Stability and Security of

Power Networks
G. T. Heydt Arizona State University
ECEDHA 2004 Annual Meeting
March, 2004 Orlando, Florida

Outline
Stability and security: a general discussion
Weaknesses and strengths of the North American grid Some theoretical considerations Solutions: short range and long range Propaganda: power engineering education Conclusions

Stability
Power system stability basically refers to the ability of operating an AC network with all generators in synchronism, retaining synchronism even after a large disturbance

Stability
Each synchronous generator has a Newtons law second order nonlinear differential equation that describes the machine angle and control systems (e.g., power system stabilizers) also contribute a higher order nonlinear controller to the dynamics
P (T ) | E f || Vt | sin( ) xs

A large interconnection (WECC, e.g.) may have about 200 generators + 150 PSSs = about 1000 to 10000 order nonlinear differential equations

Stability
The basic analysis technique is state space analysis / eigenvalues for the linearized system, or simulation for the nonlinear system. Typically, the dimension is very high in the 1000 10,000 range. The interconnection is modeled as Ibus = Ybus Vbus which is reduced to eliminate the nondynamic nodes (i.e., remove the non-generation nodes).

Power system stabilizers

A PSS is a controller that uses (usually local) measurements to provide a signal to one generator so that damping torque is produced by the machine field winding. The basic concept is that a linear controller is used with standard feedback control technology to place the poles of the linearized system solidly in the LHP. Virtually all large generating units in North America are fitted with PSSs.

Power system stabilizers

The main weaknesses of this approach are that the nonlinear system may respond poorly, and also dynamics external to the generator + PSS are not modeled (nor included in the measurements). Therefore modes that result from inter area dynamics may not be damped.
x x x xx xx x x

Wide area robust power system stability control

By injecting the appropriate signals from distant measurements in the system, transmitted through LEOS, the controller is able to obtain superior performance in terms of damping interarea oscillations compared to use of conventional local signals. The main concept is to use interarea signals for interarea controls
Low Earth Orbit Satellites LEOS

REGIONAL MEASUREMENTS

LOCAL MEASUREMENTS

SPSS

Hierarchical robust power system controller

Execution Level
Signal pre-processor Actuator / Distributor

Management Level

Operation Level

Operation Level
System modal identifier SPSS damping loop

Execution Level
Input Data

Management Level
Fuzzy logic based parameter tuner

Control

Power System

Voltage Regulator With PSS and SPSS

SPSS Remote Signals ,f, or Pa
Generator Excitation System

Vt
+
Ref+

PSS

Voltage Regulator

Gen

Generator Field

Area 1 G1

Area 2 G3

0.011+j0.11

Load 1 G2
SYS impulse response--1st input to outputs
From: U(1) 1

Load 2 G4
SYS bode graph--1st input to 1st-2nd outputs
From: U(1)

Phase (deg); Magnitude (dB)

200 0 -200 0 -200 -400 200 0 -200 0 -500 -1000 10

-2

To: Y(1)

Amplitude

-1 1

To: Y(2)

-1 0 14 28 42 56 70

To: Y(2)

To: Y(1)

10

10

Time (sec.) SYS+LMI1 impulse response--1st input to outputs

Frequency (rad/sec) SYS+LMI1 open-loop transfer function Bode graph

From: U(1)

Phase (deg); Magnitude (dB)

From: U(1) 0.2

0 -200 -400 500 0 -500 0 -200 -400 0 -500 -1000 10

0

To: Y(1)

Amplitude

-0.2 0.2

To: Y(2)

-0.2 0 5 10 15 20 25 30

To: Y(2)

To: Y(1)

10

Time (sec.)

