R 011720Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4577 S E C R E T BOGOTA 003814 SUBJECT: COLOMBIA SECURITY UPDATE - Q1'06 Classified

By: William B. Wood, AMB For reasons 1.4(a), (b), (d) ------SUMMARY ------1. (C) This quarterly review of the security outlook in Colombia considers Plan Patriota, FARC, ELN, and paramilitaries. The first quarter of 2006 was dominated by FARC pre-election actions and by large paramilitary demobilizations. Near the end of President Uribe's first term, his security initiatives on multiple fronts are in progress, showing substantial results but also raising new challenges to push them through to completion. Henceforth Plan Patriota gets harder, the COLMIL must get tougher and smarter, and thousands of exparamilitaries must be reinserted into lawful society.

-----------------------PLAN PATRIOTA - Phase 2B -----------------------2. (C) Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-O) continues its efforts to retake FARC strongholds in the rural south. Sustained military pressure has been focused since 2004 on the guerillas' former safe haven (despeje). By most indicators, the FARC is on the strategic defensive - with a shrunken sphere of control and constrained mobility. FARC columns are now compelled to be more regularly on the move in remote terrain, suffering more sickness and disease, with more difficult access to supply routes, and in more limited contact with ideological leadership. Financially, too, Farclandia's golden age may be over due to disruption of local narco-economies. Morale in ranks is said to be low, not fully reflected by deserters (1,135 in 2005) because desertion is punished by death. Under pressure to defend its core territories and coca assets, the FARC has engaged with JTF-O out of necessity rather than by choice, without holding the strategic initiative. JTF-O reports improved casualty ratios: 598 FARC killed/captured against 25 COLAR soldiers killed in 2005, compared to 481 FARC killed/captured and 67 COLAR troops killed in 2004. 3. (C) Offensive actions by the FARC have been more limited, with a predominance of political or economic rather than military attacks. Typical targets are unarmed civilians (including town councilmen and mayors as well as the general public) or isolated infrastructure, wreaking terror

and damage to give the impression especially to the media of offensive capability. The FARC's handful of attacks on government security forces have in several cases inflicted high tolls in military and police casualties, most notably in the coca fields of Meta Department (detailed below). These attacks, however, have been opportunistic and sporadic, targeted at isolated and vulnerable government units caught off guard. In no case has the FARC recently met the COLAR head-on in a frontal assault on a COLAR position. 4. (S) The most important contrary indicator to a defensive FARC posture is the new accumulation of substantial guerilla forces in a more exposed location poised for offensive operation. In the last few months the FARC are reported to have concentrated on the Sumapaz plateau, a key entry corridor to Cundinamarca Department and gateway to Bogota. Such a move is difficult to reconcile with intelligence indicators that the FARC considers itself to be at the weakest moment in its history. While the insurgency maintains a long-term strategic goal of taking the capital, a broad attack now is extremely unlikely. Concentration at Sumapaz is more likely short-term preparation for more limited pre-election operations or counterattacks on JTF-O. In either case it indicates a hybrid posture: primarily defensive of threatened core territory, making mostly limited risk-averse offensive attacks -- but possibly now preparing for more assertive action against Bogota or against the COLAR in Meta in the run-up to presidential elections.

5. (C) The FARC's strategic stance varies by location, with multiple geographic and functional centers. The FARC's central fronts protect the guerillas' historical heartland and economic base of coca cultivation; the south is important for coca supply and access to the Ecuadorian border; northern blocks function as cartels in narcotics sales and weapons procurement; and cross-border territory in Venezuela serves as a rear guard and safe haven. This configuration of multiple centers of gravity throws into question JTF-O's narrow focus on Meta, perhaps months past its prime utility in signaling an end to the safe haven, and after the FARC had already shifted its weight northward. The newly appointed JTF-O Commander Gilberto Rocha has reportedly recently rebalanced the effort. 6. (C) Looking ahead, Plan Patriota Phase 2B is progressing but will be increasingly tough to close. JTF-O has yet to meet its primary strategic goal to kill or capture high value targets from among senior most FARC leadership. The FARC is highly adaptive to new tactics and terrains, an important advantage as they retreat into more difficult and remote locations. The guerillas can operate nimbly in small mobile columns, invisibly in dense jungle, and silently with good discipline in communications. This compares with the COLAR operating at battalion/brigade scale for the safety of its troops and from the habits of its training, slow to react to real-time intelligence of enemy movements, and lax in keeping its attack plans quiet. Moreover, the FARC always retains the option to 'go to ground,' fading under cover until COLAR withdraws.

7. (C) For the COLMIL, the desired end state of the conflict is its diminution from a problem of national security to one of public security, i.e. from a unified terrorist insurgency to fragmented criminality, perhaps after a negotiated settlement has dismantled major organizational structures. To that end, the COLMIL's goal is to strike a series of decisive blows to splinter the leadership. Strikes against high value targets (HVTs) would be required to cut broadly across the Secretariat and into the next level down of the command structure, since the FARC's talent is deep enough to refill the top ranks. Since 2004 the HVT effort has been costly and without result. While the pursuit has presumably diverted some FARC resources and disrupted some of their operations, the impact is difficult to quantify in cost/benefit terms. New COLAR Commander General Montoya is emphasizing attrition through a push for kills and captures from throughout the FARC hierarchy, without yet diminishing the HVT effort. --------------------------------FARC Resistance in Coca Territory --------------------------------8. (U) The year opened under the pall of the deadliest guerilla attack since the inception of Plan Patriota: on December 27 the FARC ambushed and killed 29 soldiers guarding coca eradication workers in Meta Department. This incident caused President Uribe to mount a massive operation of manual coca eradication in the Macarena National

