1

G.R. No. 158121 December 12, 2007 HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA vs. LUMOCSO FACTS: Petitioners claim to be the rightful owners of a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A, and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A, all situated in Dipolog City, wherein respondent siblings are the patent holders and registered owners. Valeriano Sr. and his children filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with Damages raffled to the RTC of Dipolog City, and subsequently, two separate complaints for Reconveyance with Damages, for a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases on the same grounds, one of which was lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints. Respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00. Petitioners opposed, contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. xxx The totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC denied the respective motions to dismiss of respondents, so they filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration, but to no avail. Subsequently, they jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Restraining Order Ex Parte with the CA. The CA reversed the resolutions and order of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant cases. RULING: NO Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz: Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less than P20,000.00. Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases. It has been held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). Under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark.

2
G.R. No. 184197 February 11, 2010 RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. VILLA

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . mandamus and damages against several defendants including respondents, docketed at the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, substituted service was resorted to by serving summons upon respondents househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names. Respondents failed to file their Answer prompting petitioner to file a Motion to Declare herein respondents in Default which the trial court granted. Respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and eventually such order was set aside giving them five days to file their Answer. They did not file an Answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion to declare them in default, which the trial court again granted. Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of summons. The trial court denied respondents Omnibus Motion and proceeded to receive ex-parte evidence for petitioner. Respondents, via certiorari, challenged the trial courts Orders before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court annulled the trial courts Orders declaring respondents in default for the second time. Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, comes to the Court via petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether respondents voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court in filing the first Motion to Lift the Order of Default RULING: YES It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latters voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al.: It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the courts jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.

3
G.R. No. 168296 January 31, 2007 VILLAGRACIA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FACTS: Private respondent filed an election protest with the Municipal Trial Court. The trial court adjudged private respondent as the true winner and nullified the proclamation of petitioner. Petitioner appealed the decision with the First Division of the COMELEC raising for the first time on appeal the issue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the election protest for failure of private respondent to pay the correct filing fees. The First Division set aside the decision of the trial court and dismissed the election protest of private respondent for lack of jurisdiction, so private respondent moved for reconsideration. The First Division elevated the motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC En Banc granted the motion for reconsideration and reinstated the decision of the trial court. It issued a writ of execution ordering petitioner to vacate his post as Punong Barangay in favor of private respondent.

ISSUE: Whether there was lack of jurisdiction over the election protest for failure of private respondent to pay the correct filing fees. NO Whether the Soller Doctrine is applicable in the instant case. NO RULING: In Soller, petitioner therein filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss private respondents protest on the ground of, among others, lack of jurisdiction. In the case at bar, petitioner actively participated in the proceedings and voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. It was only after the trial court issued its decision adverse to petitioner that he raised the issue of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal with the COMELECs First Division. While it is true that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case upon complete payment of the prescribed filing fee, the rule admits of exceptions, as when a party never raised the issue of jurisdiction in the trial court. It was therefore error on the part of the COMELECs First Division to indiscriminately apply Soller to the case at bar.

4
INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION (IBC-13) vs. LEGASTO FACTS: To put an end to the suit for a sum of money before the RTC, petitioner and private respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement. xxx 4. The balance of 6,080-30s primetime spots airtime shall mean usage in commercial placement for TV commercials. In the event of privatization, the said spots will be valued at the companys prevailing market price and be made payable upon demand. However, petitioner, commenced an action to declare the aforesaid Compromise Agreement null and void ab initio. They were by then already privatized and under a new management. On the other hand, private respondent filed the 5 January 2001 complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC. Private respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment and a motion for summary judgment after that. Petitioner filed a motion styled as one for dismissal and/or suspension of all proceedings in the aforesaid consolidated cases. The fact that private respondent only paid P8,517.50 in docket fees, petitioner maintained that, rather than for specific performance and damages as indicated in his complaint, private respondents cause of action was actually one for a sum of money, the totality of the latters claim, as disclosed in his motion for issuance of a writ of attachment, translated into unpaid docket fees amounting to P5,452,237.50; and, that private respondents suit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or, at the very least, suspended until payment of the correct docket fees. The RTC denied petitioners motion and held that the unpaid docket fees be treated as a judgment lien if favorable to respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, but to no avail. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court acquired the requisite jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: YES The ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion when this Court held that in the former there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide by paying the additional fees as required. At the time of the filing of the January 5, 2001 complaint by the respondent, paragraph 4 of the Compromise Agreement cannot yet be quantified in monetary terms. The value of the 6,080 30s primetime spots was dependent upon the privatization of the petitioner and its prevailing market price for the primetime spots. The only basis then for the computation of the docket fees are the damages that the respondent prays to be awarded to him. It was only when the trial court rendered its summary judgment that respondents prayer for specific performance was valued at P540,000,000.00. Prior to the filing of the complaint for specific performance, respondent requested for a meeting with the members of petitioners Board of Directors to discuss the monetary equivalent of paragraph 4 of the Compromise Agreement. The P8,517.00 docket fees were computed on the basis of what was legally quantifiable at the time of the filing of the complaint. Upon proof of payment of the assessed fees by the respondent, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated. In the case at bar, the respondent relied on the assessment made by the docket clerk which turned out to be incorrect. The payment of the docket fees, as assessed, negates any imputation of bad faith or an intent to defraud the government by the respondent. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the respondent and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply. Hence, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over the instant suit.

