BHR DOD Aff

SDI BHR 1
DOD AFF ENERGY EFFICIENCY
1AC......................................................................................................................................... .3
A LESS EFFECTIVE MILITARY FORCE MAKES WAR MORE LIKELY.......................................... .13
a weak military is worse than none at all – it will invite aggression or create a false
confidence that leads to major war .................................................................. .................13
finally,U.S. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS THE KEY TO SOLVING A MULTITUDE OF GLOBAL
EXTINCTION SCENARIOS..................................................................... ...............................15
UNCHECKED INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN WILL UNLEASH A PANDORA’S BOX OF GLOBAL
VIOLENCE AND LAUNCH OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ............................................. .................24
SUCH A CONFLICT WOULD UNLEASH A WAVE OF TERRORISM AND COLLAPSE THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY...................................................................................................................... .....26
TOPICALITY BLOCKS.................................................................................. ............................30
AT: NOT ALTERNATIVE ENERGY.................................................................... .........................30
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY EXTENSIONS ..................................................................................... .36
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT............................................................................. ...........................38
IN THE UNITED STATES........................................................................................ ..................40
SUBSTANTIALLY.......................................................................................... ...........................42
INHERENCY EXTENSIONS................................................................................................ .......44
AT: DOD DOING EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES NOW..........................................................44
INCENTIVES SOLVENCY EXTENSIONS........................................................................... ..........49
READINESS SOLVENCY EXTENSIONS................................................................................. ....53
FUTURE INTERVENTIONS ARE INEVITABLE............................................................... ..............68
READINESS UNIQUENESS........................................................................... ...........................69
READINESS IMPACTS............................................................................... ..............................71
ENERGY DEPENDENCE.................................................................................................... .......80
ECONOMY..................................................................................................................... .........81
Energy Research and Development The final required element in the DoD's quest for foreign
oil independence is the re-creation of R&D accomplishments on the scale that allowed
America's aerospace engineers to send Neil Armstrong to the moon. After decades of
successful innovation since Apollo, President Bush and others have stated that today
America's global innovation leadership position is under attack by the effects of
globalization. On the positive side, US companies can significantly reduce costs by
outsourcing both menial and intellectual work for pennies on the dollar in a globalized world.
On the negative side, the growing lack of interest (and ability) on the part of American
students to pursue engineering and science degrees, coupled with a reverse brain-drain of
R&D talent back to new renaissance countries like India and China, has left the US with a
quickly aging science and engineering community and the prospect of losing its position of
science and technology leadership in the world. To illustrate, last year in Germany 36
percent of undergraduate students earned degrees in math and science, in China 59
percent, and in Japan 66 percent-in the US the figure was only 32 percent. (124) In 2004,
China graduated over 600,000 engineers, India 350,000, and America only about 70,000.
(125) Underscoring the President's acknowledgment of this problem in his 2006 State of the
Union Address, (126) the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on Prospering in
the Global Economy of the 21st Century best articulates the alarm in their 2005 report,
Rising Above the Gathering Storm, in which they state, It is easy to be complacent about
the US competitiveness and preeminence in science and technology. We have led the
world for decades, and we continue to do so in many research fields today. But the
world is changing rapidly, and our advantages are no longer unique. Without a renewed
effort to bolster the foundations of our competitiveness, we can expect to lose our
privileged position. For the first time in generations, the nation's children could face
poorer prospects than their parents and grandparents did.... The US faces enormous
challenges because of the disadvantage it faces in labor costs. Science and technology
provides the opportunity to overcome this disadvantage by creating scientists and
engineers with the ability to create entirely new industries (emphasis added)--much as
has been done in the past. (127) In response to their alarm, the committee identified two
challenges tightly coupled to scientific and engineering prowess: creating high-quality jobs
SDI BHR 2
for Americans and responding to the nation's need for clean, affordable, and reliable energy.
(128) The NAS identifies a nexus of opportunity that simultaneously strengthens the
economy and national security while simultaneously solving America's looming energy
crisis--the intense application of an R&D commitment that promises intellectual and financial
reward for those Americans already inspired, and those yet to be inspired in the sciences.
With a DoD commitment to lead its own energy revolution, the US could create an entirely
new, leading-edge commercial sector for the global market; a sector that could propel the
US economy for decades and turn this nation into a new energy or energy technology
exporter, much like the US achieved in the 1940s and 1950s when it dominated the export
of petroleum development technology. ........................................................ .......................81
COMPETITIVENESS ADVANTAGE............................................................ ................................82
A)A DOD COMMITMENT TO EFFICIENCY WOULD INCREASE U.S. COMPETITIVENESS..............82
TERRORISM................................................................................................. ..........................83
SPILL OVER................................................................................................................. ...........85
RENEWABLES.......................................................................................... ..............................88
POLITICS....................................................................................................................... .........90
AT: WITHDRAW TROOPS C-PLAN...................................................................... .....................95
AT: OFFSHORE BALANCING..................................................................................... .............101
SPENDING........................................................................................................................... .107
OIL DISADS................................................................................................................. .........108
AT: SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS.................................................................... ..............109
AIR FORCE....................................................................................................... ....................110
ARMY....................................................................................................................... ............111
SDI BHR 3
1AC
WE BEGIN WITH OBSERVATION:
(1)SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED INCENTIVES ARE VITAL FOR

MILITARY ENERGY CONSERVATION
PRESENT POLICIES OF THE DOD DO NOT ACCOUNT FOR THE REAL

COSTS OF ENERGY IN OPERATIONS PREVENTING INCENTIVES FOR
REDUCING ENERGY CONSUMPTION
The Defense Science Board Task Force 01

MORE CAPABLE WARFIGHTING THROUGH REDUCED FUEL BURDEN
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/fuel.pdf
The DoD currently prices fuel based on the wholesale refinery price and
does not include the cost of delivery to its customers. This prevents an
end-to-end view of fuel utilization in decision making, does not reflect the
DoD’s true fuel costs, masks energy efficiency benefits, and distorts
platform design choices.
The Defense Energy Supply Center (DESC) acts as the market consolidator and wholesale agent for the DoD. For simplicity in dealing with its
service customers, OSD establishes a "standard fuel price" annually. The standard price does not reflect the cost to the Services of delivering the
fuel from the DESC supply point to the ultimate consumer, such as a tank, ship or aircraft. The cost of delivery is absorbed by each military
service budget and is spread across many accounts, making the actual cost of delivering fuel uncomputed, unknown and not factored into
important investment decisions. The difference between the price and true cost reflects what the Services must pay to deliver the fuel. In FY99,
the standard DESC fuel mix price (average price of the fuels sold) was $0.87 per gallon, in FY00 it was $0.62, in FY01 it is $1.01, and in FY 02 it
will be $1.337. But the true cost of these fuels is much higher - $17.50 per gallon for USAF worldwide tanker-delivered fuel, and hundreds of
dollars per gallon for Army forces deep into the battlespace. These costs are not used in economic analyses that form the basis for efficiency
that the
investment decisions, which result in sub-optimal allocation of resources. A consequence of using the DESC price is
logistical cost of
delivering fuel to platforms is considered free, even though logistics
accounts for
about a third of DoD’s budget and half of its personnel, and most of the
tonnage
delivered by the logistics effort is fuel. The Services maintain huge
infrastructures to ensure fuel delivery. Large and small surface trucking
organizations, naval fleet tankers and aerial refueling aircraft, along with
substantial maintenance and logistics organizations contribute to significant
overhead costs. Increases in fuel efficiency would correspondingly shrink
this
overhead burden, enabling savings through reductions in logistics
requirements
far in excess of the investment.
Were the true costs of fuel delivery and supporting infrastructure (including
equipment, people, facilities and other overhead costs) known, understood and
factored into the cost of fuel, there would be proper visibility to focus the
requirements and acquisition processes on the true benefits of improving
platform efficiency. This would create incentives to introduce fuel efficiency
into
those processes, thereby cutting battlefield fuel demand and reducing the
fuel
logistics structure needed to deploy and employ weapons systems.
Until policy guidance requires emphasis on weapons system fuel
efficiency and the true cost of provisioning fuel to end users is gathered and
understood, there is no incentive for leaders, managers or operators to
depart
SDI BHR 4
from current practices.

SDI BHR 5
DESPITE SOME EFFORTS TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY THE OVERALL

LACK OF INCENTIVES HAS NOT CHANGED
Defense Science Board Feb 2008

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy “More Fight
– Less Fuel”
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf
The 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force report “More Capable Warfighting
Through Reduced Fuel Burden” found that:
• Fuel logistics represent a significant portion (~70%) of the tonnage the Army
ships into battle.
• Multiple technologies are available for all categories of deployed systems
and at
all levels of maturity that could reduce fuel demand.
The key finding was that warfighting, logistics and monetary benefits occur
when
weapons systems are made more fuel-efficient, but those benefits are not
valued or
emphasized in the requirements and acquisition processes. This is because
DoD’s
business processes do not explicitly, routinely or systematically consider
either the
energy problem or opportunities to address it. The report found that the
requirements
process does not require energy efficiency in deployed systems, the
acquisition process
does not value it, the procurement process does not recognize it, and the
Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) process does not
provide it
visibility when considering investment decisions.
The 2001 report made 5 recommendations:
• Base investment decisions on the fully burdened cost of fuel and on warfighting
and environmental benefits.
• Strengthen the linkage between warfighting capability and fuel logistics
requirements through wargaming and other analytical tools.
• Incentivize fuel efficiency throughout DoD.
• Target fuel efficiency improvements through investments in Science and
Technology and systems design.
• Include fuel efficiency in requirements and acquisition processes.
It asserted that DoD’s warfighting capability could be greatly strengthened
through
implementation of these recommendations because it would result in more
resources
available to fight (more tooth), with fewer needed for support (less tail). It
asserted too
that DoD’s budget challenges would be eased through reductions in
Operations and
Support costs and less exposure to volatile energy prices.
The present Task Force again examined DoD’s business processes,
investments,
policies and practices as they relate to the energy efficiency of combat and
combat
SDI BHR 6
related systems. It concluded that while some progress has been made, it is
limited and
late, stimulated mainly by recent high oil prices rather than the fundamental forces
that
affect DoD energy costs.
In essence, the Task Force found that many of the same problems that
existed in 2001
still exist today. A great deal of work goes into identifying options across the
DOTMLPF
(Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and
Facilities) spectrum that produce warfighting “effects.” Yet too little attention is paid to
the amount of effort necessary to achieve those effects, where effort encompasses the
delivery of necessary logistics, particularly fuel logistics.
WHILE INCENTIVES ARE NOT USED WITHIN THE DOD NOW THEIR USE
WOULD EFFECTIVELY LEVERAGE A TRANSFORMATION IN ENERGY
POLICY

– Less Fuel”
How systems are operated also significantly affects fuel consumption.

