ISLAMIC

FUNDAMENTALISM

Concepts, Definitions and

Characteristics
1. Several kinds of Islamic revivalism:
 In general, the term represents an increase in
Islamic consciousness among the masses
 Popular Islam
 It is what we observe around in our daily life:
 the spread of benevolent societies
 Sufi brotherhoods
 the conspicuous observance of Islamic practices
 This kind of fundamentalism is usually
characterized with its passivity.
2. Islands of religious activism consisting of
militant Islamic groups and societies
 a heightened Islamic political consciousness
 against the state, the ruling apparatus and its
institutions
 violence, terror and armed struggle
 in periods of crises they establish close
relations with the mainstream Islam and recruit
new members
 in periods of the state investigation they hide
from the security forces
3. Contemporary revivalist movements

 dynamic continuity of the spiritual (Sufi) religiosity

 passivist in action but activist in demanding more from
the state
 so, harmonious with state policies and institutions or
appears to be so
 attempts to come to power, or influence it to bring
more Islamic consciousness into life and to make it a
life-style.
Definition

 Islam as religion
 An open-minded faith
 Tolerance, the lack of force
 An individual belief, a relationship with God
 Islamism as politics and ideology
 A concept of world politics
 An intolerant political ideology
 A challenge to world politics, security and stability
 A way of coming to power to rule
 No Islamism in Islam itself
Definition

 Religious Fundamentalism:
1. An aggressive politicization of religion for non-religious ends
2. A political reality not unique only to the world of Islam
3. Religious politics stemmed from any religion may be used for
religious extremism and/or terrorism

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IS THE USE OF RELIGIOUS

SYMBOLS IN PUBLIC LIFE AND, ISLAMIC LEGITIMACY
AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM IN THE POLITICAL ORDER.
The Early Islamists
 Jamal Al-Din Afghani (in Cairo btw 1871-79)
 Islamic reformist
 The need to return to Islam for social regeneration and strength
 The essence of Islam is rational, Islamic scholasticism has constrained
Isl. Phil.
 Islam is not passive obedience, b/ an active way of life using mind and
knowledge
 Against Western (Christian) imperialism and materialism
 Opposition to western influences on the culture of Muslims
 Pan-Islamism:
 Islamic reform is needed by educational modernization, and
 Islamic way of life should be adapted to the requirements of modernity
 Revolution and violence, if needed, for the political unity of the ummah
 and freedom from foreign domination
The Early Islamists
 Muhammad Abduh:
 An Egyptian from lower strata, trained as a journalist, judge and teacher
 Critique of violence for establishing an Islamic order
 Gradual reform in Islam to return the earliest pure form
 Freedom of Egypt from despotic rule, and est. of a more egalitarian
society
 Arabic is a unifying force (Unity btw the Fusha and Amiyane)
 Supported the Arabi movement and exiled along with him to Ceylon?
 In Paris, joined Al-Afghani and published journal jointly
 “Egyptian revolution is not possible due to poverty and lack of education
as the Egyptians are not powerful enough to get rid of the British.
Therefore, a rational and pragmatic accommodation of Islam to modern
world is required.”
 Cromer brought him to Cairo in 1888 and became a judge in local court
 1899 Grand Mufti of Egypt until his death in 1905
ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM

The Types
Three Comprehensive Types of Islamic Resurgence:
 Movements focusing on individual religiosity
 Movements concerning with social reform (they try to make the
sociopolitical system religiously livable within the prevailing
regime)
 Political Islam
1. Mainstream Islamic Politics:
 Islam from Above
 State Islam: apology for the status quo
 State’s appeal to Islamic symbols and religious order (the
Shariah)
2. Religiously based political movements: the change of the regime
 Islam from below
 Political-power oriented: conservative, challenging secularism
 Power oriented: militant
Fundamentalism  used to define various, even
contradictory movements, and in general militant Islam.
 The proponents of Islamic fundamentalism themselves:
 Islamiyyin = the Islamists
 Asliyyin = the original or authentic people
 mu'min and mutadayyin = pious, devout

