Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God

R. E. Houser
ABSTRACT: Thomas of Aquino, from the time he wrote his commentary on the Sentences through writing the Summa of Theology, recognized how far beyond Aristotles was the rational theology of Avicenna. After perfecting his approach to proving the existence of God in the five ways, Aquinas further developed Avicennas organization for treating Gods nature by simplifying Avicennas often convoluted thought and added his own developments in content and order. In sum, Aquinass treatment of Gods nature depends closely upon Avicennas treatment of the subject in his Metaphysics 8.37, even more so than upon Aristotle. This conclusion can be seen by comparing the doctrines of Aristotle, Avicenna, and Aquinas on the divine nature.

T SoMeTIMeS IS SAId ThATAvicennas influence on Aquinas, while prominent in earlier works like De ente and Scriptum in Sententiis, waned with the passing of the years as he came to know Aristotles text more closely.1 It is hoped

1 Studies on the nature of God to which I am indebted: Aristotle on God: Leo elders, A Commentary on Bk. of the Metaphysics (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972); Giovanni Reale, The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. John R. Catan (Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1980); J. owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd ed. (Toronto oN: PIMS, 1978); T. Irwin, Aristotles First Principles (New York NY: oxford Univ. Press, 1990); Stephen Menn, Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good, Review of Metaphysics 45 (1992): 54373; Antoine Ct, Intellection and divine Causation in Aristotle, Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2005): 2539; Lloyd Gerson, Aristotle and other Platonists (Ithaca NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2006). Avicenna on God: A.-M. Goichon, La distinction de lessence et de lexistence dapres Ibn Sina (Avicenne) (Paris: desclee de Brouwer, 1937); Michael e. Marmura, Avicenna on the Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of his al-Shif in Logos Islamikos: Studia Islamica in honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens, ed. R. Savory and A. dionisius (Toronto oN: PIMS, 1984), pp. 21939; J. Jolivet, Aux origins de lontologie dIbn Sina in tudes sur Avicenne, ed. J. Jolivet and R. Rashed (Paris: 1984), pp. 1928; d. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1988); I. Netton, Ibn Sinas Necessary and Beloved deity in Allah Transcendent, ed. I. Netton (London and New York, Routledge, 1989), pp. 149202; M. e. Marmura, Quiddity and Universality in Avicenna, in Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, ed. Parviz Morewedge (New York NY: SUNY Press, 1992), pp. 7787; B. Mondin, La metafisica di Avicenna, Sapienza 52 (1999): 25779; Robert Wisnovsky, Notes on Avicennas Concept of Thingness (Shayiyya), Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10 (2000) 181221; Robert Wisnovsky, Avicennas Metaphysics in Context (Ithaca NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2003), pp. 17380, 24565; Peter Adamson, on Knowledge of Particulars, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2005): 25778; Thrse-Anne druart, Metaphysics in Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. P. Adamson and R. C. Taylor (Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), pp. 32748; Amos Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotles Metaphysics in Avicennas Kitb al-Shif (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2006). Aquinas on God: etienne Gilson, Thomism: the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, trans. L. K. Shook and A. Maurer, from the sixth and final edition of Le thomisme (Toronto: PIMS, 2002), pp. 84126; Jan Aertsen, Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinass Way of Thought (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1988); J.F.X. Knasas, The Preface to Thomistic Metaphysics (New York: Lang, 1990); Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the

International Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 51, No. 3, Issue 203 (September 2011)

356

R. E. HoUSER

that this study of Aristotle, Avicenna, and Aquinas on Gods nature goes some way toward showing how false this interpretation is. even at the late point in his career when he was writing the Summa theologiae (12661273), his treatment of the divine nature was much closer to Avicennas than it was to Aristotles. In order to show how this is so, the present consideration is set around three themes that help to determine what is common and what is different among the doctrines, and the principles used to establish them, concerning the nature of God in the thought of Aristotle himself and of two great medieval Aristotelians: Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and Thomas Aquinas. These themes are (1) the conclusions drawn about the nature of God, (2) the order used to present these conclusions, and (3) the influence of demonstrative metaphysical principles on the conclusions drawn. Aristotle. Rather than using Physics 8, let us concentrate on Aristotles Metaphysics (12), his metaphysical consideration of the divine. In accord with his theory of science, Aristotle there lays out in chapters one to five the principles needed to develop the theology presented in chapters six to ten. The scientific subject under consideration is substance.2 That the existence of sensible and perishable substances is manifest is one of the proper principles of metaphysics, the kind Aristotle calls an hypothesisa fundamental proposition in a science. Aristotle focuses on the other kind of proper principle, the definitions or fundamental notions that he needs in order to prove the existence and nature of immovable substance.3 Aristotles argument for the existence of immovable substance is built around his definition of change (metabolhv): everything changes from that which is
Transcendentals: the Case of Thomas Aquinas (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1990); Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinass Natural Theology in Summa contra gentiles I (oxford and New York: Clarendon, 1997); Brian davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (oxford UK: Clarendon Press, 1992); eleanore Stump, Aquinas (London and New York: Routledge, 2003); Benedict Ashley, The Way toward Wisdom: An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Introduction to Metaphysics, Center for Thomistic Studies Series (Notre dame IN: Univ. of Notre dame Press, 2006). The influence of Aristotle and Avicenna on Aquinas: e. M. Macierowski, does God have a Quiddity According to Avicenna? Thomist 52 (1988): 7987; J. F. Wippel, The Latin Avicenna as a source for Thomas Aquinass metaphysics, Freiberger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie (1990): 5190; Rahim Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation: Avicennas and Thomas Aquinas Positions (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 79130; R. e. houser, The Real distinction and the Principles of Metaphysics: Avicenna and Aquinas in Laudemus viros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer C.S.B., ed. R.e. houser, Center for Thomistic Studies Series (Notre dame IN: Univ. of Notre dame Press, 2007), pp. 75108. 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.1 (1069a1), ed. W. d. Ross (oxford UK: oxford Univ. Press, 1958), ed. W. Jaeger (oxford UK: oxford Univ. Press,1957). hereafter Met. All translations from primary texts are my own, unless indicated otherwise. 3 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2 (72a1523), 1.10 (76b1216). An Aristotelian science consists of three main parts: subject, principles, and attributes demonstrated of the subject. There are three kinds of principles: common axioms and proper hypotheses and definitions. on Aristotelian theory of science and scientific principles, see: William A. Wallace, The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology: a Study in Methodology in St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, d.C.: Thomist Press, 1962); William A. Wallace, Causality and Scientific Explanation (Ann Arbor MI: Univ. of Michigan Press, 19721974); J. Barnes, Aristotles Posterior Analytics (oxford UK: Clarendon, 1975); Richard d. McKirahan, Principles and Proofs: Aristotles Theory of Demonstrative Science (Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992); Commentary on Aristotles Posterior Analytics, trans. Richard Berquist, dumb ox Books Series (Notre dame IN: St. Augustines Press, 2009).