Despite a few
programs to induce careful operator use of energy, the Task Force found that
commanders generally are not incentivized to reduce fuel consumption. More
programs
are needed like the Navy’s Incentivized Energy Conservation program (i-
ENCON) that
allows ship commanders to keep a portion of the money saved through
operational
efficiency measures and use it for morale, welfare and recreation or
investments in
further efficiency measures; or the Air Force Model Base Energy Initiative
which
includes operational practices in its effort to minimize installation energy
footprint. Many
further improvements in operational procedures among all the Services and
Defense
Agencies appear possible. Some examples of steps that could be taken follow:
Aircraft
• Reduce unnecessary equipment aboard aircraft to reduce weight and accurately
manage cargo center of gravity.
• Avoid tank “top off” when not needed.
• Use single engine taxiing.
• Avoid use of afterburners as much as possible.
• Plan and execute efficient flight routing.
• Make more extensive use of simulators.
• Refuel in-flight only when absolutely necessary.
• Move fuel by air as little as possible.
• Plan missions to minimize any need to “dump” fuel.
Ships
• Slow steam ships on only one engine running at peak efficiency instead of
multiple engines at lower efficiency.
Ground Forces
• Reduce battery re-supply in the field through use of lightweight portable
photovoltaic systems.
• Reduce air conditioning losses at hot weather FOBs through tent insulation.
Logistics and Planning
• Make maximum use of ocean shipping to avoid the need for air shipping.
• Plan air logistics transport to maximize load factors.
SDI BHR 7
Aircraft and Ground Vehicles
• Use Auxiliary Power Units (APUs), or batteries when power is needed for
stationary vehicles instead of running main propulsion engines.
Facilities and Shipboard Hotel Loads
• Use only Energy Star or Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP)
designated efficient products where available.
• Maintain heating and cooling systems in top performance through continuous
commissioning.
• Manage thermostat settings.
• Use compact fluorescent light bulbs or solid state / light-emitting diode (LED)
lighting.
• Use occupancy sensors to turn lights on and off.
• Eliminate requirement for computer systems to be on 24/7 through better
scheduling of software updates and other maintenance activities.
Procurement Policy
• Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and Government Services Administration (GSA)
to offer only Energy Star or FEMP designated products as required by the
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section 104.
• Prohibit government credit cards from being used to purchase non-Energy Star
or FEMP designated products.
The Task Force found that the key barrier to implementing actions such as
these is
people taking the availability of energy for granted. Overcoming this will
require a
campaign linking saved energy to national security and strong leadership attention
focused on strategy, metrics and accountability. It will require inculcating
energy
considerations into business processes, fitness and performance reports,
education and
training programs and incentive programs. The challenge is now greater
than it was in
the 70s and 80s and the consequences of failure even greater. Creating both
incentives and awareness at all levels will focus people’s attention and make
implementing many of the recommendations of this report easier by
unleashing the
creativity of the Department’s best assets – its people.
SDI BHR 8
ACCOUNTING FOR THE TRUE COST OF FUEL WOULD INCENTIVIZE

EFFICIENCY THROUGHTOUT THE MILITARY
NYGREN, MASSIE & KERN 2005

Kip P. Nygren, Darrell D. Massie*, Paul J. Kern
United States Military Academy
ARMY ENERGY STRATEGY FOR THE END OF CHEAP OIL
http://www.ndia.org/Content/ContentGroups/Divisions1/Environment/PDFs31/Army%20energy%20strategy%20for%20the%20end%20of%20ch
eap%20oil.pdf
If the total cost of fuel delivery and supporting infrastructure (including equipment,
people, facilities and other overhead costs) were known, understood and factored into the
cost of fuel, the requirements and acquisition processes would logically be more
focused on the true savings of improving platform efficiency. This would create
incentives for DoD to integrate fuel efficiency into the acquisition process, thereby
cutting battlefield fuel demand and reducing the fuel logistics structure. Clear policy
guidance will enable the DoD to achieve the deployability, agility and sustainability
required by joint doctrine.
INCREASING INCENTIVES IS THE MOST IMPORTANT WAY TO

INCREASE ENERGY EFFICIENCY THROUGHOUT THE MILITARY
Michael J. Hornitschek 06
Colonel Michael J. Hornitschek is Vice Commander, 62nd Airlift Wing, McChord Air Force Base, Wash Air Force Journal of Logistics, Fall, 2006
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_3_30/ai_n18618914/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1
To date, the definitive DoD internal document advocating increased efficiency remains
the 2001 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Improving Fuel Efficiency of
Weapons Platforms' report entitled, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden. It identified five major efficiency recommendations.
* Base investment decisions on the true cost of delivered fuel, warfighting, and environmental benefits
* Strengthen warfighting and fuel logistics links in wargame modeling
* Have leadership incentivize fuel efficiency throughout the DoD
* Specifically target fuel efficiency improvements through investments in science and technology and systems designs
* Explicitly include fuel efficiency in requirements and acquisition processes
Arguably, it is the report's third suggestion, "Have leadership incentivize fuel
efficiency throughout the DoD," that is the most important and transformational. (97)
The authors go on to emphasize:
For the DoD to take advantage of the large cost and performance
benefits of significant improvements in weapons platform fuel
efficiency, senior civilian and military leadership must set the
tone and agenda within the Department. Leadership must begin
promoting the message that efficiency at the tactical platform
and system level is a clear strategic path to improve performance,
reduce logistics burden and free resources for modernization and
readiness. This needed emphasis by DoD leadership is not merely
desirable; it is an essential ingredient to achieve the force
improvements to execute Joint doctrine. (98)
While looking specifically at improving existing and future weapon systems, the DSB's advice
applies equally well to all operating procedures and installation infrastructure as
well. This is a message that all Service chiefs and combatant commanders could
broadcast loudly and repeatedly through their established information outlets.
Subordinate levels of command would have to internalize and demonstrate
acceptance of these concepts to junior ranks until even basic recruit and contractor
behavior reflects the DoD's emphasis on efficiency and conservation. Success will
depend largely on providing meaningful behavior change incentives to energy users
for the purpose of long-term payback. One incentive model could be to return any
normalized energy savings over the previous year directly to the saving
organization--a potentially powerful motivator for under-resourced units. It is
important, though, that to avoid the temptation of compromising safety to earn
energy efficiency rewards, commanders and leaders not be penalized for exceeding
the previous year's normalized energy bill. Bottom line: properly incentivized people
will make a difference.
SDI BHR 9
PLAN:
The Department of Defense should provide incentives in the United

States for energy conservation including factoring delivery and
infrastructure into the costs of fuel in its business processes and
providing rewards for energy efficiency to individual units.
SDI BHR 10
ADVANTAGE 1: MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
A) MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS CONSTRAINED NOW
INITIALLY, WE NOTE THAT THE U.S. MILITARY WILL INEVITABLY BE

INVOLVED IN A WIDE RANGE OF GLOBAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Nardulli 2002
Bruce, RAND policy analyst
http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.08.02/groundops.html
Almost a year has passed since the president declared the war on terrorism the nation's top security priority. Considerable
it is already clear that waging a
uncertainty remains as to the scale, scope, and pace of that war. Yet
long-term global war on terrorism will entail the extensive use of American
ground forces in a wide variety of missions. The U.S. Army, in particular, will
encounter more frequent deployments, more long-term deployments, and a
demand for additional counterterrorism capabilities.
To prepare for the future, the army needs to respond in two overarching ways. First, it must consider options to meet the
likely increase in the tempo of operations, continued high demand for scarce military specialties, and expanded
requirements to support operations overseas in numerous new locales. Second, the army should adjust some of its light-
weight and medium-weight capabilities (so-called "light" and "medium" forces) to reinforce the offensive campaign against
terrorism with increased speed and modified combat power. The army must undertake these efforts while simultaneously
maintaining its readiness to fight major regional wars and transforming itself for future warfare.
More People, Places, and Things
The army already has long-term commitments of troops in such places as
Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai. In all likelihood, these will continue. If anything,
the events of Sept. 11 have increased the pressure on U.S. forces to remain as a
stabilizing influence. Added to these ongoing commitments will be substantial
military operations against terrorist groups, such as the operations in
Afghanistan. About 6,000 U.S. Army soldiers are committed to operations there,
indicating the scale and duration of deployments that can be entailed in rooting out
terrorists and their infrastructure and preventing their reemergence. Other sizable
rotational deployments are possible, not only in Central Asia but also in
Southwest Asia and Africa.
Because the United States plans to conduct the war on a wide front, the
army will likely carry out other types of operations as well. Stabilizing
volatile regions will require potentially extended peacekeeping operations.
Expanded training of foreign militaries in counterterrorism operations is and
will continue to be a major element of the U.S. war effort. Such operations
are likely to include growing involvement with new partners and in
geographic areas previously of little or no interest to the United States. As
terrorist groups gravitate toward unstable regions or dysfunctional states
for secure bases of operations, U.S. counterterrorism efforts will blend into a
host of much broader counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense
activities. Friends and allies threatened by terrorists will also expect our
support, as is now the case in the Philippines and Georgia. U.S. Army forces
will be involved in all of these activities.
Offensively, some counterterror operations will require new mixes of U.S.
military capabilities and responsiveness. Certain classes of targets are likely to require different
combinations of ground units. For example, a large complex of well-defended terrorist installations in difficult terrain,
comparable to Tora Bora in Afghanistan, might require an extended operation of robust forces. Or the mission might call for
a simultaneous attack on multiple sites spread across a large area.
Many of these operations will
occur on short notice and require very rapid response. National
decisionmakers will insist on having the capability to attack high-value but
fleeting targets in far-flung places with high confidence of success. The ability
SDI BHR 11
to seize or neutralize weapons of mass destruction will be especially important in this

regard.
WHILE FUTURE INTERVENTIONS ARE INEVITABLE THE ABILITY OF THE
U.S. MILITARY TO SUCCEED IN FUTURE OPERATIONS IS SEVERELY
CONSTRAINED. THE BEST AND MOST COMPREHENSIVE STUDY
SUPPORTS THIS CONCLUSION
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 2008

FOREIGN POLICY MARCH/APRIL
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story4198.php
In an exclusive new index, Foreign Policy and the Center for a New American Security
surveyed more than 3,400 active and retired officers at the highest levels of
command about the state of the U.S. military. They see a force stretched dangerously
thin and a country ill-prepared for the next fight.
Today, the U.S. military is engaged in a campaign that is more demanding and intense
than anything it has witnessed in a generation. Ongoing wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, now entering their fifth and seventh years respectively, have lasted
longer than any U.S. military engagements of the past century, with the exception of
Vietnam. More than 25,000 American servicemen and women have been wounded and over
4,000 killed. Additional deployments in the Balkans, on the Korean Peninsula, and
elsewhere are putting further pressure on the military’s finite resources. And, at any
time, U.S. forces could be called into action in one of the world’s many simmering hot
spots—from Iran or Syria, to North Korea or the Taiwan Strait. Yet, even as the U.S.
military is being asked to sustain an unprecedented pace of operations across the
globe, many Americans continue to know shockingly little about the forces responsible for protecting them.
Nearly 70 percent of Americans report that they have a high level of confidence in the military, yet fewer than 1 in 10 has
ever served. Politicians often speak favorably about people in uniform, but less than one quarter of the U.S. Congress has
donned a uniform. It is not clear whether the speeches and sound bites we hear from politicians and experts actually reflect
the concerns of those who protect our nation.
What is the actual state of America’s military? How healthy are the armed forces? How prepared are they for future
conflicts? And what impact are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan really having on them? To find out, Foreign
Policy and the Center for a New American Security teamed up to conduct a
groundbreaking survey of current and former military officers. Recognizing that the military is
far from a monolith, our goal was to find out what America’s highest-ranking military people—the very officers who have run
the military during the past half century—collectively think about the state of the force, the health of the military, the course
of the war in Iraq, and the challenges that lie ahead. It is one of the few comprehensive surveys of
the U.S. military community to be conducted in the past 50 years.
In all, more than 3,400 officers holding the rank of major or lieutenant commander and above were surveyed from across
the services, active duty and retired, general officers and field-grade officers. About 35 percent of the participants hailed
from the Army, 33 percent from the Air Force, 23 percent from the Navy, and 8 percent from the Marine Corps. Several
hundred are flag officers, elite generals and admirals who have served at the highest levels of command. Approximately one
third are colonels or captains—officers commanding thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines—and 37 percent
hold the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander. Eighty-one percent have more than 20 years of service in the military.
Twelve percent graduated from one of America’s exclusive military academies. And more than two thirds have combat
experience, with roughly 10 percent having served in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both.
These officers see a military apparatus severely strained by the grinding demands of
war. Sixty percent say the U.S. military is weaker today than it was five years ago.
Asked why, more than half cite the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the pace of troop deployments those conflicts require.
More than half the officers say the military is weaker than it was either 10 or 15 years ago. But asked whether “the demands
of the war in Iraq have broken the U.S. military,” 56 percent of the officers say they disagree. That is not to say, however,
that they are without concern. Nearly 90 percent say that they believe the demands of the war
in Iraq have “stretched the U.S. military dangerously thin.”
The health of the Army and Marine Corps, the services that have borne the brunt of the fighting in Iraq, are of greatest
concern to the index’s officers. Asked to grade the health of each service on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning the officers
have no concern about the health of the service and 10 meaning they are extremely concerned, the officers reported an
average score of 7.9 for the Army and 7.0 for the Marine Corps. The health of the Air Force fared the best, with a score of
5.7. The average score across the four services was 6.6. More than 80 percent of the officers say that,
given the stress of current deployments, it is unreasonable to ask the military to
wage another major war today. Nor did the officers express high confidence in the
military’s preparedness to do so. For instance, the officers said that the United
States is not fully prepared to successfully execute such a mission against Iran or
North Korea.
SDI BHR 12
THE LACK OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY IS A CRITICAL RESTRAINT ON

MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

– Less Fuel”
The Task Force found that combat and combat related systems generally are
inefficient
in their use of fuel. This represents a major constraint on the operational
effectiveness
of U.S. forces and translates directly into poor endurance and persistence in
the
battlespace. Platforms are forced to use time transiting to fuel sources
instead of
residing on station, and more of them are needed to maintain a continuous
presence.
Improvements in the efficiency of platforms therefore would enable U.S.
forces to
increase their in-theater effectiveness by spending more time on station
relative to
transit, and by allocating fewer of their assets to sustain a given number at
that station.
Platform inefficiency affects operational effectiveness in other ways as well.
Moving
and protecting fuel through a battlespace requires significant resources. It
constrains
freedom of movement by combat forces, makes them more vulnerable to
attack, and
compels them to redirect assets from combat operations to protection of
supply lines.
Thus, the need to move and protect fuel detracts from combat effectiveness
in two
ways; by adding to sustainment costs and by diverting and endangering in-
theater force
capability.
SDI BHR 13
B) MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS CRITICAL TO PREVENT GLOBAL

CONFLICT
A LESS EFFECTIVE MILITARY FORCE MAKES WAR MORE LIKELY

Perry and Flounroy in 6
William J Perry, Former Secretary of Defense, and Michele A. Flournoy, Senior Fellow at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, National Defense, The US Military: Under
Strain And At Risk, National Defense, May,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/may/TheU.S.MilitaryUnder.htm
Meanwhile, the United States has only limited ground forces ready to respond to
contingencies outside the Afghan and Iraqi theaters. As a global power with
global interests, the United States must be able to deal with challenges in
multiple regions of the world simultaneously. If the Army were ordered to
send significant forces to another crisis today, its only option would be to
deploy units at readiness levels far below what operational plans would
require. As stated rather blandly in one Defense Department presentation, the Army
“continues to accept risk” in its ability to respond to crises on the Korean
Peninsula and elsewhere. The absence of a credible, sizable strategic
reserve increases the risk that potential adversaries will be tempted to
challenge the United States. Although the United States can still deploy air, naval,
and other more specialized assets to deter or respond to aggression, the visible
overextension of our ground forces could weaken our ability to deter
aggression.
a weak military is worse than none at all – it will invite aggression or

create a false confidence that leads to major war
Feaver in 3
Professor of Political Science at Duke, Peter D., Armed Services: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-
Military Relations, p.213
The civil-military problematique is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital and
potentially conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong
enough to prevail in war. One purpose behind establishing the military in the first place is
the need, or perceived need, for military force, either to attack other groups or to ward off
attacks by others. Like an automobiles airbag, the military primarily exists as a guard
against disaster. It should be always ready even if it is never used. Moreover, military
strength should be sized appropriately to meet the threats confronting the
polity. It serves no purpose to establish a protection force and then to vitiate
it to the point where it can no longer protect. Indeed, an inadequate military
institution may be worse than none at all. It could be a paper tiger
inviting outside aggression strong enough in appearance to threaten
powerful enemies but not strong enough in fact to defend against their
predations. Alternatively, it could lull leaders into a false confidence,
leading them to rash behavior and then failing in the ultimate military
contest.
SDI BHR 14
U.S. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS KEY TO PREVENT CONFLICT

Kagan 7
Robert. senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the
German Marshall Fund. August/September 2007. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html.
It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in
providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance,
the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other
nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or
grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international
waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw
materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian
of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval
dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on
the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would
disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the
goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great
geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War
ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even
today Europe’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes
unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous
development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would
not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater
equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic
logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine
that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would
remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and
institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today
reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A
different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India,
and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the
powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps
for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the
United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee
regional
against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity,
conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between
China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could
erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its
European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian
victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict
between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could
draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may
be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they
are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws
from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East
Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a
stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s
neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the
region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.
In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it
SDI BHR 15
could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to

remained the world’s most powerful nation —
an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its
periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end
to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent
American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet
communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a
strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict
involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United
States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to
imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and
the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater
stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access
open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and
hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel,
which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to
come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to
protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the
The subtraction of American power from
region, both on the seas and on the ground.
any region would not end conflict but would simply change the
equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the
region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn’t change this. It only adds a
new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel
The alternative to
and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change.
American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further
competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence
would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper
involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also
expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that
any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East
An American withdrawal
further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn’t changed that much.
will produce a new
from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It
instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative
to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a
new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified
competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance
no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a
into the future,
retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an
easier path.
finally,U.S. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS THE KEY TO SOLVING A

MULTITUDE OF GLOBAL EXTINCTION SCENARIOS
Thayer 6
Bradley. In Defense of Primacy, associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri
State University, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/In+defense+of+primacy-a0155089106
A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point

the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These
interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around
the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and
that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies
SDI BHR 16
are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the
a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to

Australians in East Timor. In contrast,
achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the
United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in
Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from

international politics.
threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history
shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus
abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American
wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer
to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the
threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such
threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on
engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far
from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This
requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.

Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's
airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a
consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and
strategic deterrent capabilities is increased. (2) This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics
today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align
themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because
doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own
purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied
with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major
economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of
U.S.
states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.
primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence

in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of
states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create
coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo,
Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its
charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to
the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang
of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United
States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and
actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the
United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the
United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But
China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future
because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three
of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-
American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY,peace and
stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant
power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of
international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current
international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime,

increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization is
directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think
that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of
U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded
of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when
international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler
succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal
order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great
Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to
, American primacy within the international

ensuring the security of the United States and its allies
system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The
first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that
SDI BHR 17
American primacy helps keep a

were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today,
number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey,

Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and
Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously
threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly
war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United
States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of
liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these
pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview. (3) So,
once states are governed democratically, the

spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition,
likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because

democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is
because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to
resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic
states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to
spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why
democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course,
whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps
democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to
Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces
threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to
democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly
democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the
Third, along with the growth

Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive.
in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of
the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create
an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and
commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital
and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all
states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the
economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits
Economic spin-offs foster the

defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable.
development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps

the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the
World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now
the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third
recognizes that
World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and

globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy. (4) As a witness to the failed
alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth
the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power
and finally,
not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over
the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty
operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911
force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake,
flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous
earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid.
Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the
About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines

aftermath of the disaster.
responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and

prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those
killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort.
No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical
reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the
United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to
help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other
measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable
SDI BHR 18
opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October
2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately,
diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also
provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about
America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable,
while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake
of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian
mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military
THERE IS no other state, group of

action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.
states or international organization that can provide these global benefits.

None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and
major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and
trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act
as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does
anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may
have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time
being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving
the world's ills.
SDI BHR 19
MAINTAING EFFECTIVE U.S. LEADERSHIP IS THE KEY TO PREVENTING

THE LAUNCH OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Khalilzad 95
Zalmay, Washington Quarterly, Spring, LN
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global
rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and
vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States
leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be
exercises
such
more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second,
a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with
the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of
regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally,
U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival,
enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all
the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership
would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
SDI BHR 20
C) AFGHANISTAN
AFGHANISTAN IS COLLAPSING INTO INSTABILITY AND THE U.S. CAN’T

SEND IN MORE TROOPS ALTHOUGH MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS WILL
ENSURE STABILITY
WHITE 7-2-2008
JOSH, The Washington Post
http://www.kansascity.com/news/world/story/689893.html
The nation’s top military officer said Wednesday that more U.S. troops are
needed in Afghanistan to help tamp down an increasingly violent insurgency.
However, Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the
military does not have sufficient forces to send because of the war in Iraq.
Mullen said insurgent Taliban and extremist forces in Afghanistan have become “a very
complex problem” that is tied to the extensive drug trade, a faltering economy and the
porous border region with Pakistan. Violence in Afghanistan has increased
markedly over recent weeks, and June was the deadliest month for U.S.
troops since the war began in 2001, with 28 combat fatalities.
“I am and have been deeply troubled by the increasing violence there,” Mullen said at
a briefing for reporters at the Pentagon.
He added that he has made no secret of wanting to send more forces into the country.
“The Taliban and their supporters have become more effective in recent
weeks. ... We all need to be patient. As we have seen in Iraq, counterinsurgency
warfare takes time and commitment.”
Mullen said military commanders were looking at the prospects for sending additional
troops to Afghanistan in 2009, but conditions in Iraq would have to continue to improve
for that to happen. The war in Iraq has occupied as many as 20 military brigades
during the troop buildup over the past year. The military is reducing that force to 15
brigades this year.
“I don’t have troops I can reach for, brigades I can reach to send into
Afghanistan, until I have a reduced requirement in Iraq,” Mullen said. “Afghanistan
remains an economy of force campaign, which by definition means we need more
forces there. We have the ability in almost every single case to win from the
combat standpoint, but we don’t have enough troops there to hold. That is
key to the future of being able to succeed in Afghanistan.”
SDI BHR 21
IN AFGHANISTAN MANY TROOPS ARE TIED UP PROTECTING THE

ENERGY FUEL LINES
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN ADVANTAGE LINKS

– Less Fuel”
Figure 2.1 shows who is responsible for specific fuel delivery costs. The costs
incurred
from Points A to D are included in the “standard” price DESC charges its customers for
the commodity. Costs incurred beyond Point D are typically paid by the military
services through the support force structure they maintain, operate and
sustain. These
costs are borne by budgets not attributed to fuel. They are the total ownership costs of
assets such as tanker aircraft, fuel trucks and oiler ships; and personnel, parts, training
and fuel needed to keep them operational. They also include protection required
to
assure delivery of the fuel from Point D to the point of use. The costs of
protection are
difficult to measure and are often not monetary costs. They include reduced combat
effectiveness, risk to mission, and casualties. In Iraq and Afghanistan, combat
forces
are dedicated to supply line protection rather than combat operations. As of
November
2007, approximately 80 convoys travel continuously between Kuwait and Iraq
destinations, all protected by uniformed forces. This degrades combat
capability,
resulting in real costs, even if not attributed to the supplies themselves.
THE QUANTITIES OF FUEL USED IN AFGHANISTAN ARE MASSIVE
BRYCE 2007
Robert Bryce is the managing editor of Energy Tribune.
Logistical Vulnerabilities and the Afghanistan War
Heinrich Boll Foundation
http://www.boell.de/downloads/worldwide/bryce_logistical_vulnerabilities.pdf
The U.S. military's fuel vulnerabilities in Afghanistan were made clear last year
during a
conference sponsored by the Defense Energy Support Center, the agency that
purchases
and manages the delivery of fuel for the Defense Department. During a briefing on the
fuel operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Army Colonel Dan Jennings, who was
overseeing fuel delivery for Afghanistan and southern Iraq, told a group of about 75
people that "Fuel support for Afghanistan operations is what keeps me up at night."
Standing in front of a Power Point map of Afghanistan, Jennings said the agency was
hauling hundreds of thousands of gallons of jet fuel per day to America's
main bases in
SDI BHR 22
Afghanistan. Some 700 tanker trucks were being used to deliver the fuel and
some of the
trucks were taking a month or more to make a round trip delivery from their
starting
points in Pakistan. According to Jennings, on some occasions, the U.S. military
had as
much as 4.7 million gallons of motor fuel in transit between Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
SDI BHR 23
INCREASES IN FUEL EFFICIENCY WOULD FREE UP LOTS OF TROOPS

