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Power System Stability in the New Industry

Environment: Challenges and Solutions
presented by:

Dr. Prabha S. Kundur
Kundur Power Systems Solutions, Inc.
Toronto, Ontario
Canada



Tutorial
Copyright P. Kundur
This material should not be used without the author's consent
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Copyright P. Kundur
Power System Stability and Control
Tutorial Outline



1. Brief Introduction to Power System Stability
Basic concepts
Classification

2. Examples of Major System Blackouts Caused by Different Forms
of Instability

3. Challenges to Secure Operation of today's Power Systems

4. Major System Blackouts in 2003 and 2004

5. Comprehensive Approach to Enhancing Power System Stability
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Copyright P. Kundur
Power System Stability
Refers to continuance of intact operation of power system,
following a disturbance
Recognized as an important problem for secure system operation
since the 1920s
Major concern since the infamous November 9, 1965 blackout of
Northeast US and Ontario
criteria and analytical tools used till now largely based on the
developments that followed
Presents many new challenges for today's power systems
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Copyright P. Kundur
Power System Stability: Basic Concepts
Power System Stability denotes the ability of an electric power
system, for a given initial operating condition, to regain a state of
operating equilibrium after being subjected to a physical
disturbance, with all system variables bounded so that the system
integrity is preserved
integrity of the system is preserved when practically the entire power
system remains intact with no undue tripping of generators or loads

Stability is a condition of equilibrium between opposing forces:
instability results when a disturbance leads to a sustained imbalance
between the opposing forces
Ref: IEEE/CIGRE TF Report, "Definition and Classification of Power System Stability",
IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, Vol. 19, pp. 1387-1401, August 2004
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Copyright P. Kundur
Basic Concepts (cont'd)
Following a transient disturbance, if the power system is stable it will reach a
new equilibrium state with practically the entire system intact:
faulted element and any connected load are disconnected
actions of automatic controls and possibly operator action will eventually
restore system to normal state

On the other hand, if the system is unstable, it will result in a run-away or
run-down situation; for example:
a progressive increase in angular separation of generator rotors, or
a progressive decrease in bus voltages

An unstable system condition could lead to cascading outages, and a shut-
down of a major portion of the power system
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Classification of Power System Stability
Classification into various categories greatly facilitates:
analysis of stability problems
identification of essential factors which contribute to instability
devising methods of improving stable operation

Classification is based on the following considerations:
physical nature of the resulting instability
size of the disturbance considered
devices, processes, and the time span involved

We should always keep in mind the overall stability !
solutions to problems of one category should not be at the
expense of another

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Copyright P. Kundur
Power System Stability
Frequency
Stability
Small-Signal
Stability
Transient
Stability
Short Term Long Term
Large-Disturbance
Voltage Stability
Small-Disturbance
Voltage Stability
Voltage
Stability
Rotor Angle
Stability
Consideration
for
Classification
Physical
Nature/ Main
System
Parameter
Size of
Disturbance
Time Span
Short Term
Short Term Long Term
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Rotor Angle Stability
Ability of interconnected synchronous machines to remain in
synchronism after being subjected to a disturbance
Depends on the ability to restore equilibrium between electromagnetic
torque and mechanical torque of each synchronous machine
If the generators become unstable when perturbed, it is as a result of
a run-away situation due to torque imbalance
A fundamental factor is the manner in which power outputs of
synchronous machines vary as their rotor angles swing
Instability that may result occurs in the form of increasing angular
swings of some generators leading to loss of synchronism with other
generators
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Transient Stability
Term traditionally used to denote large-disturbance angle stability
Ability of a power system to maintain synchronism when
subjected to a severe transient disturbance:
influenced by the nonlinear power-angle relationship
stability depends on the initial operating condition and severity of
the disturbance
A wide variety of disturbances can occur on the system:
The system is, however, designed and operated so as to be stable
for a selected set of contingencies
usually, transmission faults: L-G, L-L-G, three phase
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Small-Signal (Angle) Stability
Small-Signal (or Small-Disturbance) Stability is the ability of a power
system to maintain synchronism under small disturbances
disturbance considered sufficiently small if linearization of system
equations is permissible for analysis
Instability that may result can be of two forms:
aperidic increase in rotor angle due to lack of sufficient synchronizing
torque
rotor oscillations of increasing amplitude due to lack of sufficient
damping torque
In today's practical power systems, SSS problems are usually
associated with oscillatory modes
local plant mode oscillations: 0.8 to 2.0 Hz
interarea oscillations: 0.1 to 0.8 Hz
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Voltage Stability
Ability of power system to maintain steady voltages at all buses in the
system after being subjected to a disturbance

A system experiences voltage instability when a disturbance, increase in
load demand, or change in system condition causes:
a progressive and uncontrollable fall or rise in voltage of buses
in a small area or a relatively large area
Main factor causing voltage instability is the inability of power system to
maintain a proper balance of reactive power and voltage control actions

The driving force for voltage instability is usually the load characteristics
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Short-Term and Long-Term Voltage Stability
Short-term voltage stability involves dynamics of fast acting load
components such as induction motors, electronically controlled
loads and HVDC converters
study period of interest is in the order of several seconds
dynamic modeling of loads often essential; analysis requires
solution of differential equations using time-domain simulations
faults/short-circuits near loads could be important

Long-term voltage stability involves slower acting equipment such as
tap-changing transformers, thermostatically controlled loads, and
generator field current limiters
study period may extend to several minutes
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Frequency Stability
Ability to maintain steady frequency within a nominal range
following a disturbance resulting in a significant imbalance
between generation and load

