment unanimity rule. Respecting the EU equalitarian approach: no centre currency bilateral interventions by strong and weak currency central banks. No role for the US dollar: Europe on its own.

The EMS: Past and Present

The EMS was originally conceived as the solution to the end of the Bretton Woods System. Over the years, its nature changed and it became a kind of DM area, with the Bundesbank very much in command. This, and the speculative crisis of 1993, made the monetary union option attractive. Now the EMS is mostly the entry point for future monetary union members.

Four Incarnations of the EMS

1979-82: EMS-1 with narrow bands of fluctuation (2.25%) and symmetric. 1982-93: EMS-1 centered on the DM, shunning realignments. 1993-99: EMS-1 with wide bands (15%). 1999- : EMS-2, assymmetric, on the way to euro area.

History of the ERM

Belgian franc Danish krone German mark French franc Irish punt Italian lira Dutch guilder UK pound Spanish peseta Mar '79 En21/4% En21/4% En21/4% En21/4% En21/4% En6% En21/4% Sept '79 2.9 +2.0 Nov '79 4.8 +5.5 3.0 6.0 3.0 +5.5 Mar '81 Oct '81 Feb '82 8.5 3.0 June '82 Mar '83 +1.5 +2.5 +5.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 +3.5 July '85 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 6.0 +2.0 Apr '86 +1.0 +1.0 +3.0 3.0 Aug '86 Jan '87 +2.0 +3.0 8.0 B21/4% +3.0 +3.0 En6% Jun '89 Jan '90

+4.25 5.75 2.75 +4.25

'93 '95 '95 '96 '96 '98 '99 Belgian franc B15% S Danish krone B15% B21/4% German mark B15% S French franc B15% S Irish punt 10.0 B15% +3.0 S Italian lira 7.0 Ex En15% S Dutch guilder B15% S UK pound En6% Ex Spanish peseta 5.0 6.0 8.0 B15% 7.0 S Portuguese escudo En6% 6.0 6.5 B15% 3.5 S Austrian schilling En15% S Sloman (2006) Finnish markka Source: En15% S Greek drachma En15% =% devaluation; + =% revaluation. B% = new band; En% = entry band; Ex = exit; S = join single currency

Oct + =% Aprrevaluation. Sept Sept Nov Jan En% May = entry Aug band; Jan Ex Mar Oct Nov single Marcurrency Jan =% devaluation; B% = new band; = exit; S = join '90 '92 '92 '92 '92 '93 '93

Jan '01

Evolution: From Symmetry to DM Zone

First a flexible arrangement: different inflation rates: long run monetary policy independence frequent realignments.

Evolution: From Symmetry to DM Zone

Inflation

Source: Baldwin & Wyplosz 2003

The EMS: Interpretation and Assessment

Can EMS have monetary policy independence ? The Impossible trinity: widespread capital controls to preserve at least the ability to have different inflation rates. But Single Market Act ruled out
Fixed Exchange Rate EMS Monetary union

Monetary Independence

Free float

Full Capital Mobility

Source: Baldwin & Wyplosz 2003

Evolution: From Symmetry to DM Zone

But: realignments: barely compensated accumulated inflation differences were easy to guess by markets put weak currency/high inflation countries on the spot: Continuing current account deficits Speculative attacks. The symmetry was broken de facto. The Bundesbank became the example to follow.

The DM Zone What shadowing the Bundesbank required: giving up much what was left of monetary policy indepedence aiming at a low German-style inflation rate avoiding realignments to gain credibility.

History of the ERM

Belgian franc Danish krone German mark French franc Irish punt Italian lira Dutch guilder UK pound Spanish peseta Mar '79 En21/4% En21/4% En21/4% En21/4% En21/4% En6% En21/4% Oct '90 Apr '92 Sept '79 2.9 +2.0 Nov '79 4.8 +5.5 3.0 6.0 Sept '92 Sept '92 Nov '92 3.0 +5.5 Jan '93 Mar '81 Oct '81 Feb '82 8.5 3.0 June '82 Mar '83 +1.5 +2.5 +5.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 +3.5 July '85 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 6.0 +2.0 Apr '86 +1.0 +1.0 +3.0 3.0 Aug '86 Jan '87 +2.0 +3.0 8.0 B21/4% +3.0 +3.0 En6% Jun '89 Jan '90

