Maritime Strategic Context for AFRICOM

With Particular Reference to the Gulf of Guinea

Briefing for the Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Center, Charleston 25-26 October 2007 Dr. J. Peter Pham

Strategic Vision
Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration. It is a place of promise and opportunity, linked to the United States by history, culture, commerce, and strategic significance. Our goal is an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006) I am pleased to announce my decision to create a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to stand up U.S. Africa Command by the end of fiscal year 2008. This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa. President George W. Bush (February 6, 2007)

Geographical and Environmental Context

Gulf of Guinea

U.S. Africa Squadron, 1842-1861

The rights of our citizens engaged in lawful commerce are under the protection of our flag; and it is the chief purpose as well as the chief duty of our naval power to see that these rights are not improperly abridged or invadedIt is to be borne in mind, that while the United States sincerely desire the suppression of the slave trade, and design to exert their power, in good faith, for the accomplishment of that object, they do not regard the success of their efforts as their paramount interest. Instructions to Captain Matthew C. Perry from Secretary of the Navy Abel P. Upshur

Economic Context

Low GDP: regional average is $1,500 per capita (PPP). Hydrocarbon sector is significant proportion of economy and source of foreign exchange: 50-90 in Angola, 20-95 in Nigeria, 50-75 in Gabon.

Hydrocarbons
Top West African producers by barrels of oil per day:
1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Nigeria: 2.5 million Angola: 902,000 Equatorial Guinea: 350,000 Gabon: 289,000 Congo: 235,000 Chad: 200,000 Cameroon: 67,000 Cte dIvoire: 33,000

U.S. Energy Security

Production in the Gulf of Guinea will increase 40 percent by 2015. The region already provides approximately 55 percent of U.S. imports of light, sweet crude, which is easier to refine for domestic consumption than the high sulfurcontent petroleum from the Middle East or Venezuela.

millions of barrels per day of growth

Gulf of Guinea

0 2005 2010 2015

Demographic Context
African demographics creates breeding ground for extremists
Youth bulge 40% of population is less than 15 years old Systemic corruption prevents equitable distribution of resources

African Demographics and Corruption

Uganda: highest percentage of youth bulge at 51% under age 15 Nigeria currently 9th most populous country (132 million) will be 8th most populous in 2015 (163 million) Transparency International: Half of the 20 most corrupt countries in the world are in Africa

Two choices for growing population:

Stay in Africa with little hope; terrorism and criminal activity perpetuates and aggravates instability
Immigration (legal and illegal) upsets European Muslim ratio; promotes Islamic extremism

Religious Context

Political Context
Multilateral Organizations in the Region
United Nations (UN) and Africa Union (AU) members Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Political Context

Weak governance capacity afflicts most nation-states in the region. Democratization efforts have been uneven. Living standards have been in relative decline. Religious divisions have accentuated ethnic and economic factors as conflict motivators.

Tipping Points
Migration Minimally governed areas Extremist inroads Piracy and Theft

Piracy and Theft

Wars and serious conflicts since 1994

Niger Delta Region MEND

Bakassi Peninsula

Liberian Civil Wars

(1989-2003) Nigerian-led regional intervention (ECOMOG)

Congo War (DROC) 1996-2003

Recent Coup Attempts So Tom and Prncipe (2003) Equatorial Guinea (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo (2004) Togo (2005) Angola Civil War (1974-2002)

Military Context

Focus has been predominantly on army and internal security services. Overall maritime capability is poor, even by developing world standards: small, undermanned, poorly equipped, inadequately trained naval components are largely inoperable. Most countries are unable to cope with piracy, criminal enterprises, and poaching, much less with terrorism.

Liberia

Coastline: 579 km No personnel since 2003 4 inoperable craft

Ghana

Coastline: 539 km 1000 personnel 4 patrol craft 2 patrol aircraft

Togo

Coastline: 56 km 200 personnel 2 patrol craft

Benin

Coastline: 121 km 200 personnel 5 patrol craft

Nigeria

Coastline: 853 km 6700 personnel 1 frigate, 1 corvette, 6 missile boats, 5 maritime patrol craft, 2 aircraft, 17 coastal patrol craft, and 50 riverine patrol craft

Cameroon

Coastline: 402 km 1300 personnel 10 riverine patrol craft, 6 harbor patrol craft, 3 maritime patrol craft

Equatorial Guinea

Coastline: 296 km No personnel No craft

So Tom and Prncipe

Coastline: 209 km (142,563 km2 EEZ) 50 personnel 2 inflatable craft

Gabon

Coastline: 885 km 600 personnel 3 coastal patrol craft, 1 maritime patrol craft

Congo (Brazzaville)

Coastline: 169 km 800 personnel 12 riverine patrol craft

Democratic Republic of Congo

Coastline: 37 km 1300 personnel 5 patrol craft

Angola

Coastline: 1600 km 2200 personnel 16 coastal patrol craft, 5 landing craft, 5 aircraft, 5 helicopters, 11 harbor craft

Gulf of Guinea Maritime Traffic

Regionally: 40 ship departures per day, 280 per week.

