PLATOS THEORY OF REPRESENTATION IN THE PHAEDO AND THE CRATYLUS AND ITS SIMILARITY TO ANTI-REALIST THEORIES OF SCIENTIFIC MODELING

John Fraiser December 2009

Introduction Much has been written in philosophy of science on what it takes for a scientific model to represent that which it is representing. There are primarily two responses to this question. Structuralist theories of modeling hold that scientific models can represent their subjects through either mathematical representation or visual resemblance since they naturally share the same structure. Contrary to structuralist theories, scientific anti-realist theories argue that scientific models represent because we construct artificial contexts in which the model can represent the data. In the Phaedo, Plato addresses the question of what it takes for one thing to be similar to another and what it takes for a particular to be similar to the Forms. I will argue that Platos theory is remarkably similar to anti-realist theories of representation, though I maintain that there is a significant realist element in his thought on representation. Millennia after Plato considered the questions of how we can recognize two things as similar or dissimilar, these questions are still with us. Consider this question from Bas van Fraassen: ...a theory in mathematical physics is, if just taken in itself, a mathematically formulated theory, in just the way that, for example, Euclidean and hyperbolic geometry are. How could it have more content, to make it something different from pure mathematics? No use adding an extra axiom such as the above axioms are true of reality (van Fraassen 2006, p. 538) The common response to this question is a kind of structuralism which says that mathematics is the language of the world. Mathematical theory has more than just pure 1

mathematics because mathematics maps the world. A ruler has mathematical markings on it and these can be placed along side of objects and measured. The world is mapped isomorphically by taking one point in the world and transferring it to the model. This is certainly a commonsense answer to the question, and is widely accepted by scientists and philosophers alike. But despite its popularity, it faces a variety of challenges. Notice that this answer depends upon the assumption that the represented world is a mathematical structure that can be abstracted isomorphically to a mathematical object such as a formula or an equation. That is not a problem if the world does in fact have this mathematical structure. But what we often take to be a mathematical structure of the world comes about by our selectivity of choosing to take certain data into account while choosing to ignore other data. This point is not hard to demonstrate. The very straight, smooth plain that we are measuring with a ruler, isnt really straight, and it isnt really smooth. Were we to take into account all the data, our isomorphic mathematical structure would fall apart. We havent really mapped the data. We approximated it and gave it a structure for a certain purpose in order to get a certain result. So, even if we accept the realist answer that the mathematical structure maps the structure of the world, we should now ask how that which the realist calls the structure of the world represents the world itself. What we are measuring isnt really the structure of the world after all, but only the data we chose to include for the purpose of measuring with a ruler. We are only able to map from the world to the model on the condition that we first create an artificial structure for mapping or measurement, and while this structure can be measured, there is a question about the meaning of those measurements outside of the artificial structure. As van Fraassen states, The use of graphs, functions, and mathematical spaces within scientific practice is not a case of applying concepts to the unconceptualized but to structures that already have a description admitted as acceptable in context. (van Fraassen 2006, p. 541).

Interpreting Platos Theory of Representation 2

Plato is also concerned with the question of how one thing can represent another. In the Phaedo, Plato presents his doctrine of recollection in which knowledge comes by way of recalling what was known prenatally. According to Plato, this recollection can take place by encountering something that is similar to that which we recall or it by encountering something dissimilar (Phaedo 73c-e). Since the doctrine depends on the concept of similarity (which also covers the concept of dissimilarity), it raises the question of what it means for one thing to be similar or dissimilar to another. In the dialogue, Socrates asks Simmias: When the recollection is caused by similar things, must one not of necessity also experience this: to consider whether the similarity to that which one recollects is deficient in any respect or complete? To which Simmias gives the expected answer: One must. But to know the extent to which one thing is similar to another requires that we know a third entity beyond those which we are comparing for similarity. This third entity Plato calls the Equal. Plato posits the existence of the Equal on the understanding that knowledge of the extent to which two things are similar cannot come from the two things themselves since no two things are entirely similar (Phaedo 74a-b). To make the argument a bit more formal: 1. To recall something by looking at a similar thing requires recognition a similarity between the two. 2. To recall something by looking at a dissimilar thing requires only that the dissimilar thing cause the subject to recall a thing. 3. To recognize the similarity between two things requires recognition of the extent to which the two are similar. 4. To recognize the extent to which two things are similar requires a third entity, the Equal, since no two things are entirely similar. The Equal, Plato claims, is not the same as the equal things. Equal things can have dissimilarities, but the Equal cannot. Still, it is from the equal things that we have knowledge of the Equal. We can truly recognize equality between two things that are not in fact equal because we already know the Equal. The Equal is what allows us to recognize equality between two objects of comparison. We also notice the deficiencies in them because of the Equal (Phaedo 74c-e).

