CONTENTS

FOREWORD PART I: INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION Giuseppe Caforio and Gerhard Ku mmel PART II: CONFLICT RESOLUTION MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND DEVELOPMENT Manas Chatterji TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: BASIC LINES Jaime Garca Covarrubias THROUGH LITTLE STEPS y: INFORMAL NETWORKS IN PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION Bandana Purkayastha PART III: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS INTRODUCTION Giuseppe Caforio xi

53

63

79

vi

CONTENTS

CIVIL-MILITARY GAP ISSUES AND DILEMMAS: A SHORT REVIEW Maja Garb CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF CIVILMILITARY RELATIONS IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: THE CASE OF BULGARIA Yantsislav Yanakiev THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PARENT SOCIETY: THE GERMAN CASE Sabine Collmer THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND ITS PARENT SOCIETY IN ITALY Giuseppe Caforio THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PARENT SOCIETY IN ROMANIA Marian Zulean THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PARENT SOCIETY IN SLOVENIA ic Maja Garb and Ljubica Jelus THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PARENT SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA Lindy Heinecken and Richard Gueli SPAIN: AN EQUATION WITH DIFFICULT SOLUTIONS Rafael Martnez and Antonio M. Daz

83

93

115

127

151

171

193

213

Contents

vii

IS THERE A CULTURAL GAP IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SWEDEN? Alise Weibull IS THERE A CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PARENT SOCIETY? AN ANALYSIS OF SWITZERLAND Tibor Szvircsev Tresch, Dominik Allenspach, Michael Born and Karl W. Haltiner PART IV: WOMEN, CONFLICT AND THE MILITARY WOMEN IN AN INSECURE WORLD Marie Vlachova RAPE IN WAR: REALITIES AND REMEDIES June A. Willenz CHALLENGING PSYCHOSOCIAL RESPONSES TO FEMALE CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT Pamela Bell INTEGRATING THE OTHER: THE BUNDESWEHR AND WOMEN SOLDIERS Gerhard Ku mmel FACTORS THAT LIMIT THE TRUE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN AT MILITARY ACADEMIES Heidi L. Smith and Christopher J. Luedtke

249

265

299

313

331

343

369

viii

CONTENTS

PART V: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE MILITARY CARING LEADERSHIP: PREPARING LEADERS TO CARE FOR SOLDIERS AND FAMILIES Todd Woodruff MULTINATIONALITY AS A CHALLENGE FOR ARMED FORCES Paul Klein and Karl W. Haltiner TOTAL FORCE IN IRAQ: A FAILURE OF POLICY OR IMPLEMENTATION? Roger Thompson KOREAN RESERVE FORCES: THEIR MISSION RECONSIDERED Doo-Seung Hong DEFENCE TRANSFORMATION AS A LATIN AMERICAN PHENOMENON Jaime Garcia Covarrubias PART VI: MOTIVATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS WHO WANTS TO GO AGAIN? MOTIVATION OF GERMAN SOLDIERS FOR AND DURING PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS Maren Tomforde and Jo Keller rg

393

403

415

425

431

443

Contents

ix

MOTIVATION AND JOB SATISFACTION OF SLOVENIAN SOLDIERS AND POLICEMEN IN PEACE OPERATIONS ic Ljubica Jelus and Maja Garb MOTIVATION AND MISSION SATISFACTION IN THE 5TH SWISSCOY CONTINGENT Jonathan Bennett, Rolf P. Boesch and Karl W. Haltiner PART VII: MILITARY UNIONISM INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION IN THE BRITISH ARMY: HAS THE TIME FINALLY ARRIVED? Richard Bartle FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE CANADIAN FORCES: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE TRENDS Kelly Farley, Rick Walker, Harry Bondy and Dan Mendoza MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE TURN FROM CONSCRIPTION TO PROFESSIONAL FORMAT Eraldo Olivetta SOUTH AFRICA: TEN YEARS OF MILITARY UNIONISM Lindy Heinecken