ARISToTLE AND TWo MEDIEvAL ARISToTELIANS oN THE NATURE oF GoD

357

potentially to that which is actually.4 The principles presented in chapters two to five are organized around this definition. Change requires matter, in addition to form and privation, because in change matterunderstood as potencyreceives a new form of which it was heretofore deprived. For example, change from potentially white to actually white requires some matter that goes from non-white to white.5 While earthly sensible substances are generated and destroyed, their form and matter are not generated or destroyed in themselves, because they do not exist in themselves, but only as principles of beings (o[vnta). For when a man is healthy, the health also exists; and the shape of a bronze sphere exists at the same time as the bronze sphere.6 different beings have formswhether accidental forms, as here, or substantial forms. Substantial form is the primary cause of a things being. Physical things have matterthe principle of potency and changein addition to form. This means that an individual physical substance must include matter in order to exist. But what makes it actual and definite is its substantial form. Consequently, form is that in virtue of which a thing is call a this (tovde ti).7 It is the union of the substantial form, a this in the primary since, for it is the source of actuality and definiteness in things, with matter that produces an individual substance, a this in the secondary sense of a particular thing (kaq' eJkavston). For Aristotle, there are no abstract forms are individuated by matter functioning as a principle of individuation, as later Aristotelians will hold. Rather, there are three kinds of substances: matter, which is a this only in appearance...; nature [= form] which is a this and a kind of disposition toward which [motion tends]; and the third is substance composed of these, an individual, such as Socrates or Kallias.8 Substantial change also requires efficient and final causes. Therefore analogically there are three elements and four causes and principles; but the elements are different in different things, and the proximate mover is different for different things. health, disease, body; the mover is the medical art.9 Finally, the notions of act and potency are used analogously to define change and to understand the four causes. And in yet another way, analogically identical things are principles, that is, actuality and potency (ejnevrgei kai; duvnami~); but these also apply in different ways to them.10 By the end of chapter five, then, the principles for dealing with eternal substances are set in place, having been made clear from an analysis of sensible substance. Aristotle devotes chapter six to demonstrating the existence of separate or immovable substance, using a short argument that in two steps draws out implications from his definition of change. The first step concerns matter. Change requires a preexisting subject (as well as a post-existing one), because change is actualization of a
Aristotle, Met. 12.2 (1069b16). Ibid., 12.2 (1069b18). 6 Ibid., 12.3 (1070a234). 7 Aristotle, on the Soul 2.1 (412a89). 8 Aristotle, Met., 12.3 (1070a1013). Inserting lines 2021 between 10 and 11 is incorrect; it comes from following the order of Aristotles text in the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias. But the codices of Aristotle correctly put the inserted lines after l. 19. 9 Aristotle, Met. 12.4 (1070b268). Trans. Ross. 10 Ibid., 12.5 (1071a45).
4 5

358

R. E. HoUSER

potency found in something that pre-exists the change. Without that potency, change is impossible, as Parmenides well understood. It follows that sensible changing substances, whether taken individually or considered globally, can have no absolute beginning; they always come into being from something prior, whether the same or a different type of substance. The reason is that every supposed beginning would itself be achieved through a process of change that requires pre-existing matter. And they likewise cannot be annihilated, since change always produces some actual result. Consequently, there always were and always will be perishable sensible substances. In short, the physical world is eternal.11 Sensible perishable substances on earth are eternal only in their species, while the heavenly bodies are sensible substances eternal as individuals. The second step in Aristotles argument concerns the fact that change requires a cause or mover (kinou`n). An eternal physical world requires an eternal actual mover, or if there is more than one mover, an ultimate mover that is equally eternal with the effect. This is true for the physical universe conceived globally, though Aristotle was more directly concerned with the cause of each of the distinct heavenly spheres that move continuously in a circle. But to be an eternal cause, an ultimate mover cannot be in any way in potency, but must be unmoved, a principle whose very substance is actuality (hJ oujs iva ejnevrgeia).12 It follows that these substances must be without matter. We should note here that Aristotle uses the plural (substances), which he will explain later, and that since such an ultimate cause must be a substance without matter, it must be a pure form, though Aristotle does not explicitly say this here. Aristotle devotes chapters seven to ten to describing the nature of separate substance. Chapter seven describes their nature as such, and chapters eight to ten attempt to resolve three problems (ajporivai) that arise from Aristotles description. his presentation of divine nature in chapter seven reflects his search for causes, so it begins with an extrinsic description of separate substance in relation to the effects it produces. Then Aristotle adds an intrinsic definition of divine nature. Avicenna and Aquinas sharply distinguish these two halves of Aristotles thought. his extrinsic consideration begins with the eternal circular motion of the first heaven, the outermost heavenly sphere. This movement requires a mover that moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality. This description summarizes what he has gleaned about the nature of separate substance from his argument for its existence. Then he abruptly adds: And the object of desire and the object of knowledge move in this way; they move without being moved.13 Separate substance, then, does not exercise formal or efficient causality, but is a final cause and therefore a kind of good. There are sound reasons for this conclusion. Aristotle has already shown that a god cannot be a material cause, because this would involve potentiality. Were it the substantial form or soul of a heavenly sphere it would move at least per accidens, along with the motion of its sphere. If a separate substance were an
Ibid., Met. 12.6 (1071b612). Ibid., 12.6 (1071b20). 13 Ibid., 12.7 (1072a267).
11 12

ARISToTLE AND TWo MEDIEvAL ARISToTELIANS oN THE NATURE oF GoD

359

efficient cause, it could not be pure, unchanging actuality; for efficient causes, as Aristotle conceived them, are moving causes that introduce form into some other matter. Consequently, they themselves must change in exercising their actuality. So none of these three kinds of causes could move without being moved. But if separate substance is a final cause, then the first mover exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is as a good, and it is in this way a first principle.14 Aristotles second major conclusion in chapter seven is an intrinsic description that tries to get at the essential character of divine nature. A god is living, living the best life, which is that of intelligence, one wholly separate from the world of change. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy only for a short time ... since its actuality is also pleasure. ... And knowing in itself concerns that which in itself is best, and that which is knowing in the highest sense with that which is best in the highest sense. And knowing knows itself, ... so that knowledge and object of knowledge are the same.15 This second consideration of divine nature leads Aristotle to use the term god for the first time in his argument and to sum up his results this way: We say, therefore, that a god (tojn qi;on) is living, eternal, best, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to a god, for this is a god (oJ qeov~).16 Aristotle ends chapter seven by repeating that such a substance must be separate from sensible substance, with no internal parts. In the final three chapters of book twelve, Aristotle solves three problems that arise from chapter seven. Unlike Platos one good, there must be many separate substances or gods, though the number is not certain, since it depends upon the number of the heavenly spheres whose circular rotation they cause.17 In order for separate substance to be knowledge knowing itself, there must be identity of knowing substance, the act of knowing, and the object known, all of which are ontologically different in human knowers. Consequently, for the gods the normal ontological distinction between the first act of being a substance and the second act of knowing breaks down, and so do the normal distinctions among knower, his knowing, and object of knowledge.18 Finally, Aristotle clarifies how a separate substance is good.There is no separate good itself like Platos good, nor is a gods good confined to the good found in its effects, like the good found in the order of the parts. Rather, a separate substance is likely good in both ways, good as being a substance separate from the parts that make up the world, but its good causes the good found in the order of the parts. Its good, Aristotle adds, is like that of the general of an army or the freemen of a household that also includes slaves and cattle.19 Aristotle, in sum, used the philosophical principles he employs throughout his works to address the existence and nature of a god: his ten categories, four causes,
Ibid., 12.7 (1072b1112). Ibid., 12.7 (1072b1422). 16 Ibid., 12.7 (1072b2728). 17 Ibid., 12.8 (1073a134b14). 18 Ibid., 12.9 (1074b155a11). 19 Ibid., Met. 12.10 (1075a1276a7).
14 15

