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Financial reporting
unregulated regulated
Political and economic nature of the regulatory process Economic consequences of accounting standards
Agency Theory
Views the firm as a nexus of agency relationships and seeks to understand behavior by examining how parties maximize their own utility Management-Owner agency relationship
Potential conflict between goals of two groups Financial reporting may mitigate conflicts
Signaling Theory
Voluntary disclosure is necessary in order to compete successfully in the market for risk capital A good reputation with respect to financial reporting will improve a firms ability to raise capital Good reporting would lower a firms cost of capital
Less uncertainty about firms that report more extensively and reliably Less investment risk and a lower required rate of return
Signaling Theory
Economic incentive to report (even bad news) is at the heart of the argument for voluntary financial reporting Information asymmetry between the firm (insiders) and outsiders (investors)
Regulatory Behavior
Capture theory
The group being regulated eventually comes to the regulatory process to promote its own self-interest Result is that the regulatory process is considered captured
Life-cycle theory
Argues a regulatory process goes through several distinct phases Starts out in the public interest, but later becomes an instrument of protecting the regulated group
FASB
Considers cost-benefit of standards Standards
One set for all firms Compliance costs are disproportionately high for smaller, nonpublicly traded forms
political and economic nature of the regulatory process economic consequences of accounting standards