457

467

481

497

519

527

PART VIII: THE TURKISH MILITARY IN TRANSITION INTRODUCTION lu A. Kadir Varog

553

CONTENTS

THE TURKISH MILITARY ETHOS AND ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH THE NATIONAL TURKISH CULTURE lu, r A. Kadir Varog Unsal Sg and Erbil Isn OPINIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS ON DEMOCRACY AND INTERVENTIONS OF THE MILITARY IN TURKEY Bahattin Aksit, Ayse Serdar and Bahar Tabakoglu THE TURKISH MILITARY ACADEMY FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE Ceyda Kuloglu A UN TYPE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: DILEMMAS OF MILITARY OBSERVER MISSIONS IN THE EXAMPLE OF UNOMIG Mesut Uyar

557

565

575

583

A UN TYPE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: DILEMMAS OF MILITARY OBSERVER MISSIONS IN THE EXAMPLE OF UNOMIG
Mesut Uyar
1. INTRODUCTION
Peace support operations and the role of the United Nations is getting important in changing the global power system. But generally peace support missions are creating new problems while trying to solve the original ones. In this presentation I will try to examine the relative effectiveness of the UN in the military observer missions, which is the most common type of UN peace support operations. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) is used to show their relative effectiveness in the current world system by means of differentiating the problems they are facing. After showing the common problems, I will give special emphasis to the genuine problems of UNOMIG. First of all we have to take a brief look at the origins of military observer missions. During the long Cold War, the UN had to engage in conict resolution/management in a world widely divided between two superpowers. The Security Council (SC) suffered lots of problems to handle conicts without jeopardising the interests of the superpowers. So in most of the cases (except Korea and Congo) the SC did not
Military Missions and their Implications Reconsidered: The Aftermath of September 11th Contributions to Conict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 2, 583594 Copyright r 2005 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1016/S1572-8323(05)02037-0

583

584

MESUT UYAR

authorise the necessary military forces to the conict areas. Instead the SC preferred to send interpositional forces with light arms or military observers without arms after getting the consent of the conicting parties. Currently we are calling this approach traditional peacekeeping. By experiences gained on the ground and in the SC it was understood that the best and easiest reaction is establishing a UN military observer mission (UNMOM) (Mackinlay, 1996, pp. 911; British Army, 1995, pp. 12/27). According to this limited and conservative logic this process must follow standard steps: First an armed conict between two states; second a stalemate that nobody is able to defeat the other side completely; third conicting states ask the UN to enforce a ceasere; fourth the SC authorises neutral military observers to monitor a ceasere and to achieve some other limited objectives, according their mandate; fth conicting states try to reach a peaceful solution by diplomatic negotiations with the help of the UN; sixth agreement is reached and end of UNMOM. In short, the duty of the military observers is to monitor the ceasere and the restrictions agreed to by both parties in a geographically limited area for a limited time. But in reality, diplomatic negotiations often do not provide fast and lasting solutions. UNMOMs have remained and temporary missions turned into permanent ones. The answer to the question why is that they are economically cheap operations and politically easier to maintain than to remove. Most of the UNMOMs that were established in different continents are still going on without an end in sight (Brahimi et al., 2000, p. 3).

2. THE FOUNDATION OF UNOMIG

The disintegration of the Soviet Union was painful and bloody, particularly in newly independent Georgia. The legacy of history, Soviet ethnic policies and conicting interests created a suitable atmosphere for civil wars in Georgia. Initial troubles began in South Ossetia and later in Abkhazia. Numerous attempts to solve the real and imaginary problems failed. The actual ghting was begun after the entrance of the Georgian National Guard in Abkhazia on 14 August 1992. Georgian forces easily captured the capital city Sukhumi and most of Abkhazia. Abkhazs managed to stop the Georgian advance further north. The ghting between ill-trained and hastily formed units was immediately turned to ruthless inter-communal ghting. The SC members were reluctant to deal with the issue as Georgia was seen as an area of Russian inuence. Russia took the lead and brokered an agreement between Georgians and Abkhazs on 3 September 1992. But both