 Opponents:
 Muta'sib = fanatic, zealot; the one who applies to the use of violence
 Tatarruf = extremism
 Mutatarrif = radical, extremist
 Mutadayyin = religious (pious) used by the revivalists themselves
 to characterize a faithful Muslim and
 to define the revivalists themselves as distinct from other Muslims

 Al-Usuliyya Al-Islamiyya (the return to the essence) is not used to define

fundamentalism, since it tells only one side of a socially based political
movement. This aims to return to the glorious age (Asr Al-Saadah)
Al-Usuliyya Al-Islamiyya
(the most appropriate term, since it implies)
 a search for the fundamentals of the faith,
 the foundations of the Islamic community (umma) and
polity,
 and the bases of legitimate authority (shar'iyyat al-
hukm)
The Arab proponents and opponents use the term Al
Sahwa al-Islamiyye (Islamic Revival/Islamic Awakening) or
al-Ba'th al-Islami (Islamic Renaissance). They may prefer
even the term Al-Nahda al-Islamiyye (Islamic
Enligthenment), though this term comes close to
nationalist awakening.
ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM

Reasons for the Rise of

Islamic Fundamentalism
The Reasons for the Rise of Islamic
Resurgence:
1. Secularization - Globalization:
 the development of communication systems
 the inseparability of political systems from religious belief in
Muslim societies
2. Crises created by modernization and westernization
 identity
 legitimacy
3. Social and political limits of contemporary rules (cyclical
limits)
 Structural nature and limits of some religions: castes, tribes,
dynasties, families, classes: the limits of mobilization
General Explanations of Islamic Resurgence
1. Oil phenomena: the increasing importance of the oil
wealth:
 But this is not explaining anything by itself. It is highly instrumental to say the main
reason is the oil wealth since it does not explain why the people go and join the religious
movements

 However, the increasing of oil and natural energy sources in the mid-1970s
 the workers remittances
 a more speedy communication
 incresing wealth
 acceleration of social change

 This change in turn, created value changes especially in oil-poor countries.

Therefore certain social forces entered into political arena, and Islamic movements
was one of them. Such an explanation is more useful than a pure instrumental
approach regarding the oil wealth.
General Explanations of Islamic Resurgence
2. Social base of the movements:

 The movements are religious but they are also social movements
 The approach analyzes the members recruited into the Islamic
fundamentalist movements.
 Their social base proves that they recruit from disadvantegeous groups:
 People who have limited income
 fixed income middle classes
 small shopkeepers
 government employers
 recent migrants from the countryside to the cities
 People who are vulnerable in socioeconomic setting:
 Journalists, doctors, lawyers, judges, students, the unemployed
 The social foundations of the movements stem also from the provision of
the social services to the needy poor by the members of these
organizations. In this kind of explanation all the Islamic movements are
explained by the class terms and socioeconomic formations.
General Explanations of Islamic Resurgence
3. International setting - external conditions:
 Frustration of Islamic movements with Western influences
 Cultural Confrontation: Superiority-Inferiority Complexes
 another external push for Islamic fundamentalism
 the confrontation of the world of Islam with the West (from the Crusades to neo-
colonialism)
 feelings of Western domination Muslim societies (the Western attacks on):
 Cultural structures and created antagonisms
 Life-styles, rituals, customs and traditions, dissimilarities
 Religious confrontation, misjudgments about Islam, negation of Muslims

 Islam was held responsible for underdevelopment, considered to prevent

progress, science and modernization.
 The Western misunderstanding of Islam and the misjudgments
 strong desire to defend the religion and to protect it from external effects
 increase the Muslim consciousness against the destructive effects of the West.
 development of Muslim identity against the Western acculturation
 expression of Muslim frustration with Islamic fundamentalism
General Explanations of Islamic Resurgence
4. Crises : Identity, legitimacy, distribution:

 Crisis of individual and collective identity

 Challenge to nationalism, socialism, democracy, monarchy
 Challenge to socio-economic system, income distribution,
absolute poverty
 Lack of socio-economic justice => official corruption and failure of
elites => crisis in legitimacy
 Coercion and oppression of regimes against opposition
 Military weaknesses in wars, Arab inferiority to Israel
 Oil wealth generated consumerism and crisis in culture
 Destruction of traditional structures and values through imported
Western culture
Why Identity Crisis: Modernity?

