Changing Practice in Gulf of Mexico Design and Operating Criteria

The Early Days

(sometimes it is better to be lucky than good)

Gulf of Mexico platforms built around 1946 48 typically had deck heights 20 to 40 feet above mean sea level Consultants evaluations:

in 100 feet of water waves will probably seldom, IF EVER, exceed 20 feet in height settled on a maximum wave height of about 25 feet and a recommended deck height of 32 feet

Consensus: maximum wave ~ 29 feet, occurring perhaps once every 40 to 50 years. Very loose consensus no API guidance, little regulation.

Luck Starts to Run Out

1947 1952: series of relatively weak, small hurricanes in the Gulf October 1949 platform off Freeport damaged post-mortem suggested waves as high as 40 feet. Observed damage in others led to estimates of 22-29 feet calls into question both the upper limit and frequency of occurrence of high waves in Gulf Leads to stronger designs for a few operators

Lulled to Sleep? All Hurricanes and Trop Storms in Gulf 1947 - 1955

Luck Starts to Run Out

1956 Hurricane Flossie A Category 1 storm 50 men rode out the storm in the Gulf. One vessel lost its anchor and floated around during the storm in keeping with a philosophy of taking a calculated risk that they would be safe.

Led to calls for complete evacuation in hurricanes.

Luck Starts to Run Out

1957 Hurricane Audrey Forms in Gulf now called Sudden storms

One mobile drilling rig sank, with four tenders suffering damage when pulled loose from their mooring and running aground Industry record of no fatalities held.

Industry Intensifies Action

1957 Hurricanes Audrey and Bertha three significant storms in 2 years. API forms Advisory Committee on Fundamental Research on Weather Forecasting. Disbanded in 1962. Why? Other issues and Gulf fairly quiet (Carla in 1961 but it hits Texas)

Hmmmm? All Hurricanes and Trop Storms in Gulf 1956 - 1963

No Consensus

Deck height practices:

Varied from the 1950 era standard of 28 32 feet above mean Gulf level to higher than 50 feet. Not coincidently, those using higher values were companies directly impacted by storms either in terms of property or direct threat to employees. Higher meant safer and more expensive each company placed a bet on the right combination of safety and cost.
(Primitive cost-benefit analysis)

Luck Starts to Run Out All Hurricanes and Trop Storms in Gulf 1964 - 1973

1964: Hurricane Hilda Category 4

Luck Run Outs 1964 - 1969

1965: Hurricane Betsy

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Hilda

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Betsy

Luck Runs Out 1964 - 1969

1964: Hurricane Hilda Category 4 Hilda was the most damaging tropical cyclone to the offshore oil industry, at the time of its impact. More than US$100 million in losses. 13 oil platforms were destroyed 5 more damaged beyond repair[

Luck Runs Out 1964 - 1969

1965: Hurricane Betsy strong Category 3 at landfall Eight offshore oil platforms were destroyed during Betsy, with others experiencing damage.

The oil rig Maverick disappeared during the cyclone

Industry Action

1966: API Committee on Standardization of Offshore Structures created.

Focus to create better design standards through cooperative efforts.

Basic research and measurement of wind, waves, and soils continues.

Includes the Ocean Data Gathering Program (ODGP) 6 platforms instrumented in Gulf from 1968 through 1971

Some Good Luck, Some Bad

1969: Hurricane Camille

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HurricaneCamille

ODGP measured a wave between 70 and 75 feet high!!!

Some Good Luck, Some Bad

1969: Hurricane Camille

Used to calibrate hindcast models in Gulf for decades.

Metocean criteria developed using those hindcasts as database of storms in Gulf.

ODGP measured a wave between 70 and 75 feet high!!!

API Standards and Design Waves

First API offshore standard (RP2A) issued in 1969

No design wave information until 7th edition in 1976. Recommends use of the 100-year wave

To this point the owner chose the return period and the use of both 25 and 100 year values was common.
1% risk of exceedance annually = 100 yr 4% risk of exceedance annually = 25 yr

API Standards and Design Waves

20th edition (1993) includes a new wave force calculation recipe that substantially changes that of the 19th edition (1991)

Design (100-year) wave conditions changed as well

WOW!

1992 saw Hurricane Andrew

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Andrew

What Hath Andrew Wrought?

