How Influential Were the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the Japanese Decision to Surrender?

Jun 30, 2010 By Oliver Bloom While reading Barry Blechman and Alex Bollfrasss piece in Sundays Washington Post, for the PONI blog, I noticed their mention of a 2007 article by Ward Wilson on the role of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the surrender of Japan in World War II. Wilson, then an independent scholar and now a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, argues that it was the Soviet declaration of war on Japan, not the atomic bombings, that pushed the Japanese to unconditional surrender. He argues that the atomic bombings were not qualitatively different in the eyes of the Japanese leadership than the more than sixty bombings of other Japanese cities, and rather, it was only the Soviet invasion that forced Japans hand by removing any chance that the Japanese could negotiate anything but a complete surrender. Wilsons article does more than explain an important element in American and Japanese history. As Wilson notes, the field of nuclear weapons scholarship is like a large structure standing precariously on only a handful of support posts (1) the results of test explosions in deserts and on islands, (2) knowledge about the capabilities of missiles, (3) some knowledge about postHiroshima/Nagasaki medical effects,(4) what little is certain and measurable about human decisionmaking under duress, and (5) the outcome of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Change the meaning of any one of these few fact-posts, and the whole structure shudders. I always assumed that the nuclear bombings influence the Japanese leadership, Wilsons thesis, and the ensuing consequences, are quite provocative. Contrary to the common perception that the two atomic bomb attacks in August 1945 forced the Japanese to surrender and prevented a costly American invasion, in Wilsons opinion, a close reading of what primary source documentation is available regarding the Japanese leaderships thinking at the time suggests that the bombings had little effect. As Wilson argues, by the summer of 1945, the Japanese had two approaches towards ending the war: either they get the neutral Soviets to mediate a peace treaty, or they fight one last decisive battle on the Japanese home islands with the hope of inflicting so many casualties that the United States would be willing to agree to more lenient terms. By Wilsons analysis, both of these options were still available after the bombing of Hiroshima, but neither was possible after the Soviet invasion. Wilson suggests that

conventional attacks launched by U.S. bombers against Japan in the spring and summer of 1945 were almost as large as the Hiroshima bombing; they often caused more damage (and once caused more casualties); and given that sixty-six other Japanese cities were also attacked that summer, it may have been hard to differentiate the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. If the devastation caused by the atomic bombings so profoundly affected Japanese strategic thinking, Wilson asks why did the conventional bombings not similarly affect their thinking. From Wilsons reading of the limited primary source documentation available, the Hiroshima attack didnt prompt a crisis in Japan (the Supreme Councilthe highest body of military and political leadersdid not meet for more than two days after the bombing, the bomb was not the center of high level political discussions after the attack, the Emperors response to the attack was only to request more details and various offhand accounts dont suggest that the Japanese were so shocked as to immediately push for unilateral surrender). On the other hand, Wilson sees the Soviet intervention as immediately doing just the opposite prompting a crisis within the upper ranks of Japans government and military and a realization that they not only could no longer hope the Soviets would mediate a more lenient peace, nor could they launch an effective defense of the Japanese home islands. Wilson offers six reasons for why the original interpretation is wrong. First, he argues that there obvious appearance of causality between the August 6th atomic bombing and the August 10th unilateral surrender certainly suggested a link. Second, he suggests that the Japanese leadership actively colluded to mislead the Americans both to please their occupiers (knowing many within their ranks would be tried for war crimes) and to save face by obscuring the causes of defeat. Third, Wilson feels it was in U.S. interests to believe the bomb was decisive and to discount the role of the Soviets. Fourth, Wilson suggests that the Japanese systematically destroyed much of the documentation available. Fifth, Wilson argues that it was difficult for U.S. investigators to place themselves in the shoes of Japanese leaders. Lastly, and most broadly, Wilson feels that our perspective on nuclear weapons influences our thinking about their role and influence, and thus, since most historical scholarship regarding the Japanese surrender took place at a time when U.S. strategic thought placed a high value on the influence of nuclear weapons, the scholarship would conform to these beliefs. We will have to take Wilsons word about this readings of the primary source documentation (I, for one, cant read Japanese), but if his analysis is correct, then perhaps we would need to at least reconsider the value and influence of nuclear weapons. It seems generally agreed upon that nuclear weapons have a profound effect on leaders thinking, but were it to be the case that nuclear weapons were not profoundly different than large scale conventional bombings (which have been seen to have a limited effect see, for example, Robert Papes Bombing to Win), then much of our understanding of nuclear weapons could be flawed. That is not to say, however, that large scale nuclear attacks have no influence. Ward Wilson is quick to point out that his scholarship applies only to very small nuclear arsenals (not, for example, the United States large thermonuclear arsenal), but then again, we are most concerned today about the relatively small arsenals of North Korea and Pakistan and future small arsenals in places like Iran. Does that mean I totally buy Ward Wilsons arguments? No. I would want to see a more thorough analysis of Japanese thinking to be convinced that it was the Soviet invasion alone that convinced