IMMEDIATELY FOR OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

– Less Fuel”
The Task Force found that combat and combat related systems generally are
inefficient
in their use of fuel. This represents a major constraint on the operational
effectiveness
of U.S. forces and translates directly into poor endurance and persistence in
the
battlespace. Platforms are forced to use time transiting to fuel sources
instead of
residing on station, and more of them are needed to maintain a continuous
presence.
Improvements in the efficiency of platforms therefore would enable U.S.
forces to
increase their in-theater effectiveness by spending more time on station
relative to
transit, and by allocating fewer of their assets to sustain a given number at
that station.
Platform inefficiency affects operational effectiveness in other ways as well.
Moving
and protecting fuel through a battlespace requires significant resources. It
constrains
freedom of movement by combat forces, makes them more vulnerable to
attack, and
compels them to redirect assets from combat operations to protection of
supply lines.
Thus, the need to move and protect fuel detracts from combat effectiveness
in two
ways; by adding to sustainment costs and by diverting and endangering in-
theater force
capability.
SDI BHR 24
UNCHECKED INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN WILL UNLEASH A

PANDORA’S BOX OF GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND LAUNCH OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Morgan 7
Stephen J. Morgan is a former member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee. March 04, 2007 Better
Another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?
They are low on adequate resources and relegated in importance. The former British
Commander of NATO forces admitted that last year they came close to losing Kandahar, the second city. It is not ruled out that much of the
south and east could fall into Taliban hands this year, paving the way for
the fall of Kabul, the year after. The Taliban are ferocious fighters, with a messianic fervour to fight to the death. They bring with
them the experience of veterans of the brutal Soviet war and the civil war which followed. Now regrouped, rearmed, their forces are prepared both for
unfavourable open combat of almost suicidal proportions. Furthermore they are opportunistically changing tactics, both in order to create maximum urban
destabilization and to win local support in the countryside. Boasting of more than 1,000 suicide volunteer bombers, they have also renounced their former
policy against heroin cultivation, thus allowing them to win support among the rural population and gain support from local tribes, warlords and criminal
gangs, who have been alienated by NATO policies of poppy field destruction. Although disliked and despised in many quarters, the Taliban could not
advance without the support or acquiescence of parts of the population, especially in the south. In particular, the Taliban is drawing on backing from the
Pashtun tribes from whom they originate. The southern and eastern areas have been totally out of government control since 2001. Moreover, not only
have they not benefited at all from the Allied occupation, but it is increasingly clear that with a few small centres of exception, all of the country outside
The conditions for unrest are ripe and the

Kabul has seen little improvement in its circumstances.
Taliban is filling the vacuum. The Break-Up of Afghanistan? However, the Taliban is unlikely to win much support outside
of the powerful Pashtun tribes. Although they make up a majority of the nation, they are concentrated in the south and east. Among the other key
Tajiks and Uzbeks, who control the north they have no chance of making new inroads. They will fight the
minorities, such as
Taliban and fight hard, but their loyalty to the NATO and US forces is tenuous to say the least. The Northern
Alliance originally liberated Kabul from the Taliban without Allied ground support. The Northern Alliance are fierce fighters, veterans of the war of
liberation against the Soviets and the Afghanistan civil war. Mobilized they count for a much stronger adversary than the NATO and US forces. It is possible
will certainly resist any new Taliban

that, while they won’t fight for the current government or coalition forces, they
rule. They may decide to withdraw to their areas in the north and west of the
country. This would leave the Allied forces with few social reserves, excepting
a frightened and unstable urban population in Kabul, much like what happened to the Soviets.
Squeezed by facing fierce fighting in Helmund and other provinces, and, at the same time, harried by a complementary tactic of Al Qaeda-style urban
terrorism in Kabul, sooner or later, a “Saigon-style” evacuation of US and Allied forces could be on the cards. The net result could
be the break-up and partition of Afghanistan into a northern and western area and a southern and
eastern area, which would include the two key cities of Kandahar and, the capital Kabul. Pastunistan? The Taliban themselves, however may decide not to
take on the Northern Alliance and fighting may concentrate on creating a border between the two areas, about which the two sides may reach an
agreement regardless of US and Allied plans or preferences. The Taliban may claim the name Afghanistan or might opt for “Pashtunistan” – a long-
standing, though intermittent demand of the Pashtuns, within Afghanistan and especially along the ungovernable border regions inside Pakistan. It could
not be ruled out that the Taliban could be aiming to lead a break away of the Pakistani Pashtuns to form a 30 million strong greater Pashtun state,
encompassing some 18 million Pakistani Pashtuns and 12 Afghan Pashtuns. Although the Pashtuns are more closely linked to tribal and clan loyalty, there
exists a strong latent embryo of a Pashtun national consciousness and the idea of an independent Pashtunistan state has been raised regularly in the past
with regard to the disputed territories common to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The area was cut in two by the “Durand Line”, a totally artificial border
between created by British Imperialism in the 19th century. It has been a question bedevilling relations between the Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout
their history, and with India before Partition. It has been an untreated, festering wound which has lead to sporadic wars and border clashes between the
two countries and occasional upsurges in movements for Pashtun independence. In fact, is this what lies behind the current policy of appeasement
President Musharraf of Pakistan towards the Pashtun tribes in along the Frontiers and his armistice with North Waziristan last year? Is he attempting to
avoid further alienating Pashtun tribes there and head–off a potential separatist movement in Pakistan, which could develop from the Taliban’s offensive
across the border in Afghanistan? Trying to subdue the frontier lands has proven costly and unpopular for Musharraf. In effect, he faces exactly the same
problems as the US and Allies in Afghanistan or Iraq. Indeed, fighting Pashtun tribes has cost him double the number of troops as the US has lost in Iraq.
Evidently, he could not win and has settled instead for an attempted political solution. When he agreed the policy of appeasement and virtual self-rule for
North Waziristan last year, President Musharraf stated clearly that he is acting first and foremost to protect the interests of Pakistan. While there was
outrageous in Kabul, his deal with the Pashtuns is essentially an effort to firewall his country against civil war and disintegration. In his own words, what he
fears most is, the « Talibanistation » of the whole Pashtun people, which he warns could inflame the already fierce fundamentalist and other separatist
movement across his entire country. He does not want to open the door for any backdraft from the Afghan war to engulf Pakistan. Musharraf faces the
nationalist struggle in Kashmir, an insurgency in Balochistan, unrest in the Sindh, and growing terrorist bombings in the main cities. There is also a large
Shiite population and clashes between Sunnis and Shias are regular. Moreover, fundamentalist support in his own Armed Forces and Intelligence Services
is extremely strong. So much so that analyst consider it likely that the Army and Secret Service is protecting, not only top Taliban leaders, but Bin Laden
and the Al Qaeda central leadership thought to be entrenched in the same Pakistani borderlands. For the same reasons, he has not captured or killed Bin
Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership. Returning from the frontier provinces with Bin Laden’s severed head would be a trophy that would cost him his own
head in Pakistan. At best he takes the occasional risk of giving a nod and a wink to a US incursion, but even then at the peril of the chagrin of the people
and his own military and secret service. The Break-Up of Pakistan? Musharraf probably hopes that by giving de facto autonomy to the Taliban and Pashtun
leaders now with a virtual free hand for cross border operations into Afghanistan, he will undercut any future upsurge in support for a break-away
independent Pashtunistan state or a “Peoples’ War” of the Pashtun populace as a whole, as he himself described it. However events may prove him sorely
wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon
into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but
captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan.
the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead
Then,
the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces

SDI BHR 25
have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world
situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist
uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is

deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not
a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a
coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic
regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a
protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the
The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic

Sunni and minority Shia populations.
proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over
Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from
Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the
Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with
regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist
attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly
nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda
Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al
Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course,
open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the
possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the
Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes
a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons
secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America.
Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic
possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations.
It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the
US.
SDI BHR 26
FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN WILL ENSURE WIDESPREAD WAR IN THE

MIDDLE EAST
Junk Inside in 7
Nato Forces Can Not Be Successful In Afghanistan. 7/17/7. http://www.junkinside.com/nato-forces-can-not-be-
successful-in-afghanistan.
“The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,” he

said. “If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain
would be massively multiplied. “I think you could not then stop a widening regional war
that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in
the end between Sunni and Shiites right across the Middle East.”
SUCH A CONFLICT WOULD UNLEASH A WAVE OF TERRORISM AND

COLLAPSE THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Forest 7 (James, director of terrorism studies at the U.S. Military Academy, The Futurist 41
no5 20 S/O 2007)
A regional war in the Middle East would bring a variety of negative consequences for the
United States. First, and most obvious, the global security environment would shift
in a most unfavorable direction. The death and destruction would transcend
geopolitical boundaries and possibly spill over into neighboring regions. The
humanitarian crisis would overwhelm the unprepared regimes throughout the Middle East.
Calls for intervention and relief could result in allies of the United States
becoming involved. Meanwhile, the asymmetric nature of much of the fighting
will offer new opportunities for many young, motivated men and women to
acquire the skills of guerrilla warfare, making them attractive recruits for al-
Qaeda and affiliate terrorist organizations. Wars bring an enabling
environment for arms trafficking and other sorts of criminal activity, as well as human
rights abuses--in some cases, even atrocities like genocide. It is also highly doubtful that,
should such a war take place, the victors of the bloodshed will be inclined to
establish the sort of liberal, open democratic societies that were fostered and
nurtured in Europe and Asia following World War II. The impact of a regional war
on the world's increasingly interdependent economy would go beyond the price we pay to
heat our homes and fuel our cars, which will increase dramatically. (Of course, this could
force more serious private and personal investment in alternative energy sources, which is
not a bad thing.) Key shipping lanes, like the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Suez, will
become hazardous for all types of commercial vessels. We have already witnessed how
instability in the Middle East--punctuated by brief skirmishes like the Israeli-Hezbollah
conflict in 2006--negatively affects global commodity prices, foreign exchange
rates, and other facets of the global economy. A full-blown regional war
would naturally exacerbate this.
SDI BHR 27
D) THE AFF LEADS TO A MORE EFFECTIVE U.S. MILITARY
CHANGE POLICY TO PROPERLY VALUE ENERGY IN THE DOD WOULD

MAKE THE MILITARY FORCES MORE EFFECTIVE

http://www.ndia.org/Content/ContentGroups/Divisions1/Environment/PDFs31/Army%2
0energy%20strategy%20for%20the%20end%20of%20cheap%20oil.pdf
Solutions can only come from a comprehensive systems view of energy.

Account for the total cost of energy in force and equipment design decisions
in terms of the Soldiers, equipment and training necessary to distribute the
fuel at all levels in the supply chain. The savings are larger than a cursory review
might indicate and can result in a distinctly more effective expeditionary and
campaign capable military force. Decision makers at the highest levels must
be made aware of the design tradeoffs involving energy in the acquisition of
military systems and we recommend that investment decisions be based on
the true cost of delivered fuel and on warfighting and environmental
benefits.
INCENTIVES ENSURE READINESS

Provide leadership that incentivizes fuel efficiency throughout the DoD.

