HAZOP

Session 10

Hazard and Operability Studies Overview

Originated as a hazard identification technique for process plants developed by ICI in mid 1960s
also commonly applied in petrochemical, nuclear and food processing industries

Described as a system of imaginative anticipation of hazards Differs from Functional Failure Analysis in 4 key ways:
always a team activity concentrates on deviations in flows between components uses well-defined guide words to steer analysis considers both plausible causes and possible consequences of deviations
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HAZOP technical approach

In the process industries, HAZOP is normally applied once the piping and instrumentation (P&I) diagram has been produced Scope of study explicitly extends to cover unusual circumstances such as startup, shutdown and plant maintenance Scope of study does not include making detailed design changes, although recommendations and follow-up questions should be produced

As with FHA, results are recorded in a tabular format

No reason why HAZOP cannot be applied to any system in which flows can be identified including information flow in software
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HAZOP procedure
Start Select a component Select a flow Suggest a deviation using a guide word Investigate and document causes Investigate and document effects
NO NO

Finish
YES

All components analysed?

YES

All flows analysed?

YES

NO

All guide words considered? Record as hazard. Make recommendations for action if necessary

Record as non-hazardous deviation, with a justification

NO

Does deviation have plausible causes and hazardous effects?

YES

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HAZOP Team Members 1

Leader
planning and preparation act as chairman for meeting sign off documentation ensure follow-up work is completed

User(s)
may be site representative, operator, maintenance crew supply information about the context in which the system will be used, e.g. site facilities ask questions, and help decide which issues affect safety

Recorder
participant in study (?) document the analysis

Expert(s)
key function is to explore
ask questions suggest deviations / causes / effects

Designer(s), process / project engineers

understand and explain the plant design answer questions about the plant and process

need good knowledge of process chemistry, or experience of similar plant

Team may recruit extra members (technical specialists) if required

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HAZOP Team Members 2

Team may recruit additional members when required Typically to answer specific questions, e.g.
control engineer mechanical engineer occupational health / hygienist environmental specialists

Different teams often appropriate for different stages of the lifecycle, but continuity (e.g. same leader) usually recommended

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HAZOP guide words

Guide Word Deviation NO or NONE No part of the intention is achieved MORE Quantitative increase in a physical property (rate or total quantity) LESS Quantitative decrease in a physical property (rate or total quantity) MORE THAN All intentions achieved, but with or AS WELL AS additional effects (qualitative increase) PART OF Only some of the intention is achieved (qualitative decrease) OTHER THAN A result other than the intention is achieved REVERSE The exact opposite of the intention is achieved Example Interpretation No forward flow when there should be. Higher pressure, flow rate, temperature... Quantity of material is too large. Lower pressure, flow rate, temperature... Quantity of material is too small. Impurities in flow (air, water, oil...) Chemicals present in more than one phase (vapour, solid) One or more components of mixture missing, or ratio of components is incorrect Unusual circumstances etc... see next slide Reverse flow.

Physical properties

Temperature Viscosity

Flow rate

Pressure

Reaction rate

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HAZOP guide words 2

Guide word Other Than has many interpretations this word particularly is often defined specifically for particular study examples include
plant operation phases
startup, shutdown, maintenance, sampling and inspection

instrumentation
control philosophy, location of instruments, alarms and trips

failure of plant services

cooling water, fuels, power supplies

other external factors

weather

spare / non-installed / portable equipment safety

fire and leak detection, emergency planning
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HAZOP example a bit of P&I

Valve (normally closed during operation of the plant) Valve (normally open during operation of the plant) Manually operated valve Pump Non-return valve

LC

Automation (level controller)

Hydrocarbon from storage

PG

LC

Drain

PG Settling tank

Drain

Transfer pumps (one working, one spare)

To reactor Drain

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HAZOP example output

Guide Word
NONE

Deviation No flow

Possible Causes No hydrocarbon available from storage

Consequences

Action Required

MORE

More flow

Transfer pump fails (motor fault, loss of power, impeller corroded etc.) Level control valve fails to open, or LCV bypassed in error Isolation valve or LCV closed when pump running High intermediate storage temperature

Loss of feed to reactor. 1) Ensure good communication Polymer formed in with storage area heat exchanger 2) Install low level alarm on settling tank As above Covered by 2)

Settling tank overfills

More pressure More temperature

Line subjected to full pump pressure Higher pressure in transfer line and settling tank

3) Install high level alarm 4) Check size of overflow 5) Establish locking-off procedure for LCV bypass when not in use 6) Install kickback on pumps

7) Install warning of high temperature at intermediate storage

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Hazard Study Phasing 1

1 2 3 4 5 6

Research and Process Development Process and Project Definition Project Design Procurement and Construction Commissioning

Operation

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Hazard Study Phasing 2

1 - Concept Study
PHI, checklist, materials and reagents study, first outline HAZOP

2 - Process Flow Study

HAZOP

3 - Detailed Design (P&I) Study

HAZOP

4 - Detailed Design (Physical) Study

HAZOP update, Sneak, Fault Trees, FMEA

5 - Audit of installed plant against design

Checklist, review of HAZOP actions, inspections

6 - Audit / review of process

Final review of evidence, completeness of HAZOP actions
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HAZOP Pros and Cons

Advantages very methodical. Use of guide words can give confidence in completeness of analysis. has both inductive and deductive phases team conclusions may carry more weight than those reached by individual analysts Disadvantages can produce lots of output. Structure is only obtained by reference back to P&I diagrams team approach is expensive must be shown to be cost-effective
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ICI Experience
More operability problems than hazards are usually found
though difference is smaller with existing plants

Number of post-commissioning modifications to plant is reduced Time to achieve intended production rates is reduced For major plant, cost is typically about 1% of design cost
0.1 - 0.2% of total plant cost

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