It should be apparent at that Platos theory of representation is already more complex than the isomorphic structuralist theory of representation we saw above. Plato recognizes that no mapping from one thing to another can reveal equality between them because there will always be some dissimilarity. According to Plato, the only thing that has total similarity is the Equal itself. Platos account also supports the anti-realist position that the similarity can be noticed in anything even if we usually regard the two things as dissimilar. As he states, As long as the sight of one thing makes you think of another, whether similar or dissimilar, this must of necessity be recollection (Phaedo 74d). Whether the two actually match is inconsequential for the question of how something is represented to an individual. This idea can be unpacked further. Are all cases of representation like this? Does the representation of one object (mathematical or otherwise) by another depend upon a natural similarity or is the similarity our own work of creating the similarity? Presumably Platos answer to this question that there is a similarity between the two but it is always an imperfect similarity since total similarity is only found in the Equal. In other words, there really is a similarity in the world between two inferior things which crudely mimics the Equal.

Anti-realism in Platos Theory of Representation As we will see, this idea clearly has a realist component, but it is important to notice. for the time being, the clear anti-realist component as well. According to the doctrine of recollection, if a thing causes one to remember some other thing , no matter how dissimilar the two things appear, one has sufficient reason one to treat the two things as similar. Our ability to represent one thing as similar to another is what determines the similarity, not some principle of reality which makes them similar. Now let us see just how comparable the theory of representation in the Phaedo is to the antirealist theory of representation. More specifically, we can compare it with three scientific anti-realist claims made by van Frassen. First, Van Fraassen takes it that we should not say that one thing represents another in some absolute sense since there will always be dissimilarities between them (van Fraassen 2008, p. 17). As we have seen, this point is also clearly found in the Phaedo, where Socrates states that, 4

because only the Equal has perfect similarity, all physical things fall short of total similarity (Phaedo 74d). Second, van Fraassen argues that representation is a human action not an characteristic of the world. When something is represented it is because we represent it (van Fraassen 2008, p. 21). This point is more subtle in Plato, but it is still present. Socrates asks Simmias, Do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to one to be equal and to another to be unequal? To which Simmias replies, Certainly they do (Phaedo 74d). The difference of opinion about the equality of the sticks or stones comes about because each person takes into account /ignores data in a way that is different from the other. Thus one person considers the sticks to represent each other, while the other denies the representation. Despite initially referring to the objects as equal, Plato makes clear that they are not, in fact, equal. Two people can view the objects as equal or not, depending on how each takes the object to represent something else. Therefore, we say that whether they are taken to be equal or unequal depends on how the objects are represented by us. Third, van Fraassen claims that we use one thing to represent another in a certain way for a certain function. This can also be seen in the Phaedo. Plato draws our attention to a scenario in which a lover sees an object that her beloved has used. She knows what this object is but the recollection of the beloved takes place because the lover represents the object for the function of recalling the beloved (Phaedo 73b). These three anti-realist claims about representation are even more clear in the Cratylus than in the Phaedo. The first thesis is expressed by Socrates when he says, an image cannot remain an image if it presents all the details of what it represents (Cratylus 432b), and again when he asks Cratylus, Havent you notice how far images are from having the same features as the things of which they are images? The second and third theses are found together in a discussion between Socrates and Cratylus about how letters can represent images. Socrates likens names to images since, just as an image is an imitation of something, so also names are imitations of something. But Socrates asks Cratylus if an image imitates a thing because it is naturally appropriate to a particular object or only because we have assigned it to that 5