For the DoD to take advantage of the large cost and performance benefits
of significant improvements in weapons platform fuel efficiency, senior
civilian
and military leadership must set the tone and agenda within the
Department.
Leadership must begin promoting the message that efficiency at the tactical
platform and system level is a clear strategic path to improve performance,
reduce logistics burden and free resources for modernization and readiness.
This needed emphasis by DoD leadership is not merely desirable; it is an
essential ingredient to achieve the force improvements to execute joint
doctrine.
It is essential that the requirements determination community, specifically
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Services
organizations that input to the JROC, recognize the importance of their decisions
in creating the existing scale of logistics infrastructure. Having created it, they
exclusively have the ability to shrink it by requiring efficient platforms and
systems. This recognition of responsibility at all levels, the implementation of
analytical tools and action on newly revealed opportunities are essential tasks of
departmental leadership.
SDI BHR 28
INCREASED ENERGY EFFICIENCY INCREASES MILITARY

EFFECTIVENESS IN 6 INDEPENDENT WAYS

Improved warfighting capability can be directly linked to improved

adherence to the following Principles of War.
• Surprise: Fuel efficiency increases platform stealth by diminishing the
platform’s heat signatures, exhaust, and/or wakes; and affords less
chance of compromising movement by reducing the logistics tail and
resupply communications.
• Mass: Fuel efficiency decreases the time required to assemble an
overwhelming force.
• Efficiency: Fuel efficiency increases commander’s flexibility in efficiently
assembling an overwhelming force.
• Maneuver: Platforms will travel faster and farther with reduced weight and
smaller logistics tails that improve platform agility, loiter and flexibility.
• Security: Fuel efficiency decreases platform vulnerability to attacks on
supply lines, and reduces demand for strategic reserves.
• Simplicity: Fuel efficiency decreases the complexity and frequency of
refueling operations and logistics planning, while reducing vulnerability to
the “Fog of War”.
SDI BHR 29
ENERGY CONSERVATION WILL HAVE A MULTIPLIER EFFECT ON

MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OVERCOMING OTHER BARRIERS TO
READINESS

– Less Fuel”
The payoff to DoD from reduced fuel demand in terms of mission

effectiveness and
human lives is probably greater than for any other energy user in the world.
More
efficient platforms would enhance range, persistence and endurance. They
also would
reduce the burden of owning, employing, operating and protecting the
people and
equipment needed to move and protect fuel from the point of commercial
purchase to
the point of use. An important implication is that increased energy efficiency
of
deployed equipment and systems will have a large multiplier effect. Not only
will there
be direct savings in fuel cost, but combat effectiveness will be increased and
resources
otherwise needed for resupply and protection redirected. Truck drivers and
convoy protectors can become combat soldiers, increasing combat capability
while reducing
vulnerabilities caused by extensive convoys. In short, more efficient
platforms increase
warfighting capability.
WHILE THERE MAY BE OTHER ISSUES EFFECTING READINESS NO

ISSUE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ENERGY EFFICIENCY
AMORY LOVINS – CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF SCIENTIST ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE APRIL
2008
http://www.ndia.org/Content/ContentGroups/Divisions1/Environment/Energy_PDFs/Rocky%20
Mountain%20INstitute.pdf
Aggressively developing and applying energy-saving technologies to military

applications would potentially do more to solve the most pressing long-term
challenges facing DOD and our national security than any other single
investment area.
SDI BHR 30
TOPICALITY BLOCKS
AT: NOT ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
1) INCLUDING ENERGY CONSERVATION AVOIDS VOTER

DISENFRACHISEMENT.
ENERGY CONSERVATION WAS INCLUDED ON THE STATEMENT OF

TOPICAL AFFS THAT ACCOMPANIED THE BALLOT. PEOPLE WHO
VOTED FOR THE TOPIC BASED ON THAT STATEMENT WOULD BE
DISENFRACHISED BY EXCLUSION OF CONSERVATION. IT IS ALSO THE
BEST INDICATION OF FRAMERS INTENT.
FORENSICS QUARTERLY 2008 (P. 49)
A useful index of the intent of the topic framers is provided by the paragraph
which is sent along with the topic selection ballot. The authors of the topic
proposal and the members of the Wording Committee jointly write this
paragraph. The summary paragraph on the ballot for the alternative
energy topic follows: The demand for energy worldwide is expected to
grow over 50 percent by 2030, and most economies are fundamentally fossil-
fuel based. International competition for these fossil fuels is growing intense
and access to oil especially is often located in places that are geographically
hard to reach and geopolitically challenging. The United States federal
government needs to articulate a sound and sustainable energy policy that
pursues alternative energy resources, so that it has access to available,
sustainable and secure sources that move the country away from its
addiction to fossil fuels. Affirmative plans would require the use of
incentives to promote alternative energy sources, including but not
limited to solar, wind, geothermal, hydroelectric and nuclear power, as well
as, biofuels, hydrogen fuels, new technologies and conservation
measures. Negative approaches to the topic would include a number of
case specific solvency debates, the problems and impacts of using
government incentives and many different disadvantage scenarios such as
foreign policy implications of decreasing oil imports, collapse of economies
such as those of the Middle East and Russia and relations disadvantages, as
well as, a good number of disadvantages specific to particular affirmative
solutions. Counterplan ground might include states/private industry, as well
as, international solutions, and critical argumentation might include
capitalism and the environment. Current federal policy tends to support big
oil and other fossil fuel companies; ultimately, our very civilization will pay a
high price for our lack of oversight and action on the issue of energy. This
topic paragraph is useful in the construction of topicality arguments in
numerous ways. First, the paragraph provides the best record of what
SDI BHR 31
the topic framers were thinking about when they wrote the topic.
Whenever the topicality debate turns to “framers’ intent,” the topic
paragraph provides the most authoritative evidence. Second, the
paragraph was available to the debaters and coaches when they
were voting on the topics. As such, the topic paragraph provides the
best indication of the limits that the voters themselves expected
would be placed on the resolution.
SDI BHR 32
2) ENERGY CONSERVATION IS ONE OF THE THREE MAIN CATEGORIES

OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
New Alternatives Fund 2004

http://www.newalternativesfund.com/invest/invest_alternative.html
Alternative Energy includes three main groups:

Renewable Energy (Solar, Wind, Hydro, Geothermal, Biomass)
Fuel Cells & Hydrogen
Energy Conservation and Enabling Technologies
3) THEIR INTERPRETATION IS FLAWED. IT ASSUMES THE

RESOLUTION SAYS ALTERNATIVE ENERGY GENERATION.
“ALTERNATIVE ENERGY” INCLUDES CONSERVATION AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO INCREASED POWER SUPPLY
UNDP 1999
Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme Report
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/05/06/000094946_000420
0551328/Rendered/INDEX/multi_page.txt
Given these significant social and environmental impacts of power development it

is reasonable to ask what can be done to mitigate or avoid them and what it would
cost. The
environmental impacts of power development may be reduced by using less
electricity, by
controlling the impacts of generation, by preventing waste products reaching the
environment or
by adopting new, intrinsically clean technologies. Energy conservation is an
alternative to new power supply. Renewable energies are an alternative to
fossil-fuel generation.
2.18 These measures cannot be studied in isolation. An integrated view is
necessary to
see how the possibilities in terms of supply, demand and control can be best
combined. The
objective is to find a suitable balance between the needs for power and the
preservation of the
environment over the long-term.
SDI BHR 33
4. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES HAVE AGREED THAT ENERGY

EFFICIENCY IS ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
ASTAE 2008
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTEAPASTAE
/0,,contentMDK:21122177~menuPK:3144322~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSiteP
K:2822888,00.html
In response to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, ASTAE has

extended its definition of alternative energy to include technologies addressing
energy poverty, in addition to renewable energy and energy efficiency which are
generically termed sustainable energy technologies.
5. LAWS HAVE FORMALLY INCLUDED ENERGY CONSERVATION AS

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
THE OFFICE OF SMALL BUSINESS ADVOCATE

ON INTERCONNECTION STANDARDS PROPOSED REGULATIONS 2005
http://www.puc.state.pa.us/electric/pdf/Intercon_Proposed_Regs_Comments-OSBA.pdf.
Section 2 of the Act defines “alternative energy sources” to include 12

categories
of energy production and one category of energy usage reduction. “Distributed
generation system” is one of the 13 categories. Nothing in the definition of “alternative
energy sources” states or implies that one of the 13 categories is to receive a subsidy
or
preferential treatment relative to the other categories.
Section 2 of the Act also defines “Tier II alternative energy source” to
include six
categories of energy production and one category of energy usage reduction.
“Distributed generation systems” are but one of the seven categories included in Tier
II.
Nothing in the definition of “Tier II alternative energy source” states or implies that one
of the seven categories is to receive a subsidy or preferential treatment relative to the
other categories.
6. CONTEXTUALLY IT IS ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
International Institute for Energy Conservation 98

Developing and Financing Energy Efficiency Projects and Ventures in Emerging
Markets
http://www.ecee.org/pubs/financing.pdf.
A difficult path to economic growth still lies ahead for most countries, growth that
depends on
industry, transport and commerce. The expansion of energy supplies and electric
capacity needed
to run these industries carries high monetary and environmental costs. Energy
efficiency is one of the keys to meeting this challenge. Energy saved by making
SDI BHR 34
equipment and systems more efficient represents an alternative energy

resource that is often less costly than new energy supply,
infrastructure and new power plants.
SDI BHR 35
7. ALL ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES REQUIRE USE OF SOME

FOSSIL FUELS TO POWER OR DEVELOP THEM. THEY JUST USE
LESS THAN CONVENTIONAL SOURCES. THEIR INTERPRETATION
WOULD OVERLIMIT.
8. PRESERVES PREDICTABILITY SINCE IT WAS IN THE TOPIC

PAPER.
9. THE NEGATIVE STILL HAS GROUND FROM DISADS BASED ON

REDUCTIONS OF FOSSIL FUEL CONSUMPTION.
SDI BHR 36
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY EXTENSIONS
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IS CONTEXTUALLY A FORM OF ALTERNATIVE

ENERGY
Energy Efficiency Summit East 2008

http://www.infocastinc.com/index.php/conference/efficiency
The need to reduce carbon emissions is driving renewed efforts to harvest the
cheapest and cleanest form of alternative energy: energy efficiency and
demand response.
A recent McKinsey & Company report claims “by capturing the potential available from
existing technologies with an internal rate of return (IRR) of 10 percent or more, we
could cut global energy demand growth by half or more over the next 15 years.”
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IS ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
VANCOOK 2008
http://vanrcook.tripod.com/alternative_energy_sources.htm
Alternative energy sources are being developed at a faster rate as Peak Oil and an
energy crisis approach. Alternative energy sources are divided into the categories of
non-renewable energy sources, e.g. natural gas and renewable energy sources, e.g.
solar energy. Oil sands, LNG, wind power, hybrid cars, solar energy, GTL, ethanol and
improved energy usage efficiency are alternative energy sources with the
best chances to reduce foreign oil dependency.
VANCOOK 2008
http://vanrcook.tripod.com/alternative_energy_sources.htm
Alternative energy sources discussed in this web site include solar energy, oil sands,
ethanol, biodiesel, wind energy, coal mine methane, geothermal energy, nuclear
energy, hybrid cars, LNG, GTL, hydrogen fuel cells, and compressed natural gas.
Also included are energy efficiency improvements which I count as alternative
energy sources. These energy efficiencies are too important to leave out.
SDI BHR 37
ENERGY CONSERVATION IS ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
STREET INSIDER 7-10-2008

http://www.streetinsider.com/New+Coverage/Wachovia+Initiates+Echelon+(ELON)+with+an+Outperform/
3809827.html
(Investment Journal)
Wachovia initiates coverage on Echelon (NASDAQ: ELON) with an Outperform rating

and a $12 to $14 valuation range.
The firm said, "Energy conservation is an alternative energy source, and the
technology to do so automatically, without negatively impacting productivity or
comfort, is here today and available through Echelon’s NES and LWI product lines. We
believe that, over time, the company’s products will increasingly be adopted in various
energy-consuming markets as a way to conserve energy, increase energy efficiency,
and reduce cost. Near term, we believe potential upside could be tempered by a lack
of revenue visibility and cost pressures."
CONSERVATION IS A SOURCE OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY’S GREEN SCHOOL PROGRAM (no date given)

http://www.montgomeryschoolsmd.org/departments/facilities/greenschoolsfocus/pdf/Alliance
IRSecondary.pdf
Conservation is an alternative source of energy that is free and easy to

implement. In order for conservation to be successful, people must learn to
use less energy and use it more efficiently. Each person must recognize that
supplies of fossil fuels are limited, and there major disadvantages (including the
serious environmental effects) of other energy sources.
REDUCTIONS IN DEMAND ARE ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
NEW ALTERNATIVES FUND 2004

http://www.newalternativesfund.com/invest/invest_strategy.html
There is a special interest in alternative energy. Alternative energy means

production and conservation of energy by means which reduce pollution and harm
to the environment; particularly when compared to conventional coal, oil or atomic
energy.
SDI BHR 38
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
1. THEIR INTERPRETATION IS FLAWED. THE TOPIC DOESN’T