360

R. E. HoUSER

and the notions of being (o[n), act, and potency. his argument for the existence of a god is closely tied to the astronomical cosmology of his age. on this basis, Aristotle mounts an argument from the eternal motion of the heavenly spheres to the existence of their unmoved movers. This kind of argument shows a god to be eternal, substance, and actuality, the last point ensuring that a god is immaterial and unchanging. In causal terms, a god is a final cause, in definitional terms, a spiritual substance contemplating itself. A god is firmly contained within the category of substance, albeit the higher, immaterial kind, and so not infinitely perfect, but is limited in perfection. This is why there can be many such gods, each living a self-contained intellectual life unaware of a world that depends upon it. In short, a god is an odd sort of general, one who inspires his troops while oblivious of them. Avicenna: In his Healing, Metaphysics (Shif, Ilhiyyt), Avicenna developed his first sustained and ex professo metaphysical treatment of the existence and nature of God, one that would be translated into Latin and have a profound impact on thinkers in the Latin world from Gundissalinus onwards. In accord with the structure of an Aristotelian science, Avicenna sets out in book one the subject and principles of scientific metaphysics. The subject of divine science is being (mawjd; ens) considered in its universality.20 The common principles or axioms of metaphysics are the law of the excluded middle and the principle of non-contradiction, conceived as two sides of one and the same principle.21 Unlike Aristotle, Avicenna then set out the proper principles of metaphysics quite explicitly. Its definitions or fundamental notions are those of a being (mawjd; ens), thing (shay; res), necessary (darr; necesse) (along with possible and impossible), and finally existence (wujd; esse).22 Its two hypotheses or fundamental propositions are these: possible beings are ontological composites of thing (or quiddity or truth) and existence; existence necessary in itself is ontologically one, only existence.23 The first hypothesis assumes the existence of the sensible beings of our everyday experience, just as Aristotle had done. But Avicennas description is different from Aristotles; they are possible existence rather than sensible substance. Avicennas second hypothesis does not assume the existence of existence necessary in itselfit will be demonstrated in book eight, but it does set down certain requirements for such a being, namely, God. The conclusions drawn in metaphysics fall into two groups. In books two to seven Avicenna explains possible beings, dividing them into the quasi species of being as beingthe ten categories (books two and three)and the quasi properties of being as being, such as the one and the many, the potential and the actual, the universal and the particular, and the possible and the necessary (books four
Avicenna, The Healing, Metaphysics (Al-Shif; Al-Ilhiyt), trans. and ed. Michael e. Marmura (Provo UT: Brigham Young Univ. Press, 2005); Avicenna Latinus: Scientia divina, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain: Peeters, 1977), 1, c. 2, sec. 12 (Arabic: 10.23; Latin: 1: 13.368). hereafter, Avicenna, Met. Translations are my own. Since Aquinas read the Latin text, my translations are taken from the Latin, unless otherwise indicated. Arabic text used is the Cairo text contained in Marmura. Section numbers are Marmuras. Important technical terms are given in Arabic and Latin. 21 Ibid., 1.8, sec. 2 (Arabic: 39.6; Latin: 1: 56.7374). 22 Ibid., 1.5, sec. 1 and 9 (Arabic: 22.1112, 24.913; Latin: 1: 31.0203, 34.5435.61). 23 Ibid., 1.7, sec. 1314 (Arabic: 38.111; Latin: 1: 54.3855.55).
20

ARISToTLE AND TWo MEDIEvAL ARISToTELIANS oN THE NATURE oF GoD

361

to seven).24 In books eight to ten Avicenna turns to God, the fundamental cause of possible or created beings. Book eight considers God in himself, first his existence and then his nature; book nine looks at creatures emanating from God; and book ten considers their return to God. In the first three chapters of book eight Avicenna offers an argument for the existence of God (using his philosophical name, necessary existence) that takes off, not from Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, but from Metaphysics 2.2, where Aristotle had defended the possibility of scientific knowledge, by showing that infinite regress in any of the four lines of causality is impossible. Avicenna uses Aristotles arguments as the first half of his argument for the existence of God. Looking at each of the four lines of causality leads to the conclusion that there must be a first, that is, a cosmic first cause, standing at the head of each line of causality. In the second half of his argument, Avicenna must find unify among the firsts, either by finding one of them that is God or somehow identifying all four firsts with God. Avicenna follows the first option and, as we shall see, Aquinas the second. After establishing four firsts, Avicenna turns to the first efficient cause and simply drops from consideration the other three lines of causality. The reason that he does so is because the first efficient cause clearly must be one in number and it must be necessary existence. Now these were the two criteria for God that Avicenna had set out in the second hypothesis among his metaphysical principles. A first efficient cause is in accord with this hypothesis, whereas this fit is not so readily apparent for the other three firststhe first formal, material, and final causes. having concluded that a first efficient cause exists, since this cause fulfills the requirements for being God, that is, it is necessary existence and also one in number, Avicenna can happily conclude that his argument for the existence of a first efficient cause is nothing other than an argument for the existence of God. Avicenna then rounds out chapter three by contrasting God with creatures: It is evident that whatever is other than him, if considered in itself, is possible in its existence and therefore it is caused, and it is seen that causality without doubt terminates in him.25 The priority of God to creation is ontological, not temporal, for God is necessary existence, whereas possible beings or creatureseven perpetual beings like the intelligencesare composites of quiddity and existence. Avicenna then turned to the nature of God. And he devoted chapters four and five of book eight to developing conclusions about Gods intrinsic nature, based on his own metaphysical principles. his metaphysical hypothesis about God said two things: God, if he can be proven to exist, must be necessary existence and must be one. Avicenna had used both of these criteria to develop his argument for the existence of God. So, in accord with this approach, Avicenna treats the divine nature in chapter four by drawing out the consequences of God being necessary existence, while in chapter five he draws out the consequences of God being one.
24 Ibid., 1.2, sec. 13 (Arabic: 10.411; Latin: 1. 13.3846). on the organization of Avicennas Met., Bk. 1, and the division of the rest of the book into ontology (Bks. 27) and rational theology (Bks. 810), see R. e. houser, The Real distinction and the Principles of Metaphysics: Avicenna and Aquinas. in Laudemus viros gloriosos (2007): 75108. 25 Ibid., 8.3, sec. 56 (Arabic: 271.14272.3; Latin: 2: 395.12396.21).

362

R. E. HoUSER

Then in chapters six and seven Avicenna turns to a more Aristotelian approach, considering divine goodness and knowledge, topics Aristotle had treated. In effect, between proving Gods existence and treating Gods nature causally, in chapter four and five Avicenna inserts something quite newconsideration of Gods intrinsic nature set out, we might say, definitionally rather than causally. Avicenna begins chapter four with the description of Gods nature that comes out of his argument for Gods existence, which has shown that, under the description necessary existence, God actually exists and is one. Now one of the aspects of unity is being first. So, God is first in rank in comparison with all other things, and this in turn means that God is the cause of necessity for all other things.26 A second aspect of divine unity emerges when we look within Gods nature and see that it is completely one, purely true (aqq; vera). Now truth is but another name for quiddity or essence. So Avicennas argument for Gods existence has uncovered the language he will use to describe the divine nature: being, one, necessary, essence, and existence, the very terms he had introduced as the conceptual principles of metaphysics. Avicenna then caps off the preliminaries to his consideration of the divine nature by pointing out that there are two ways for the metaphysician to know Gods nature. even though utterly one, God still comes to be known by reference to other things, in two ways: by way of negating certain modes of being of him; and by way of his relation toward other beings. So, Avicennas intrinsic consideration of Gods essence follows the ways of negation and relation, and Thomas will follow them, as well.27 After these important preliminaries, Avicenna unrolls the nature of God by deducing a series of theses about the divine nature. In order to understand them, we must distinguish three features of any being: the individual thing or subject, such as Zayd; its essence or quiddity, such as human; and its existence, whether real or imaginary. (1) Avicennas first conclusion plays off of the fact that Zayd, when conceived as an individual subject, is not the same as his essence, because there are many individuals who have the same human essence. But God, considered as an individual subject, is one with his essence: When we say he is one in essence and is not multiple we mean that he is such [one] in his essence (f dhti-hi; in sua essentia). There is no ontological distance, then, between the individual subjectGodand his essence.28 (2) having compared God to his essence, Avicenna next compares his essence to his existence: the First has no quiddity (mhyyatu; quidditatem) other than his individual existence (al-inniyyati; anitatem). The term inniyya emphasizes individuality and can mean either individual quiddity or individual existence. But Avicenna has just identified God as individual subject with his essence, so he has
Ibid., 8.4, sec. 1 (Arabic: 273.611; Latin: 2: 397.55398.64). Ibid., 8.4, sec. 2 (Arabic: 273.1216; Latin: 2: 398.6572). In describing the way we know God, Aquinas normally refers to the three ways of dionysius (De divinis nominibus, 7.3): the ways of negation, eminence, and causality. Both eminence and causality are based upon relations between God and creatures, thereby correlating the dionysian and Avicennian ways to God. 28 Ibid., 8.4, sec. 2 (Arabic: 273.1617; Latin: 2: 398.7274): ipsum est sic [unum] in sua essentia. Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Leonine ed., 411 (ottawa oN: Collge dominicain, 1941), 1.3.3: utrum sit idem deus quod sua essentia vel natura. hereafter ST.
26 27