Frequency (rad/sec)

Key issues
Full scale nonlinear solution (transient stability study)
Eigenvalues of the linearized system near the operating point (small signal stability) Line and component ratings Voltage ratings (maximum and minimum) Coherency - groups of generators swinging together Synchronizing torque, PSSs Acceptable operating conditions (including operation within about 50 mHz of 60 Hz)

Security
Network
Internal Sources
Information & decisions

Market
Communication systems

External Sources Security refers to the ability of the system to respond only to intended operator commands, blocking all unintended operations

Intentional human acts

Natural calamities

Electric power system is vulnerable to failure due to

Natural disasters Deliberate attack

Equipment failures
Operator error Accidents

Tree-related events

High load periods

Software failures

Monitoring of electric power networks

Underground Transmission Lines Advanced PMU Transformers Sensor Systems

Substations

Overhead Transmission Lines

EMS

Energy management systems

Archiving Sensory information

Command and control

EMS
State estimator

Generator controls

Operator interaction

Network vulnerability reduction through virtual sensor utilization

No Data!

Network Data Lost

EMS

Virtual Data
Virtual Sensor Present

Tradeoffs between virtual and physical sensors

Low Cost Less Accurate

High Cost Greater Accuracy

Z = [H] X

V
$ $ $

I
$ $

$ $ $ Physical Sensors

Virtual Sensors

What is needed to enhance both security and stability

Ability to acquire and interpret extensive real-time information from diverse sources, ranging from sensors to satellites. Sensory data used in Hx = z state estimators to enhance system performance. Ability to quickly evaluate system vulnerability with respect to catastrophic events in a market environment involving competing, self-serving agents Ability to adapt protective device performance based on system-wide and external system assessment Ability to reconfigure the power network to minimize system vulnerability Ability to develop system restoration plans to minimize the impact of disruption

Strategic Power Infrastructure Defense System

Communication system for strategic power

infrastructure defense
Time synchronization (GPS) / Self healing / Info. Exchange (LEO) GPS or LEO satellite communication Internet based communication channel Internet based or more direct and faster communication channel
Satellite dish

Protectiv e dev ice

Gateway

S ate

llit e

Strategic power infrastructure main system

Intranet Ethernet or model based network is used in the Intranet. Each Intranet can have a gateway that handles IP addresses in the Intranet

Internet or any other communication channel for a number of Intranets

The North American grid

NERC: policies, rules, reliability, plans, synchronous interconnections

North American Electric Reliability Council

Sets standards for the reliable operation and planning
Monitors, assesses and enforces compliance with standards Provides education and training

Assesses, analyzes and reports on bulk electric system adequacy

Coordinates with Regional Reliability Councils Coordinates the provision of applications, data and services

Certifies reliability service organizations and personnel

Coordinates critical infrastructure protection Enables the reliable operation by facilitating information exchange and coordination among reliability service organizations Administers procedures for appeals and conflict resolution

Weaknesses and strengths of the North American grid

Basic transmission design is over 40 years old. Some basic distribution circuits are over 60 years old.
Never designed to handle high levels of bulk power Both transmission and generation constrained The impact of market driven exchange of power has stressed the transmission grid The transition to market based infrastructure has stressed the newly created control entities (e.g., ISOs) in an industry that is rapidly loosing corporate memory

The Northeast blackout of 2003

Time 8/14/2003 4:09:57 PM EDT: The first significant events were initially recorded in Michigan and Ohio

The Northeast blackout of 2003

Time: 8/14/03 04:10:39 PM EDT: The disturbance was then recorded all over Michigan , Ohio , and the city of Buffalo, NY

The Northeast blackout of 2003

Time: 8/14/03 04:10:58 PM EDT: 19 seconds later, the disturbance had propagated to the eastern seaboard.