A UN Type Conict Management

585

sides violated this agreement and others that followed. Abkhaz forces reinforced with alleged volunteers from Russia and heavy weapons from Russian stocks launched a major offensive to Sukhumi and managed to capture the city on 27 September 1993 (MacFarlane, 1997). At the end of December 1993 all Georgian troops withdrew from Abkhazia except some remaining units in the Kodori valley. The intense communal ghting left 10,00015,000 dead and forced more than 200,000 people (most of them Georgians) to ee from Abkhazia. UN reactions to the conict were too little and came too late. The UN Secretary General tried to use diplomatic means by appointing a special envoy on 11 May 1993. When the initial diplomatic negotiations did not succeed, the SC approved the deployment of a limited number of military observers on 9 July 1993 (UNSCR 849). The advance team arrived in Abkhazia on 8 August 1993. UNOMIG was formally founded on 24 August 1993 (UNSCR 858) to monitor the 27 July 1993 Ceasere Agreement. UNOMIGs deployment did not help to stop the conict; it suspended all operational activities after the breakdown of the agreement. With the mediation of Russia the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed the Agreement on a Ceasere and Separation of Forces in Moscow on 17 May 1994. Both sides agreed to the deployment of a peacekeeping force from the Commonwealth of Independent States (ClS) to act as an interpositional force between the two sides and to give consent to UNOMIG for monitoring the implementation and observing of the conduct of the CIS peacekeeping force (CISPKF). On 21 July 1994 (UNSCR 937) the SC expanded UNOMIGs mandate and increased the strength to 136 military observers. The new mandate gave three main objectives to the mission: (a) monitoring and verication of the Moscow Agreement by conducting regular patrols; (b) observing the operation of CISPKF; and (c) maintaining close contacts with all sides to safeguard an orderly return of the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Over the years, the UN has continued its diplomatic activities to promote a peaceful and lasting solution to the problem and the return of refugees and IDPs. Despite all efforts too little results have been achieved. The peace process has come to an impasse. The SC is renewing the mandate every 6 months without attempting to solve the impasse by using other types of peace support operations. The general situation in the conict area remained mostly calm but unstable. Unexpected factors came to the surface like widespread criminality and lawlessness. UNOMIG continued to carry out its mandate by means of daily ground patrols from its headquarters in Sukhumi and the two sector headquarters at Gali and Zugdidi, as well as

586

MESUT UYAR

through regular helicopter patrols. But repeated incidents showed that military observers are not able to handle sporadic crises and ill-equipped to deal with criminality. And occasionally the observers themselves fell victim to the assaults and had to stop all operational activities for some time (Solomon, 2001; UN AgencyUNDPI, 1996, pp. 571588).

3. DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PROBLEMS

Currently, everybody on the ground is accusing UNOMIG for everything that is going wrong. Authorities of both sides are blaming UNOMIG more than they blame each other. The local population is asking everything ranging from medical help to the erasers for the students from military observers who have no means to meet the requests. Personnel of NGOs and all other aid organisations are frequently writing reports that UNOMIG is not providing necessary security to their convoys and ofcials on the ground. The CIS peacekeepers are not happy with UNOMIG and see it as a burden. Even the individual military observers are voicing their frustration with UNOMIG. International and national media are highlighting the achievements of the OSCE Mission in South Ossetia and give much attention to the alleged blunders of UNOMIG. In short, UNOMIG turned out to be an ideal scapegoat for every interested party. Is it possible and proper to blame UNOMIG for not doing enough in Abkhazia? As far as we are concerned the answer is absolutely No! Without differentiating the problems and seeing them from new perspectives we cannot blame UNOMIG or any other UNMOMs. And of course we cannot nd ways to solve problems like Abkhazia and improve the ways to deal with it. The problems that UNOMIG is facing are mostly not unique and they do not fall into one simple category. In fact, UNOMIG is facing three different categories of problems. And two categories of problems are common issues for all UNMOMs. I will mention the basics of the rst two categories and will focus on the third category, which is unique to UNOMIG.