 The basic pattern of modernization

 industrialization in economics
 secularization in thought and in social and legal organization
 urbanization
 acquisition of modern patterns of behavior, personality and
communication
 democratization in the political sphere
 integration into the world culture

 Two pillars of modernity:

 Modern mentality
 Modern social system
Individual and Collective Identity Crisis
 Attitudes in traditional societies by tradition
 Logic, facts and observation in modern societies
 The process of rationalization in modern society
 Particularism vs. Universalism
 Transition from traditional to modern
 personality alterations
 psychological changes
 future shocks
 loosing of a set of particular values that have no place in the modern setting.

 The turmoil of rapid social, economic and political change

 individual (and social) confusion and frustration
 the destruction of traditional standards of thought and behavior
 resistance to change and demands to return to old values

 Iran: the 1970s:

 massive political, economic and social changes
 the lack of adequate preparedness of the people to change
 social discontents that such a change would bring about
 rise for regime change
General Explanations of Islamic Resurgence

5. Failure of Contemporary Ideologies of Modernization

1. The Failure of Western Liberalism

2. Failure of State Socialism
3. The Failure of Traditional Marxism
4. The Failure of Tribal Ritualism
General Explanations of Islamic Resurgence

6. Discovery of Indigenous Powers

 The power of Islam for salvation

 Increasing consciousness of the Muslims about the rise of their
religious faith
 Historical traditionalism, present conservatism and actual self-
confidence
 Moral and ethical crises in the West
 The failure of economic liberalism
 The “success” of the Iranian revolution
ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM

The Characteristics
 Characteristics
 Pervasiveness= the state of crisis is not limited and
peculiar to certain countries, instead it is pervasive
throughout the Islamic world.
 Comprehensiveness = crisis is multifaceted: social,
economic, political, cultural, psychological, spiritual.
 Cumulativeness = Culmination of failures in
nation-building and socio-economic development and
military prowess. The 1970s became the years of
ideological, political, military, and developmental failure
which created hopelessness and pessimism.
 Xenophobism = Secularism, modernity and
westernization encouraged by governments were
considered a total threat to the very integrity of Islamic
culture and the way of life.
ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM

Types of Islamic Groups

Four Types of Islamic Groups:
 Gradualist - Adaptationist
 Revolutionary Shiite
 Revolutionary Sunni
 Messianic - Primitivist
Gradualist – Adaptationist Islamic Movements

 Large proportion of Sunni revivalists groups

 Activism, but operation in the legal order
 Policies of gradualism to heighten religious
consciousness among the masses
 Push of the implementation of the Sharia by the state
 The gradual establishment of the Islamic order:
therefore some flexibility and readiness to adapt their
ideologies to modernity
 Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Egypt, Iraq, the Gulf, the Sudan, Jordan,
N. Africa)
 Jama’at al-Islami (Pakistan)
Revolutionary Shiite

 Iran
 the official doctrine of Iran: Khomeini’s Wilayat al-Faqih
(Guardianship of Jurisconsult)
 Hizb al-Dawa, Iraq
 Hizbullah, Lebanon
 Jihad al-Islami, Lebanon
 Amal Lebanon
Revolutionary Sunni
 Return to roots by militancy and Jihad in order to establish an
Islamic state
 Revivalist ideology with political and social activism in daily life
 Ready to challenge religious and political authorities and to suffer
for belief
 Influenced by Wahhabi, Ibn Kathir, Ibn Qayyim, Sanusiyya
movement, Mahdiyya and Salafiyya of the 19th century
 Ikhwan’s split into two (1965): Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Hudaibi
[Qutb was under the influence of Ibn Taymiyya and Abu al-Ala Mawdudi and
defended militant sunni politics as an ideology to protest and revolution]