ARISToTLE AND TWo MEDIEvAL ARISToTELIANS oN THE NATURE oF GoD

363

already made the point that the divine essence is not plurifiable but unique. So, if the present thesis is a new claim, inniyya must mean individual existence. So taken, Avicennas second thesis advances his argument by adding that Gods essence is one with his existence.29 Taking Avicennas first two theses about the divine nature together shows the complete unity of God; for when he is considered as individual subject, God is absolutely the same as his essence, which in turn is absolutely the same as his necessary existence. The contrast with creatures could not be greater; for Zayds individuality, nature, and existence are all ontologically distinct from each other. This is why he is an individual who has a nature in common with other humans, none of whom have to exist, but all of whom are intrinsically contingent, and become necessary only when their quiddities are caused to exist. (3) Based on his first two theses, Avicenna then reflects on what we know about God. We know the nature of a creature, say, a human or some other substance through knowing its quiddity. This is different from knowing its existence, because the two are ontologically distinct features of a creature. But they are the same in God. For this reason, necessary existence is understood intellectually as necessary existence itself, because Gods essence just is necessary existence, these two features of God being absolutely identical. Indeed, their identity is what makes Gods existence necessary in the first place30 (4) From his third thesis, Avicenna then draws a negative conclusion that further contrasts God with creatures. An individual created being must be an ontological composite of quiddity and existence, a bestowed existence that makes the creature necessary in a qualified way. Avicenna describes existence and unity as occurring accidentally (yaraa li-hi; cui accidit) to the quiddity. But necessary existence cannot be the sort that involves composition, so that there is some quiddity ... such that this quiddity would have a notion other than its truth (aqqiqati-h; certitudinem eius), that is, its truth as necessary existence. In short, God cannot involve ontological composition of quiddity and existence, while every creature must involve such composition.31 To support and clarify his fourth thesis, Avicenna offers a series of dialectical arguments. Among them is one that will strike the fancy of Thomas of Aquino. It concerns the two logical possibilities for a being, unlike God, whose essence is not identical with its existence:
(11) So we say that whatever has a quiddity other than existence is caused. ... So its existence must be a concomitant. (12) Consequently, either it [existence] is a concomitant of the quiddity because it is that quiddity, or it would be a concomitant because of something else. Now the meaning of our saying concomitant is to follow existence. ... And for everything that in existence follows an existence, what it follows must exist prior
Ibid., 8.4, sec. 3 (Arabic: 274.4; Latin: 2: 398.83399.84): primum non habet quidditatem nisi anitatem. Cf. Aquinas, ST 1.3.4: utrum in deo sit idem essentia et esse. 30 Ibid., 8.4, sec. 4 (Arabic: 274.710; Latin: 2: 399.8690): dico quod necesse esse iam intelligit ipsum necesse esse. 31 Ibid., 8.4, sec. 67 (Arabic: 274.1519; Latin: 2: 399.9802). occurring accidentally is Marmuras translation of the Arabic.
29

364

R. E. HoUSER

to it. Consequently, the quiddity has to exist in itself prior to its existence; which is a contradiction. The alternative is that its existence is due to a cause. Therefore, everything that has a quiddity is caused. All the things other that necessary existence have a quiddity. And it is these quiddities that in themselves are possible in existence, existence occuring to them from outside.32

Avicennas argument, in short, is this. Apart from a being whose existence is somehow identical with its essence, there are only two possibilities: either existence flows as a property from its essence, or existence is like a predicable accident to the extent that is comes from an extrinsic cause. The first alternative is impossible because it would require that the quiddity exist before it exists, while the second alternative is not just possible, it is necessary for all creatures. For them, existence can only come from an extrinsic efficient causeGod. (5) From this argument, Avicenna immediately draws another conclusion about God: Therefore, the First has no quiddity (mhyya; quidditatem). Both of the alternatives Avicenna has considered rest on the assumption that a things quiddity is distinct from its existence. The first alternative is impossible for any kind of being, and the second is impossible for God, who cannot be caused. So Avicenna denies the initial assumption. God cannot have a quiddity distinct from his existence; so Avicenna further concludes God cannot have a quiddity at all. This strong statement does not mean that God has no essence (dht; essentia), that he is empty of intelligible content. The reason Avicenna denies quiddity to God is because, as he uses the term quiddity expresses the kind of nature that could be multiplied in more than one individual. It is this kind of plurifiable quiddity that God cannot have, because his essence is unique. To clarify his use of quiddity he adds another comparison with creatures: over those things having quiddities, existence flows from him. But he is pure existence, with the condition of negating privations and all other properties of him.33 From the fact that God does not have a plurifiable quiddity (mhyya; quidditas), several further consequences follow. (6) The First has no genus, because he has no quiddity. Should God fall under a genus, he would share that genus with other things, all of which are composites of quiddity and existence.34 (7) And the First has no differentia that would serve to distinguish him from other things under a
Ibid., 8.4, sec. 1112 (Arabic: 276.615; Latin: 2: 401.33402.47). The argument is fuller in the Arabic; the Latin translation seems to have left out sec. 10 of the Arabic text. Cf. ST 1.3.4c, first argument: Quia quidquid est in aliquo, quod est praeter essentiam eius, oportet esse causatum: vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia propria consequentia speciem, ut risiblile consequitur hominem et causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est quod esse illius rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel a principiis essentialibus eiusdem rei. Impossiblile est autem quod esse sit causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, quia nulla res sufficit ad hoc quod sit sibi causa essendi, si habeat esse causatum. oportet ergo quod illum cuius esse est aliud ab essentia sua, habeat esse causatum ab alio. hoc autem non potest dici de deo, quia deum dicimus esse primam causam efficientem. Impossiblie est ergo quod in deo sit aliud esse et aliud eius essentia. Also, De ente, c. 4. Aquinass superb interpretive skills allowed him to clarify the argument and add the examples, but the argument itself is Avicennas. 33 Ibid., 8.4, sec. 13 (Arabic: 276.1617; Latin: 2: 402.4850). 34 Ibid., 8.4, sec. 14 (Arabic: 277.4; Latin: 2: 402.61).
32