Instability that may result occurs in the form of sustained
frequency swings leading to tripping of generating units and/or
loads

In a small "island" system, frequency stability could be of concern
for any disturbance causing a significant loss of load or
generation

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Frequency Stability (cont'd)
In a large interconnected system, frequency stability could be of
concern only following a severe system upset resulting in the
system splitting into islands

Depends on the ability to restore balance between generation and
load of island systems with minimum loss of load and generation

Generally, frequency stability problems are associated with
inadequacies in equipment responses, poor coordination of
control and protection systems
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Examples of Major System Blackouts Caused by
Different Forms of Instability
1. November 9, 1965 blackout of Northeast U.S. and Ontario

2. April 19, 1972, blackout of Eastern Ontario

3. July 2, 1996 disturbance of WSCC (Western North
American Interconnected) System

4. August 10, 1996 disturbance of WSCC system

5. March 11, 1999 Brazil blackout

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November 9, 1965 Blackout of
Northeast U.S. and Ontario
Copyright P. Kundur
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Copyright P. Kundur
November 9, 1965 Blackout of NE U.S. and Ontario
Clear day with mild weather; load levels in the region normal

Problem began at 5:16 p.m.

Within a few minutes, there was a complete shut down of electric
service to:
virtually all of the states of New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, Vermont
parts of New Hampshire, New Jersey and Pennsylvania
most of Ontario

Nearly 30 million people were without power for about 13 hours
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Copyright P. Kundur
North American Eastern Interconnected System
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Copyright P. Kundur
Events that Caused the 1965 Blackout
The initial event was the operation of a backup relay (zone 3)
at Beck GS in Ontario near Niagara Falls
opened circuit Q29BD, one of five 230 kV circuits connecting
Beck GS to load centers in Toronto and Hamilton

Prior to opening of Q29BD, the five circuits were carrying
1200 MW of Beck generation, and
500 MW import from Western NY State on Niagara ties

Loading on Q29BD was 361 MW at 248 kV;
The relay setting corresponded to 375 MW

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Events that Caused the 1965 Blackout (cont'd)
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Events that Caused the 1965 Blackout (contd)
Opening of circuit Q29BD resulted in sequential tripping of the
remaining four parallel circuits

Power flow reversed to New York: total change of 1700 MW

Generators in Western New York and Beck GS lost synchronism,
followed by cascading outages: Transient (Angle) Instability !

After about 7 seconds from the initial disturbance
system split into several separate islands
Eventually most generation and load lost due to the inability of
islanded systems to stabilize: Frequency Instability !

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Formation of Reliability Councils
Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) formed in January 1966
to improve coordination in planning and operation among utilities
first Regional Reliability Council (RRC) in North America

Other eight RRCs formed in the following months

National/North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)
established in 1968

Detailed reliability criteria were developed;
Procedures for exchange of data and conducting stability studies were
established

Many of these developments have had an influence on utility practices
worldwide; still largely used !
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Copyright P. Kundur
Special Protections Implemented after the 1965 Blackout
AP Relays on Niagara Ties

trip Niagara ties to NY when AP exceeds set value;
cross-trip St. Lawrence ties to NY
in place until mid 1980s

Underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) throughout the
interconnected system

beginning of the use of UFLS by the industry

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April 19, 1972 Blackout of
Eastern Ontario
Copyright P. Kundur
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Copyright P. Kundur
April 19, 1972 Disturbance: Eastern Ontario
Incident:
230 kV lines east of Toronto tripped due to communication malfunction;
ties to New York at St. Lawrence tripped
generation rich island formed in eastern Ontario (G=3900 MW, L=3000 MW)
frequency rose to 62.5 Hz and then dropped to 59.0 Hz due to speed
governor
underfrequency load shedding !
frequency rose to 62.6 Hz and dropped to 58.7 Hz
stabilized at 60.8 Hz with 1875 MW generation
Frequency Instability !
Source of problem: overspeed controls associated with prime-mover
governors of Pickering A: NGS
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Copyright P. Kundur
MHC Turbine Governing System with Auxiliary
Governor
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Transient Response of Nuclear Units with Auxiliary
Governor
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Transient Response of Nuclear Units with Auxiliary
Governor Out-of-Service
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July 2, 1996 WSCC / WECC
(Western North American
Interconnected System)
Disturbance
Copyright P. Kundur
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Copyright P. Kundur
WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance
Started in Wyoming and Idaho area at 14:24:37

Loads were high in Southern Idaho and Utah;
High temperature around 38C

Heavy power transfers from Pacific NW to California
Pacific AC interties - 4300 MW (4800 rating)
Pacific HVDC intertie - 2800 MW (3100 capacity)
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Copyright P. Kundur
WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)
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Copyright P. Kundur
WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)
LG fault on 345 kV line from Jim Bridger 2000 MW plant in
Wyoming to Idaho due to flashover to a tree
tripping of parallel line due to relay misoperation

Tripping of two (of four) Jim Bridger units as stability control; this
should have stabilized the system

Faulty relay tripped 230 kV line in Eastern Oregon

Voltage decay in southern Idaho and slow decay in central Oregon
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Copyright P. Kundur
WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance (contd)
About 24 seconds later, a long 230 kV line (Amps line) from western
Montana to Southern Idaho tripped, due to zone 3 relay operation
parallel 161 kV line subsequently tripped

Rapid voltage decay in Idaho and Oregon

Three seconds later, four 230 kV lines from Hells Canyon generation to
Boise tripped

Two seconds later, Pacific intertie lines separated

Cascading to five islands 35 seconds after initial fault

2.2 million customers experienced outages; total load lost 11,900 MW

Voltage Instability!!!

