Hillier and Lieberman Problem 14.

4-2 Page 746

Consider the game having the following pay-off (to A) table:
Player B Strategy 1 Player A 2 -1 2 1 3 2 -2

Use the graphical procedure to determine the value of the game and the optimal strategy for each player according to the minimax criterion. When B plays strategy 1 As Expected pay-off 3 x1-1(1-x1) = -1 + 4x1

-2 x1+2(1-x1) = 2 4x1

B2
(3/8, 1/2) 0 1 x1

B1

Thus A should play his strategies 1, 2 with probabilities 3/8, 5/8. And the value of the game = 1/2. Now if Bs optimal strategies are y1* and (1-y1*), then
3 y1* - 2(1- y1* ) = 1/2 Or 5 y1* = 5/2 , i.e., y1* = 1/2 = y2* Thus B should play his strategies 1, 2 with probabilities 1/2, 1/2.

Hillier and Lieberman Problem 14.4-3(a) Page 746

Consider the game having the following pay-off (to A) table:
Player B Strategy 1 Player A 2 0 1 2 1 4 2 3 3 1

Use the graphical procedure to determine the value of the game and the optimal strategy for each player according to the minimax criterion

Hillier and Lieberman Problem 14.4-3(b) Page 746

Consider the game having the following pay-off (to A) table: Strategy

Player B 1 2
1 2 3 4 1 0 3 -3 -1 4 -2 6

3 3 1 5 -2

Player A

Use the graphical procedure to determine the value of the game and the optimal strategy for each player according to the minimax criterion.
It is clear that the strategy 3 of player B is dominated by the strategy 1 of player B, in the sense that Bs pay-off to A is less whatever strategy A plays. (Note 1 < 3, 0 < 1, 3 < 5, -3 < -2). Thus B should never play the strategy 3 and the pay-off matrix becomes

Player B
Strategy 1 2 3 4 1 1 0 3 -3 2 -1 4 -2 6

Player A

Thus we first solve Bs problem graphically.

Let B play the strategies 1, 2 with probabilities y1 and (1-y1). Thus

When A plays strategy Bs expected pay-off (to A)

y1 (1-y1) = -1 + 2y1

2
3

4(1-y1) = 4 - 4y1
3y1 2(1-y1) = -2 + 5y1

-3y1 +6 (1-y1) = 6 - 9y1

A4
A2

(2/3, 4/3)
y1

A1 A3

Thus B should play strategy 1 with prob 2/3 and strategy 2 with prob 1/3 and the value of the game = 4/3.

Now we find As prob distribution. From the graph we see that A should never play the strategy 1. Thus x1 = 0. If x2*, x3*, x4* are the optimal prob with which he plays the strategies 2, 3, 4, then we find
x2*(4 4y1) + x3*(-2+5y1)+ x4*(6-9y1) 4/3 for all y1: 0 y1 1. This becomes an equality when y1 = 2/3. Hence (4/3)x2*+ (4/3) x3*+ (0)x4* = 4/3 Hence x2*+ x3* = 1 which implies x4* = 0

Now 3 x3* = 4/3 or x3* = 4/9 and so x2* = 5/9

Hillier and Lieberman problem 14.5-3 Page 747

Consider the game having the following payoff matrix. Solve it by LPP method
Player B
Strategy 1 1 4 -1 2 2 0 3 -3 3

Player A

2
3

-2

We now add 3 to each entry so that we get the new pay-off matrix with all entries nonnegative.
Player B
Strategy 1 Player A 2 1 7 2 2 5 3 3 0 6

Putting u1 = x1/, u2 = x2/, u3 = x3/ , As problem is

Minimize z = u1 + u2 + u3 Subject to 7u1 + 2u2 + 5u3 1 5u1 + 3u2 + 6u3 1 u1 , u2 , u3 0 6u2 + u3 1

Putting t1 = y1/, t2 = y2/, t3 = y3/ , Bs problem is

Maximize w = t1 + t2 + t3 Subject to 7t1 + 5t2 1

2t1 + 3t2 + 6t3 1 5t1 + 6t2 + t3 1 t1 , t2 , t3 0

Solving we get: t1 = 8/91, t2 = 1/13, t3 = 9/91 t1 + t2 + t3 =1/ = 24/91.

