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2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Seminar

History, perspectives and challenges of the Nuclear Security Summit


Giuseppe Gherardi ICIS Rome 9 March 2012

Presentation scheme
Introduction: Who, What, Where, When, How Inventories and risks

Concerns
Action Plan Last comments

History

G.Gherardi

The Promise of Prague In April 2009, in Prague, President Obama spoke of his vision of a world without nuclear weapons stop the spread of nuclear weapons reduce nuclear arsenals secure nuclear materials prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and trafficking In April 2010 in Washington the NSS leaders of 47 nations came together to advance a common approach and commitment The Summit Communiqu endorses President Obama call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years (>2014)

History

G.Gherardi

Also In April 2010 > New START treaty between the US and the RF that limits the number of strategic arms >US released a Nuclear Posture Review that reduces dependence on nuclear weapons while strengthening the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty: future deterrence will not rely on nuclear weapons only and forever

History

G.Gherardi

The most important outcomes of NSS Washington 2010 shared recognition among heads of state of the urgency and seriousness of the threat of nuclear terrorism political commitment to addressing the issue Work Plan Role of IAEA in the Work Plan

History

G.Gherardi

In the last 60 years no nuclear Summit hosted a gathering of so many Heads of State and Government
60 years ago: Atom for peace were proposed to the UN General Assembly hope of a new era after destructions of WWII after Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also the year of Bikini and the end of the war in Korea Now: unprecedented meeting to address an unprecedented threat

G.Gherardi

Who ? fundamental responsibility of States More than 50 nations are represented: heads of state and top officials What ? world free of nuclear risks, peaceful use of nuclear technologies NSS is focused on preventing non-state actors from acquiring nuclear materials either for terrorism or for criminal purposes. Nuclear plant safety and "unofficial summit issues : strongly interrelated but also separate

Introduction G.Gherardi

where? nuclear states, non nuclear states seen by a terrorist group, 25 kg of (nearly) weapon grade material in a non nuclear state can be more attractive than a storage with 10.000 times more (250 tonnes) in a nuclear country (better protected) when ? Hopefully 2014 for securing vulnerable HEU and Pu in most countries, then

Introduction G.Gherardi

How? States: Engagement from the highest levels of government on voluntary basis International organizations, NGO science diplomacy: networking, standards NSS is one component of a system of treaties, conventions, initiatives, and ad hoc measures Some country feels reluctant=too resources requested=better complete and enlarge existing agreements and instruments than new initiatives: move from regime to architecture

Introduction G.Gherardi

How? States nuclear security is primarily a national responsibility international framework is designed to achieve sustainability, consistency, and coordination in meeting nuclear-related threats

framework developed in a number of forums and rapidly evolving threat environment >> a number of inconsistencies, overlaps, duplication and gaps > move from regime to architecture

Inventories and risks G.Gherardi

* Harm * vulnerab-

categories of material and quantities = priorities in security engineering ***** ***** Weapon Heads - weapon grade * materials (military only) ***** ***** separated Pu from NPP ** ***** *** HEU research reactors ***** ***** * NPP spent fuel ** **** LEU commercial new nuclear fuel ** *** high level radioactive sources (HL medical - industrial - nuclear waste) ******* * low and medium activity materials (LL medical - industrial - nuclear waste + TENORMS) ***** ***** *****

Inventories and risks

G.Gherardi

> existing international conventions - do not impose strong obligations regarding security of all categories of material - do not require States to adhere to minimum protection standards or to report on the implementation of nuclear security measures > strengthening the existing agreements will address some of these issues > other will be harder: ensuring security of military material or provide transparency and accountability in nuclear security

October 2010 Poland more than 450kg of Russian HEU sent back to Russia- 5 shipments HEU from research reactors

Inventories and risks

G.Gherardi

what is a significant quantity of plutonium and uranium-235 ? (weight sufficient for a Nuclear Weapon Warhead ) IAEA: 8kg and 25kg respectively (but may be less) there is material enough for 500.000/8 + 2000000/25 = 82.500 Warheads (some other figures > 100 thousand) Terrorist group point of view = one would be enough

Inventories and risks

G.Gherardi

The world still has approximately 19,500 nuclear weapons (22.600 "intact warheads" Kristensen report - 8.000 operational - 1.880 alert ) they are alive, they are aging "feed and clean - it is expensive and dangerous: supply chain, trained operators and trainers and people going in out and

Terrorist group point of view = one would be enough

Inventories and risks

G.Gherardi

The world still has approximately 19,500 nuclear weapons (22.600 "intact warheads" Kristensen report - 8.000 operational - 1.880 alert ) politicians have fundamentally divergent views about the future many including President Obama have made nuclear abolition their long-term goal others continue to fiercely oppose the idea of nuclear abolition, and advocate nuclear modernization Terrorist group point of view = one, also an old one, would be enough

Saudi Arabia ???

Saudi Arabia ???

Inventories and risks

G.Gherardi

a single U.S. Trident submarine carries slightly less WHD than India and Pakistan together.
140 ships are powered by 180 nuclear reactors

Emergency plan in case of accident standards


Terrorist group point of view = one, also coming from a submarine wreckage , would be enough

NWFZ in Africa

Signing

ratifing

A DREAM

Inventories and risks

G.Gherardi

Pu

>1.670 tons civil, >155 tons military

HEU > 175 tons civil, >1720 tons military >440 operating nuclear power plants in 31 States >480 research reactors (>70 with HEU) >100 fuel cycle facilities 100.000 Cat I and II radioactive sources 1.000.000 Cat III radioactive sources Terrorist group point of view = vulnerability x damage

Inventories and risks G.Gherardi

Pu HEU

>1.670 tons civil, >155 tons military > 175 Tons civil, >1720 tons military

>440 operating nuclear power plants in 31 States >480 research reactors (>70 with HEU) >100 fuel cycle facilities >100.000 Cat I and II radioactive sources >1.000.000 Cat III radioactive sources

Production of military fissile materials continues in India Pakistan -North Korea (Israel, is believed to produce plutonium) In Russia, UK, Japan, India reprocessing facilities separate plutonium from spent fuel of NPP China is building a pilot reprocessing facility. Terrorist group point of view: WoW !