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WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)
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WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)
Loss of voltage control following
the tripping of the Amps line
Time in Seconds
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Copyright P. Kundur
TSAT was Used to Replicate Disturbance
in Time Domain
MEASURED RESPONSE
SIMULATED RESPONSE
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August 10, 1996 WSCC
(WECC) Disturbance
Copyright P. Kundur
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Copyright P. Kundur
WSCC August 10, 1996 Disturbance
High ambient temperatures in Northwest;
high power transfer from Canada to California
Prior to main outage, three 500 kV line sections from lower Columbia
River to load centres in Oregon were out of service due to tree faults
California-Oregon Interties loaded to 4330 MW north to south
Pacific DC Intertie loaded at 2680 MW north to south
2300 MW flow from British Columbia
Main outage: Ross-Lexington 230 kV line at 15:47:36
Growing 0.23 Hz interarea oscillations caused tripping of lines
resulting in formation of four islands
Small-Signal Oscillatory Instability !

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Copyright P. Kundur
August 10th, 1996 WSCC Event
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Copyright P. Kundur
Malin - Round Mountain MW Flow
2300
2400
2500
2600
2700
2800
2900
3000
0 3 6 9 12 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 47 50 53 56 59 62 65 68 71 74
Time in Seconds
WSCC August 10, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)
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Copyright P. Kundur
As a result of the undamped
oscillations, the system split
into four large islands




Over 7.5 million customers
experienced outages ranging
from a few minutes to nine
hours! Total load loss 30,500
MW
WSCC August 10, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)
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Copyright P. Kundur
TSAT was Used to Replicate Disturbance in
Time Domain
MEASURED RESPONSE
SIMULATED RESPONSE
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Copyright P. Kundur
Sites Selected for PSS Modifications
San Onofre
(Addition)
Palo Verde
(Tune existing)
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Copyright P. Kundur
Power System Stabilizers
With existing controls
Eigenvalue = 0.0597 + j 1.771
Frequency = 0.2818 Hz
Damping = -0.0337


With PSS modifications
Eigenvalue = -0.0717 + j 1.673
Frequency = 0.2664
Damping = 0.0429
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Copyright P. Kundur
Design of HVDC Modulation
HVDC intertie shown (as expected) to have low participation in the
mode of interest (0.23 Hz interarea oscillations)
Often however, HVDC can be modulated to improve damping, provided
adequate input signal is found and proper compensator is designed
SSAT used to examine frequency response for several potential input
signals
Frequency response magnitude identified local bus frequency as
having good operability/controllability of the mode of interest
Frequency response phase used to design compensator which
provides proper modulation signal to HVDC controls
TSAT and SSAT used to verify modulation performance
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Copyright P. Kundur
TSAT Verification of Effectiveness of HVDC
Modulation
Without HVDC Modulation
Eigenvalue = 0.0597 + j 1.771
Frequency = 0.2818 Hz
Damping = -0.0337
With HVDC Modulation
Eigenvalue = -0.108 + j 1.797
Frequency = 0.2859
Damping = 0.0602
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March 11, 1999 Brazil
Blackout
Copyright P. Kundur
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Copyright P. Kundur
March 11, 1999 Brazil Blackout
Time: 22:16:00h, System Load: 34,200 MW

Description of the event:
L-G fault at Bauru Substation as a result of lightning causing a bus
insulator flashover
the bus arrangement at Bauru such that the fault is cleared by opening
five 440 kV lines
the power system survived the initial event, but resulted in instability
when a short heavily loaded 440 kV line was tripped by zone 3 relay
cascading outages of several power plants in Sao Paulo area, followed
by loss of HVDC and 750 kV AC links from Itaipu
complete system break up: 24,700 MW load loss; several islands
remained in operation with a total load of about 10,000 MW
Transient instability followed by voltage problems
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Copyright P. Kundur
March 11, 1999 Brazil Blackout (cont'd)
Measures to improve system security:
Joint Working Group comprising ELECTROBRAS, CEPEL and ONS staff
formed
organized activities into 8 Task Forces
Four international experts as advisors

Remedial Actions:
power system divided into 5 security zones: regions with major
generation and transmission system;
emergency controls added for enhancing stability
improved layout and protection of major EHV substations
improved maintenance of substation equipment and protection/control
equipment
improved restoration plans
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Challenges to Secure Operation of
Today's Power Systems
Copyright P. Kundur
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Copyright P. Kundur
Limitations of Traditional Approach to Power
System Stability
Focus largely on one aspect of stability: "transient stability"
Deterministic approach for system security assessment
System designed and operated to withstand
loss of any single element preceded by a fault
referred to as N-1 criterion
Analysis by time-domain simulation of selected operating
conditions
scenarios based on judgment/experience
Operating limits based on off-line studies
system operated conservatively within pre-established limits
"Adhoc Approach" to application of power system stability
controls
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Copyright P. Kundur
Challenges to Secure Operation of Today's
Power Systems
Power Systems are large complex systems covering vast
geographic areas
national/continental grids
highly nonlinear higher order system
Many processes whose operations need to be coordinated
millions of devices requiring harmonious interplay
Increasing use of Wind Power for generation of electricity
requires careful consideration in integration with power grids



cont'd
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Copyright P. Kundur
Challenges to Secure Operation of Today's Power
Systems (cont'd)
Complex modes of instability
global problems
different forms of instability: rotor angle, voltage, frequency