ARISToTLE AND TWo MEDIEvAL ARISToTELIANS oN THE NATURE oF GoD

365

common genus. (8) Since he has neither genus nor difference, he has no definition. (9) And lacking a definition, there is no demonstration of him, because there is no cause of him. here Avicenna is speaking of the stronger demonstration of the reasoned fact that proceeds from cause to effect; he has already used demonstration of the fact to prove Gods existence by proceeding from effect to God as cause.35 (10) Avicenna rounds out his existential consideration of Gods nature in the fourth chapter of book eight with what is perhaps his most historically significant thesis. he has an objector note that he has avoided saying God is a substance; and Avicenna answers that it is true that God is not a substance. The reason is that in his metaphysics of essence and existence, the very notion (mana; intentio) of substance has changed in an important way, one that limits substance to the realm of creatures. Where Aristotle had defined substance as being not in a subject,36 for Avicenna substance is a thing with an established quiddity, whose existence is not in a subject, for example, a body and a soul.37 The category of substance is limited to those beings composed of quiddity and existence, all of which are limited in their perfection. So, only creatures are substances. The metaphysical description of Gods nature Avicenna has set out purely in trans-categorical, that is, transcendental terms, for only such terms can describe a supremely one and necessary existence. In chapter five Avicenna goes over much of the same material as chapter four, which is why it is entitled a confirmation and recapitulation of what has previously been said.38 But there is one major difference. In his ontology of creatures, Avicenna conceives of existence and unity as correlatives, both of which are added to a possible quiddity to produce an actual being. When considering Gods nature, since he concentrated on Gods existence in chapter four, he concentrates on the feature correlative to existenceGods unityin chapter five. The chapter focuses on the fact that the divine essence cannot be multiplied in the way there can be many individual creatures having a common species, or as many species can have a common genus, or as the ten categories fall under the common notion of being. Avicenna caps off chapter five by reiterating the two ways we can attempt to understand the divine nature, the way of negation and the way of relation: after his individual existence, he is only described by negating all similarities to him and by affirming relations to him. For every thing that exists is from him, and there is nothing common between him and what is from him.39 Avicennas God, however, does have some of the kinds of features that Aristotle had attributed to a god. Avicenna lays them out in chapters six and seven of book eight. here Avicenna describes God in relation to creatures and in terms of his primary activities. First, God is perfect and more than perfect, which sets God at the top of the scale of being, a position occupied by Aristotles highest god.40
Ibid., 8.4, sec. 16 (Arabic: 1011; Latin: 2: 403.7073). Aristotle, Categories 2 (1b3), 5 (21112). 37 Avicenna, Met. 8.4, sec. 1718 (Arabic: 277.1217; Latin: 2: 403.7380): intentio eius [substantiae] est quod est res habens quidditatem stabilem, cuius esse est esse quod non est in subjecto, corpore vel anima. 38 Ibid., 8.5, title (Arabic: 278.1415; Latin 2: 405.1). 39 Ibid., 8.5, sec. 14 (Arabic: 283.23; Latin: 2: 411.4448). 40 Ibid., 8.6, sec. 1 (Arabic: 283.1014; Latin: 2: 412.5561). Cf. Aquinas, ST 1.3.7; 1.4.13.
35 36

366

R. E. HoUSER

Second, this means that God is pure good, a divine name that for Avicenna focuses on the beneficent side of goodness rather than on the desirability of goodness.41 Consequently, for Avicenna goodness connotes in the first instance God as free bestower of existence on creatures rather than God as end, which was the only way in which Aristotle had conceived of God. Third, God is Truth.42 For Avicenna, truth has an ontological sense, which is why it is a synonym for thing and quiddity. Gods quiddity is that of pure intellect.43 As such, God knows himself, as Aristotle had said. But unlike Aristotles god, Avicennas creative God knows all things through knowing himself.44 Again reflecting Aristotle, in God knower, knowing, and known are one.45 As intellect, Avicennas God knows universals, to be sure, but he also knows particulars, albeit universally. Finally, in the seventh chapter Avicenna looks at the objects of divine knowledge more carefully, in order to ensure that neither the many objects of divine knowledge nor the many divine attributes themselves introduce multiplicity into God.46 Avicenna ends book eight with a brief consideration of joy and happiness in God. Since Gods knowledge does not introduce multiplicity, the divine splendor, majesty, and glory characterize a joy and happiness that are undivided in God himself. Such an end humans can only imitate, both in the present life and in the life humans will have upon returning to God.47 Avicennas views about God do exhibit a few similarities with Aristotles. In proving the existence of God, Avicenna does follow Aristotles lead in offering a demonstration of the fact argument by reasoning from effects to cause. And in his views about the nature of God Avicenna incorporates certain Aristotelian doctrines, such as that God is unchangeable, good, a self-knower, and supremely happy. Far more striking, however, are the ways in which Avicenna goes beyond Aristotles positions, which no doubt explains why he was unwilling to fulfill al-Juzanis request for a commentary on Aristotle, but in his Healing was willing to write out his own thought for his disciple. First, Avicenna draws his conclusions from principles that are quite different from Aristotles. Second, Avicenna concludes to the existence of God as efficient cause, not as final cause. Third, Avicennas God is cause of existence, not of motion. Fourth, Avicenna develops his most important conclusions in a completely original section (chapter four and five of book eight) inserted between his argument for Gods existence and the more Aristotelian conclusions developed in chapters six and seven. Where an Aristotelian god is a separate substance, Avicennas metaphysical principles lead him to doctrines that surpass Aristotles: Gods primary name is necessary existence. God is unique, one in number, contrary to Aristotles polytheism. Finally, Gods essence is unique: God is the same as his essence; Gods essence is identical with his existence; God
Ibid., 8.6, sec. 2 (Arabic: 283.1518; Latin: 2: 412.6267). Cf. Aquinas, ST 1.6.2. Ibid., 8.6, sec. 5 (Arabic: 284.1216; Latin: 2: 413.8394). Cf. Aquinas, ST 1.16.5. 43 Ibid., 8.6, sec. 6 (Arabic: 284.17; Latin: 2: 414.95). 44 Ibid., 8.6, sec. 1516 (Arabic: 288.213; Latin: 2: 418.91419.9). 45 Ibid., 8.6, sec. 816 (Arabic 285.11288.13; Latin: 2: 415.19419.9). 46 Ibid., 8.7, sec. 114 (Arabic: 291.1297.2; Latin: 2: 422.1431.49). 47 Ibid., 8.7, sec. 1518 (Arabic: 297.3298.13; Latin: 2: 431.50433.02).
41 42

ARISToTLE AND TWo MEDIEvAL ARISToTELIANS oN THE NATURE oF GoD

367

has no quiddity; and consequently God has no genus, species, differentia, and is not a substance, through which he could be defined. Aquinas: Let us consider the first part of the Summa of Theology (written 1265 1268), rather than Summa contra gentiles (12591265) or his Scriptum in Sententiis (12521256), because this part was Thomass latest and most mature treatment of the divine nature and differs importantly from the earlier two works in the order Aquinas presents the topics involving the divine nature. Thomas conceived theology (or sacred doctrine) as an Aristotelian science in which conclusions are demonstrated from principles. From his Scriptum onward he recognized theology contains both demonstrations based on revealed principles and purely rational demonstrations. In his Scriptum he set out both explicitly. The revealed principles are the articles of faith as contained in the ancient creeds,48 while at d. 8, q. 1, a. 13 he set out his Avicennian metaphysical principles, which were also presented in his De ente. In the Summa contra gentes he did not go so far as to identify theologys revealed principles with the articles of faith, because its first three books are limited to rational arguments; but he did say that what has been passed on to us in the words of sacred Scripture may be taken, as it were, as principles.49 Concerning the rational principles that theology uses, Aquinas did not explicitly present Avicennian principles, as he had in the Scriptum; but he did note that to rationally make the divine truth known, we must proceed through demonstrative arguments,50 which depend upon principles that are naturally known. And he added that the knowledge of the principles that are known to us naturally has been implanted in us by God; for God is the author of our nature. These principles, therefore, are also contained by the divine Wisdom.51 At the outset of the Summa theologiae Aquinas explicitly sets out the proper principles of theologythe articles of faith52because he uses both rational demonstrations and arguments from revelation throughout Summa theologiae, unlike the Summa contra gentes. As in Summa contra gentes, he does not explicitly list the philosophical principles that theology uses in its rational demonstrations. But he does make extensive use of philosophical principles that he had set out in two very early works: the Avicennian metaphysical principles he had laid out in De ente and the different principles of natural science, which, though basically Aristotelian in content, he had laid out in De principiis naturae, as he knew them from the first book of Avicennas Physics. The philosophical principles he uses can be inferred from the rational demonstrations he offers.53
48 Aquinas, Scriptum in Sententiis, Bk. 1, Prol., 1.3.1c and 1.3.2 ad 2m, in Adriano oliva, Les dbuts de lenseignement de Thomas dAquin et sa conception de la Sacra doctrina: avec ldition du prologue de son commentaire des Sentences (Paris: Vrin, 2006). 49 Aquinas, SCG 4.1.10. 50 Ibid., 1.9.2. 51 Ibid., 1.7.2. 52 Aquinas, ST, 1.1.2, 3, 7. 53 Aquinas makes use of Avicennian metaphysical principles from early on in ST at 1.2.3 (second way efficient cause is cause of existence, third waypossible and necessary existence, fourth waytranscendental perfections of being), 1.3.1c (third argumentthe transcendentals), 1.3.2 (the notions of participated and essential good), 1.3.4 and 5 (the notions of essence and existence). In this way one can see that he has not changed his mind from his earlier commentary on the Sentences.