Category 4 storm in Gulf MMS estimates 700 structures took significant hit 22 older platforms destroyed 65 others with significant damage Majority had been designed to 25 year values and 35 to 40 foot decks Newer platforms that were designed with decks to pass up to 72 foot waves had only minor damage

Effect of Andrew and New API Force Recipe

Gave a boost of energy to an API committee looking at assessment of existing platforms Task group decided that the new criteria should be relaxed for existing platforms and consideration be given to CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE

Willing to take higher risks with older assets in part because cost to modify/replace are too high

Effect of Andrew and New API Force Recipe

Three categories with different metocean criteria:

L-1 (high consequence / manned-evacuated or unmanned L-2 (low consequence / manned-evacuated)

Full-population of hurricanes, 1% annual exceedance probability

Sudden hurricane and winter storm population

L-3 (low sequence / unmanned, or minimum consequence

Winter storm population

Included deck height criteria

Consequence-based Criteria for New-Build Platforms

CBC for assessing existing platforms in place in 1996 (issued as a supplement to the 20th edition of RP2A.

Sets stage for introducing this concept for new-build

L1 L2 L3

Table 1 Risks Considered for Consequence-Based Criteria for the Gulf of Mexico

LEVEL 1 1 2 3

LIFE SAFETY Manned, nonevacuated Manned, evacuated Unmanned

CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE HIGH MEDIUM LOW

Lulled to Sleep Again? All Hurricanes and Trop Storms in Gulf 1993 - 2000

Whats Happening Out There? All Hurricanes and Trop Storms in Gulf 2001 - 2005

Impact of Ivan, Katrina, and Rita

Impact of Ivan, Katrina, and Rita

2005 Atlantic Season: most active in recorded history 28 named storms, 15 hurricanes, 7 major hurricanes, and four category 5 hurricanes (per NOAA NHC) Worst season previously: 1933 with 21 named storms, 10 hurricanes, and 5 major hurricanes

Impact of Ivan, Katrina, and Rita

2004-2005 was worst two year period (23 hurricanes) since 1886-1887 (21 total) Lots of damage to platforms and mobile rigs (114 platforms destroyed in Katrina and Rita)

Lots of infrastructure damage (pipelines) leading to loss of oil and gas production

MODU Failures Floating (Semi) and Jackup

Ivan, Katrina, and Rita

Total Failure Partial Failure

Ivan: Sept. '04, Cat 4 Katrina: Aug. '05, Cat 5 Rita: Sept. '05, Cat 4

Semi Jackup Semi Jackup Semi Jackup

4 1 4 2 7 7

1 1 3 0 4 1

API Metocean Reaction

Study of Ivan led to conclusion it was a rare event statistically but no need for significant criteria revision (OTC Paper 17740) Recommendation was to simply include Ivan in any extremal analysis Maximum Hs (m):

Ivan Katrina Rita

16.0 16.9 11.5

API Criteria before these storms? Hmax = 21.5 m Hs 12.6 m

Industry and API Metocean Reaction

The rapid-fire occurrence of three huge storms in two years led to significant revisions in part due to a mooring risk JIP led by ABS which required the best possible metocean data

Several key findings:

Loop current and or Loop eddies provided get source of energy for all three of these storms Dividing the Gulf into four regions was deemed appropriate Use of the full 1990 present hurricane database was not appropriate

Loop Current - Source of Deep Warm Water

Depth below Ocean surface, m

0 -100 -200 -300 -400 Other Areas Loop and Eddy Areas

10 20 30 40 Temperature, deg C

Stages develop on time scale of months = persistent warm water conditions

Storm Tracks over Loop

http://www.esl.lsu.edu/qu icklinks/publications/imag es/PreStorms.gif

Reprinted courtesy of Colorado Center for Aerodynamics Research

API Metocean Criteria Changes after Ivan, Katrina, and Rita

Gulf divided into 4 regions.

Bias in Storms Prior to 1950

Measurements were sparse, often only at land stations. What went on in the Gulf was speculative.

In a 2006 paper (OTC 18418), Cooper and Stear concluded that there was a negative bias in the 1900 to 1949 storms as characterized by the National Hurricane Center.