 Syrian Muslim Brotherhood

 Islamic Liberation Organization of Egypt and Jordan
 Jihad and Taqfir wa al-Hijra of Egypt
 Hizb al-Tahrir of Jordan and Syria
Messianic - Primitivist

 The most puritanical type

 The Mahdist phenomenon in Sunni Islam
 Al-Ansar (the Sudan)
 Takfir wa al-Hijra (Egypt)
 Al-Ikhwan (Saudi Arabia)
 Mahdiyya (the Sudan)

 Puritanism: the strict emulation of the Prophet’s example and the life-
styles of the first Islamic community. The leadership wants to create the
Prophet’s umma and opposes to innovation and attempts of
modernization
ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM

Types of Islamic Leadership

Leadership :

 Mahdist : Takfir wa al-Hijra (Shukri Mustafa) and Mawdudi

 Marjaist : Shiite Iran The Marjiyya of the Shia is the clerical
establishment
 Mujaddidist : Banna, Mawdudi, Ibn Taymiyya - Renewal (tajdid)
taqlid
 Collegial : Collective leadership - some Egyptian groups
 Al-Jihad (Omar Abd al-Rahman)
 Islamic Liberation Oranization (military academy attack)
 Ikhwan leadership was divided:
 one is the chief theoretician
 the others take charge of administrative, political and social affairs
ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM

Ideological Framework of
Islamic Fundamentalism
General Ideological Framework of Islamic Resurgence
 Din wa Dawla:
 Islam is a total system of existence, universally applicable
 No separation between the state and religion
 Rule (hukm) is inherent in Islam
 The Quran gives the law, and the state enforces it

 Quran ve Sunna:
 Foundations of Islam
 Correct path to return and revival
 No salvation without the guidance of the Quran

 God’s Sovereignty and the Rule of Sharia :

 the ultimate aim
 Accomplished by constituting an Islamic order (Nizam al-Islami)
 The Sharia is supreme in the Islamic Order
 Salvation for humanity and individual salvation from desires is possible only through Islam

 Puritanism and Social Justice :

 Family is the cornerstone of society
 Man and woman are separated. Man is the leader, woman provides kindness, love
 The mixing of sexes is controlled, so the veil is for dignity
 Western values are alien to Islam.
General Ideological Framework of Islamic Resurgence
 Socio-economic justice:
 All property belongs to God
 Man only uses wealth earned through his labor
 Private property is recognized but limited with the general welfare
 Zakat instead of tax thus no class antagonism
 No dependence on the West.

 Jihad  the Sixth Pillar :

 Five pillars must build the ideal Islamic community under the Sharia
 The World: Dar al-Islam (House of Peace) and Dar al-Harb (House of War)
 The need for the holy war to destroy the Jahiliyya (the pre-Islamic society of impiety and
ignorance)
 Taking the authority to rule with Jihad
 Jihad is comprehensive from states and social systems to the world
 Use of violence when necessary
 Martyrdom is a requirement, Muslims are ready to sacrifice themselves
 Victory can only come with the “art of death”
 Jihad with other means as well
Demands:
 Not a new interpretation of Islam
 Not a reform in Islam as religion
 Not simply a revival of past Islamic tradition or the golden age
 This would be contradictory
 Only revival requires to be ahistorical
 Muslim societies should be accepted as monolithic/homogeneous
 Social mobilization for religious ends
 Political organization for political activity
 Seizure of political authority
 Islamicization of public life
 Reformulation of a new Islamic teaching to challenge the change
 Demands are different from one country to another
 Egypt: critical of Mubarek’s politics, economic system, welfare, education
 Syria: critical of government’s oppression and favoring of the rich, urban, upper classes
 Tunisia: critical of secularism, teaching of Islam
 Algeria: critical of regime, military and politics
 Palestine: critical of the West, US, Israel; worry about state-formation
ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM

The State, Society and Islamic

Movements
State and Islamic Fundamentalism
 Contextual Differences between Islamic Movements
1. The nature of Society: The demands of the Islamic movements differ if
the Muslims are majority or minority
 Majority  application of the Sharia
 Minority  self-rule
2. The nature of challenge: Islamists differ if they are against Muslim or
non-Muslim rule:
 Muslim  Islamicization of society, rules, state etc
 Non-Muslim  challenge to occupation, acculturation, foreign culture
3. The nature of the state: secular, moderate, Islamic, liberal, socialist...
 Secular  Islamicization of the state
 Islamic  coming to power
 Foreign  struggle against imperialism
 Liberal  ending close connections w/the West, challenge against
external penetration...
 Whatever  Islam as an alternative
State and Islamic Fundamentalism
 Institution of Islamic law, and establishment of Islamic order:
 Saudi Arabia: ironic to have Islamic movements, the Shiite opposition, 1979 Aşure Day
 Egypt: 1971 & 1979 amendments in the Constitution
 Libya, Pakistan, Iran
 Change in the language of politics and increasing use of religious symbols
 Middle Eastern governments inclinations to make Islamic programs
 Sadat’s (Rais al-Mumin) policies to counterbalance socialists
 The 1973 War (Yom Kippur) 10th of Ramadan, the code name: Badr
 Saudi’s green flag with Islamic symbols
 Iran’s Islamism during the Shah, and Khomeini
 Saddam Husayn’s use of Islam especially during the 1980-88 War
 Resorting to religious symbols in public life
 Veiling, special dressing, beard, other religious symbols
 Increase in personal religious orientation
 Increase in Islamic media (perodicals, papers, TVs, radios, tapes, Cds)
 1977: The 1st Islamic Conference on Religious Education (S. Arabia)
State and Islamic Fundamentalism
 Emergence/Proliferation of Islamic Social and Political Groups
 Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin (Brotherhood): Journal Dawa
 New Groups: Taqfir wa al-Hijra (underground, militant)
Shabab Muhammad (Muhammad’s Youth)
Jund Allah (God’s army)
 Student groups (Jamaat al-Islamiyya)
 Iraq: Many new groups after occupation
 Lebanon Imam Musa Al-Sadr (Amal for Shiites)
 Jordan Abu Musab Al-Zarkawi
 Charismatic mosque preachers (Friday Khutbas)
 Sheikh Muhammad Al-Gazzali
 Sheikh Kishk (sermons are taped and sold commercially)
 Imam Abd al-Rahman
 Internationalization of Islamic organizations
 Establishment of int’l organizations by states for socio-political issues (ICO)
 Solidarity among Islamic groups, parties and organizations
 Al-Kaide
ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM

COUNTRY STUDIES
SAUDI ARABIA
 Saudi Kingdom: the long-standing Islamic identity
 Wahhabism
 Islam covers all aspects of life
 The influence of Sharia over the individual
 Shada is in the flag
 Morality squads to enforce daily prayers
 Exclusively Islamic political language
 Political opposition also in religious forms
 Legitimacy
 Religious
 Tribal
 Islamic movements accuse the Saudi regime of deviating true Islam
 The Saudi regime lost its legitimacy
 The end of hypocratic sheikhs, the puppets of Kingdom
 The end of bribery and corruption
 The end of the close links with the West
SAUDI ARABIA
 Rise in oil revenues after 1973
 Economic development
 Developments in Communication age
 Socio-Economic change
 Islam as a political (social, sectarian) movement
 rentier state
 unequal distribution of wealth
 differential rewards
 skyrocketing land values
 increasing contacts w/the world
 de-tribalization
 undermining traditional culture
 generational gap
 rapid increase in crimes
 urbanization
 education
 foreign work force
 political participation
 socio-economic differentiation
IRAQ
 Iraq: Three bases of state’s legitimacy
 Religion
 Tribe
 Baath (State, bureaucracy, military, security)
 Ethnically, religiously divided society
 Sunni tribes (Tikrit family within Al-Bu Nasr tribe)
 Shiite religious sect
 Kurdish organizations
 1991-2003 socio-economic destruction
 2003 War in Iraq
 De-baathization
 Collapse of the national system
 Devastated infrastructure and superstructure
IRAQ
 Old-timer Islamic and Nationalist movements
 The old Baath members: mostly financing the others
 Also warrior groups: Al-Adawh; Snakehead Movement
 The anatomy of resistance after 2003
 Initially social opposition
 Now turned to be guerilla movements
 Majority Sunni Islamic and nationalist groups
 Former Baath members
 Lower-middle level retired (fired) army officers
 Islamic groups, tarikas, religious orders, communities
 Tribal members
 Imported Arab activists
 Sunni Islamic cells (nationalist as well)
 Iraq National Islamic Resistance Movement
 The 1920 Revolutionary Brigades
 National Front for the Liberation of Iraq
 Popular Resistance for the Liberation of Iraq
IRAQ
 Shiite Resistance Movements
 The Mehdi Army (Mukteda Al-Sadr) [But also in the pol. Process]
 The Badr Brigades
 Shiite opposition groups, organized
 Shiite communities around Shiite leaders (the Askariyya Tomb)
 Extremist Islamic Groups (Assassinations, Bombings...)
 Al-Kaide and Abu Musab Al-Zarkawi (Jordan connection)
 Kurdish Ansar Al-Islam
 Islamic Wrath Brigades
 The Black Flag Group
 Warriors of Hizb Al-Muzafferan
 Crime organizations, groups, and Mafia
EGYPT
 Jamal Al-Din Afghani
 Muhammad Abduh
 The Wafd party and the British Mandate in Egypt 1920-1952
 The Muslim Brotherhood
 Est. İn 1928 in Ismailiye
 Hasan Al-Banna
 Jamal Abd Al-Nasser and the Egyptian Revolution, 1952
 The Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutb (Jihad Ideology)
 Anwar Sadat and State’s policy toward Islamists
 Splinter groups
 Husnu Mubarek’s Presidency
ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM

The Future of Islamic

Movements
Future of the Islamic Movements
1. State Policies: Incremental reform, co-optation and suppression
 Islamic groups are the product of crisis
 Need for comprehensive social, political and economic reforms
 However, incremental reforms, co-optative measures and repression
 Response of Islamic Movements
 periodic campaigns against governmental corruption and bureaucratic
inefficiency
 adaptation of religious symbols, legal precepts and practices
 Government’s use of religious establishment
 Governmental use of religion to counter the militants’ propaganda
 Only partial success
 No institutional means to express dissent for fundamentalists
 Engagement of militants in violent attacks against the state and leadership
 Sometimes mass support (the Iranian revolution)
Future of the Islamic Movements

2. External Connections :
 External events and developments in the Middle East
 Iran’s Islamic victory as a stimuli
 The impact of national crises on neighbors
 Military defeats or diplomatic losses
 Oil phenomena
 Weaknesses of ruling elites
 Strength of Islamic militancy in the world
Future of the Islamic Movements
3. Initiatives of Islamic Groups:
 The quality of intellectual and political leadership
 Meaningful ideological and tactical programs
 Adoption of peaceful gradualism political and social policies
 Playing the games according to the rules

 The success (!?) of religious politics depends on:

 the development of broad and flexible program that can have
the widest mass appeal
 the strengthening of transnational links between the revivalist
societies
 the emergence of capable leaders and cadres