368

R. E. HoUSER

When treating the existence of God in Summa theologiae 1.2.3, Thomas employs a version of Aristotles argument from motion in his first way, but the other four ways are modeled on the first step of Avicennas argument, namely, proving that there is a cosmic first in each of the four lines of causality. But where Avicenna opted for one among the firststhe first efficient causeas cause of the other three firsts, Thomas argues in ways two through five that all four lines of Aristotelian causality lead inevitably to one and the same first causeGod. So, God is the first efficient cause giving existence to all creatures; all possible beings, both those constituted of matter and even purely spiritual creatures, require a necessary God; God is the most formally perfect being; and God is the final cause that provides governance through imparting natural ends to creatures. In both his Summa contra gentes and his Summa theologiae, after proving the existence of God Aquinas addresses the nature of God. In the Summa contra gentes his thought still reflected a more Aristotelian order in treating the divine nature. Immediately after proving Gods existence (SCG 1.13), he began his treatment of the divine nature, not as Avicenna had done, but with a section devoted to some of the same attributes with which Aristotle had begun his consideration of divine nature: God as eternal (1.15), an active power (1.16), immaterial (1.17), incomposite (1.18), and completely natural (1.19). These topics preceded the Avicennian features of divine nature (1.2127). Thomas then took up Gods perfection and goodness (1.2841), divine knowledge (1.3071), will (1.7299), and ended with divine beatitude (1.100102). In the Summa theologiae, however, Aquinas changed the order of topics significantly, and in an Avicennian direction. Intent on shining the lights of revelation and reason together on the issue of Gods nature, in Summa theologiae Thomas treats first the nature of the one God, known primarily through natural reason (ST 1.326), then turns to the Trinitarian nature of God, knowledge necessarily based on revelation (1. 2743), something he had put off to book four in Summa contra gentes. In treating the divine nature rationally Thomas follows Avicennas general plan, first treating the Avicennian features of God based on unity (ST 1.311), then treating those features of God recognized by both Aristotle and Avicenna (1.1225). The first half of this plan follows quite Avicennas order in his Metaphysics 8.47. of premier importance is that Thomas begins his treatment of Gods nature just where Avicenna had, with divine ontological simplicity; though even here he adapts Avicenna to his own way. Where the Vizier had laid out consequences deduced from Gods necessity and unity in a synthetic manner, Thomas follows Avicennas negative approach by arguing deductively, but in an empirical and analytic manner. he denies different kinds of ontological multiplicity of God, beginning with stronger senses of multiplicity (and weaker senses of unity) and proceeding gradually to lesser senses of multiplicity (and stronger senses of unity). This order is designed to force the mind of his reader to recognize that God is not multiple in even a minimal way, but completely and absolutely ontologically simple. Thomas, therefore, argues in turn: God is not a physical body whose parts are extended in space (ST 1.3.1). God is not composed of matter and form, as are all material substances (1.3.2). Conceived as an individual subject, God is same as his

ARISToTLE AND TWo MEDIEvAL ARISToTELIANS oN THE NATURE oF GoD

369

essence (1.3.3), unlike sublunar creatures, where there are many individuals of one species. Most importantly, Gods essence is identical with his existence (1.3.4) which was Avicennas premier metaphysical claim about God. Since God does not have a quiddity or essence distinct from existence, God has no genus (1.3.5). Nor does God have any accidents (1.3.6), for God is completely simple (1.3.7). Consequently, in no way does God enter into the composition of things, even though God is the direct efficient cause of the existence of all creatures (1.3.8). From his thoroughly Avicennian starting point in question three, Aquinas then develops a number of other features of Gods nature, again drawing heavily upon Avicennas Metaphysics 8.45. Since God is ontologically simple, he is most actual, and therefore most perfect. And as creator, God pre-possesses all the perfections of his creation.54 God is not just good but the highest good.55 Where Aristotles highest god was the highest good only per accidens, because the final cause of the highest sphere, Aquinass God, like Avicennas, is not the highest good for some extrinsic reason, but God alone is good through his essence, ... for whom alone essence is his existence.56 This conception of goodness as a transcendental attribute of being (ens), leads Aquinas to re-introduce a new kind of participation that makes all things good by the divine goodness. For although
it seems unreasonable to posit species of natural things subsisting separately through themselves [as Plato did and Aristotle rejected] ... still it is absolutely true that something is first which, through its own essence is a being (ens) and good, which we call God. ... Therefore, by the first, through its own essence a being and good, everything can be called good and a being, in as much as it participates in it by way of a kind of assimilation, albeit remotely and deficiently. ... Therefore, in this way everything is called good by the divine goodness, as by a first principle that is the exemplar, efficient, and final cause of all goodness.57

It also follows that God is essentially and absolutely infinite, a status that can only be true of one God and therefore is beyond Aristotles many gods, who were limited in perfection by the immaterial forms they are.58 And God is omnipresent in creatures, not as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that on which it works, for God is in all things as causing the existence (esse) of all things.59 God does this directly, a departure from Avicennas mediated creation. Moreover, God is utterly unchangeable. Aquinas offers three reasons for this conclusion, only the first of which Aristotle could (and did) accept: God is pure act, without the admixture of any potency. But Aquinas adds two more arguments. Change requires composition, but in God there is no composition, for he is altogether [ontologically] simple, a clear reference back to his Avicennian explanation
Aquinas, ST 1.4.1. Ibid., 1.6.2. 56 Ibid., 1.6.3c. 57 Ibid., 1.6.4c. 58 Ibid., 1.7.2c. 59 Ibid., 1.8.1c and ad 1m.
54 55