REQUIRE ALL THREE BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT , IT
REQUIRES USING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. THE DOD IS
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
REUTERS 3-6-08
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS215488+06-
Mar-2008+BW20080306
The federal government includes all civilian and defence

agencies, departments, organizations, and offices of the US federal
government.
2. COUNTER INTERPRETATION. THE AFFIRMATIVE CAN IDENTIFY

WHICH PART OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOES THE PLAN.
3. THEIR INTERPRETATION OVERLIMITS. NO POLICIES ARE EVER

ADOPTED BY ALL THREE BRANCHES. CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT NORMALLY ENACT LAWS WITHOUT JUDICIAL
ACTION. CONGRESS CAN ENACT LAWS BY ITSELF BY
OVERRIDING A VETO, AND THE COURTS CAN ACT ALONE. ANY
OF THOSE ACTIONS BECOME FEDERAL POLICY.
HELMKE LIBRARY 2004

http://www.lib.ipfw.edu/2641.0.html
Federal policy relies on a constant give-and-take among the branches of government

and is an amalgam of congressional enactment, administrative rulemaking,
and judicial decisions.
4. THE NEGATIVE INTERPRETATION LEGITIMATES AGENT PICS. IT

WOULD ALLOW NEGATIVES TO PIC OUT OF ONE OF THE
BRANCHES AND WE WOULD NEVER FOCUS ON THE MERITS OF
THE PLAN.
5. THE NEG HAS NO RIGHT TO AGENT COUNTERPLANS—
6. THEY STILL HAVE GROUND. THEY CAN ARGUE THE EXECUTIVE

GETS CREDIT AND RUN ALL THEIR PRESIDENTIAL BASED
DISADS.
SDI BHR 39
7. IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO FORCE DEBATE ON THE MERITS. IF WE

WERE FORCED TO DO ALL THREE BRANCHES THEY COULD JUST
COUNTERPLAN WITH THE DOD DOING IT AND THE AFF LOSES ALL
GROUND.
SDI BHR 40
IN THE UNITED STATES
1. THE TOPIC REQUIRES THE INCENTIVES TO BE IN THE U.S. NOT

THE ENERGY CONSUMPTION. THE PLAN REQUIRES THE
INCENTIVES TO BE IN THE U.S. THE CHANGING IN VALUATION
IS PART OF A BUDGETING AND ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE DONE
IN THE U.S. AND THE REWARDS ARE GIVEN IN THE FORM OF
BUDGET RETURNS TO UNITS AND PROMOTIONS FOR OFFICERS
ALL OF WHICH OCCUR IN THE U.S.
2. THIS IS AT BEST AN EXTRATOPICALITY ARGUMENT NOT A

TOPICALITY VIOLATION. IF ANY OF THE INCENTIVES WE GIVE
OCCUR OUT OF THE UNITED STATES THEY COULD BE SEVERED
OUT OF THE PLAN.
3. IN IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE TERM. IN DOES NOT REQUIRE THEM

TO BE EXCLUSIVELY IN THE U.S. THEY COULD TOPICALLY BE IN
AS WELL AS OUT AS LONG AS THEY WERE NOT ONLY OUT OF
THE U.S.
4. IT DOES NOT TAKE OUT SOLVENCY. MOST DOD ENERGY

CONSUMPTION IS IN THE UNITED STATES
DIMOTAKIS, GROBER & LEWIS SEPT 2006

Paul Dimotakis, Robert Grober, Nate Lewis JASON STUDY GROUP
Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf
DoD lives in a complex and changing regulatory environment.

Additionally, most of the DoD fuel is consumed in the
continental U.S. Congress has mandated that most of this fuel
must meet the 15 ppm sulfur regulation in the future. JP-8
does not meet this specification. Note that exceptions are
provided for ground combat vehicles, e.g., Bradley, Abrams,
and Stryker vehicles.
5. MILITARY BASES ABROAD ARE U.S. TERRITORY
LATTINVILLE 96
Robert Lattinville is an attorney practicing in the corporate
department of Stinson, Mag & Fizzell Kansas Journal of Law &
Public Policy
SDI BHR 41
"Territory" means the United States of America, its territories, and

possessions, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as well as United States
military bases abroad.
SDI BHR 42
SUBSTANTIALLY
1. SUBSTANTIALLY IS AN ADVERB IN THE RESOLUTION. AS AN

ADVERB IT REFERS TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE INCREASE
OCCURS NOT THE AMOUNT. WE MEET BECAUSE WE
UNCONDITIONALLY COMMIT TO OFFERING THE INCENTIVES
Smith 84
Jim, Attorney General of florida 1984
http://myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/9CF0AA7178DC692C8525657700610790
'Substantially' is variously defined as meaning in a substantial manner; in

substance; in the main; essentially; solidly; actually; really; truly; competently."
83 C.J.S. Substantially p. 765.
2. THE COUNTERINTERPRETATION PROVIDES A LIMITING

FUNCTION FOR THE WORD SUBSTANTIALLY. IT PREVENTS
AFFIRMATIVES FROM CONDITIONING THE OFFER OF
INCENTIVES ON OTHER ACTIONS.
3. QUANTITATIVE DEFINITIONS DON’T MAKE SENSE IN THE

CONTEXT OF THE RESOLUTION. TOTAL U.S. FEDERAL
INCENTIVES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO QUANTITATIVE
MEASUREMENT. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE HOW MANY
TOTAL INCENTIVES EXIST.
4. THE NEG INTERP OVERLIMITS. IT ELIMINATES ALL AFFS THAT

GIVE INCENTIVES TO SPECIFIC ENERGIES
5. WE ARE A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN INCENTIVES. THERE ARE

NO INCENTIVES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE DOD NOW
6. COUNTERINTERPRETATION. SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE MEANS

A VALUABLE INCREASE
Law Encyclopedia: 2008

http://www.answers.com/topic/substantial
Substantial
Of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable. Belonging to

substance; actually existing; real; not seeming or imaginary; not illusive; solid; true;
veritable.
SDI BHR 43
7. WE CONTEXTUALLY MEET

Increasing energy efficiency within the DoD can have substantial value well
beyond what current analyses would conclude due to a flawed energy accounting
process. It would provide a more effective expeditionary and campaign
quality Army for the same cost.
The options for reducing the impact of rising oil prices are several at this point, but
with the rapidly increasing cost of liquid fuels, not much time exists to develop and
implement these options.
8. WE ARE SUBSTANTIAL. THE DOD IS THE LARGEST ENERGY

USER IN THE UNITED STATES
TURSE ‘8
Nick Turse, a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, is the associate editor and research director of
Tomdispatch.com March 2008
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5097/
According to retired lieutenant general Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., the president of the
National Defense Industrial Association (“America’s leading Defense Industry
association promoting National Security”), the Pentagon is “the single largest
consumer of petroleum fuels in the United States.” In fact, it’s the world’s
largest energy consumer, according to Shachtman. That, alone, guarantees the
military-petroleum complex isn’t going anywhere, anytime soon – just some fuel for
thought next time you head out to a Shell, BP, Exxon, or Mobil station to fill ’er up.
9. THEIR INTERPRETATION IS ARBITRARY

SDI BHR 44
INHERENCY EXTENSIONS
AT: DOD DOING EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES NOW
1. WE POST DATE. THE 2008 STUDY GROUP IN THE 1AC SAYS

DESPITE SOME EFFORTS IT IS NOT DONE SYSTEMATICALLY AND
THERE ARE NO INCENTIVES.
2. THE DOD IS NOT IMPLEMENTING THE MEASURES IT HAS

ADOPTED NOW
DefenseAlert - 6/12/2008
http://www.defensenewsstand.com/defensenewsstand_spclsubj.asp?s=fuel
Defense Department officials have never applied a 2006 Pentagon policy

aimed at making energy efficiency a key criterion in the development of new
military capabilities, sources tell InsideDefense.com.
3. PRESENT DOD EFFORTS ARE TOO PATCHWORK. IT NEEDS TO BE

INTEGRATED THROUGH EVERY ASPECT OF THE MILITARY TO SOLVE
French 07
Felicia French, LTC, US Army Army Environmental Policy Institute
http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/how-army-can-be-energy-paragon.pdf
This paper demonstrates the need for an Army Energy Strategy that supports the new
Army Strategy for the Environment six goals. This analysis indicates that currently
the Army has an energy program that is insular, fragmented and needs an
integrated approach. This is not to say that the Army is not already making
an effort toward conserving energy and using renewable energy in a number
of sites and areas. However, because of the Army’s limited resources, it
needs to make a concerted effort to focus and prioritize against the Army’s
Strategy for the Environment until it is expanded into our everyday life and on
every Army installation and operation.
SDI BHR 45
4. EVEN IF THE DOD IS PURSUING EFFICIENCY NOW, IN THE PRESENT

SYSTEM THEY WON’T IN THE FUTURE
BLACKWELL 07
Kristine E. Blackwell National Defense Fellow Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
The Department of Defense: Reducing Its Reliance on Fossil-Based Aviation Fuel –
Issues for Congress
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf.
There are also those who express concern that enthusiasm for recent energy
initiatives will wane once a sense of urgency regarding energy availability
and prices
has subsided. Without a dedicated DOD focal point to ensure consistent
progress of
the various energy related activities within the department, this concern
may have
some merit. In light of the financial demands put on DOD by ongoing operations,
it is possible that without a dedicated advocate, funding for energy related
initiatives
may be discontinued or postponed indefinitely.
SDI BHR 46
DOD FAILS TO FULLY IMPLEMENT ITS CURRENT ENERGY INITIATIVES
BLACKWELL 07
Kristine E. Blackwell National Defense Fellow Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
The Department of Defense: Reducing Its Reliance on Fossil-Based Aviation Fuel –
Issues for Congress
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf.
DOD’s efforts to explore greater use of alternative aviation fuel and to

reduce
its overall consumption of petroleum-based fuel have been lauded by many.
However, the department’s ability to follow through with its initiatives may
be
adversely affected by a number of factors. They include DOD organizational
structure, funding, and external expectations for DOD in the nation’s search for
alternative fuel sources.
DOD Organizational Structure
The perception among many in DOD and others in the federal government
seems to be that there are no clear organizational lines of responsibility to
lead and
manage the department’s energy reduction efforts.81 This may adversely
affect its
ability to complete long-term projects that are underway and to fund or
implement
new ones.
Many offices within DOD have responsibility for individual energy-related
initiatives but the growing number and complexity of activities seem to have
grown
beyond the current capabilities of the organizational structure. The USD
(AT&L) has
been directed to ensure the implementation of President's Bush 2007 Executive Order
and to "continue efforts of the Energy Security Task Force by implementing the
findings and monitoring implementation"82 However, there does not appear to be a
designated individual in that office to oversee a comprehensive department-
wide
energy strategy–to prioritize, coordinate, and advocate for the various
ongoing
projects.
SDI BHR 47
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 2001 DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

REPORT HAVE NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED

– Less Fuel”
The recommendations from the 2001 Defense Science Board Task

Force Report “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden” have
not been implemented.
The principal finding of the 2001 DSB report was that DoD systematically
underestimates the cost of fuel to its tactical forces by failing to recognize the costs of
the support structure and the protection necessary to bring that fuel to the systems
that
use it. As a consequence, significant warfighting, logistics and monetary
benefits are
available from making weapons systems more fuel-efficient, but those
benefits are not
valued or emphasized in DoD’s requirements and acquisition processes. The
report
found that the requirements process does not require energy efficiency in deployed
systems, the acquisition process does not value it, so the PPBES process cannot not
provide it visibility when considering investment decisions.
These findings remain valid today. Few of the recommendations of that study
have
been implemented to date. Those that have begun; making energy efficiency a
selective Key Performance Parameter in system design, and using the fully burdened
cost of fuel in life cycle costing of alternative systems; are in their early stages of
implementation. Focused leadership will be required to complete the recommendations
of the 2001 study and similar recommendations made herein.
SDI BHR 48
THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS NOT MAXIMIZING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN

THE MILITARY

Finding #1
Although significant warfighting, logistics and cost benefits
occur when weapons systems are made more fuel-efficient,
these benefits are not valued or emphasized in the DoD
requirements and acquisition processes.
Military requirements documents understandably place the highest priority
on performance. However, defining performance too narrowly imposes a
substantial provisioning and maintenance penalty. There have been efforts to
reduce support costs by improving certain platform features, but they too have
focused narrowly. For example, recent DoD policy guidance placed heavy
emphasis on improving reliability as a way to reduce support costs and logistics
burden. However, substantial performance gains can also be achieved through
improving the efficiency of platforms and systems in other ways. These
opportunities are overlooked because the analyses used to identify cost
drivers
do not include important factors. Making a platform more fuel efficient also
improves its combat capability by increasing range and payload, and
reducing
combat vulnerability. In terms of their broader contribution to warfighting
capability, more efficient platforms are more deployable and sustainable. To
optimize costs and capability, all these factors must be considered as
integral to
the whole combat system. Current approaches overlook opportunities to
deliver
more capability at less cost.
THE DOD DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR THE REAL COSTS OF FUEL

The DoD currently prices fuel based on the wholesale refinery

price and does not include the cost of delivery to its
customers. This prevents an end-to-end view of fuel utilization
in decision making, does not reflect the DoD’s true fuel costs,
masks energy efficiency benefits, and distorts platform design
choices.
SDI BHR 49
INCENTIVES SOLVENCY EXTENSIONS

CALCULATING REAL COSTS AND GIVING INCENTIVES FOR
APPLICATION WITHIN THE DOD SOLVES

http://www.ndia.org/Content/ContentGroups/Divisions1/Environment/PDFs31/Army%20energy%20strategy
%20for%20the%20end%20of%20cheap%20oil.pdf
Policy changes. The conclusions and recommendations of the 2001 Defense Science
Board Reportxxvi are even more important in 2005. Presently, the real cost of fuel in
the Army is invisible to decision makers and, therefore, fuel conservation
measures have no apparent value in the decision making process. To
change its culture, the U.S. military must first account for the true cost of
energy in the planning, programming and budgeting process. The leadership
must then provide guidance with tangible motivations for increasing energy
efficiency and set aggressive but realistic goals for unit and installation
commanders that provides for the sharing of energy savings. An unpublished
study of the processes and goals instituted by private industry to reduce their energy
needs demonstrates that a serious approach to energy conservation has produced
substantial savings in a wide range of industries.xxvii
INCENTIVES SOLVE
BOOK 02
Elizabeth, National Defence Information Agency
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2002/Mar/Pentagon_Needs.htm
Incentives for Efficiency

Another recommendation of the Defense Science Board was to “provide leadership
that incentivizes fuel efficiency throughout the Defense Department.” The report
suggested that senior civilian and military leadership should set the agenda within
the department to promote fuel efficiency. A consultant to the report explained that
there is no language in the acquisition process that says fuel efficiency should be a
consideration when new weapons platforms are procured. “We found nothing in the
requirements documents that addressed the issue of efficiency,” he said.
One of the report findings was that the Defense Department’s “resource allocation
and accounting processes do not reward efficiency or penalize inefficiency.”
If fuel efficiency is not being considered during the early stages of the acquisition
process, it is less likely to become a deciding factor later on, said the consultant. Also,
“the people who would make the fuel efficiency investment, such as a program
officer, would not be the same people who would benefit—probably the operating
commanders,” he said. “We found that the system neither requires nor values
efficiency.” The DSB suggested that fuel efficiency goals be included in requirement
documents for new vehicle programs.
The research and development community, additionally, should “make platform fuel
efficiency a primary focus to identify, track and package technologies,” said the report.
“Highlighting the potential of a mix of technologies to improve the war-fighting
capability of fleets of specific platforms through higher efficiency gives operators
greater flexibility in choosing retrofit and new system features that minimize support
requirements and maximize overall operational capability.”
SDI BHR 50
NEW INCENTIVES ARE THE KEY TO SOLVENCY

The United States uses more petroleum each year than the next five
largest consuming nations combined. Military fuel consumption for aircraft,
ships, ground vehicles and facilities makes the DoD the single largest
consumer
of petroleum in America, perhaps in the world. However, DoD consumes a very
small proportion of the total national or global fuel supply. The most important
sources of the world’s oil are increasingly concentrated in the Southwest Asia,
and if recent decades are a guide for the future, America’s military forces will be
called upon again when the world fuel supply is threatened or interrupted.
Ten years after the Cold War, over 70 percent of the tonnage required to
position today’s U.S. Army into battle is fuel. Naval forces depend each day on
millions of gallons of fuel to operate around the globe. The Air Force is the
largest DoD consumer, and spends approximately 85 percent of its fuel budget to
deliver, by airborne tankers, just 6 percent of its annual jet fuel usage.
Considering this large and costly fuel usage, it would seem logical for the
DoD to instinctively strive for continuous improvement in the fuel efficiency
of all
its platforms and forces. Similarly, a high and visible DoD priority would be to
improve fuel efficiency to enhance platform performance, reduce the size of the
fuel logistics system, reduce the burden high fuel consumption places on agility,
reduce operating costs, and dampen the budget impact from volatile oil prices.
To achieve these goals, future Science & Technology investments would
focus more on fuel efficiency; cost-benefit decisions would be based on the true
cost of fuel; and modern, near-real-time modeling tools concerning fuel efficiency
choices would aid decision makers in the requirements determination, acquisition
and war gaming communities. Strong incentives would then encourage operators
to reduce consumption while still maintaining readiness; the requirements
process would demand fuel efficiency in platforms; the acquisition system
would
produce more efficient platforms and systems; and senior civilian and
military
leadership would trumpet the huge advantages of efficiency to combat
capability.
Unfortunately, none of these priorities, tools or incentives are in evidence
today.
SDI BHR 51
INCENTIVES FROM DOD LEADERSHIP ARE THE KEY TO SOLVENCY

Provide leadership that incentivizes fuel efficiency throughout the DoD.

civilian
Department.
This needed emphasis by DoD leadership is not merely desirable; it is an
essential ingredient to achieve the force improvements to execute joint
doctrine.
in creating the existing scale of logistics infrastructure. Having created it, they
exclusively have the ability to shrink it by requiring efficient platforms and
systems. This recognition of responsibility at all levels, the implementation of
analytical tools and action on newly revealed opportunities are essential tasks of
departmental leadership.
ACCOUNTING FOR THE REAL COSTS OF FUEL WOULD CREATE

INCENTIVES FOR MAXIMIZING PLATFORM EFFICIENCY

If the true costs of fuel delivery and supporting infrastructure (including

equipment, people, facilities and other overhead costs) were known, understood
and factored into the cost of fuel, the requirements and acquisition
processes
would be more focused on the true benefits of improving platform efficiency.
This
would create incentives for DoD to integrate efficiency into those processes,
thereby cutting battlefield fuel demand and reducing the fuel logistics
structure.
Until policy guidance requires emphasis on weapons system fuel
efficiency and the true cost of provisioning fuel to end users is gathered and
understood, there is no incentive for leaders, managers or operators to
depart
from current practice. Clear policy guidance will enable the DoD to achieve
the
deployability, agility and sustainability required by joint doctrine.
SDI BHR 52
INCENTIVES ARE THE KEY TO INCREASING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN

THE DOD
Provide leadership that incentivizes fuel efficiency throughout

the DoD.
civilian
Department.
in creating the existing scale of logistics infrastructure. Having created the
existing scale of the logistics infrastructure, they have the ability and an important
obligation to reduce the demand on logistics infrastructure by requiring efficient
platforms and systems. This recognition of responsibility at all levels, and
willingness to implement analytical tools that can reveal where the opportunities
exist and act on analytically indicated opportunities are necessary departmental
leadership roles.
The task force recommends that the Department:
• Develop and implement incentives for operational users to find ways to
become more efficient in training, exercise and combat operations, similar
to NAVSEA's Encon Program in which operational commanders are
permitted to keep a portion of the financial savings for local priorities
rather than relinquishing the entire savings to the comptroller.
• Issue a policy memorandum recognizing efficiency at the platform level as
an important element of becoming more agile, deployable, sustainable
and reducing support costs.
SDI BHR 53
READINESS SOLVENCY EXTENSIONS

DOD ACTION ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IS KEY TO PRESERVE U.S.
LEADERSHIP
Lengyel 7
Gregory J. Colonel USAF. August 2007.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf.
The Department of Defense can lead the way in transforming the way in
which the United States consumes and produces energy. In the 1985 movie, Back to
the Future, scientist Dr. Emmett Brown returns from the year 2015 with a 1980’s vintage vehicle modified with a
“Mr. Fusion” device creating huge amounts of energy from organic material found in common household garbage.
The year 2015 is only 8 years away and there is no evidence Mr. Fusion, or any other major scientific breakthrough
making oil obsolete, is going to happen inside the next 30 years. Mr. Fusion represents the unlikely event of a game
In reality there are few home runs to
winning home run with bases loaded and a full count.
reduce the United States’ addiction to foreign oil. Improving energy security
must be done using a steady, incremental approach not tied to individual
personalities, specific military leaders or partisan political administrations.
Securing the energy future of the Department of Defense is a
prerequisite to ensuring the United States remains the world’s
preeminent global power.
SDI BHR 54
A 10% REDUCTION IN FUEL CONSUMPTION WOULD HAVE A RIPPLE

EFFECT ON MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS ACROSS THE BOARD
Consider the value of reducing fuel requirements by ten percent.

The cost of oil energy for the Army is driven more by the transportation weight of the
fuel and its associated distribution system for both the initial deployment and for
continual resupply than by the actual cost of the oil itself. To achieve the expeditionary
and campaign quality goals of the Army Chief, the best force possible must be
designed within the constraints of maximum size and cost given the realities of an all
volunteer Army and limited funding.
Consider, for example, the Division equipped with the Future Combat System. We can
reliably estimate the following force design parameters:
Initial Deployment. The maximum cargo weight and volume per day that can be
devoted to airlift and sealift the ground forces by the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy
during the initial deployment is well known. This establishes the rate at which forces
can be deployed into the theater. Change the weight and volume of the initially
deployed force, and you change the rate at which ground forces can be deployed to
any desired location. Reduce the initial supply needs of the force during deployment
and you can increase the rate of initial combat force employment.
• Resupply. The maximum weight and volume per day that can be devoted to airlift
and sealift the resupply needs of the ground forces is generally known. By reducing the
weight and volume of the supply needs of the force, resources allocated to transport
and distribute the supplies can be reallocated to increase the effectiveness of the
combat force.
A reduction in fuel requirements can, therefore, cause a ripple effect
throughout the DoD that can ultimately result in a better design of our
military forces to significantly increase the ability of the Army to provide the
most capable force to the combatant commanders. Using the actual weight and
volume data, it would be possible to estimate the sensitivity of ground force
effectiveness to a reduction in fuel requirements. The authors believe that this
sensitivity is more significant than intuition might presume.
The other factor in designing future force structure is the almost certain
knowledge that the cost of liquid petroleum fuels is going to substantially
increase; some experts predict a 200% increase in the next five years. Therefore,
without a reduction in fuel requirements, more of the resources allocated to
the DoD to design our military forces will go into fuel and less into enhancing
the mission effectiveness of the force.
SDI BHR 55
BASING DECISIONS ON THE TRUE COSTS OF ENERGY LEAD TO A

TRANSFORMATION OF POLICY LEADING TO INCREASED READINESS


benefits.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY TECHNOLOGIES THAT INCREASE OPERATIONAL