"Deregulated" market environment
many entities with diverse business interests
system expansion and operation driven largely by economic drivers
lack of coordinated planning
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Example of a Complex Mode of Instability
A transmission line fault causes transient instability of a
remote area:

Sensitive to conditions in the faulted area

Nature of the stability problem is not readily apparent
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North American Western Interconnected System
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Case A
4-cycle fault on Palo Verde - Devers line (Arizona-California)

Alberta to B.C. transfer 500 MW

East of River interface flow 7300 MW


Note: power flow conditions considered for this study as unusual,
and do not represent present operating conditions
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BPA Bus Voltage
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BC Hydro Bus Voltage Near Alberta Tie
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Rotor Angles in B.C. and Alberta
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Case B
East of River interface flow reduced to 7000 MW
(from 7300 MW for Case A)
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BC Hydro and Alberta Bus Voltages
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Rotor Angles in B.C. and Alberta
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North American Western Interconnected System
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Major Power System Blackouts in 2003
and 2004
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Copyright P. Kundur
Blackouts in 2003 and 2004
We had several wake up calls since 2003:
August 14, 2003 blackout of North East USA and Ontario
63,000 MW load loss affecting 50 million people
September 23, 2003 blackout of South Sweden and East Denmark
6,500 MW load loss affecting 4 million people
September 28, 2003 blackout of Italy
50,000 MW load unsupplied affecting 60 million people
August 12, 2004 blackout of three Australian States: Queensland,
NSW and Victoria
load loss 1,000 MW
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Copyright P. Kundur
August 14, 2003 Blackout of Northeast US
and Canada
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Copyright P. Kundur
14 August 2003 Blackout of Northeast US - Canada
Approximately 50 million people in 8 states in the US and
2 Canadian provinces affected
63 GW of load interrupted (11% of total load supplied by Eastern
North American Interconnected System)
During this disturbance, over 400 transmission lines and 531
generating units at 261 power plants tripped
For details refer to: "Final Report of Aug 14, 2003 Blackout in the
US and Canada: Causes and Recommendations", US-Canada
Power System Outage Task Force, April 5, 2004.
www.NERC.com
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NERC Regions Affected: MAAC, ECAR, NPCC
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Conditions Prior to Blackout
Electricity demand high but not unusually high
Power transfer levels high, but within established limits and
previous operating conditions
Planned outages of generating units in the affected area: Cook
2, Davis Bess plant, East Lake 4, Sammis 3 and Monroe 1
Reactive power supply problems in the regions of Indiana and
Ohio prior to noon
Operators took actions to boost voltages
voltages within limits
System operating in compliance with NERC operating policies
prior to 15:05 Eastern Daylight Time
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Blackout Started in Midwest
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Sequence of Events
The Midwest ISO (MISO) state estimator and real-time contingency
analysis (RTCA) software not functioning properly from 12:15 to 16:04
prevented MISO from performing proper "early warning" assessments
as the events were unfolding
At the First Energy (FE) Control Center, a number of computer
software problems occurred on the Energy Management System
(EMS) starting at 14:14
contributed to inadequate situation awareness at FE until 15:45
The first significant event was the outage of East Lake generating unit
#5 in the FE system at 13:31:34
producing high reactive power output
voltage regulator tripped to manual on overexcitation
unit tripped when operator tried to restore AVR
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East Lake 5 Trip: 1:31:34 pm
ONTARIO
2
1
ONTARIO
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Copyright P. Kundur
Initial line trips in Ohio, all due to tree contact:
Chamberlin-Harding 345 kV line at 15:05:41
Hanna-Juniper 345 kV line at 15:32:03
Star-South Canton 345 kV line at 15:41:35
Due to EMS failures at FE and MISO control centers, no proper
actions (such as load shedding) taken
Critical event leading to widespread cascading outages in Ohio
and beyond was tripping of Sammis-Star 345 kV line at 16:05:57
Zone 3 relay operation due to low voltage and high power flow
Load shedding in northeast Ohio at this stage could have
prevented cascading outages that followed

Sequence of Events cont'd
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Tripping of many additional 345 kV lines in Ohio and Michigan by
Zone 3 (or Zone 2 set similar to Zone 3) relays
Tripping of several generators in Ohio and Michigan
At 16:10:38, due to cascading loss of major lines in Ohio and
Michigan, power transfer from Canada (Ontario) to the US on the
Michigan border shifted
power started flowing counter clockwise from Pennsylvania through
New York and Ontario into Michigan
3700 MW of reverse power flow to serve loads in Michigan and Ohio,
which were severed from rest of interconnected system except Ontario
Voltage collapsed due to extremely heavy loadings on transmission
lines
Cascading outages of several hundred lines and generators leading
to blackout of the region
Sequence of Events
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End of Cascade
Areas Affected by the Blackout
Service maintained
in some area
Some Local Load
Interrupted
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Primary Causes of Blackout
(as identified by the US-Canada Outage Task Force)
1. Inadequate understanding of the power system requirements:

First Energy (FE) failed to conduct rigorous long-term planning
studies and sufficient voltage stability analyses of Ohio control area
FE used operational criteria that did not reflect actual system
behaviour and needs
ECAR (East Central Area Reliability Council) did not conduct an
independent review or analysis of FE's voltage criteria and operating
needs
Some NERC planning standards were sufficiently ambiguous that FE
could interpret them in a way that resulted in inadequate reliability for
system operation

cont'd
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Copyright P. Kundur
Causes of Blackout cont'd
2. Inadequate level of situation awareness:
FE failed to ensure security of its system after significant
unforeseen contingencies
FE lacked procedures to ensure that its operators were
continually aware of the functional state of their critical
monitoring tools
FE did not have adequate backup tools for system monitoring