3.1. Nature of UNMOMs The rst category of problems is related to the nature of observer missions. As I have already mentioned observer missions are traditional type of peacekeeping operations. They are temporary missions with limited objectives. That means if you want a successful UNMOM operation you

A UN Type Conict Management

587

have to formulate a clear, credible, achievable and adequately resourced mandate. You also need to have a time table, good organisation (military and civilian) and strategic planning. UNMOMs are effective in inter-state conicts when both sides give up actual ghting and give consent to the UN. So you need responsive governments who could maintain control on their troops and security forces and who at the same time, are reasonable and rational enough for every sort of dialogues. But after 1990 most of the conicts are intra-state conicts between a state and groups trying to establish their own spheres of sovereignty. In most of the cases conicting sides have difculty to control their so-called military units and their leadership is widely divided with divergent aims. Additionally they have neighbours who are willing to use the conicts for their own benets. Traditional UN sanctions are not effective against these types of loose political groups who can act irrationally and nd illegal economic means to support them. The GeorgianAbkhaz conict is a very good example in this sense. It is an intra-state conict between a newly founded state and an ethnically distinct minority group trying to establish its own state. And they have a neighbour the Russian Federation hoping to reestablish an effective political and economical control of the former Soviet territory. Both sides have difculty to control their military and security forces. Their leaders and societies are divided on several issues. Widespread criminality, illicit goods trafcking and human rights violations are also part of the scene. In terms of mandate, UNOMIG is again a good example of what not to do. Except monitoring ceasere agreements, it is not a clear and achievable mandate. UNOMIG has limited means to observe the CISPKF operations and absolutely no means to help a safe and orderly return of refugees and IDPs. It is interesting to note that UNOMIG is the only UNMOM operation, which is charged with the duty of safe and orderly return of refugees and IDPs. According to both sides the mandate is far from credible. There is no time table and strategic planning. And of course there is no exit strategy. (Solomon, 2001, 218f, 222f).

3.2. Operational Conditions The second category of problems is related to operational conditions. By saying operational conditions I am not only including geography, topography, demography and infrastructure, but also political, historical, economical and socio-cultural settings. Operational conditions are the most important barriers for the success of any peace support operation. And of

588

MESUT UYAR

course we have limited means to control them. In this sense the Georgian Abkhaz conict shows all the trademarks of an ideal conict. Abkhazia is a strategically located region between Russia and Trans-Caucasia. The importance of the regions oil resources is widely acknowledged and is reected in growing American geopolitical interest in the region. With its suitable climate and terrain, Abkhazia was a touristic attraction of the former Soviet Union and at the same time an ideal place for agriculture. It has a multiethnic population. According to the 1989 Soviet census ethnic Georgians constituted 45.7%, Abkhazs 17.8%, Armenians and Russians 14.6% and 16.8% respectively of the population. But historically Abkhazs see the region as a distinctly Abkhaz entity. Past Russian and Soviet politics made the ethnical claims more disputable. Even though Soviet economic policies created multinational cities like Sukhumi and Tkvarcheli with frequent interethnic interactions, it also created nationally compact populations at the level of villages. Force relocations, using ethnic groups against each other, trying to separate the community in every respect, frequent policy changes and the like provided fertile ground for future conicts. Whether the actual ghting started intentionally or not ethnic cleaning was the major visible outcome. Initially Abkhaz civilians ed during the Georgian advance and later Georgian civilians ran away when the tide had turned (Dale, 1997). Widespread human rights violations inamed the already existing ethnic suspicions. The volatile atmosphere of the neighbouring region and the availability of large numbers of mercenary type volunteers and stocks of weapons were the other factors that affected the outcome. In short, Abkhazia had all the ingredients for an ethnic conict and all the complexities and difculties as barriers for a lasting solution.

3.3. Problems Unique to UNOMIG The last category of problems is unique to UNOMIG. It is the reluctance of the SC members to handle a conict in a Russian area of interest and the relative reluctance of the UN to organise a peacekeeping mission after failures like UNOSOM and UNPROFOR. So from the very beginning an observer mission was the only suitable alternative. 3.3.1. CISPKF When the SC refused to send interpositional peacekeepers, Russia used the opportunity to send peacekeepers under its control. Russia got the authorisation of the conicting parties in the Moscow Agreement and from