object. Cratylus believes that it is the former. Leading him along for a while, Socrates convinces Cratylus that if each image naturally imitates a particular object, then names must also naturally fit that which they name, and letters with their accompanying sounds must naturally fit certain properties such as smoothness or motion. However, Socrates eventually gives enough counterexamples to his theory that Cratylus proposes the alternate explanation that names are fitted with their objects by how we use the name (i.e. by usage Cratylus 434e). Socrates then seeks to draw out of Cratylus what he means by usage, but Cratylus cannot quite explain it. Finally, in a passage that warrants extended quotation, Socrates concludes: ...the correctness of names has become a matter of convention for you, for isnt it the chance of usage and convention that makes both like and unlike letters express things? And even if usage is completely different from convention, still you may that expressing something isnt a matter of likeness but of usage, since usage, it seems, enables both like and unlike names to express things. Since we agree on these points, Cratylus, for I take your silence as a sign of agreement, both convention and usage must contribute something to expressing what we mean when we speak....I myself prefer the view that names should be as much like things as possible, but I fear that defending this view is like hauling a ship up a sticky ramp, as Hermogenes suggested, and that we have to make use of this worthless thing, convention, in the correctness of names (Cratylus 435b-c). Despite admitting a preference for the view that names naturally fit the things they name, Socrates finds this view untenable. The sure reason that names represent the objects that they do is that we make them do so. Furthermore, we make them represent the objects they do with the function of communication. Hence we see that each of van Fraassens theses on representation is even more explicit in the Cratylus than in the Phaedo.

Realism in Platos Theory of Representation Platos view also contains dissimilarities to van Fraasens view of representation. There is an objective realist element in Plato that is clearly missing in the anti-realist view of representation. In the Phaedo, equal things are not just represented by us as similar to the Equal. They are similar to the Equal. They are crude copies of it. As Socrates states, We must then possess knowledge of the Equal before that time when we first saw the equal objects and realized that all these objects strive to be like the Equal but are deficient in this. Here it is clear that the 6

similarity of the equal objects to the Equal is not due to our work in drawing the similarity, but due to the striving of the objects themselves to be like the Equal. Here Plato promotes isomorphic mapping between the equal objects and the Equal itself. The doctrine of recollection is just that, in seeing one thing we recall another which we knew prenatally. Thus, when we see equal things which are not themselves truly equal we are reminded of the Equal itself. How do we do this? We are able to do this because there really are similarities between the equal objects and the Equal and, through recollection, we map these similarities one-to-one. We have already seen why Socrates thinks we cannot learn about things just by learning the names. The reason is that names represent their objects because we make them represent them, not because they are fitted by nature to them. Isomorphic mapping between the representation (the name) and what is represented (the object) cannot take place because the similarity between them is our doing not natures. However, the same does not hold for the relationship between the objects and the Forms since objects are naturally fitted to their Forms. This natural fit is why we can learn about the Forms themselves through the study of sensible objects. Here we reach an important conclusion for understanding Platos theory of representation. The realist element in his theory consists in the objective representation of the Forms by objects in our physical world, not in the relationship between objects in this world to one another. There is a clear boundary between the extension of the realism and the extension of anti-realism in Plato. There is still one objection to this interpretation of Platos theory of representation. I have been saying that Plato thinks that no two objects can be perfectly equal since only the Equal has perfect equality. Therefore, when one thing in this world represents another it is because we make it represent the other in a certain respect and with a certain function. Outside of the context we create for representation, the one does not represent the other. But some interpreters of Plato have challenged the idea that only the Forms have perfect equality. If they are right, then we could have particulars of perfect equality in the physical world and be able to isomorphically map the 7

similarities between them, just as we can isomorphically map the similarities between the Forms and their this-worldly copies. David Sedley argues that in the Phaedo we should understand Plato to be saying that there might in principle be a participant in the Form which in no way fell short of it in terms of likenessjust as there might in principle be a perfect (albeit two-dimensional) portrait of Simmias (Sedley 2006, p. 312). He concludes this from Platos assertion that the portrait is of Simmias. This portrait might or might not fall short qua portrait. It surely falls short qua Simmias, since Simmias is three-dimensional and the portrait is only two-dimensional, but it may be a perfect two-dimensional representation of Simmias. That is, with respect to the two dimensions of Simmias the isomorphic mapping of a perfect portrait would be perfect. Sedley argues that while Platos example of the sticks and stones do, in fact, fall short of the Equal itself, this is a special case. That the equality of two sticks falls short of the equality of the Equal is no argument against there being particulars that do not fall short in their likeness of the Forms. According to Sedley, Plato allows that in principle there can be an object in this world that perfectly mirrors its Form just as an image of Simmias can perfectly reflect the two-dimensionalism of Simmias (Sedley 2006, p. 313). There are two lines along which we can examine this interpretation: exegetical and philosophical. That is, we can ask if it is an accurate interpretation of representation in the Phaedo and the Cratylus, and, regardless of whether the interpretation is accurate, we can ask whether the theory it proposes succeeds as a piece of philosophy. For the present purpose, I am primarily concerned with the accuracy of Sedleys interpretation of Plato, though, as we will see, even if it succeeds at the exegetical level, it fails on the philosophical level. Sedleys interpretation taps into a larger debate among Plato scholars over how to interpret Plato on the relationship between the Forms and the particulars. On the one hand we have the common interpretation, sometimes called the approximation view, which says that all particulars fall short of the perfection of the Forms since by their nature they can only approximate the Forms themselves. The approximation view is clearly found in A. E. Taylor. He writes: 8