3. Inadequate level of vegetation management (tree trimming)
FE failed to adequately manage tree growth into transmission
rights-of-way
resulted in the outage of three 345 kV lines and one 138 kV
line
cont'd
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Causes of Blackout cont'd
4. Inadequate level of support from the Reliability Coordinator
due to failure of state estimator, MISO did not become aware of
FE's system problems early enough
did not provide assistance to FE

MISO and PJM (Regional Transmission operator) did not have in
place an adequate level of procedures and guidelines for dealing
with security limit violations due to a contingency near their
common boundary
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September 23, 2003 Blackout of Southern
Sweden and Eastern Denmark
Copyright P. Kundur
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The Transmission Grid in the Nordic Countries
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Blackout of 23 September 2003 in Southern Sweden
and Eastern Denmark
Pre-disturbance conditions:
system moderately loaded
facilities out of services for maintenance:
400 kV lines in South Sweden
4 nuclear units in South Sweden
3 HVDC links to Germany and Poland
The first contingency was loss of a 1200 MW nuclear unit in
South Sweden at 12:30 due to problems with steam valves
increase of power transfer from the north
system security still acceptable
cont'd

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Blackout of 23 September 2003 in Southern Sweden
and Eastern Denmark (cont'd)
Five minutes later (at 12:35) a disconnector damage caused a
double busbar fault at a location 300 km away from the first
contingency
resulted in loss of a number of lines in the southwestern grid and
two 900 MW nuclear units
At 12:37, voltage collapse in the eastern grid section south of
Stockholm area
isolated southern Sweden and eastern Denmark system from
northern and central grid

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The Blackout in Southern Sweden and Eastern
Denmark, September 23, 2003
Tenhult
Strmma
Horred
Sdersen
Barsebck
Hemsj
Simpevarp
Nybro
Kimstad
Glan
Kolstad
Hallsberg
Breared
Alvesta
The voltage collapse
Maintenance work
The fault in Horred
Line outages due to:
Tenhult
Strmma
Horred
Sdersen
Barsebck
Hemsj
Simpevarp
Nybro
Kimstad
Glan
Kolstad
Hallsberg
Breared
Alvesta
The voltage collapse
Maintenance work
The fault in Horred
Line outages due to:
The voltage collapse
Maintenance work
The fault in Horred
Line outages due to:
Voltage Collapse
Isolated Subsystem
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The Blackout in Southern Sweden and Eastern
Denmark, September 23, 2003
The blacked-out area after the grid separation at 12.37
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The isolated system had enough generation to cover only about 30%
of its demand
voltage and frequency collapsed within a few seconds, blacking out the
area
Impact of the blackout:
loss of 4700 MW load in south Sweden
1.6 million people affected
City of Malmo and regional airports and rail transportation without
power
loss of 1850 MW in eastern Denmark
2.4 million people affected
City of Copenhagen, airport and rail transportation without power
Result of an (n-3) contingency, well beyond "design contingencies"

Blackout of 23 September 2003 in Southern Sweden
and Eastern Denmark cont'd
1529pk - 90
September 28, 2003 Blackout of Italy
Copyright P. Kundur
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Copyright P. Kundur
Italian System Blackout of 28 September 2003
Predisturbance conditions (Sunday, 3:00 am):
total load in Italy was 27,700 MW, with 3638 MW pump load
total import from rest of Europe was 6651 MW
Sequence of events:
a tree flashover caused tripping of a major tie-line between Italy and
Switzerland (Mettlen-Lavorgo 380 kV line) at 03:01:22
Sychro-check relay prevented automatic and manual reclosure of line due
to the large angle (42) across the breaker
resulted in an overload on a parallel path
attempts to reduce the overload by Swiss transmission operators by
network change was not successful
at 03:21 import by Italy was reduced by 300 MW but was not sufficient to
mitigate the overload of a second 380 kV line (Sils-Soazza), which tripped
at 03:25:22 due to sag and tree contact
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Copyright P. Kundur
the cascading trend continued and the power deficit in Italy was such
that the ties to France, Austria and Slovania were tripped
the outages left the Italian system with a power shortage of 6400 MW
the frequency decay could not be controlled adequately by under-
frequency load shedding
over the course of several minutes, the entire Italian System collapsed at
3:28:00

The blackout affected about 60 million people
total energy not delivered 180 GWh
worst blackout in the history of Italy
power was restored after 3 hours in the northern area and during the
same day for most of Italy
Italian System Blackout of 28 September 2003 cont'd
1529pk - 93
What Can We Do To Prevent
Blackouts?
Copyright P. Kundur
1529pk - 94
Copyright P. Kundur
Factors Impacting on System Security











Regulatory Framework
Governments, Reliability Councils





Business Structure
Owning and operating entities; Financial
and contractual arrangements

Physical System
Integrated Generation,
Transmission, Distribution
System

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Copyright P. Kundur
Comprehensive Approach to Enhancing System
Stability
Impractical to achieve 100% reliability of power systems
Good design and operating practices could significantly minimize
the occurrence and impact of widespread outages
Reliability criteria: risk-based security criteria
Improved protective relaying
Robust stability controls
Coordinated emergency controls
Comprehensive stability assessment: analytical tools and models
Real-time system system monitoring and control
Wide-spread use of distributed generation
Reliability Management System
Good vegetation management
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Reliability Criteria
At present, systems designed and operated to withstand loss of any
single element preceded by single-, double-, or three-phase fault
referred to as "N-1 criterion"
formulated nearly 40 years ago after the 1965 blackout
Need for using risk-based security assessment criteria
consider multiple outages
account for probability and consequences of instability
Built-in overall strength or robustness best defense against
catastrophic failures !