370

R. E. HoUSER

of divine simplicity in the third question. Also, since God is infiniteanother nonAristotelian thesisit would be impossible for him to acquire a new perfection through change, indeed, impossible to change at all.60 God is also truly eternal, he does not merely persist through all time, as Aristotle thought.61 Finally, Aquinas completes the circle of his reasoning by returning to where it began. To his earlier consideration of divine simplicity, Aquinas now makes clear that in addition to true and good, since one is also a transcendental attribute of being (ens), God must be one to the highest degree, as he is being, true, and good to the highest degree. Aquinas offers three reasons for Gods unity, which stand as a kind of coda for the Avicennian section of his treatment of Gods nature. God is one, first, from his simplicity, second, from the infinity of his perfection, and finally, from the unity of the world that is bestowed by the first, which is completely perfect and through itself, not through another.62 None of these reasons could Aristotle have accepted in the way in which Thomas explains them, because he had borrowed all of them from Avicenna. After his consideration of what pertains to the divine substance, that is, Gods nature considered intrinsically, Thomas next turns to divine operation (1.1226), which explains Gods nature extrinsically through his relation to creatures, the second of Avicennas two modes of knowing the divine nature. Thomass prologue to this next section (1.1213) covers our human knowledge of God and sets appropriate limits on what we can know with unaided human reason about Gods nature. Then he considers a series of topics that both Aristotle and Avicenna had treated. here Avicenna had not struck out completely on his own, but had radically emended the thought of Aristotle; and Thomas again follows his lead. The first operation that Thomas considers is Gods knowledge. Aristotle had said that the object of divine knowledge is a god himself, so that knower, knowing, and object known are one. Avicenna had adopted this Aristotelian and later neoplatonic model, and Thomas follows him. But Aristotle had concluded that a god knows only himself, nothing else. Avicenna had said that God knows all of creation in knowing himself, but indirectly, since in knowing himself God knows creatures only by way of knowing their causes. Thomas develops this line of reasoning further. In knowing himself, God directly knows all creation. The reason is that if Gods knowledge is completely perfect, he must know not only himself but all the consequences that follow from himself as the first efficient cause of all things. But unlike Avicennas God, whose creative act is mediated by intervening creative causes, Thomas says God is the direct creative cause of each and every creature. So, God must know directly each and every creature he creates. And this conclusion appears still more plainly if we add that the very existence of the first efficient cause, that is, God, is his own act of understanding, an argument based on Aquinass Avicennian doctrine of existence (esse), as outlined earlier in the third question. The ontological identity of God with his act of understanding and with himself as object of understanding
Ibid., 1.9.1. Ibid., 1.10.12. 62 Ibid., 1.11.3.
60 61

ARISToTLE AND TWo MEDIEvAL ARISToTELIANS oN THE NATURE oF GoD

371

does not prevent Thomas from saying that there are many divine ideas. For the divine ideas function in Gods productive knowledge as creator, not in the speculative order; so their multiplicity derives from the multiplicity of things he knows and creates. For the divine ideas are multiple, then, not as they are Gods internal means of understanding, but as they are the many objects God knows. Therefore, in so far as God knows his own essence as imitable by some kind of creature, he knows it as the proper type and idea of that creature; and the same is true for other creatures. And in this way it is clear that God understands many proper types of many things, which are the many ideas.63 After treating divine knowledge Thomas turns to the allied topics of truth and falsity (1.1617). While Aristotle recognized only the epistemological truth that is present in a knowing mind, Avicenna had added an ontological sense of truth, one that follows on being, as does goodness, and is the foundation of epistemological truth. Aquinas recognizes both senses of truth:
As good is in a thing so far as the thing is ordered to the appetite, for this reason the aspect of goodness also passes over from the thing desired to the desire itself, so far as the appetite is called good to the extent it is of the good; so likewise, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is in conformity to the thing understood, it is necessary that the aspect of the true pass over from the intellect to the thing understood, so that the thing understood is also called true, so far as it has some order to the intellect.64

Just as epistemological truth is found in Gods mind as perfect knower, so also the ontological sense of truth is found in God himself as the perfect being. here Aquinass main focus is to develop his account of the ontological sense of truth, to complement the transcendentals being (ens), one, and good he had already introduced. The transcendentals he drew from Avicenna, by way of Philip the Chancellor and Albert, are exceedingly important for his rational theology, for unlike categorical terms they do not intrinsically imply imperfection, and therefore are most appropriate for describing God scientifically rather than metaphorically. After considering the things belonging to divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will,65 since willing is the desiderative operation that accompanies intellectual knowledge. Thomass account of Gods will is modeled on his Avicennian account of Gods understanding, where in knowing himself God also knows his creatures. Likewise, God wills both himself and other things, but himself as the end, other things as ordered to the end, in so far as it befits the divine goodness that other things also participate in it.66 For this reason, Gods will is totally unconditioned by anything else. Consequently, it is necessary to say that the will of God is the cause of things, and that God acts by will, not by a necessity of nature, as some have supposed.67
Ibid., 1.15.2c. Ibid., 1.16.1c. 65 Ibid., 1.19.prologue. 66 Ibid., 1.19.3c. 67 Ibid., 1.19.1c.
63 64

372

R. E. HoUSER

Thomas ends his consideration of Gods operations with divine love, justice, mercy, and providence (1.2024). Arguing empirically from the human case, Aquinas notes that in the appetitive part of the soul there are found in us both passions of the soul, such as joy, love, and things of this sort, and habits of the moral virtues, such as justice, courage, and the like.68 Consequently, there must be something in God akin to the passions and virtues in humans. The analogue of passion in God is love: it is necessary to posit love in God, for the first movement of the will and of every appetitive power is love.69 If God loves because all willing involves love, then all divine actions in relation to his creation involve the virtues of justice and mercy. Aquinas summarizes:
Communicating perfections considered absolutely pertains to goodness...; but so far as perfections are given to things by God based on proportion among them, this pertains to justice...; but as God does not bestow perfections on things for his own use but only based on his own goodness, this pertains to liberality; and so far as the perfections given to things by God expel every defect, this pertains to mercy.70

After considering Gods acts of intellect and will separately, Aquinas then brings them together in considering Gods providence in relation to all things, and predestination and reprobation and their consequences, in relation to humans.71 Aquinas had ended his treatment of the divine substance in itself (1.311) by returning to where it had begunwith Gods ontological simplicity. In a similar way Thomas completes the circle of Gods intellectual and voluntary operations by turning to their sourceGods powerand their resultGods happiness (beatitudo). About Gods power, Aquinas focuses on his power in relation to other thingshis creative power. Gods power is active, not passive, and his power is infinite. This makes God omnipotent, but we must understand this term rightly. If one considers the issue correctly, since power is said in relation to things that are possible, when God is said to be able to do all things, nothing else is correctly understood than that he is able to do all possible things, and for this reason is called omnipotent.72 Finally, Thomas ends his treatment of Gods nature with divine beatitude. he takes off from the traditional Boethian definition of happinessa state perfected by the aggregation of all goods. As usual, this definition, which Boethius had devised with an eye to human happiness,73 has to be altered analogically when applied to God: Aggregation of goods is in God, not in the manner of composition but in the manner of simplicity; because things that in creatures are multiplied in God pre-exist in a manner that is simple and unified.74 With this backward reference to divine simplicity and unity (1.3 and 11), Thomas completes the circle of his treatment of Gods nature. Though his consideration was initially inspired by Aristotle, to be
Ibid., 1.20.prologue. Ibid., 1.20.1c. 70 Ibid., 1.21.3c. 71 Ibid., 1.2224. 72 Ibid., 1.25.3c. 73 Boethius, Consolatio, 3 prose 2. 74 Aquinas, ST 1.26.1 ad 1m.
68 69