The same visual sensations which suggest the notion straight to me, for example, are the foundation of the judgment that no visible stick is perfectly straight. The form is thus never contained in, or presented by, the sensible experience that suggests it. Like the limit of an infinite series it is approximated but never reached (Taylor 1966, p. 188).

The approximation view holds that geometric illustrations are the paradigm cases for all relations between the Forms and the particulars in Platos thought. Just as geometric figures in our world are imperfect or fuzzy approximations of the Forms, the same is true in other contexts whether ethics or politics. Earthly justice and earthy beauty are only approximations of Justice and Beauty in the Forms. The sensible world is imperfect because every particular falls short of being whatever we say it is. Over against the approximation view is the alternative view. We find this view represented by Alexander Nehamas. According to Nehamas, Plato does not develop his views out of geometry. Rather, his theory of the Forms grew out of problems finding references for terms of moral virtue such as justice, virtue, courage, piety, temperance, and beauty, etc. and with terms of measurement or comparison such as largeness, tallness, equality, heat, etc. (Nehamas 1999, p. 142). He noticed that the terms and their opposites could be applied to the same objects in a way that did not contradict. We could say of the same object that it is tall and short, beautiful and ugly, hot and cold, etc. Thus, no single object in our world seemed to be a paradigm of these qualities. Plato noticed that calling an object tall depended upon the context in which we placed the object. Change the objects to which it relates and the terms could change as well. But what of Tallness itself? Tallness isnt tall depending on its context. Tallness itself is absolutely tall. As Socrates states in the Phaedo, Now it seems to me that not only Tallness itself is never willing to be tall and short at the same time, but also that the tallness in us will never admit the short or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the short, approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach. It is not willing to endure and admit shortness and be other than it was, whereas I admit and endure shortness and still remain the same person and am this short man. But Tallness, being tall, cannot venture to be small (Phaedo 102d-e). In our world, each of these predicates is attributive or relational, but not all predicates are like this. Predicates such as is a man, is a stick, is a stone do not depend on relations to other things. Independent of any relation he has, Simmias is a man. According to the alternative view, this is a clear 9

distinction that Plato himself draws in several places (Nehamas cites Republic 523-25 and Alcibiades I.111b-c; Nehamas 1999, p. 143). The Forms are paralleled by particulars of these non-relative predicates. Simmias does not fall short of being a man. He is a man. Simmias cannot cease to be a man and remain who he is anymore than Tallness can cease to be tall and remain what it is. So while we refer to sensible objects with the relative predicates (beauty, justice, tallness, etc.), these objects only participate in these things by having these properties accidentally. But the Forms possess the relevant property absolutely or essentially. We have come to perhaps the key difference between the approximation view and the alternative view. According to the alternative view, Plato also held that even though the sensible objects have these properties accidentally, the properties themselves do not fall short of the Forms. They are perfect copies. Thus, the reason sensible objects fall short of the Forms is not because of defects in the properties but because they possess these properties in defective ways (i.e., Properties are had incompletely, temporarily, accidentally, etc.) (Nehamas 1999, p. 144). Establishing which view is the correct interpretation is an enormous and difficult task. The issue is continually debated in the literature. While it is a worthwhile consideration, it is not ultimately necessary for our present purpose. We want to know to what extent either of these interpretations affects the interpretation of Platos theory of representation that I have laid out here. It should seem clear that the approximation view poses no threat to what Ive said. It is more or less the view which I have assumed from the beginning. Though I assume the approximation view, it is important to note that my interpretation does not depend upon it. My interpretation is also compatible with the alternative view. I have argued that Sedleys interpretation of the Phaedo and the Cratylus is a challenge to the anti-realist elements that I attribute to Platos theory of representation. While Sedleys interpretation seems to be supported by the alternative view since both views claim that the Forms can be perfectly represented in our world, upon closer examination it is clear that Sedleys view is actually contradicted by it. Sedleys claims about perfection are not claims about the properties themselves, they are claims about the subject that has these properties. As he states, there could be an authentic case of reminding in which 10