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Improved Protective Relaying
State-of-the-art protective relaying for generating units and
transmission lines
adaptive relaying
Replacement of zone 3 and other backup relaying on important
lines with improved relaying
Improved protection and control at power plants to minimize unit
tripping for voltage and frequency excursions
Protective relay improvements to prevent tripping of critical
elements on overload
control actions to relieve overload
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Robust Stability Controls
Greater use of stability controls
excitation control (PSS), FACTS, HVDC, secondary voltage control
multi-purpose controls
multiple controllers

Coordination, integration and robustness present challenges
good control design procedures and tools have evolved

Hardware design should provide
high degree of functional reliability
flexibility for maintenance and testing

Industry should make better use of controls !
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Emergency Controls for Extreme Contingencies
Contingencies more severe than normal design contingencies
multiple contingencies
can occur anywhere on the system in any form
Currently, emergency controls used to protect against some
generator tripping, load shedding, dynamic breaking, controlled
system separation, transfer tap-changer blocking
Need for a systematic approach to cover against all likely extreme
contingencies
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Copyright P. Kundur
"Defense Plan" Against Extreme Contingencies:
Coordinated Emergency Controls
Judicious choice of emergency controls
protection against different scenarios
identification of scenarios based on past experience, knowledge of
unique characteristics of system, probabilistic approach

Coordination of different emergency control schemes
complement each other
act properly in complex situations

Response-based emergency controls should generally be preferred
"self-healing" power systems

Need for advancing this technology !
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Copyright P. Kundur
Examples of Response-Based Emergency Control
Schemes
1. Scheme for prevention of voltage collapse in Eastern Ontario
fully automated and coordinated emergency controls for voltage
stability

2. Transient Excitation Boosting
for enhancing transient (angle) stability of systems with dominant
interarea swing
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Copyright P. Kundur
Example 1: Prevention of Voltage Collapse in
Eastern Ontario
Implemented in early 1980s to cope with delays in building 500 kV
line
Under high load conditions, loss of a major 230 kV line leads to
voltage collapse of Ottawa area
A coordinated scheme consisting of fast line reclosure, load
rejection, shunt capacitor switching, and transformer ULTC
blocking
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Copyright P. Kundur
Example 1: (cont'd)
The coordinated scheme:
a) Fast reclosure of major lines (1.3s)
first line of defense

b) Load rejection (1.5s)
9 blocks, 750 MW; armed by operator
voltage/time dependent

c) Shunt capacitors switching (1.8 to 8.0s)
36 banks in 17 TSs
voltage/time dependent

d) Transformer ULTC blocking at 14 TSs
voltage/time dependent
unblocked when voltage recovers
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Example 1: (cont'd)
Coordination provided by appropriate selection of voltage and
time settings
triggered by voltage drop magnitude and duration

Following a contingency, depending on the severity (power flow,
line outage), only the required level of control action provided
1529pk - 105
Copyright P. Kundur
1300 MW
1374 MW
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Copyright P. Kundur
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Copyright P. Kundur
Response-Based Emergency Controls
Example 2: Transient Excitation Boosting
In situations with dominant interarea swing, PSS reduces
excitation after the first local mode swing
Improvements in TS achieved by keeping excitation at ceiling
until highest composite swing
increase in internal voltage
increase in voltage also increases power consumed by area load
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Copyright P. Kundur
Block Diagram of TSEC Scheme
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Copyright P. Kundur
Effect of TSEC on Transient Stability
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Example 2: (cont'd)
Transient Excitation Boosting, TSEC, applied to four major plants
in Ontario:
Nanticoke (4000 MW), Bruce A and B (6000 MW), Lennox (2000 MW)
signal proportional to angle swing
integrated with PSS and coordinated with terminal voltage limiter

In effect, a nonlinear adaptive closed loop control
may use local or remote signals
imposes little duty on equipment
1529pk - 111
Copyright P. Kundur
Comprehensive Stability Analysis Tools
Powerful analytical tools have been developed capable of
comprehensive analysis for system design and operation:
all forms of stability
large systems with detailed models
complementary use of time-domain and modal analysis
automated procedures for considering large number of scenarios

Industry gradually shifting to the use of new tools

Lack of widespread understanding and appreciation for the use of
eigenvalue based modal analyses techniques
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Copyright P. Kundur
State-of-the-Art On-Line Dynamic Security
Assessment (DSA)
Practical tools have been developed with the required accuracy, speed
and robustness
a variety of analytical techniques integrated
distributed hardware architecture using low cost PCs
integrated with energy management system

Capable of assessing rotor angle stability and voltage stability
determine critical contingencies automatically
security limits/margins for all desired energy transactions
identify remedial measures

The industry has yet to take full advantage of these developments !
1529pk - 113
Copyright P. Kundur
Dynamic Security Assessment Tools Developed and
Used by Powertech for System Design and Operation
Powerful set of complementary programs:
flexible and detailed models
alternative and efficient solution techniques

Transient (Angle) Stability Assessment: TSAT

Small-Signal (Angle) Stability Assessment: SSAT

Voltage Stability Assessment: VSAT
Frequency Stability Analysis: LTSP *
cont'd
LTSP currently not maintained/supported
*
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Copyright P. Kundur
Powertech DSA Tools (cont'd)
Automated procedures for:
contingency screening and ranking
consideration of a large number of scenarios
stability limit search
power flow dispatch
determination of stability margins
identifying remedial measures for maintaining stability and
increasing stability margins