A UN Type Conict Management

589

the CIS in June 1994. Although nominally a CISPKF, it was and still is an entirely Russian force. The CISPKF was deployed in July 1994 and took over the responsibility from Russian troops that separated the two sides since November 1993 (Danilov, 1999). From the very beginning CISPKF became a problem for UNOMIG. The conict parties do not see it as a peacekeeping but a Russian force trying to protect Russian interests in the region (Finch, 1996). Criticism of the operations of the CISPKF increased sharply after its evident failure to enforce its mandate to return the IDPs. First of all the quality and quantity of Russian troops are limited. The size of the force remained around 1,500, which is far from enough. In terms of quality their command, communication, intelligence and logistics are very poor. Ofcers and soldiers are very young and without proper peacekeeping training. Secondly their strategic and tactical attitude to peacekeeping is also problematic. Instead of conducting aggressive patrols, observation and providing security they prefer to establish platoon sized checkpoints and remain indoors except for logistical activities. The outcomes of poor training, leadership and logistics are widespread corruption, looting, illicit goods trafcking and bullying the civilians (MacFarlane, 1997, pp. 517520; Danilov, 1999; Fuller, 2002, 2003). Thirdly joint operation with UNOMIG is very limited and sometimes counterproductive. Several UNOMIG patrols were targeted after being seen with CISPKF vehicles. And most of the time civilians are reluctant to talk in front of CISPKF ofcials. At the same time UNOMIG is seen as playing a secondary role in peacekeeping because of the presence of CISPKF. Even though CISPKF is creating lots of problems its presence is still needed because its presence is deterring both sides from large scale armed hostilities. But the ideal solution is replacing CISPKF with a more effective multinational force. Even traditional type UN interpositional peacekeepers will help to improve the situation drastically (MacFarlane, 1999). 3.3.2. IDPs The second problem is managing the safe and orderly return of the IDPs. After the end of hostilities more than 2,00,000 ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia remained as IDPs. After the enforcement and monitoring of the ceasere agreement the IDP problem turned out to be the main problem to be solved in order to reach a peaceful solution. Until now all the efforts to organise the return of the IDPs have failed. The Abkhaz side is evidently reluctant to surrender the demographic advantage gained after the escape of the Georgians from Abkhazia. So everybody is expecting UNOMIG to nd a peaceful way to force Abkhazs to accept the IDPs. But this is not easy. The

590

MESUT UYAR

ruthless conict, abuses and crimes against each other, high levels of casualties, extensive damage to the infrastructure and the like have already created a big barrier for reconciliation, which is absolutely necessary for peaceful coexistence and a lasting solution. (Greenberg Research, 1999; The International Peace Academy and Best Practices Units of UNDPKO, 2002, pp. 34, 37). All the indicators show that both sides are far from reconciliation. Without the necessary preparations and without providing their physical security the return of the IDPs is a recipe for a renewal of hostilities. The May 1998 Gali clashes are a good example of the outcome of an uncontrolled return. The Gali district is at the ceasere line and nearly 96% of the pre-conict population were Georgians. More than 40,000 IDPs returned back to Gali permanently or temporarily after the end of hostilities. UNHCR and other International Organisations (IOs) and NGOs rendered humanitarian aid to these people. However Georgian partisan and militia groups tried to use the spontaneous return of the IDPs to recapture the Gali district. After sudden militia attacks Abkhaz forces launched a sweeping operation against them. Many homes and schools that were rebuilt after the ceasere were destroyed and more than 35,000 people were displaced once again. UNOMIG and CISPKF were unable to do anything to protect civilians and keep both sides apart. At the end the prestige of UNOMIG was damaged beyond repair (Fuller, 1998a,b; Hansen, 1999; Dale, 1997; MacFarlane, 1997). After the May 1998 clashes UNHCR and most IOs and NGOs stopped humanitarian aid and began to wait for the improvement of the situation. But the IDPs once again began to return back home spontaneously. The only organisation available on the ground was UNOMIG, which had no means to meet these demands. It was and still is a frequent occurrence to see IDPs voicing their frustration to military observers because military observers are the only persons, who would not harm them and listen to their complaints patiently. UNOMIG managed to launch quick-impact projects to help improve the conditions of IDPs in 2001 only. At the same time UNOMIG encouraged NGOs to cover immediate humanitarian concerns. In this way UNOMIG began to take on the responsibilities of UNHCR in Abkhazia (Annan, 2004a, pp. 78; Beau, 2004). In short, the mandate to assist the return of the IDPs is a mission impossible. UNOMIG is trying to do everything in its power but is always falling victim to biased criticism. 3.4. Criminality The political and diplomatic deadlock and both sides failure to enforce public order and security created a power vacuum. Criminal groups immediately

