Capacity Building Programme on New Techniques and Strategies in Prevention and Management of Industrial Disasters to the Karnataka Factory

Inspectorate 23-24 Oct 2010

SITING OF HAZARDOUS INDUSTRIES ROLE OF RISK ANALYSIS

Dr. A. Koshy
23 Oct 2010, Bengaluru, Karnataka

ORGANIZERS Karnataka State Safety Institute Department of Factories, Boilers, Industrial Safety & Health, Bengaluru SPONSORS

Disaster Management Institute

Concerns and issues in Siting/ Layout

Strategic Principles in the determination of safe location and layout for a new or a expansion project Key information to be considered before selecting a site location How are siting issues managed when limited space is available? How are security concerns in a new site addressed ?

An Ideal Situation

A site location and layout that will minimize risk to the surrounding and community/ personnel and property while maximizing the ease of safe operation and maintenance. Appropriate siting and layout establishes a foundation for a safe and secure operation.

Hazard Management in Life Cycle of an Engineering Project

COMMISSIONING

PRODUCTION

INSTALLATION

CONCEPT

CONSTRUCTION DETAIL ENGINEERING

FRONT-END ENGINEERING

Hazard Techniques for Site evaluation

Techniques of Fire Explosion Index and Toxicity Index

Dows Index Monds Index Codes ( OISD)

Allowing objective spacing distances to be taken into account at all stages

Major Accident Hazard Group

Major accident means an incident involving loss of life inside or outside the site or 10 or more injuries inside and / or one or more injuries outside or release of toxic chemical or explosion or fire or spillage of hazardous chemicals resulting in on-site or off-site emergencies or damage to equipment leading to stoppage of process or adverse effects to the environment.

THE MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARD CONTROL RULES, 1997

Features of Well Laid out Site

The potential for toxic impacts, fire escalation, and explosion damage will be low. The risk to personnel and the surrounding community will be reduced. Maintenance will be easier and safer to perform.

However, these benefits do not come without associated costs.

Separation distances translate to real estate that costs money.

Some key industrial accidents

Flixborough (6/74)

28 fatalities - $167MM

Seveso (7/76)
Mex. City (11/84) Bhopal (12/84) Chernob. Nuc. Plt. (4/86) Piper Alpha Plat. (7/88) Pasadena, Tx. (11/89) Channelview, Tx. (7/90)

Contaminated countryside
550+ fatalities - $26MM 3M+ fatalities - 200M affected 31 fatalities - 300 mi2 evacuated 165 fatalities 23 fatalities - $797MM 17 fatalities - $14MM

Pemex, Mexico (7/96)

Petrobras, Brasil (6/2001) Toulouse, France (9/01)

Multiple fatalities - $253MM, $8MMM loss to economy

10 fatalities - $300MM 29 fatalities, 20,000 homes damaged

* Large property damage losses (17th edition); M&M Protection Consultants; 1166 Avenue of the Americas, NY, NY

10036

Explosion at Chemical facility Flixborough, England, 1974

Explosion at Chemical facility Flixborough, England, 1974

A large quantity of cyclohexane vapor was released when a 20 makeshift bypass pipe ruptured The cyclohexane formed a flammable mixture and subsequently found a source of ignition. The resulting massive vapor cloud explosion killed 28 workers, injured 36. (Minimized as the office block was unoccupied)

Damages ( Onsite and Offsite)

18 fatalities occurred in the control room as a result of the windows shattering and the collapse of the roof.

No one escaped from the control room. Fires burned for several days and after ten days those that still raged were hampering the rescue work.

Offsite consequences -- 53 reported injuries. Property in the surrounding area was damaged to a varying degree.

Contributing Factors

Not following codes & operating procedures while introducing modifications

design codes, management of change procedures, maintenance procedures during recommissioning

Plant layout - position of occupied buildings

Control Room not designed for withstanding major hazards Emergency plan not updated following modifications

UK COMAH regulation was introduced

Explosion at Refinery, Pasadena, Texas 23 Oct 1989

Explosion at Refinery, Pasadena, Texas 23 Oct 1989

During maintenance work on a reactor settling leg, a large release of flammable vapor occurred at the Phillips 66 chemical complex. The result -- a massive vapor cloud explosion, followed by a series of further explosions and fires. 23 fatalities and 300 people injured. Extensive damage to the plant facilities

Metal & Debris as far as Km

Contributing Factors

Site and industry standards for maintenance not followed Training and competence Work permit system contractors Positioning of occupied buildings