Significant savings in computation and engineering times
1529pk - 115
On-Line Voltage Stability Assessment Tool
(VSAT)
Copyright P. Kundur
1529pk - 116
Copyright P. Kundur
Key Elements of VSAT
Interface with EMS; Model Initialization
Contingency screening and selection
Determination of secure operating region
using static analysis
Determination of remedial actions
Fast time-domain simulation
validation and checking
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Copyright P. Kundur
Contingency Selection Module
Impractical to consider every conceivable contingency
A limited number (typically 20) critical contingencies determined
for detailed studies
Performance Indices based on a few power flow solutions and
reactive reserve not reliable
A fast screening method used:
based on exact margin to voltage collapse and full power flow
solutions
number of power flow solutions 1.2 to 2.0 times number of
contingencies
Supplemented with user-specified contingencies
1529pk - 118
Copyright P. Kundur
Fig. 4 Automatic Critical Contingency Selection
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Copyright P. Kundur
Security Computation Module
Engine for voltage stability analysis
static analysis with detailed models
Secure region is defined by a number of Coordinates (SRCs)
key system parameters: MW generation, area load, interface
transfers, etc.
Voltage security determined by
voltage stability margin
MVAr reserves of key reactive sources
post-contingency voltage decline
Modal analysis of powerflow Jacobian matrix identifies areas prone
to instability
Specialized powerflow dispatcher and solver to quickly search for
stability limit
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Copyright P. Kundur
Modelling:
generator capability curves
governor response, economic dispatch, AGC
nonlinear loads
control of ULTCs, switched shunts, etc.

Inputs and Outputs:
Inputs
list of contingencies produced by screening and ranking (+user defined)
base case powerflow from state estimator
definition of SCRs
voltage security criteria and definition of parameter of stress
Output
secure region in secure region space

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Copyright P. Kundur
Secure Operating Region
1529pk - 122
Copyright P. Kundur
Secure Operating Region
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Copyright P. Kundur
Remedial Measures Module
Determines necessary remedial measures to
ensure sufficient stability margins
expand the secure region
Preventative control actions:
taken prior to a contingency
caps/reactor switching, generation redispatch, voltage rescheduling
Corrective (emergency) control actions:
applied following a contingency
load shedding, generator runback, transformer tap changer blocking
Ranking of each remedial measure using:
sensitivity analysis
user-defined priorities
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Copyright P. Kundur
Ranking and Applying Remedial Measures
Objective is to identify the most effective remedial measures to give
the desired stability margin
Obtain solved power flow case for the most severe contingency
gradually introduce the effect of the contingency
bus injection compensation technique
Compute the sensitivities of reactive power (or bus voltage) to
different control measures
rank the remedial measures
Apply controls one at a time in order of ranking until power flow
solves for the most severe contingency
1529pk - 125
Copyright P. Kundur
Expanding the Secure Region: Remedial Measures
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Copyright P. Kundur
Fast Time-Domain Simulation Module
Determines the essential dynamic phenomena without step-by-step
numerical integration
when chronology of events significant
for validating the effect of remedial measures
Focuses on the evolution of system dynamic response driven by
slow dynamics
transformer tap changers, field current limiters, switched caps
Captures the effects of fast dynamics by solving associated steady
state equations

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The complete set of differential/algebraic equations of a power
system has the following general form:



Where:

X = state vector
V = bus voltage vector
I = current injector vector
Y = network admittance matrix
Z = variables associated with the slow
control devices including ULTCs, loads, switchable reactors
and capacitors, and field current limiters
Mathematical Formulation
( ) Z , V , X f X =

( ) Z , V , X I YV =
1529pk - 128
Copyright P. Kundur
Mathematical Formulation
At each equilibrium point, Z=Z
i
and the system operating condition
is obtained by solving the following set of nonlinear algebraic
equations:




As time progresses, the slow control devices operate and the
values of Z change. The above set of nonlinear algebraic equations
is solved every time the values of Z change.
( )
( )
i
i
Z V, X, I YV
Z V, X, f 0
=
=
1529pk - 129
Copyright P. Kundur
1529pk - 130
Copyright P. Kundur
Powerflow
Solver
VSAT Structure
1529pk - 131
Transient Stability Assessment Tool (TSAT)
Copyright P. Kundur
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Copyright P. Kundur
Transient Stability Assessment (TSA)
Time-domain simulations essential
modeling detail and accuracy
Sole dependence on time-domain simulations has severe limitations
high computational burden
no stability margin/sensitivity information
requires considerable human interaction
Supplementary techniques for speeding up and automating overall
process
Methods available for deriving useful indices
Transient Energy Function (TEF)
Signal Energy Analysis
Extended Equal Area Criterion (EEAC)
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Copyright P. Kundur
A Practical Tool for TSA
Overall architecture similar to that of VSA
Time-domain program, with detailed models and efficient solution
techniques, forms simulation engine
EEAC used for screening contingencies, computing stability margin,
stability limit search, and early termination of simulation
Prony analysis for calculation of damping of critical modes of
oscillation
A powerflow dispatcher and solver for finding the stability limit
a fully automated process
No modeling compromises;
can handle multi-swing instability
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Copyright P. Kundur
EEAC
Integrates the dynamic response in the multimachine space, and
maps the resultant trajectory into a set of one-machine-infinite-bus
planes
By applying complementary cluster center of inertia (CCCI)
transformations
Keeps all dynamic information in the multimachine space
Stability analysis can be quantitatively performed for the image OMIB
systems
Has the same accuracy and modeling flexibility
Fast, quantitative
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Copyright P. Kundur
EEAC
Loss of transient stability in a power system always starts in a
binary splitting of generators:
Critical cluster of generators
Rest of the system