Inventories and risks

G.Gherardi

Pu HEU

>1.670 tons civil, >155 tons military > 175 Tons civil, >1720 tons military

>440 operating nuclear power plants in 31 States >480 research reactors (>70 with HEU) >100 fuel cycle facilities >100.000 Cat I and II radioactive sources >1.000.000 Cat III radioactive sources

Eleven countries operate uranium enrichment facilities: Russia, the United States, France, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands Japan, Brazil, India, Pakistan, and Iran Terrorist group point of view: LEU or HEU ??!

Separated Plutonium Podvig 2007

Inventories and risks Pu >1.670 tons civil, >155 tons military HEU > 175 Tons civil, >1720 tons military

G.Gherardi

>440 operating nuclear power plants in 31 States >480 research reactors (>70 with HEU) >100 fuel cycle facilities
100.000 Cat I and II radioactive sources 1.000.000 Cat III radioactive sources

Terrorist group point of view attack to a nuclear facility could result on consequences similar to Chernobyl or Fukushima Daiichi
Lesson from Fukushima: Emergency power supply = diesel generators Spent fuel repositories = water pools in an industrial building . Risk of attack: not only a plane crashing on the NPP

Inventories and risks

G.Gherardi

NPP Nuclear Power Reactors


WORLD 2009: about 240,000 metric tons of heavy metal (mostly uranium) in spent fuel in storage worldwide, most of it at reactor sites Nonsense: the whole legacy of nuclear power equivalent to a cube 30x30x30 meters = height: 10 stories

The annual spent fuel generated in the world 10,500 tons of HM = 8,500 Tons long-term storage and 2,000 tons reprocessed.
Source: International Panel on Fissile Material, Feiveson 2011

Inventories and risks G.Gherardi

Research Reactors with HEU


support for HEU minimization is growing e.g. RR producing radio-nuclides for medical use Mo99 ANSTO: demonstrated that Mo99 can be produced in LEU reactor, with full disposition of waste (synrock) without increase of market price - in the future: accelerators Operational RR: in 56 countries, 240 reactors 130 HEU fuelled shut down RR: 670 research and test reactors been worldwide, 193 > 40 years ago

Inventories and risks G.Gherardi

100.000 Cat I and II radioactive sources An exposure of only a few minutes to an unshielded Category 1 source may be fatal A/D > 1000 Category 2 Industrial gamma radiography sources And High/medium dose rate brachytherapy sources 10 < A/D < 1000 (permanent damage < 10 m, hours)
A IS FOR ACTIVITY

D IS FOR DANGEROUS

1.000.000 Cat III radioactive sources Fixed industrial gauges that incorporate high activity sources + Well logging gauges 1 < A/D < 10 (permanent damage < 1 m, hours) Terrorist group point of view = vulnerability x A/D x dispersal X vulnerability

well logging

Inventories and risks

G.Gherardi

NORM Naturally-Occurring Radioactive Materials TENORM = Technologically-Enhanced NORM Fertilizer Production Aluminum Copper Waste Rock Gold and Silver Rare Earths Titanium Ores Zircon Oil and gas extraction Coal and Coal Ash Geothermal Energy Specific damage very low

CONCERNS

G.Gherardi

Four Concerns of Nuclear Terrorism


Theft of a nuclear weapon Theft of nuclear material to make an improvised nuclear explosive device IND Theft of other radioactive material for a radioactive dispersal device RDD

Sabotage of a facility or transport


Red: issues NSS Seoul 2012 Green: unofficial summit issues

CONCERNS

G.Gherardi

Trafficking or theft of radioactive material in order to prepare and use a radioactive dispersal device RDD
Experts agree that a RDD is a psychological weapon It could cause few casualties, if any, but a huge global distress and huge economic consequences Disinformation on radiological issues may revert from a propaganda argument used by opponents of nuclear energy to a weapon in the hand of terrorists

comprehensive action plan

G.Gherardi

Efforts to minimize highly enriched uranium, plutonium and other nuclear materials > International framework, but also technological alternatives eg Mo99 Security provisions for storage and transport of nuclear and radioactive materials

Protection of nuclear facilities


> Common standards international and regional level

comprehensive action plan

G.Gherardi

Developing or refining national regulatory infrastructures towards common standards Developing national strategies for improving control over nuclear materials and radioactive sources Optimizing decisions about the priorities within resource constraints Optimizing international preparedness Emergency planning and response

Last comments

G.Gherardi

key international programmes that work on securing nuclear material and facilities run by the IAEA: the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme the Global Threat Reduction Initiative

the Group of Eight (G8) Global Partnership

Last comments

G.Gherardi

The framework is complex

N-countries and some non N-countries gave priority to N-security Other countries had different priorities
They could give an important contribution If the architecture of international security programmes were founded on capacity building, transfer of new technologies. IAEA is a perfect example under this aspect

Last comments

G.Gherardi

But the role of IAEA is to assist when requested. Credibility is founded on fidelity to the mission. Co-operation on regional basis + bilateral and multilateral These countries will be interested to something like the EU initiative of CBRN Centres of Excellence SUSTAINABLE SPREAD OF SECURITY CULTURE

ON REGIONAL BASIS - OPTIMIZATION