Tankers: 11 per day, 76 per week General cargo ships: 8 per day, 56 per week Container ships: 7 per day, 51 per week

Nigeria is most significant source of merchant traffic: 50 percent of tanker departures, 57 percent of

Benin Togo 2 daily Lom 3 daily Cotonou

Nigeria 11 daily Lagos Warri Port Harcourt Cameroon 3 daily Douala

Ghana 5 daily Tema So Tom and Prncipe

Calabar

Equatorial Guinea 3 weekly Malabo Bata Congo 2 daily Pointe Noire

2 weekly
So Tom Angola 2 daily Luanda

Shipping Departures and Major Port Locations

Gabon 2 daily Libreville

DRC 1 daily Banana

Criminal Activities
Diamonds Middle East Heroin to U.S. and Europe Stolen Cars from U.S. and Europe Oil Bunkering

Weapons Trafficking, Human Trafficking, and other Illicit Trade throughout the Region

Cocaine from South America to U.S. and Europe

Global Maritime Traffic Flow

Other Interested Parties

Ever-increasing economic, political, and military engagement of Africa by the Peoples Republic of China and India (and others) in search of:

Resources Business opportunities

Diplomatic initiatives
Strategic partnerships

Other Strategic Concerns

Developing multilateral institutions: African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA), etc. Potential for state failure, including the conflict in or even collapse of regional pivots: Angola (Cabinda separatism), Nigeria (Igbo, Ijaw, and Yoruba nationalism; Islamism among the Hausa and Fulani). Spread of terrorist phenomena: Northern Nigeria, Niger Delta, South Africa.

Strategic Guidance

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Traditional Missions

Forward Naval Presence Crisis Response Expeditionary Power Projection Maritime Security Operations Sea Control Deterrence

New Missions

Security Cooperation Civil-Military Operations Counterinsurgency Counterterrorism Counter-Proliferation Air and Missile Defense Information Operations

Specific Strategic Priorities in the Gulf of Guinea

Maritime SecurityDetect, deter, interdict, and defeat terrorist attacks, criminal acts, or hostile acts in the maritime domain, and prevent its unlawful exploitation for those purposes.
(ref. National Strategy for Maritime Security)

InfluenceThe power of producing effects without obvious exertion of force or direct exercise of command. It requires the creation of secure and stable environments that nurture enduring relationships and interdependencies.
(ref. CNO Strategic Studies Group XXIV)

A Possible Response

Global Fleet Station (GFS)

A hub where all manner of joint, interagency, international organizations, navies, coast guards and nongovernmental organizations could partner together as a force for good. ADM Mike Mullen (CNO) GFS is a persistent sea base of operations from which to coordinate and employ adaptive force packages within a regional area of interest. SOUTHCOM Website The Global Fleet Stations (GFS) pilot program will serve as a regional cornerstone for phase 0, Shaping and Stability Operations. GFS supplies an adaptive force package that supports the 1,000-ship Navy with a persistent presence. U.S. Navy Office of Information (CHINFO)

Recent and Current Efforts

GFS Pilot Programs

HSV-2 Swift (April-September 2007) USS Fort McHenry (October 2007May 2008)

Humanitarian Assistance
USS Emory S. Land
February-April 2006) (January-March 2005;

USNS Comfort (June-October 07) USS Pelilieu (June-September 2007)

The Next Steps

Functional Area Analysis to determine capabilities and requirements for GFS, examining mission areas, including:
Peacetime Engagement Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Interagency and/or NGO Coordination

Functional Needs Analysis to weigh attributes in each mission area, measure the attributes, and determine capability vis--vis

Questions?

Contact Information
Dr. J. Peter Pham
Director The Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs James Madison University MSC 1205 Harrisonburg, Virginia 22801 (540) 568.2281 (540) 568.2977 FAX phamjp@jmu.edu

Weekly Strategic Interests Column on African Security Issues: http://worlddefensereview.com/strategicinterests.shtml