At any given point in the
time-domain trajectory of
the system, the system
can be visualized as a
one-machine-infinite-bus
(OMIB) system
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Copyright P. Kundur
EEAC
The classical equal area criterion can be extended to the visual OMIB
system

Stability margin of the system is defined as

( )
( )

>

<

= q
d a
a
a d
a d
d
a d
A A
A
A A
x
A A
A
A A
x
unstable is system the if 100
stable is system the if 100

Thus, -100 s q s 100, and

q> 0 if the system is stable
q s 0 if the system is unstable

q can be used as a stability index

1529pk - 137
Copyright P. Kundur
Use of EEAC Theory
Contingency screening
stability margin gives an indication of the relative severity
Corrective measures for maintaining secure system operation
critical cluster of generators (CCG) provides valuable information
Power transfer limit search
stability limit can be determined in four iterations using stability margin
each iteration involves a detailed simulation and computation of stability
index
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Copyright P. Kundur
Results - Test System
System description

BC Hydro system
1430 buses
186 generators
4 HVDC links

Interface

GMS and PCN output
Base case transfer = 3158 MW

Contingency

Three phase fault at GMS 500 kV bus
Tripping of one of two 500 kV lines
from GMS to WSN

1529pk - 139
Copyright P. Kundur
Limit Search Results
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Copyright P. Kundur
Speed Enhancement: Parallel Processing
Code parallelization
differential equations easily parallelized, but not network equations
speed-ups limited by serial slowdown effect
up to 7 times speed-up can be achieved with 20-30 processors
not an effective way
Conventional serial computers offer much faster computational
per-CPU
For multiple contingencies
perform initialization only once
run contingencies on multiple processors - one processor per
contingency
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Copyright P. Kundur
TSAT Structure
Powerflow
Dispatcher
Time-Domain
Simulation
Stability
Indices
Increase
Transfer
Remedial
Measures
Must Run
Contingencies
Transaction
Definitions
Security Limit?
Sufficient
Margin?
STOP
Yes
Yes
No
Full
Contingency List
Solved Powerflow
+
Dynamic Data
Contingency Screening &
Ranking (EEAC)
No
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Copyright P. Kundur
Computational Performance of DSA
Target cycle time from capture of state estimation to completion
of security assessment for all specified transactions:
20 minutes
TSA and VSA functions performed in parallel
distributed processing on separate CPUs
This can be readily achieved with low cost PCs
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Copyright P. Kundur
Computational Speed of DSA (cont'd)
Voltage Stability Assessment:
- screening 300 contingencies 20.0 secs
- detailed security analysis 1.2 secs
with 20 critical contingencies
- one transfer limit search 12.0 secs

Transient Stability Assessment:
- screening 100 contingencies 75.0 secs
- 10 second simulations with 75.0 secs
10 critical contingencies
- one transfer limit search 120.0 secs
- total time for complete assessment < 5 mins

Power System model with 4655 buses, 156 generators, using 1.7 GHz,
Pentium 4 PC with 256 MB memory
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Copyright P. Kundur
Future Trends in DSA: Intelligent Systems
Knowledge base created using simulation of a large number cases and
system measurements
Automatic learning, data mining, and decision trees to build intelligent
systems
Fast analysis using a broad knowledge base and automatic decision making
Provides new insight into factors and system parameters affecting stability
More effective in dealing with uncertainties and large dimensioned problems
We just completed a PRECARN project: "POSSIT"
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Copyright P. Kundur
DSA Using Intelligent Systems
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Copyright P. Kundur
Real-Time Monitoring and Control:
An Emerging Technology
Advances in communications technology have made it possible to
monitor power systems over a wide area
remotely control many functions
Research on use of multisensor data fusion technology
process data from different monitors, integrate and process information
identify phenomenon associated with impending emergency
make intelligent control decisions
A fast and effective way to predict onset of emergency conditions and
take remedial actions

The ultimate "self-healing" power system !
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Copyright P. Kundur
Distributed Generation (DG)
Offer significant economic, environmental and security benefits

Microturbines
small, high speed power plants
operate on natural gas or gas from landfills

Fuel Cells
combines hydrogen with oxygen from air to generate electricity
hydrogen may be supplied from an external source or generated inside
fuel cell by reforming a hydrocarbon fuel

Not vulnerable to power grid failure due to system instability or
natural calamities
protection and controls should be designed so that units continue to
operate when isolated from the grid
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Copyright P. Kundur
Reliability Management System
Roles and responsibilities of individual entities
well chosen, clearly defined and properly enforced

Coordination of reliability management

Need for a single entity with overall responsibility for security of
entire interconnected system
real-time decisions

System operators with high level of expertise in system stability
phenomena, tools
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Copyright P. Kundur
Summary
1. The new electricity supply industry presents increasing challenges for
stable and secure operation of power systems
2. State-of-the-art methods have advanced our capabilities significantly
comprehensive stability analysis tools
automated tools for system planning/design
on-line Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA)
coordinated design of robust stability controls
3. Industry is yet to take full advantage of these developments


cont'd
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Copyright P. Kundur
Summary (cont'd)
4. Future directions will be to explore new techniques which can
better deal with growing uncertainties and increasing
complexities of the problem
risk-based security assessment
intelligent systems for DSA
"self-healing" power systems
real-time monitoring and control
5. Wide-spread use of distributed generation could be a cost
effective means of minimizing the impact of power grid failures