8 91 1 Thus y1 = t1 = 91 24 3 1 91 7 y2 = t2 = 13 24 24 9 91 3 y3 = t3 = 91 24 8

And the value of the game =-3=

91 19 3 24 24

Also from the optimal tableau of Bs LPP, we read out optimal values of u1, u2, u3 as
8 u1 = 91 15 u2`= 91 1 u3 = 91

8 91 1 Hence x1 = u1 = 91 24 3 15 91 5 x2 = u2 = 91 24 8 1 91 1 x3 = u3 = 91 24 24

Basic

w 1 0 0

t1 -1 7 2

t2 -1 5 3

t3 -1 0 6

s1 0 1 0

s2 0 0 1

s3 0 0 0

Sol 0 1 1

w s1 s2

s3
w t1

0
1 0

5
0 1

6
-2/7 5/7

1
-1 0

0
1/7 1/7

0
0 0

1
0 0

1
1/7 1/7

s2
s3

0
0

0
0

11/7
17/7

6
1

-2/7
-5/7

1
0

0
1

5/7
2/7

Basic

w 1 0 0

t1
0 1 0

t2
-1/42 5/7 11/42

t3
0 0 1

s1
4/42 1/7 -2/42

s2
1/6 0 1/6

s3
0 0 0

Sol
11/42 1/7 5/42

w t1 t3

s3
w t1

0
1 0

0
0 1

91/42
0 0

0
0 0

-28/42
8/91 33/91

-1/6
15/91 5/91

1
1/91

7/42
24/91

-30/91 8/91

t3
t2

0
0

0
0

0
1

1
0

3/91
-4/13

17/91 -11/91
-1/13 6/13

9/91
7/91

Problem 1 Set 14.4C Page 541

On a picnic outing, 2 two-person teams are playing hide-and-seek. There are four hiding locations (A, B, C, and D), and the two members of the hiding team can hide separately in any two of the four locations. The other team will then have the chance to search any two locations. The searching team gets a bonus point if they find both members of the hiding team.If they miss both, they lose a point. Otherwise, the game is a draw.

(a) Set up the problem as a two-person zerosum game. (b) Determine the optimal strategy and the value of the game. Thus each team has 6 strategies, namely,

AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, CD

The pay-off matrix (to the searching team) is given below:

Hiding team
StraAB tegy AC 0 1 0 0 -1 0 AD 0 0 1 -1 0 0 BC 0 0 -1 1 0 0 BD 0 -1 0 0 1 0 CD -1 0 0 0 0 1

Searching AC Team
AD BC BD CD

AB

1 0 0 0 0 -1

Since max (Row minima) = -1 and min (Col maxima) = 1,

the game has no saddle point. We go in for mixed strategies. Adding 1 to each entry, the new pay-off matrix is:
AB AC AD BC BD CD AB 2 1 1 1 1 0 AC 1 2 1 1 0 1 AD 1 1 2 0 1 1 BC 1 1 0 2 1 1 BD 1 0 1 1 2 1 CD 0 1 1 1 1 2

The hiding teams problem is: Maximize w = t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 + t6 Subject to 2t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 t1 +2t2 + t3 + t4 + 1 t6 1

t1 + t2 + 2t3

+ t5 +

t6 1

t1 + t2 + 2t4 + t5 + t6 1 t1 + t3 + t4 + 2t5 + t6 1 t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 + 2t6 1 t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6 0

Solving, using TORA, we get

t1= 0.5, t2= 0.0, t3= 0.0, t4= 0.0, t5= 0.0, t6= 0.5 The optimal tableau also gives u1= 0.0, u2= 0.0, u3= 0.5, u4= 0.5, u5= 0.0, u6= 0.0

Also tj = ui = 1. Hence
x1= 0.0, x2= 0.0, x3= 0.5, x4= 0.5, x5= 0.0, x6= 0.0

y1= 0.5, y2= 0.0, y3= 0.0, y4= 0.0, y5= 0.0, y6= 0.5
And the value of the game is 1-1 = 0.