Risk Factors in Site Selection

Risk to Population density around the site

( from choice hazardous material, equipment , activites)

Risk from Natural disaster occurrence (earthquake, flood, etc.) Risk of non-availability of power, steam and water

Plant Siting Safety Considerations

Buffer zone Location of other hazardous installations in vicinity Inventory of toxic and hazardous materials Adequacy of firefighting water supply Access to Emergency equipment Availability of emergency response support from adjacent industries and the community

Weather extremes and prevailing winds Location of highways, waterways, railroad and airplane corridors Environmental and waste disposal restrictions during emergencies Draining and grade slope Maintenance and inspection

Layers of Safety in Industrial Project

Critical Radiation Levels

Damage Criteria for Explosion

0.30 0.20 to 0.27
0.20 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.01
Over pressure (bar) Type of damage

Heavy Rupture of Oil storage tanks Possibility of damage to eardrums (Human) Steel frame constructions distorted and pulled away from foundations Repairable damage Large & small windows usually shattered 10% window glass broken Crack of windows

Damage Contours from Pool fire at manifold

Damage Contours from Jetfire at tank farm

Radiation Level Ellipse @ 4 kW/m2 Effect Zone @ 4 kW/m2 Ellipse @ 12.5 kW/m2 Effect Zone @ 12.5 kW/m2

Damage Contours from VCE

Toxic Dispersion & Effects

Vapor clouds may give rise to large fires, explosions or toxic effects. Other things being equal, toxic gas clouds are likely to be dangerous at much greater distances from the point of release than their flammable counterparts. Dispersion is the process through which gases can travel long distances. Two types of dispersion occur in industrial situations.

Types of Dispersion
Dispersions

Dense

Neutral

A distinction between different types of dispersion is made for the use of suitable models.
It is based on the type of material

Consequences from Toxic Gas Dispersion

A large toxic release may give rise to the following effects on human beings:
lethal injury non-lethal injury Irritation

Toxic gas releases may cause domino effects by rendering adjacent plants inoperable and injuring operators.

Prevention/mitigation by provision of automatic control systems using inherently safer principles and a suitable control room

Large Toxic Release

The main mode of exposure is inhalation The effects of a toxic release are estimated knowing the relationship between the concentration-time profile and the degree of injury The product C of concentration and the time of exposure t, is called dosage and is directly calculated from the dispersion equation

Exposure Limits

Three agencies provide information regarding exposure limits, specifying safe levels of air borne contaminants
OSHA The

National Institute of Occupational Safety (NIOSH)

and The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH)

These 3 agencies have established guidelines and specific exposure levels of various contaminants

Protection from Domino/ Cascade Effects

Arranging separation distances such that damage to adjacent plants will not occur even in the worst case; Provision of barriers e.g. blast walls, location in strong buildings; Protecting plant against damage; e.g. provision of thicker walls on vessels; Directing explosion relief vents away from vulnerable areas; e.g. other plants or buildings, roadways near site boundaries. However, these measures may not provide practical solutions against missiles, and risk analysis may be required to prove adequate safety.

LPG Terminal Mexico City, Mexico 1984

A major fire and a series of catastrophic explosions occurred at the PEMEX LPG Terminal.
After the intial release, the first BLEVE occurred. For the next 90 minutes, a series of BLEVEs followed as other LPG vessels violently exploded. Approximetly 500 people were killed and the facility was destroyed.

Contributing Factors

Plant layout the positioning of vessels Emergency isolation Survivability of critical systems Emergency plan and site access

Guidance values for safe separation distances

For prevention of Domino Effects Thermal radiation from fire (Jet/ Flash/ Pool/ Fireball)
kW/m2 4.5 kW/m2
12.5

1% Fatality level Safe for firefighters

Overpressure from Explosion (UVCE/ VCE/ BLEVE)

0.1

bar 1% Fatality level

Site Factors to be considered where Risks of release of flammable/ toxic materials exists

Plants/Flammable storages should be sited in the open air Locating all high-volume storage of flammable / toxic material well outside process areas; Hazardous area classification (HAC) to designate areas for elimination of ignition sources . Locating hazardous plant away from main roadways through the site; Fitting remote-actuated isolation valves where high inventories of hazardous materials may be released into vulnerable areas; Provision of ditches, dykes, embankments, sloping terrain to contain and control releases & limit safety & environmental effects;