+4.25 5.75 2.75 +4.25

May '93

Aug Jan Mar Oct Nov Mar Jan Jan '93 '95 '95 '96 '96 '98 '99 '01 Belgian franc B15% S Danish krone B15% B21/4% German mark B15% S =% devaluation; + =% revaluation. B% = new band; French franc B15% S En% = entry band; Ex = exit; S = join single currency Irish punt 10.0 B15% +3.0 S Italian lira 7.0 Ex En15% S Dutch guilder B15% S UK pound En6% Ex Spanish peseta 5.0 6.0 8.0 B15% 7.0 S Portuguese escudo En6% 6.0 6.5 B15% 3.5 S Austrian schilling En15% S Sloman (2006) Finnish markka Source: En15% S Greek drachma En15% S =% devaluation; + =% revaluation. B% = new band; En% = entry band; Ex = exit; S = join single currency

Breakdown of the DM zone

Bad design:
full capital mobility established in 1990 as part of the Single Act: EMS in contradiction with impossible trinity unless all monetary indepdence relinquished.

Bad luck:
German unification: a big shock that called for very tight monetary policy the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty.

A wave of speculative attacks in 1992-3:

the Bundesbank sets limits to unlimited support.

History of the ERM

Belgian franc Danish krone German mark French franc Irish punt Italian lira Dutch guilder UK pound Spanish peseta Mar '79 En21/4% En21/4% En21/4% En21/4% En21/4% En6% En21/4% Oct '90 Apr '92 Sept '79 2.9 +2.0 Nov '79 4.8 +5.5 3.0 6.0 Sept '92 Sept '92 Nov '92 3.0 +5.5 Jan '93 Mar '81 Oct '81 Feb '82 8.5 3.0 June '82 Mar '83 +1.5 +2.5 +5.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 +3.5 July '85 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 6.0 +2.0 Apr '86 +1.0 +1.0 +3.0 3.0 Aug '86 Jan '87 +2.0 +3.0 8.0 B21/4% +3.0 +3.0 En6% Jun '89 Jan '90

+4.25 5.75 2.75 +4.25

May '93

Aug Jan Mar Oct Nov Mar Jan '93 '95 '95 '96 '96 '98 '99 Belgian franc B15% S Danish krone B15% B21/4% German mark B15% S French franc B15% S Irish punt 10.0 B15% +3.0 S Italian lira 7.0 Ex En15% S Dutch guilder B15% S UK pound En6% Ex Spanish peseta 5.0 6.0 8.0 B15% 7.0 S Portuguese escudo En6% 6.0 6.5 B15% 3.5 S Austrian schilling En15% S Finnish markka En15% S Greek drachma En15% =% devaluation; + =% revaluation. B% = new band; En% = entry band; Ex = exit; S = join single currency

Jan '01

Source: Sloman (2006)

Contradictory Lessons From 1993 (1)

The two-corner view: even the cohesive EMS did not survive go to one of the two corners (pick one!). The EMS should be made even more cohesive: the monetary union is the way to go. The EMS was a bad idea: float is the future. Unlimited interventions cannot be unlimited: need more discipline and less support.

Contradictory Lessons From 1993 (2)

The Bundesbanks selection of countries to be supported: left scars (e.g. Britain) raises question on who decides what. Speculative attacks can hit even robust systems and properly valued currencies (suggesting selffulfilling crises). Both facts strengthen the two-corner view, providing arguments for each corner.

The Wide-Band EMS

Way out of crisis: wide band of fluctuation (15%) a soft EMS on the way to monetary union.

Four Incarnations of the EMS

Source: Baldwin & Wyplosz 2003

EMS-2
EMS-1 ceased to exist on 1 January 1999 with the launch of the Euro. EMS-2 was created to: host currencies of existing EU members who cannot/dont want to join euro area: Denmark and the UK have a derogation, but Denmark has adopted the new ERM Sweden has no derogation but has declined to adopt the new ERM host currencies of new EU members before they are admitted into euro area: potentially ten new members.

How Does EMS-2 Differ From EMS-1?

EMS-1
Symmetric, no anchor currency

EMS-2
Asymmetric, all parities defined vis a vis euro

Margin explicitly set

Normal (2.25%) and standard (15%) bands

ECB explicitly allowed to suspend intervention

Automatic unlimited interventions

A Revival of The EMS?

In principle, ERM membership is compulsory for the all new members. They must stay at least two years in the ERM before joining the euro area. They must also eliminate all capital controls. The impossible trinity says that they will have to fully give up monetary policy. The risk of self-fulfilling crises says that may not be enough to avoid trouble.