them to surrender (especially when there is alternative historical scholar that suggests the atomic bombings did have a profound effect; see for example, Sadao Asadas The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japans Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration). His analysis suggests the primacy of the Hiroshima bomb; the Soviet entry, coming as it did when the bomb had already shaken Japan's ruling elite, served as a confirmation and coup de grace.[]From the viewpoint of the shock effect, then, it may be argued that the bomb had greater impact on Japanese leaders than did the Soviet entry into the war. After all, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria gave them an indirect shock, whereas the use of the atomic bomb on their homeland gave them the direct threat of the atomic extinction of the Japanese people. I also dont know if I accepted the argument that Japans leaders lied about the influence of the nuclear attacks to their American captors as to please their occupiers and save face, at least without more detailed proof. More importantly, the more widely accepted limits of conventional bombing (its unlikely that any country will suffer the sustained and largely indiscriminate conventional bombings of major population centers that Japan did in the spring and summer of 1945) make it unlikely that any country will become so used to heavy bombings that small-scale nuclear attacks will be not qualitatively different. Whats more, the influence of nuclear weapons is widely accepted that it seems only natural that decisionmakers will be profoundly affected by nuclear attacks, regardless of whether a nuclear attack is qualitatively different than conventional attacks. I hope Wilson turns his paper into a much longer manuscript and manages to flesh out his arguments more (and provide more primary documentation). But Wilsons underlying point is clearif so much of our thinking about nuclear weapons and their effects stems from so few actual uses, then we have to be sure our understandings of those few real uses is correct. If the effect of nuclear weapons in those few circumstances is in doubt, then our broader understanding of nuclear weapons and their influence, based so heavily on those few instances, is in doubt. As it happens I just finished Chapters 4 & 5 last night which present a longer and more detailed treatment of the Hiroshima argument. Although it will be some time before they appear in print, (the book will be called "New Realism and Nuclear Weapons" or something) drop me an email and I'd be happy to send them to you. I'd be interested to see if they persuade you. Teaser: Asada and Frank both elide crucial information in order to make the influence of the Bomb appear greater than it was. I'm glad you found the article stimulating. I appreciated your faithful summary and I think you're exactly right: it's clear that there are questions about our interpretation of Hiroshima. If we're not 100 percent sure of what happened, how can it be prudent to rest base so much of what we think on an event whose interpretation is in doubt? Best wishes, Ward Wilson

Atomic Bomb-Truman Press Release-August 6, 1945

Introduction
In the early morning hours of July 16, 1945, great anticipation and fear ran rampant at White Sands Missile Range near Alamogordo, New Mexico. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Manhattan Project, could hardly breathe. Years of secrecy, research, and tests were riding on this moment. "For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and when the announcer shouted Now!' and there came this tremendous burst of light followed abruptly there after by the deep growling of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief," recalled General L. R. Groves of Oppenheimer, in a memorandum for Secretary of War George Marshall. The explosion carrying more power than 20,000 tons of TNT and visible for more than 200 miles succeeded. The world's first atomic bomb had been detonated. With the advent of the nuclear age, new dilemmas in the art of warfare arose. The war in Europe had concluded in May. The Pacific war would receive full attention from the United States War Department. As late as May 1945, the U.S. was engaged in heavy fighting with the Japanese at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In these most bloody conflicts, the United States had sustained more than 75,000 casualties. These victories insured the United States was within air striking distance of the Japanese mainland. The bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese to initiate United States entrance into the war, just four years before, was still fresh on the minds of many Americans. A feeling of vindication and a desire to end the war strengthened the resolve of the United States to quickly and decisively conclude it. President Harry Truman had many alternatives at his disposal for ending the war: invade the Japanese mainland, hold a demonstration of the destructive power of the atomic bomb for Japanese dignitaries, drop an atomic bomb on selected industrial Japanese cities, bomb and blockade the islands, wait for Soviet entry into the war on August 15, or mediate a compromised peace. Operation Olympia, a full scale landing of United States armed forces, was already planned for Kyushu on November 1, 1945 and a bomb and blockade plan had already been instituted over the Japanese mainland for several months. The Japanese resolve to fight had been seriously hampered in the preceding months. Their losses at Iwo Jima and Okinawa had been staggering. Their navy had ceased to exist as an effective fighting force and the air corps had been decimated. American B-29's made bombing runs over military targets on the Japanese mainland an integral part of their air campaign. Japan's lack of air power hindered their ability to fight. The imprecision of bombing and the use of devastating city bombing in Europe eventually swayed United States Pacific theater military leaders to authorize bombing of Japanese mainland cities. Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe all were decimated by incendiary and other bombs. In all, hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed in these air strikes meant to deter the resolve of the Japanese people. Yet, Japanese resolve stayed strong and the idea of a bloody "house to house" invasion of the Japanese mainland would produce thousands more American and Allied casualties. The Allies in late July 1945 declared at Potsdam that the Japanese must unconditionally surrender. After Japanese leaders flatly rejected the Potsdam Declaration, President Truman authorized use of the atomic bomb anytime after August 3, 1945. On the clear morning of August 6, the first atomic bomb, nicknamed Little Boy, was dropped on the city of Hiroshima. Leveling over 60 percent of the city, 70,000 residents died instantaneously in a searing flash of heat. Three days later, on August 9, a second bomb, Fat Man, was dropped on Nagasaki. Over 20,000 people died instantly. In the successive weeks, thousands more Japanese died from the after effects of the radiation exposure of the blast.