The Northeast blackout of 2003

Main causes
Failure of state estimator in MISO to model external system changes Combination of heavy power exchanges, high reactive power flows, planned outages of transmission circuits and planned outage of a main generating facility (none of which are unusual) Operator error / training of MISO operators / imprudent operation of an Ohio utility (generation outages) Unplanned unit and line outages

The Northeast blackout of 2003

The Northeast blackout of 2003

Generation building boom of the past

200 180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Coal

Oil

Gas

Nuclear

Other

A hindsight view of the past building boom

Generation Building Boom Follows the Baby Boom Labor Force Entry
200

35 30 Percent Change in Labor Force

180

160

29.41

140

25

120

20

100

19.23 17.93
15

80

11.93
60

10

11.69
40

5
20

0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Coal Oil

1975
Gas

1980
Nuclear

1985
Other

1990

1995

2000

Generation building boom of the future

1400

Total System Generation Capacity

1200 1000

GW

800

600

By 2020, the U.S. will need 1300 new power plants at 300 MW each
Cumulative Additions

400

200

0 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

Employment at major IOUs

TRANSMISSION

DISTRIBUTION

The N9s problem

Electric power quality Extreme bus voltage reliability, for example 'five nines' (i.e., 0.99999 availability), or six nines or even higher Utilization of new transmission and distribution technologies for improvement of reliability Utilization of distributed energy sources (DERs) to improve reliability Working with manufacturers of information technology equipment to reduce load vulnerability

24/7 UTILIZATION OF POWER SYSTEM ULTRA HIGH RELIABILITY

INFORMATION PROCESSING, FINANCIAL SERVICES, AIRLINES, POLICE, MILITARY

Reliability enhancement
Distributed rather than concentrated loads Loop circuits for distribution systems Information Technology and sensitive manufacturing loads Independence of energy sources Environmental issues

AS A RESPONSE TO THE 1993 TERRORIST BOMBING OF THE WTC,

THE PRIMARY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN THE BUILDING WAS IMPROVED TO KEEP THE POWER ON IN THE CASE OF SEVERE DISRUPTION OF THE SUPPLY / INTERRUPTION OF THE IN-BUILDING PRIMARY DISTRIBUTION. THERE WERE TEN SUBSTATIONS IN EACH WTC TOWER, ON FLOORS 7, 41, 75, AND 108, AND THE SOUTH TOWER HAD AN ADDITIONAL TENANT OWNED DOUBLY FED SUBSTATION ON FLOOR 43

THE USE OF MULTIPLE FEEDS, MULTIPLE SUBSTATIONS, AND ISOLATED POWER SUPPLIES KEPT THE POWER ON IN MOST OF THE WTC FOR 102 MINUTES AFTER THE INITIAL STRIKE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS THE MAIN FACTOR IN SAVING THE LIVES OF AS MANY AS 18,000 PEOPLE WHO ESCAPED FROM THE TOWERS BEFORE COLLAPSE

Independence of sources

LOAD

1-P = (1-P1)(1-P2) TWO FEEDERS RELIABLE LOAD BUS

The dependence of the sources will result in a much higher outage rate than (1-P1)(1-P2)

Modeling dependence of sources

The dependence effect of multiple sources can be modeled using a difference equation of the form

qn+1 = Cqn+(1-C)(q1)1/n qn
where qn = 1-pn = outage rate of circuit upon addition of nth feeder, C is a correlation coefficient The (q1)1/n term is called a discounting term and it accounts for increased potential for dependence for cases of large n (large numbers of feeders)

Discounted model

C = 0 indicates no correlation between multiple feeders

C = 1 indicates the feeder outages among several feeders are common mode

Reliability of multiple feeds

Zero circuit correlation

10 8 6 4 2 0 1% circuit correlation

100 % circuit correlation

The addition of feeders to improve reliability has a diminishing effect. For practical cases, use of more than three independent feeders of 100% capacity is counterproductive.

Reliability expressed as number of 9s

Number of circuit feeders

One generator, + 1 feeder FOR = 1%

Two feeders FOR = 1%, Dependence 10%

Three generators, FOR = 1%

Two generators, FOR = 1%

One generator, FOR = 1%

1 day in 200 years

3 feeders FOR = 1%, Dependence 10%

1 day in 20 years
0.9 1 0.99 2 0.999 0.9999 3 4 0.99999 0.999999 0.9999999 0.99999999 0.999999999 6 7 8 9 5

Probabilities of uncommon events

POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY Reliability N Outage time