Park, with heavy police and COLMIL security. After guerillas killed twelve police officers in the area within two weeks, the GOC made the decision to bomb the FARC inside the park. Despite an increase in police protection to 1500 officers guarding 600-900 civilians, over half of the eradicators quit under threat of ambushes, snipers, and coca bushes boobytrapped with explosive mines. Meanwhile in Tolima Department, as COLAR went on a similar offensive to reclaim rebel territory, nine soldiers and 35 guerillas were killed in heavy clashes. 9. (C) Taking the fight directly to the FARC, the military and public security forces will suffer more casualties. The death toll among security forces in Meta and Tolima is an indicator of Plan Patriota's progress, its penetration deeper into FARC heartland, and its direct assault on the guerillas' livelihood. In the Macarena case COLMIL admits that the unit had not observed all standard operational precautions and had made itself vulnerable to attack. Each phase of the Plan threatens the FARC more closely and will draw accordingly more resistance. Among the FARC's weapons of choice are an increasing usage of land mines to protect coca fields: Colombia now leads the world in land mine casualties, with 1,077 deaths and injuries reported in 2005. -------------------------------------------FARC Actions to Discredit Uribe in Elections -------------------------------------------10. (U) Further FARC attacks occurred in the weeks

prior to the March 12 legislative elections. These included the killing of nine civilians whose bus was torched after being separated from an Army escort in Caqueta Department, where the FARC had imposed a travel ban. Two days later gunmen opened fire at a municipal council meeting in Huila, killing nine councilors who had been under explicit FARC threat for several years. In the departments of Putumayo and Caqueta the FARC hit oil wells and electrical towers, spilling thousands of liters of crude oil and leaving some 400,000 citizens powerless for several days. FARC-mandated work and transport strikes, called 'paros armados,' brought commerce and movement to a standstill in several rural communities. In some FARC strongholds, the population was sufficiently threatened against voting that the GOC was obliged to suspend marking voters' fingers with indelible black ink. 11. (C) According to communiqus from FARC leaders, these attacks aimed to discredit President Uribe's "Democratic Security" program in the lead-up to elections. However, most attacks were small-scale and opportunistic, in isolated locations, not a concerted and sustained show of substantial force. On election day itself the FARC's actions were anemic. Some argue that this was a matter of risk aversion in the face of 200,000 security personnel deployed by the GOC on election day; they suggest that the FARC may be biding its time, saving its thunder for presidential elections in May. Others believe the FARC is incapable of mounting the attacks it threatened. Presidential election day and inauguration day will be further tests.

-----------------------------FARC Intransigence on Hostages -----------------------------12. (C) In December 2005 a newly-formed international commission comprised of individuals from France, Spain, and Switzerland called for the creation of a 'security zone' to discuss a humanitarian exchange of FARC-held hostages for jailed guerillas. The GOC quickly accepted the plan, despite the fact that such a zone is a concession the Uribe government had vowed never to make. A few weeks later the FARC refused. Supreme Leader alias "Tirofijo" tried to claim the FARC never received the proposal at all. A French attempt to negotiate for hostage Ingrid Betancourt also failed, despite a visit to Colombia by the French Foreign Minister. 13. (S) In this electoral season the FARC is making no concessions that could be parlayed into positive publicity for Uribe. Tirofijo has stated that no humanitarian exchanges will occur under an Uribe administration. By contrast, the guerillas offered to release two police officers into the custody of presidential candidate Alvaro Leyva with ample press in tow. Uribe charged the FARC with playing politics with the hostages' lives. The two police were released to the Red Cross (ICRC) the next week, absent Leyva. ----------------------ELN: Days Are Numbered? -----------------------

14. (C) The ELN is in a tough spot, under pressure from multiple quarters. Its Marxist ideology is dated, popular support has nearly evaporated even in traditional ELN strongholds, it lacks financial resources, its numbers are down from even a few years ago, and it faces a stronger COLAR. Its relationship with the FARC is bipolar: in the west of Colombia the two rebel armies share co-located camps, cross-training, and joint operations; whereas in eastern and central areas the FARC is reportedly plotting to wipe out the ELN in the next few months, partly as punishment for the perceived 'treason' of peace talks. With all of these forces bearing on it, the ELN could be approaching its demise as an effective guerilla movement along multiple tracks perhaps some members to demobilize, others to splinter off and join the FARC, and still others to be destroyed and supplanted by the FARC. -----------------------------------Paramilitaries: Risks and Challenges -----------------------------------15. (C) The first phase of paramilitary demobilization was completed this quarter, when the last of 33 AUC blocs ceremonially surrendered its arms to the Peace Commissioner. All signatories to the Ralito Accord of 2003 have now been brought in from the field, amounting to over 28,000 AUC demobilized. While a few more non-aligned armed groups may also join in, essentially this phase is done. To date the significant achievement is the

thorough registration of former fighters, with their government identity cards, headshot photographs, fingerprints, and in some cases DNA captured in a database. This registration is a unique innovation of Colombia's peace process, aimed to act as a barrier to recidivism. 16. (C) At the end of the disarmament phase, concerns have emerged about inherent risks of recidivism and criminality in the reinsertion of ex-paramilitary into mainstream society. An OAS report claims to have verified the regrouping of subsets of ex-paramilitaries, in some cases uniformed and equipped exactly as before. The OAS cites reactivation of three AUC blocs and gang trends in five departments. Complaints have surfaced of kidnapping, murders, and extortion among ex-AUC. Narcotrafficking is an immediate lure. WOOD (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of