A UN Type Conict Management

591

seized the opportunity. Unfortunately some of the alleged militia and partisan groups also turned to criminal activities to nance their operations. Extortion, kidnapping, robbery, looting, illicit goods trafcking, killings and the like become daily events especially in the lower Gali district. So currently crime is the biggest danger for the fragile ceasere. In the beginning UNOMIG showed no interest in crime except reporting the available information about criminal incidents. But after 1998 crime became the main concern for everybody. UNOMIG had to deal with criminal incidents, but, as a military observer group, lacks the means to do so. When military observers tried to get information about the incidents and gangs they became targets. Gangs attacked UNOMIG patrols to force them not to get into their lucrative business as the example of the June 2000 ambush of Hotel Team in lower Gali shows (Global IDP Georgia, 2000, pp. 1013). After much discussion the SC decided to strengthen the capacity of UNOMIG by adding a civilian police component to the mission. The rst 10 ofcers were deployed in November 2003. But the deployment of the remaining members has been delayed because of Abkhaz refusal to accept them. The main duty of the civilian police is to help local security departments to conduct their duties effectively and professionally by means of giving training and equipment. Some Georgian police ofcers have already been chosen to participate in the OSCE Kosovo Police School. The impact of this new policy will become clear in a few years (Annan, 2004b, pp. 56).

3.5. Military Observers The strength of every organisation depends upon the values of its members. This is also true for UNOMIG. Even though the UN gained much experience from many peacekeeping operations, it still needs an overall approach to training, evaluating and controlling the military personnel assigned to diverse missions. The UNs manual on selection and training of UNMOs has clearly stated the necessary qualities and standards. But it is not easy to apply the rules in the eld. UNOMIG is lucky mission by means of countries contributing military observers. Nearly all the contributing countries have a professional army above world average. The current composition of UNOMIG is 116 military observers from 23 countries, 15 European, 5 Asian, 2 American and 1 North African. Most other UN missions are heavily dependent on third world countries military personnel. There is already a discussion going on about this cheap mercenary trend. UNOMIG

592

MESUT UYAR

is also suffering from several problems with observers. I will only list some of my observations without accusing any country but the general system: (1) More than half of the military observers do not have previous peacekeeping experience or training. A 1 week long orientation training is not enough to overcome this deciency. That means at least 1 month is needed to train novice observers before getting any contribution from them. (2) For some observers serving in the mission is just about getting additional wage. (3) It is nearly impossible to send back observers who do not have the necessary standards or have violated important rules or regulations. The evaluation system is just not working. (4) The mission language, English, is a big problem. Nearly a quarter of the observers does not speak English sufciently. This problem gets worse during operational patrols and in emergency cases. (5) An important percentage of observers has difculty to perform operational patrols because they lack some basic military qualities like driving off-road military vehicles, using maps and navigating, guiding helicopters, emergency rescue etc. (6) Communication with local people is also creating problems. Most of the observers do not speak local languages and depend on locally hired interpreters. In the OSCE Mission to Georgia which is operating in South Ossetia its is obligatory for observers to speak Russian. That is one of the important factors for the relative success of the OSCE. (7) Some observers are coming from very poor countries. Even the conditions of the IDPs are better than the conditions of some people in their home countries. So they are suffering problems to understand the complaints of the locals and to evaluate the humanitarian needs of the respective population. (8) Observers from some countries are not welcome by different local authorities. For example Georgians do not like Russian observers and Abkhazs do not like US observers. (9) Some countries are sending observers for a 6 months term only. So observers have just barely learnt their trade when they return back home. There are also some problems related to UNOMIGs organisation and general policy: (1) The main problem is the frequent rotation of observers. The average time of serving in one operational team is 3 months. Only some individuals manage to serve more than 4 months in the same team. So most