COMMON (?) LIFE

Event_______ Probability, N

Loosing at roulette
in Las Vegas bet on 00 Loosing the PowerBall lottery FAA design criteria for aircraft

97.368, 1.6

99.9

8h 45 min / yr

99.998631 4.9
99.999 99.99999 5 7

1 day / 200 yrs

5 min 15 s / yr 3.2 s / yr

99.99995,

6.3

0.999999999 0.999999999999, 9 to 12

99.999999

18.9 cycles / yr
1.8 cycles / yr

99.9999999 9

Solutions: short range

Distributed generation
Added small generation units at all levels Conservation / electronic control of loads Investment in distribution systems Sharp increase in research in both transmission and distribution engineering Recruiting of students to the power area at all levels Improvement of software tools

PHOSPHORIC ACID 250 kVA FUEL CELL

PROTON EXCHANGE MEMBRANE FUEL CELL - 7.5 kVA

Microturbines
Low capacity, high speed units with electronic interface with 60 Hz bus

Alternative fuel sources (e.g., biogas, gasifier, pyrolysis, fuels that have less than 10% of heat content compared to fossil fuels)
Catalytic combustor to reduce nitrous oxide production Heat recovery Lower capacities -- e.g., 5 - 300 kVA High efficiency small units New IEEE standard requires disconnection from the distribution system within a few cycles during low voltage or outage events

Solutions: long term

Added generation in larger units Local solutions for high reliability requirements Added capacity in distribution systems

Adaptive islanding of interconnected systems Coordinate national energy policy with system realities

The educational aspect of the problem

U. S. Power engineering undergraduate enrollments

undergraduate degree recipients

2000 1500 1000

500 0
1960 1980 2000

Source: G.T. Heydt and V. Vittal, Feeding Our Profession, IEEE Power & Energy Magazine, vol.1, issue 1, Jan/Feb 2003, pp 38-45

U. S. Power engineering graduate enrollments

200
M.S.E.E.

graduate degree recipients

150 100 50
Ph.D.

0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 year

Source: G.T. Heydt and V. Vittal, Feeding Our Profession, IEEE Power & Energy Magazine, vol.1, issue 1, Jan/Feb 2003, pp 38-45

The general electrical engineering reality

There is a certain ebb and flow to the enrolments

in engineering nation-wide; since the all-time low

in undergraduate engineering in 1998, there has been an uninterrupted growth in enrolments In many electrical and computer engineering programs, the growing tendency to select the

computer engineering option has resulted in the

majority of students seeing little or no subject matter relating to energy and power

The general electrical engineering reality

Given the decreasing number of electrical engineering undergraduates, there is good progress in stopping the precipitous decline in the undergraduate power engineering enrolments to the point where many power programs are experiencing record levels

Encouraging developments on the curriculum front

A determined movement away from the old

straight jacket curriculum to new enriched course

offerings with broadened choice New developments are evident in three principal

thrusts
addition of microeconomic/finance elements introduction of energy, environment and public policy aspects wider array of power systems, power

electronics and machines/drives courses

The impact of recent events

Restructuring of electricity and the California

crisis sharpened public interest in electricity

The September 11, 2001 tragedy brought to prominence the issue of the security of the North American interconnected power system The 2003 mega-blackout produced keen interest in the reliability of the interconnected grid

Conclusions
Stability of power systems is a well understood phenomenon, but complex numerical problem.
Stability enhancement controls are very complex to design, but the present research thrusts and engineering practice have yielded in-service designs (or designs nearly in-service) that are suitable to the task The transition to a market based energy infrastructure may not have been well thought out, and system implications are just now being remedied

Conclusions
Distribution engineering, long a step-child of power engineering, is a focus of research mainly related to high reliability, cost reduction, and distributed generation sources
System security is a point of focus in contemporary power engineering Research on sensory systems is needed to enhance system security Power engineering education and the production of power engineers at all levels seems to have a significant impact on the health of the national power system. It is unclear that the number of engineers needed will be attained by US educational institutions.