Bias in Storms Prior to 1950

Start=1900, End=1949, Min CPI (mb)=63
0 1900/09/06 1915/09/30 1916/08/19 1919/09/12 1932/08/14 1933/09/04

Start=1955, End=2005, Min CPI (mb)=63

0 1961/09/10 1964/10/02 1965/09/09 1969/08/17 1970/08/02 1974/09/09 1979/09/12 1980/08/10 1982/09/10 1992/08/25 1995/10/10 1999/08/22 2004/09/15 2005/07/09 2005/08/27 2005/09/22 60 80 100 CPI (mb) 120 140 160

Distance from Shore (km)

200

Distance from Shore (km)

160

200

400 40

60

80

100 CPI (mb)

120

140

400 40

Plots: 6 pre-50; 16 post-50 storms Pre-50, 70% of storms show no drop as they near coast Post-55, 12% show no drop

Plots provided by Chevron Energy Technology Company

Suggest: pre-50 applied coastal data offshore resulting in low bias

Other factors support conclusion: NOAA generally does not use pre-50 8 of top 10 winds occurred post-50 7 of top 10 waves occurred post-50

Hurricane Reconnaissance

Became common after WWII

Industry Response
API RPs 2I, 2SM, and 2SK were all updated MODU Mooring JIP (budget approx. $2.2m)

Interim Guidance for Design of Offshore Structures for Hurricane Conditions API BULLETIN 2INTDG First Edition, May 2007 Interim Guidance for Assessment of Existing Offshore Structures for Hurricane Conditions API BULLETIN 2INTEX First Edition, May 2007 Interim Guidance on Hurricane Conditions in the Gulf of Mexico API BULLETIN 2INTMET First Edition, May 2007

Measured Data is Foundational

Hindcasts are used to generate criteria BUT these are calibrated against data

Excellent network of data buoy in Gulf and along coast

Future Hurricanes

More/less? Stronger? Similar tracks? Was the 2004-2005 season a precursor of things to come?

Atlantic Hurricane Variability Over Time: 1886 2004

Future Hurricanes

Multi-decadal variability El Nino

Yellow = named storms, Green = hurricanes, Red = Category 3 and above

Future Hurricanes

Was the 2004-2005 season a precursor of things to come? Was it all that unusual? How confident can we be in the historical record? Prior to about 1950 no air reconnaissance Satellites much later

Future Hurricanes

Key factors: warm water and wind shear generally considered most important Area of much current research AND considerable controversy Experts do not agree Models do not agree

Two interpretations of SST data lead to VASTLY different future Atlantic activity
extrapolated into the 21st century using absolute SSTs calculated from global climate model projections suggest that it is the SST in the tropical Atlantic main development region relative to the tropical mean SST that controls fluctuations in Atlantic hurricane activity

Science 31 October 2008: Vol. 322. no. 5902, pp. 687 689 DOI: 10.1126/science.1164396 CLIMATE CHANGE: Whither Hurricane Activity? Gabriel A. Vecchi,1 Kyle L. Swanson,2 Brian J. Soden3

Future Hurricanes and API

As opposed to the general historical pattern of API, being REACTIVE, there is a shift to being more PROACTIVE Funding a synthetic hurricane study at a cost significantly larger than normal API-funded research to develop a long term (100000 yrs) synthetic data base of hurricanes in the Gulf Supportive of National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) modelling work on how climate change is likely to influence hurricane activity through 2055 through RPSEA with Industry reps on steering committee, members time, etc.

Future Hurricanes and API

No criteria changes to account for any future climate scenario being applied in part due to uncertainties

May be applied when the results of the sponsored research efforts are finished

QUESTIONS ?

BACKUP

TABLE 2 LIFE SAFETY LEVEL

1

MANNING CONDITIONS
Manned, nonevacuated

EXPOSURE TO PERSONNEL
Platform continuously manned Evacuation prior to design event is not intended or is not feasible Personnel exposed to severe hurricanes Platform normally manned Evacuation prior to design event is planned and feasible Largest events that personnel are exposed to are a sudden hurricane or a winter storm

Manned, evacuated

Unmanned

Platform normally unmanned except for day trips to perform short field operations May have emergency shelter but no permanent quarters Personnel exposed to worst event that can occur during the day

Occasional manning for short durations Short maintenance, construction, workover, or drilling Scheduled to minimize potential hurricane exposure

TABLE 3 CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE PLATFORM CATEGORY

1

CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE
High

PLATFORM CHARACTERISTICS
Platform with major drilling, production, pipeline processing, or storage facilities Other platforms with high consequences of failure Wells not shut-in during design event Potential for well flow in the event of platform failure All platforms in depths greater than 400 feet Platform with drilling or production pipeline facilities with medium consequences of failure Wells shut-in during design event Wells protected by SSSVs Oil storage limited to process inventory and surge tanks for pipeline transfers

Medium

Low

Small well protectors and caissons with small consequences of failure No more than 5 completions on or connected to platform Wells shut-in during design event Wells protected by SSSVs No more than 2 pieces of production equipment Oil storage limited to process inventory Maximum water depths of 100 feet