5
G.R. No. 131023 July 17, 2007 THE HEIRS OF BORRES vs. ABELA FACTS: The Borres heirs, represented by Atty. Villarruz, filed a complaint for partition and accounting against private respondent, Mrs. Radjaie, and sought the cancellation of TCT No. T-24150 and the declaration of the property as commonly owned by Mrs. Radjaie and the Borres heirs. The case was raffled to Branch 17 of the RTC of Roxas City then presided by Judge Alovera. For her alleged failure to file an answer, private respondent was declared in default and the Borres heirs presented their evidence ex-parte. In a Decision allegedly promulgated on January 30, 1995, Judge Alovera ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-24150 and declared the subject property as commonly owned by Mrs. Radjaie and the Borres heirs. On January 9, 1996, Acting Presiding Judge Villarruz, ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the January 30, 1995 Decision. Subsequently, possession of the subject property was turned over to the Borres heirs. On March 5, 1996, Mrs. Radjaie filed a petition for relief, which was later on granted, assailing the January 30, 1995 Decision and the January 9, 1996 Order. She alleged that she was never served with summons; that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person; that the proceedings in Civil Case No. V-6186 is null and void; and that the January 30, 1995 Decision was penned by Judge Alovera after his retirement and was never entered in the book of judgments. She prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and "that disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against those involved in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of justice." Judge Abela, the new Presiding Judge of Branch 17, nullified the January 30, 1995 Decision and the January 9, 1996 Order and ordered a preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond and directed the Borres heirs to surrender possession of the subject property to Mrs. Radjaie. The Borres heirs moved for reconsideration but were denied. A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued and possession of the subject property was restored to Mrs. Radjaie. The Borres heirs claim that the January 30, 1995 Decision has become final and executor and that the proper remedy is an action for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy. YES Whether the petitions should be dismissed for violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts. NO RULING: It is well-settled that although the SC, CA and RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioners unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. Petitioners should have filed their petitions before the Court of Appeals. However, considering the peculiar circumstances of these cases and the length of time that the proceedings herein have been pending, we deem it necessary and practical to resolve the present controversy in order to avoid further delay. The January 30, 1995 Decision could never attain finality for being void. It was penned by Judge Alovera after his retirement when he no longer had the authority to decide cases. It is clear that the proceedings in Civil Case No. V-6186 were attended with irregularities. The hearing on December 10, 1993 was simulated; the January 30, 1995 Decision was penned by Judge Alovera after he retired; and the decision was never entered in the book of judgments as mandated in the rules. Thus, petitioners contention that the decision has become final and executory lacks merit. In this case, Mrs. Radjaie assailed the January 30, 1995 Decision by way of a petition for relief. Under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a verified petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered or such proceeding was taken. The Borres heirs claim that the petition for relief was filed out of time. However, we likewise held in Hilado that where a judgment is on its face void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38 are inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack in any way and at any time, even when no appeal has been taken. So it is in this case where the decision cannot be said to have any force and effect. The decision is null and void as it was rendered in the complete absence of authority on the part of Judge Alovera. Accordingly, it is as if no decision was rendered at all.