ARISToTLE AND TWo MEDIEvAL ARISToTELIANS oN THE NATURE oF GoD

373

sure, to Thomass mind the topics he treated and the conclusions he drew had been much more developed by Avicenna, using his metaphysics of the transcendentals, being, and essence and existence. And it was upon by the Persian, much more than the Greek, that he was guided. Close comparison of Aristotle, Avicenna, and Aquinas does reveal philosophical development in several aspects of their doctrines of divine nature. Principles: The demonstrative principles that they use clearly separate Aristotle from these two medieval Peripatetics. The Philosopher used the same principles throughout his theoretical philosophyhis ten categories, four causes, and the notions of being, potency, and act. This is why he famously said that unless separate substance can be proven to exist, there will be no difference between physics and metaphysics.75 Since they have the same principles, they differ in their subjects or not at all. Avicenna clearly distinguished the principles of physics,76 which are the same as Aristotles philosophical principles, from the principles of metaphysics. Aquinas used both the Aristotelian principles of natural philosophy and the Avicennian principles of metaphysics in all his theological writings. About the nature of God in the Summa theologiae, he depends more on Avicennian metaphysical principles, because metaphysics, as the highest human science, is closest to sacred doctrine.77 Existence of God: Aristotles argument from motion presupposed the eternity of the physical universe and led to a multiplicity of unmoved movers, defined philosophically as separate substances and religiously as gods. Avicenna accepted Aristotles eternal universe, but his properly metaphysical argument first proceeded along all four lines of causality, then were narrowed down to efficient causality, where efficient cause means cause of existence, not moving cause.78 Finally, Aquinas combined Aristotles argument from motion with Avicennas argument from the four lines of causality to create his five ways. his argument from motion no longer depended upon the eternity of the world. And he developed Avicennas multi-causal approach into four separate arguments, each proceeding causally all the way to God. order: The order of topics our three philosophers follow in treating divine nature reveals another philosophical progression. For Aristotle, a god is a separate substance, eternal, purely in act, and therefore a final cause. In its intrinsic nature, a god is a spiritual and intellectual substance that knows itself. Avicenna saw clearly that Aristotles description of divine nature was poorly organized, reflecting how little Aristotle had understood God is the one transcendent creator of the world. So after concluding that God exists, and before turning to Gods activity of knowing, Avicenna inserted a new, metaphysical description of Gods intrinsic nature as necessary existence and one. once Thomas finally broke out of the scholastic order of Peter Lombard and the Aristotelian order of his own Summa contra gentes, in the Summa theologiae he followed Avicenna, his intrinsic treatment of divine nature
Aristotle, Met., 6.1 (1026a2733). See Avicenna, Healing, Physics 1 (Shifa, Al-Tabiiyyat 1; Liber primus naturalium). 77 See Aquinas, Super Boethium de trinitate, q. 5, art. 4. 78 Avicenna, Met., 6.1, sec.2.
75 76

374

R. E. HoUSER

beginning with divine simplicity, and culminating in divine unity (1.11). only then did he turn to the traditional Aristotelian topics included under divine operations. Divine Nature: In describing a gods intrinsic nature, Aristotle developed a view he thought superior to Platos conception of a single good that was beyond being and therefore not itself a person, knower, or god. Aristotle said the highest things were personal gods and the highest of beings (o[nta), immaterial substances (oujs ivai). This is how they would be exemplars of the delphic injunction to know thyself. For Avicenna, God is one means not only that there is but one God, contrary to polytheists, but also that God is intrinsically ontologically simple necessary existence (al-wjib al-wujd; necesse esse), and only that. on Avicennas authority, Aquinas dropped the term necessary as un-necessary; so God became for him existence (esse) or existence itself (ipsum esse) or, most accurately put, subsistent existence itself (ipsum esse subsistens). This is a progression in the conception of the divine nature of central importance to philosophy and theology. Divine Causality: For Aristotle, a god could be only one kind of cause, a final cause. A separate substance cannot be the internal matter or form of something, nor can it be an efficient cause, since all efficient causes are changed in exercising their causality; or so Aristotle thought. A god can also indirectly cause other things, by way of a mediated finality. Within the human realm, a god can provide political leaders with a remote model for their practical and political life devoted to attaining a second class happiness, while for the few philosophers a god can provide a model for the happiness that comes from living the highest intellectual life. For Avicenna, God is above all the first efficient cause: the direct cause of the highest angel or intelligence, and the ultimate cause of the existence of all creatures, through his doctrine of mediated creation. God is efficient cause, but also the ultimate final cause, for a creator God is the ultimate, if never directly attained, end of all creatures. For humans, their direct and ultimate end is union with the tenth or agent intelligence who, as giver of forms, also bestows their formal quiddity on all things in the sublunar world. For Aquinas, God is the direct and proximate efficient cause of the existence of all creatures. But to be so, God must also be their ultimate formal and final cause. As creator, he directly bestows existence on each and every creature. So he must contain within himself all perfections of creatures, though in a higher mode than found in creatures; and he must himself be the ultimate end of all creation, in order that creatures exhibit action toward their respective ends. And especially God must be the directly attainable final end for humans, whose intellectuality makes it possible for them to see God face to face. Divine Knowledge: These three different accounts of divine causality, each of which built on the previous one, are directly connected with three different accounts of Gods knowledge. For Aristotle, a god knows only himself. Avicennas great breakthrough was to see that if God does know himself, as the object of his own knowledge God must also know the created consequences of his knowledge. his explanation was to say that God, like all intelligences, knows universally, and he likened God to a human astronomer: if [he] were to know all the heavenly

ARISToTLE AND TWo MEDIEvAL ARISToTELIANS oN THE NATURE oF GoD

375

movements, he would then know every eclipse and every particular conjunction and disjunction in its concrete existence, but in a universal way.79 Aquinas accepted Avicennas conclusionthrough knowing himself God knows all things, down to the particularsbut he reversed Avicennas emphasis, by comparing God as governor of all things to a human governor. The human governor knows what he should do universally but must apply his knowledge to particulars through prudence, which is why he often makes mistakes. But God never makes mistakes, because he knows each and every part of his creation in its all particularityhis creative knowledge in itself is practical and prudent.80 So, God can manage all the details, while a king or general can know only the big picture and always lacks important details. Divine will: Since the very notion of the will, as opposed to desire, was not well developed by Aristotle or any Greek philosopher, the Philosopher was content to posit an all-purpose appetite (o[rexi~) that can be joined to any sort of cognition. Thus he reduced divine will to divine intellect and did not take up the divine will as a distinct topic. even though Avicennas God was a creator and his religion was called islamsubmission to the divine willhis philosophical account of the will did not progress much beyond Aristotle. So he said, the will of the necessary existence does not differ in essence from his knowledge, nor does it differ in meaning from his knowledge.81 on this crucial point, Aquinas followed the lead of Augustine and John damascene more than Aristotle and Avicenna. he resolutely refused to reduce the human will to the intellect: in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensitive being there is animal appetite. Therefore, there must be will in God, since there is intellect in him.82 For Aquinas, then, Gods will does not differ in essence from his knowledgeconsequently, as his intellect is his own existence, so is his willbut it does differ in meaning. So the God who is ontologically simple is also a freely creating and redeeming God. From the time he wrote his commentary on the Sentences through writing the Summa of Theology, Thomas of Aquino recognized how far beyond Aristotles was the rational theology of Avicenna. Not content just to repeat Avicenna, he improved upon him. he simplified Avicennas often convoluted thought and language, and he further developed Avicennas content and order. Aquinass determination to show his colleagues and confreres that Aristotles thought could be interpreted in a way compatible with Christianity in no way undermined the ongoing influence of Avicenna on his thought. In metaphysics, the way that Aristotles thought could be shown compatible with Christianity was to take a resolutely Avicennian interpretation of Aristotle, not an Averroistic one. This is shown in his treatment of the divine nature in Summa theologiae 1.226, which opens the mind of the metaphysical theologian to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, at Summa theologiae 1.2743. In these texts, there is no doubt that Thomas offered his own considered thought on a topic at the center of his teaching, his knowledge, and his life.
Avicenna, Met. 8.6, sec. 18. Aquinas, ST 1.14.11c and ad 1m. 81 Avicenna, Met. 8.7, sec. 12. 82 Aquinas, ST 1.19.1c.
79 80