A UN Type Conict Management

593

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

of the observers never learn more than the basics about the teams area of responsibilities (AORs). There are one main HQ, two sector HQs and one liaison HQ, which means there are more staff positions than operational team duties. Observers with talents and able to speak English uently are picked for staff duties, leaving the operational value of the teams problematic. The contributing countries are reluctant to take risks for their observers. That means that in any life threatening situation all operations would be discontinued for the time being. After a decade the local population and sometimes the media still do not understand why UNOMIG is in Georgia. The mission needs reliable channels for information. By this way UNOMIG could explain its mission, capabilities and would be able to mobilise NGOs, the media and the local population. UNOMIG does not have a satisfactory de-briefing and lessons-learned system. So the valuable experiences of the observers are remaining with themselves. It is sometimes impossible to learn what had happen even a year ago. Local mayors, directors and people are tired of answering the same questions again and again after every rotation. The sectors have difculty to follow and understand what is happening on the other side and gaining access to events.

4. CONCLUSION
As a conclusion even though UNOMIG proved itself a learning organisation and military observers are trying to do their best, UNOMIG is not a successful peacekeeping mission like other UNMOMs. It has many problems and limited means to overcome them. As we have already discussed most of the problems are beyond the power of UNOMIG. But even under these conditions some of the problems can be solved without waiting for a concrete change in Abkhazia or the UN peace support operational system. To improve the relative effectiveness of UNMOMs we need to differentiate the problems and to focus on the ones that a respective mission has the means to overcome. By this way UNMOMs will be more successful and will not waste their limited means on impossible issues.

REFERENCES
Annan, K. (2004a). Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia. S/2004/315 UN, New York.

594

MESUT UYAR

Annan, K. (2004b). Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia. S/2004/26 UN, New York. Beau, Ch. (2004). Georgia: No improvement in return conditions despite decade-long ceasere, In: http://www.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Georgia. Brahimi, L. et al., (2000). Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping, operations in all aspects, A/55/305-S/2000/809. British Army. (1995). Wider Peacekeeping. London: HMSO. Dale, C. (1997). The dynamics and challenges of ethnic cleansing: The GeorgiaAbkhazia case. Writenet Country Papers (Refworld). Danilov, D. (1999). Russias Role. In: Accord, 7. Finch, R. C. (1996). The strange case of Russian peacekeeping operations in the near abroad 19921994. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Ofce. Fuller, L. (1998a). The blood-dimmed tide is loosed. RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 1, 13. Fuller, L. (1998b). Georgian fugitives as political football. RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 1, 14. Fuller, L. (2002). Will Georgia insist on CIS peacekeepers withdrawal from Abkhazia. RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 5, 2. Fuller, L. (2003). Georgia, Russia still at odds over Russian peacekeeping force in Abkhazia. RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 6, 24. Global IDP Georgia. (2000). Joint assessment mission to the Gali District evaluate conditions for the return of the displaced, http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/ wCountries/Georgia. Greenberg Research, Inc. (1999). Country report: GeorgiaAbkhazia. ICRC Worldwide Consultation on the Rules of War. ICRC: Geneva. Hansen, G. (1999). Displacement and return. In: Accord, 7. MacFarlane, S.N. (1997). On the front lines in the Near Abroad: The CIS and the OSCE in Georgias civil wars. In: Third World Quarterly, 18(3), 509525. MacFarlane, S.N. (1999). The Role of the UN. In: Accord, 7. Mackinlay, J. (Ed.) (1996). A guide to peace support operations. Providence: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies. Solomon, A. (2001). United Nations observer mission in Georgia: Keeping the peace and observing the peacekeepers. In: M. Bothe & B. Kondoch (Eds), International Peacekeeping: The yearbook of international peace operations (Vol. 7, pp. 197235). The Hague: Kluwer Law International. The International Peace Academy and Best Practices Unit of UNDPKO (2002). Challenges in Peacekeeping. Past, Present, Future. Seminar Report. UN Agency UNDPI. (1996). The blue helmets: A review of United Nations peace-keeping (3rd ed.). New York: UN Department of Public Information.