the subject noticed no shortfall of resemblance whatsoever (Sedley 2006, p. 311). This is quite different from the alternative view, which states that all particulars necessarily fall short by virtue of being copies and which attributes perfect resemblance only between the abstract properties and the Forms (Nehamas 1999, p. 144). In the alternative view, falling short is a necessary condition of being a particular, whereas in Sedleys view, falling short is only an accidental condition: On the one hand, the equal sticks and stones do fall short of the Equal itself in terms of likeness, because, whereas the Equal itself is a model of pure unadulterated equality, they are only imperfectly or unstably equal; but that, on the other hand, there might in principle be a participant in the Form which in no way fell short of it in terms of likenessjust as there might in principle be a perfect (albeit two-dimensional) portrait of Simmias (Sedley 2006, p. 312). Despite the clear interpretive differences between the approximation view and the alternative view, they are in agreement that particulars fall short qua particulars. For this reason, Sedleys view is contradicted by both interpretations.1 Aside from the challenges presented by both dominant views of Plato on the relationship between the Forms and the particulars, Sedleys interpretation faces additional challenges. Since his primary thesis is that theoretically there could be a particular that did not fall short of the Forms, he claims that when Socrates states that the sticks and stones differ from the Equal (Phaedo 74c), he only means that they differ in size not in similarity since equal is the balance between largeness and smallness (Sedley 2006, 323). On this interpretation, mapping could occur not only between the Forms and the particulars but also between particulars since the difference between the Forms and the particulars is only one of scaling. Sedleys interpretation fails to account for clear statements in the Phaedo. Socrates speaks of equals and inequals, Equality and Inequality, similarity and dissimilarity. Sedley is concerned to show that Socrates references to similarity and dissimilarity do not apply to his comparisons of two sticks or

I take it that a key weakness in Sedleys interpretation is that he appears unaware of this standard debate over the interpretation of Plato on the relationship between the Forms and the particulars. He lays out his interpretation without any acknowledgement of the challenges that both of these views pose for his interpretation.

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two stones but are references instead to objects which differ categorically, such as when a lyre reminds one of her beloved. A lyre and a beloved are clearly dissimilar, but, according to Sedley, two sticks are necessarily similar so the only further question is whether they are equal or inequal. Notice, however that Socrates also applies similarity and dissimilarity to the comparison of one stick to another. When the recollection is caused by similar things, must one not of necessity also experience this: to consider whether the similarity to that which one recollects is deficient in any respect or complete?One must. Consider, he said, whether this is the case: we say that there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stick or a stone to a stone or anything of that kind, but something beyond all these, the Equal itself. Shall we say that this exists or not? And again: These equal things and the Equal itself are therefore not the same? I do not think they are the same at all, Socrates. But it is definitely from the equal things, though they are different from that Equal, that you have derived and grasped the knowledge of equality? Certainly. It makes no difference. As long as the sight of one thing makes you think of another, whether it be similar or dissimilar, this must of necessity be recollection? Quite so. Well then, he said, do we experience something like this in the case of equal sticks and the other equal objects we just mentioned? Do they seem to us to be equal in the same sense as what is Equal itself? Is there some deficiency in their being such as the Equal or is there not? A considerable deficiency, he said (Phaedo 74c-d).