Incident at POL Depot, Jaipur, 29th Oct 2009, 6:10 pm

Liquid Motor Spirit had gushed out, when the tank was being lined up (made ready for pumping to BPCL) because MOV connecting to the tank was also open when the Hammer Blind was in the changeover position Product leaked for 75 minutes- 1000 tons of MS= 20 tons TNT before explosion took After explosion, fire occurred in 9 of the 11 tanks and the fire continued till the fuel contents were totally burnt. 60000KL product burned out in 11 day 11 fatalities, many injured and 280 cr loss

LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

Open condition of dyke valve in tank dyke drainage system is connected to storm water drain also which is open to atmosphere, Hydrocarbon entering this allows vapor to spread throughout installation.

INADEQUATE MITIGATION MEASURES

MOV closure from control room was malfunction Non availability of SCBA No emergency plan for the scenario No emergency responder

Critical factors to be considered in plant layout

Location of control room /Protection Fire water tank and fire water pump house Congestion in the plant site because of buildings, structures, pipelines, trees etc.

The emergency exit gate shall be away from the main gate and always be available for use for personnel evacuation during emergency. Evacuation routes should not be blocked by poor plant layout

Extract from IOC Fire Accident Report 10.5 Plant Layout

Positioning of occupied buildings

The distance between occupied buildings and plant buildings( w.r.t dangers of explosion, fire and toxicity). Locate buildings and structures in the upwind direction Congestion in the plant site because of buildings, structures, pipelines, trees etc. All buildings which are not related to terminal operation shall be located outside the plant area. (eg. canteen, ignition sources) Personnel with more general site responsibilities should usually be housed in buildings sited in a non-hazard area near the main entrance. In all cases occupied buildings should not be sited downwind of hazardous plant areas.

HPCL-Vizag refinery explosion 14th September 1997

Fire broke out at 6:15 am, following a suspected leak in the LPG pipeline from the Vizag port to the storage farm. It caused a series of explosions, and soon spread to at least six other naphtha and petrol tanks.

Damages ( HPCL Refinery Fire )

Affected the entire product terminal area, including 11 storage tanks containing naptha, petrol, diesel, kerosene and furnace oil, besides the six ''Horton spheres'' containing LPG.
The refinery's administrative building, its canteen and some other buildings came crashing down like a pack of cards Even an earthquake measuring eight on the Richter scale would not have caused so much damage.

What to do in case of Restricted SpaceCase study of Fire at IOC filling station (petrol bunk)

Gas tanker filling underground tanks of the LPG outlet suddenly caught fire, Caused by leakage of LPG from a nozzle of a gas tanker 3 persons were killed and a dozen others injured The fire engulfed a gas tanker, an electricity transformer and three cars and spread to a nearby multistorey apartment building. Ignition followed by Fire - spread to nearby houses and burnt trees and damaged electricity poles and wires. Estimate about 12 to 15 tonnes of fuel went up in flames with the fire raging for six hours

IOC LPG Explosion Jaipur - Oct 12 ,2008

Entire gas station was engulfed in flames Explosion took place in the tanker itself, destroying it completely. , the impact of which was felt in the entire Shastri Nagar residential area up to a distance of three kilometres After 15 minutes of the gas that had leaked , the tanker blew off. The rear shell of the tanker had been thrown 250 feet and made a big hole into an building tanker exploded at that time and huge flames that were thrown out of it 350 feet away

Risk Analysis Need to Be Applied

Helps in
Forecasting

any unwanted situation Estimating damage potential of such situation Decision making to assess the suitability of sites Evaluating effectiveness of control measures

IOC LPG Explosion Jaipur - Oct 12 ,2008

Risk
The probability of suffering a harm or loss. A combination of hazard and Probability

Risk

= Probability of occurrence of hazard X magnitude of hazard

Measurement of Risk
Individual

Risk Societal Risk

Risk Representation

Individual Risk Contour

1.0E-04 2.0E-05 5.0E-06

ALARP As Low As Reasonable Practicable

Tolerable only if risk reduction Is impracticable or cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained

Summary & Conclusion

Poorly laid out site increases risk of an accident especially in MAH group of Industries
Site

layout factors should be considered during Plant Layout design phase

Risk and Damage contours (based on consequence Analysis) helps to demarcate hazardous areas Risk analysis may be required to decide the project when there is restriction of space.
Risk

levels criteria as stipulated in IS 15646 2006 should be employed to decide the case