Naxalism

The single biggest threat facing India?

Nyayapati Gautam

Triumphant Institute of Management Education P Ltd

www.time4education.com

Human cost
10,268 casualties between 2005 and 2010 21 policemen were killed when a police van was blown up in a landmine blast in Malkangiri district of Orissa on July 16, 2008. In Feb 2010, 24 personnel of the Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) were killed as Maoists attacked their camp in West Bengal. On April 4,2010 Maoists had triggered a landmine blast killing 11 security personnel of the elite anti-Naxal force

Human cost
P. Chidambaram on 31st December 2011: This year 447 civilians and 142 security personnel were killed as against 718 and 285 respectively in 2010. According to PC, 2011 was a satisfactory year as it had seen a historic low level of terror and Naxaliterelated violence. This is how we measure success with reference to Naxalism.

Origins
Throughout the fifties, the Terai region of West Bengal, saw discontent brewing in its tea gardens. In 1964, when the CPI split and the CPI(M) was formed, Charu Mazumdar showed his undisguised inclination to the Maoist line. Naxalbari: The peasant agitation.
In May 1967, the first police bullet was fired, triggering a violent phase in the movement. May 25: The police fired at the demonstrators, killing nine women and two children. It was after this incident that the movement lost its agrarian character and became a

The Spread of the Movement

Calcutta Andhra Pradesh Bihar & Jharkhand Chhattisgarh

Class Enemies
Naxal activists defined class enemies rather broadly. Government employees, judges and a vice-chancellor were among those killed in Kolkata in class action. At the height of the movement, traffic policemen were stabbed on the streets of Kolkata.

Naxalism
Sangam & Dalam The Red Corridor including Nepal Flowing Water Theory Rural v/s Urban

Impact
Social divisions Economic and business related POSCO Security related.

Steps that can be taken

Development
Jobs Infrastructure development

Bridging the divide

Between the Haves and the Have nots. Government and people.

Use of security forces

Sun Tzu
Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strengths and strikes weakness. And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy. And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.

Inspiration - Mao
When the enemy advances, withdraw; when he stops, harass; when he tires, strike; when he retreats, pursue. Mao Tse Tung

Maos Strategy
Mao employed four elements of national power in his theory of guerrilla warfare. The general populace (peasant population of the rural areas) was the center of gravity in his theory of guerrilla warfare. A symbiotic relationship between revolutionary soldiers and the citizenry. "The (people) may be likened to water and the (guerrillas) to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together?".

Maos Strategy
The guerrillas not only operated among the people, they were dependent on them for logistic and informational support. It was absolutely key to have the people in allegiance with the political aims of the guerrilla forces and understand how it concerned him . This education process was to be multifaceted and well developed, "by word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through plays and films, through schools, through the mass

Three Stage Process

At the strategic level, Mao managed "victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy" through a three-stage process:
Strategic defensive Strategic stalemate Strategic offensive

Strategic defensive
The forces are on the strategic defensive, focused primarily on mobile, irregular warfare to erode the strength of the enemy and build one's own strength, both militarily and politically.

Strategic stalemate
The enemy has ceased his offensive while friendly forces have control of certain base areas and continue to employ guerrilla tactics as well as some conventional operations when and where appropriate.

Strategic offensive
Friendly forces assume the strategic offensive with the primary emphasis on conventional warfare to thoroughly defeat the conventional forces of the enemy.

DAU TRANH Struggle

The Vietnamese adopted Mao's three stage strategy a means of throwing off French colonialism. The authors of Dau Tranh Vo Nguyen Giap, Ho Chi Minh, and other members of the Politburo in Hanoi viewed the military element of their theory, in Maoist terms, with both guerrilla and conventional elements. They incorporated political, military, informational, and economic considerations.

Dau Tranh
Giap had highly trained commandos infiltrate into the south to conduct a wide variety of limited operations. This strategy allowed Giap to conserve his fighting power while wearing down that of the enemy. Giap planned two-year campaign in January 1975, but he was successful in just four months with the total collapse of South Vietnam

Three Action Programmes

Action among the enemy:
aimed at both the South Vietnamese and American peoples. Among the southerners, a wide variety of media was used: meetings, leaflets, lectures, rumor campaigns, rallies, protests, stage dramas, etc. All were directed at enhancing the legitimacy of the government in the north.

Three Action Programmes

Action among the military:
Aimed at persuading South Vietnamese civil servants and military personnel to defect or desert. Promised rewards, undercover agents to spread dissension, intimidation, influence through friends and family, etc. are typical of the tactics used within this program.

Three Action Programmes

Action among the people:
This was within communist controlled areas and primarily involved administrative measures (recruitment, tax collection, organization). This action provided safe base areas for the Vietcong forces, raised revenues, and portrayed the image of societal stability under communist rule.

Che Guevara & Regis Debray

If a guerrilla operation is not in direct contact with a socially favourable situation, if the really powerful social charge that is ready to explode is somewhere else . then clearly there must be a definite link there, between the two, the detonator and the explosive, the vanguard and the moving forces of the revolution.

Che Guevara & Regis Debray

That link is a system of communication and supplies - men, information, orders, arms and ammunition, food - operating in both directions between the guerrillas and the town centres. Such a system is both technical and political since the technical operation with contacts, couriers, reinforcements is inseparable from its political content, and the importance it is given in the guerrillas' general scheme of things.

Naxalism

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