It is clear that Plato speaks of the relationship between sticks or stones to one another in terms of similarity and dissimilarity, as well as the relationship of the equality of sticks to the Equal: These equal things and the Equal itself are therefore not the same? and it makes not difference whether it be similar or dissimilar....do we experience something like this in the case of equal sticks? Furthermore, not only does Socrates clearly refer to the relationship of the particulars to the Forms in terms of similarity and dissimilarity, he nowhere states that the particulars and the Forms are unequal to one another. He says that the sticks and stones can be equal or inequal to one another in the eye of the beholder (do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to one to be equal and to another to be unequal?Certainly they do [Phaedo 74b].), but he never refers to the 12

relationship of the particulars and the Equal in this way. Yet, for Sedleys interpretation to succeed, he needs this kind of a reference. If Plato means to tell us that the only way in which geometric objects fall short of the Equal is in terms of size, it is curious that he never stated it. A final problem facing Sedleys interpretation concerns his claims about the image of Simmias. Sedley takes it that as with sticks and stones, all other objects can be entirely similar to the Forms only unequal in size. Similarly, according to Sedley, an image of Simmias can be proportionately perfect in two dimensions but will necessarily be unequal in size. Just as we saw with Socrates statements about sticks and stones, we can see that Socrates nowhere says that the image of Simmias is perfect or even theoretically perfect. The value of Sedleys interpretation is also worth considering philosophically. This interpretation of Platos view of representation is similar to what we saw above concerning mathematical structures. There, the question concerned how mathematical structures can represent the world. The realist answer is that they can do so by isomorphic mapping from the structure of the world to the mathematical structure. But the anti-realist isnt asking how a mathematical structure can represent a certain structure of the world. She wants to know how it represents the world. To tell us that it represents a certain structure raises the question of how we arrive at this structure. The realist response assumes that nature gives us the structure which the mathematical structure represents, but the anti-realist wants to know how it was decided that this structure of the world represents the world. Clearly certain things were chosen to be included in the structure of the world and certain things were not. It seems then that the mathematical structures modeling of the structure of the world takes place in an artificial context where certain phenomena are chosen to be included in the structure of the world and other phenomena are left out. We can ask the same question about how an image of Simmias can be a perfect two-dimensional image of Simmias. Sedleys interpretation of Plato assumes the same as the scientific realists theory of modeling: it is perfect if we can map between the image of Simmias and Simmias himself. But we can ask a question parallel to the one the anti-realist asked the isomorphic structuralist: how is it decided what gets to count as the structure of Simmias? Far beyond three-dimensionalism, there are many properties that 13

Simmias has that the image of Simmias does not. When we compare Simmias with the image, we find that Simmias has movement, he has a different temperature, a different texture, a different reflection of light, etc. In fact, the picture is not two-dimensional at all. Its two-dimensionalism is an illusion. The image is a three-dimensional object meant to reflect in a two-dimensional way the visual properties of the three-dimensional Simmias. So we can only call it a perfect image in the artificial context in which we have created the standard for perfection. So, we can see that, even if Sedleys interpretation meets the challenges on an exegetical front, it faces challenges on a philosophical front.

Conclusion As I noted above, we have had two different questions before us. One, what is the best theory of representation in general and scientific representation in particular? In answer to this question, I presented an anti-realist theory of representation and argued briefly that it answers the challenges faced by isomorphic structuralist theories. Two, I asked, what theory of representation did Plato hold? I answered that though he is a realist about the representation of the Forms by the particulars, he holds a view remarkably similar to anti-realist views of representation when comparing particulars to particulars. I considered Sedleys competing interpretation of Platos theory of representation and concluded that it has numerous exegetical faults. Yet, even if it should succeed on interpretive grounds, it fails philosophically since it faces the problems that attend all forms of isomorphic modeling.

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Bibliography Dorter, K. (1982). Plato's Phaedo: An Interpretation. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Gosling, J. C. (1965). Similarity in Phaedo 73B seq. Phronesis, 10, 151-161. Nehamas, A. (1999). Plato on the Imperfection of the Sensible World. In A. Nehamas, Virtues of Authenticity: Essay on Plato and Socrates (pp. 138-158). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Nehamas, A. (1973). Predication and Forms of Opposites in the "Phaedo". Review of Metaphysics, 26, 461-491. Plato. (1997). Phaedo. In J. M. Cooper (Ed.), Plato: Complete Works (G. Grube, Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. Sedley, D. (2006). Form-Particular Resemblance in Plato's Phaedo. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 106, 311-327. Taylor, A. E. (1960). Plato: The Man and His Work. London: Methuen Publishing Co. van Fraassen, B. C. (2006). Representation: The Problem for Structuralism. Philosophy of Science, 73, 536-547.

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