EFFECTIVENESS CAN BE READILY IMPLEMENTED IF PROPERLY
INCENTIVIZED

– Less Fuel”
There are technologies available now to make DoD systems more

energy efficient, but they are undervalued, slowing their implementation and
resulting in inadequate S&T investments.
The Task Force heard over a hundred presentations on technologies that addressed all
categories of end use, covering the full range of maturity from basic research to ready
to-
implement. Many of these appear quite promising. But because the operational
and
economic value of energy efficiency is not visible to decision making
processes, cost
effective technologies are not adopted, and science and technology
programs under invest
in efficiency relative to the potential value of this attribute.
The Task Force found the defense acquisition process to be inherently risk-
adverse, not
incentivized to be energy efficient, and generally preferring to support
incremental
improvements over new system designs. From an operator’s perspective this is
understandable, but it also forecloses disruptive technology that could greatly
enhance
SDI BHR 56
operational effectiveness through order of magnitude changes in energy

efficiency.
SDI BHR 57
INCREASED EFFICIENCY IN FUEL USE FREES UP RESOURCES TO

ENSURE MILITARY READINESS
The military services maintain huge infrastructures to ensure fuel delivery at

the right time and place. Large and small surface trucking organizations, naval fleet
tankers and aerial refueling aircraft, along with the associated substantial maintenance
and logistics organizations contribute to considerable overhead costs.
Increases in fuel efficiency would correspondingly shrink this overhead
burden, enabling savings through reductions in logistics requirements far in
excess of the investment. These savings accrue largely during peacetime,
and represent opportunities to shift financial resources from logistics to
operations, or from “tail to tooth”, over time.
SDI BHR 58
THE EFFECTS OF ENERGY SAVINGS ON READINESS ARE LINEAR

Due to the ripple effect discussed earlier, saving a gallon of fuel in our tactical
vehicles results in more than a gallon of fuel saved overall. This savings at
the end user is compounded by the savings in the distribution system, not
just in terms of fuel required to transport fuel, but also in the people who
operate and administer the distribution of fuel from the well to the
battlefield. Since it is estimated that 70% of the initial deployment and the resupply
weight required by an Army unit is fuel, this cascading effect may be as large as
1.5 gallons saved overall for each gallon saved due to increased fuel
efficiency in a tactical vehicle.
INCREASED EFFICIENCY IN ENERGY USE IS KEY TO READINESS

Increasing energy efficiency within the DoD can have substantial value well
beyond what current analyses would conclude due to a flawed energy accounting
process. It would provide a more effective expeditionary and campaign
quality Army for the same cost.
The options for reducing the impact of rising oil prices are several at this point, but
with the rapidly increasing cost of liquid fuels, not much time exists to develop and
implement these options.
For the military to operate effectively in the coming age of very expensive
liquid fuels, changes to our culture, policies and technology are essential.
SDI BHR 59
IF THE DOD ACCOUNTED FOR THE TRUE COST OF ENERGY IT WOULD

TRANSFORM ITS PROCEDURES AND SOLVE READINESS


benefits.
ALTERNATIVE FUELS ARE KEY TO READINESS
Naval Research Advisory Committee APRIL 2006

FUTURE FUELS
http://www.onr.navy.mil/nrac/docs/2005_rpt_future_fuels.pdf
Thus to ensure that operational commanders are better able to achieve their
missions,
system engineers and designers need to work with military users to better
design future
vehicles with increased fuel efficiency to maximize combat power. In order to
mitigate
transportation and on board storage requirements, high energy density fuels are
essential.
Liquid hydrocarbon fuels, such as diesel, represent the highest energy
density fuels available
for ground transportation. Asked to develop the ideal transportation fuel, a chemist
stated that
the result would be a liquid hydrocarbon.
While the panel identified no single action that would achieve the goal of reducing
fuel consumption by 50%, it is clear that improving the management of fuel
resources on the battlefield can lead to a significant extension of operational
reach.
SDI BHR 60
ALTERNATIVES ARE CRITICAL TO REDUCE CASUALTIES AND CAN BE

SUPPLIED FROM EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES
Lawrence P. Farrel 07
l Jr. Oct 20
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2007/October/PresPersp.htm
Besides trying to reduce the nation’s dependence on foreign oil, the military has
other compelling reasons to reduce its reliance on traditional fuels. In late July,
Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, the commander of U.S. forces in the
al-Anbar province of Iraq, sent an urgent request to the Defense
Department, asking for renewable energy systems to help reduce the
demand for ground transportation convoys.
In response, the Army Rapid Equipping Force is evaluating industry proposals
to build and ship to Iraq renewable-energy power stations that would use a
combination of solar and wind technologies.
By reducing the need for petroleum-based fuels, Zilmer writes, “We can
decrease the frequency of logistics convoys on the road, thereby reducing
the danger to our Marines, soldiers and sailors."
The good news is that the military services already are way ahead of other sectors of
the economy in the use of green energy. The Air Force is one of this nation's largest
buyers of green power, says energy consultant Scott Sklar of The Stella Group Ltd. Fort
Huachuca, Ariz., and Fort Bragg, N.C., employ solar and wind technologies to power
buildings. China Lake, Calif., has invested in a portfolio of energy efficiency and
renewable energy applications.
But for the Defense Department to have more impact as a national leader in
the energy area, explains Sklar, it needs to do a better job disseminating
information and gaining access to the technologies already available in the
marketplace.
Zilmer’s request for renewable energy sources could be met by any number
of existing electric generation units powered by solar and wind, as well as
fuel cells, advanced battery banks, small wind and thin film photovoltaics.
SDI BHR 61
ENERGY EFFICIENCY WILL MAKE TROOPS MORE MOBILE AND

EFFECTIVE

– Less Fuel”
Land Force Energy Efficient Technologies

Energy Starved Electronics for Land Warriors
As stated earlier, a principal problem facing the land warrior is the weight of
batteries
needed to power the equipment carried into combat. Various supply-side
solutions
have been proposed, including lightweight high energy density batteries, rechargeable
batteries, and fuel cells powered by methanol, JP-8, propane or some other source.
Another approach is to severely reduce the power demands of the end use equipment.
A recent NRC study recommended that the Army make energy efficiency a
first-order
design parameter and provide direct monetary incentives to manufacturers
to reduce
power demand in all procurements for soldier electronics, and especially for
communications gear. That study recommended that the Army aim for a future
soldier
system that would require no more than 2W average power and 5W peak
power, a very
substantial reduction from what soldier systems require today. Defense
Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is supporting a program (“Energy Starved
Electronics”) to reduce the power consumption of conventional signal processor
electronics by >10x while maintaining comparable throughput. Such performance
would
exceed that of already power-efficient portable consumer electronics, but would indeed
be feasible using new technologies already nearing commercialization.
Significant soldier equipment efficiency improvements coupled with
improved batteries
and new lightweight, portable, collapsible solar collectors for recharging
batteries in the
field could significantly reduce the weight soldiers carry. The improvements
would
reduce soldier requirement for power and also the number of batteries required to
supply it. This could lighten packs and reduce jump injuries, or could permit
more food,
water, munitions, etc. to be carried, increasing endurance.
SDI BHR 62
THE JASON STUDY CONCLUDES AFFIRMATIVE ADVOCATING

REDUCING FUEL CONSUMPTION TO PRESERVE READINESS

Even though fuel is only a relatively small fraction of the total DoD budget, there
are several compelling reasons to minimize DoD fuel use:
a. Fuel costs represent a large fraction of the 40-50 year life-cycle costs of
mobility aircraft and non-nuclear ships. Note that this is consistent with the
life-cycle costs of commercial airliners.
b. Fuel use is characterized by large multipliers and co-factors: at the simplest
level, it takes fuel to deliver fuel.
c. Fuel use imposes large logistical burdens, operational constraints and
liabilities,
and vulnerabilities: otherwise capable offensive forces can be countered by
attacking more-vulnerable logistical-supply chains. Part of this is because of
changes in military doctrine. In the past, we used to talk of the “front line”,
because we used to talk of the line that was sweeping ahead, leaving
relatively
safe terrain behind. This is no longer true. The rear is now vulnerable,
especially the fuel supply line.
d. There are anticipated, and some already imposed, environmental regulations
and constraints.
Not least, because of the long life of many DoD systems,
e. uncertainties about an unpredictable future make it advisable to decrease
DoD
fuel use to minimize exposure and vulnerability to potential unforeseen
disruptions in world and domestic supply.
The JASONs conclude that the greatest leverage in reducing the DoD
dependence on
fossil fuel is through an optimization of patterns of use, e.g., planning and
gaming, as
well as the development of in-situ optimization tools of fuel use that would help
planners
and field officers choose between operational scenarios to minimize logistical support
requirements by minimizing fuel consumption. Such tools for planning and for
conducting operations could evolve and improve tactics, and enable significant
reductions in fuel consumption, while improving military effectiveness at the
same time.

The key conclusions of the study are that, barring unforeseen circumstances,
availability
concerns are not a decision driver in the reduction of DoD fossil-fuel use at present.
However, the need to improve logistics requirements and military capabilities,
and,
SDI BHR 63
secondarily, the need to reduce fuel costs, as well as providing a prudent

hedge against a
foggy future, especially in the Middle East and South America, argue for a
reduction in
fuel use, in general.
SDI BHR 64
INEFFICIENT ENERGY CRUSHES READINESS NOW
French 07
The Army does not have the luxury of ignoring its dependence on fossil fuel. Along
with the rest of the Nation, it is almost completely dependent on fossil fuel to
accomplish its mission. The Department of Defense (DoD) bill for mobility and
installation energy was over $8.2 billion in fiscal year 2004 (27: NP). DoD is the
largest single consumer of the total U.S. energy consumed. The Army uses
about 6 percent of DoD mobility fuels (gas, diesel and jet fuel) to power tactical and
utility vehicles, and weapons platforms to include M1 Abrams tanks and all helicopters
(9: 4). However, this does not account for the fuel used by Air Force planes and Navy
ships in transporting Army personnel and equipment in peacetime and especially in
wartime. Fuel logistics for the Army accounts for 70 percent of all tonnage hauled
when the Army mobilizes. The transportation of that same fuel from base to projection
platform comprises 8 percent of the cost (21: 85). The Army also pays $3.2 billion
annually to 20,000 active duty and 40,000 reserve component personnel to transport
this fuel (21: 88). The Army could have more “teeth” and less “tail” if we
weren’t so dependent upon this fuel. This logistical behemoth impedes
deployment, maneuverability, and increases our personnel and equipment
requirements and diverts troops from combat arms.
SDI BHR 65
EFFICIENCY IS CRITICAL TO WARFIGHTING AND REDUCES

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE

Improving DoD Energy Efficiency Addresses Important

Environmental Security Issues
Maintaining our national security is DoD’s paramount mission. That is why
the task force has stressed in this report the evidence that improving the fuel
efficiency of weapons platform has large and unrecognized potential to
strengthen warfighting capability and free resources for other high priority
military
needs. There are, in addition, major environmental benefits from reducing
DoD’s
fuel consumption and hence the environmental footprint of its worldwide
operations. These, too, should be recognized in making decisions on investment
in fuel efficiency technology.
SDI BHR 66
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IS KEY TO WAR FIGHTING IN A POST COLD WAR

WORLD

This section addresses the contribution of fuel efficiency to DoD’s core

capabilities as described in Joint Vision 2010 / 2020, and the Army
Transformation. These documents describe the nature of future threats and the
capabilities US forces must posses to counter them. The post-Cold War threats
are characterized by diversity and asymmetry. To counter them, US forces
must
become more agile and autonomous. Efficiency, or the achievement of
maximum lethality for minimum logistics, is a strong indicator of agility.
Better
fuel efficiency improves warfighting capability, reduces deployment times
and
increases sustainability. However, the analytical tools available for quantifying
the contribution of fuel efficiency to these outcomes are weak.
SDI BHR 67
FUEL EFFICIENCY INCREASES MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 explicitly recognize that improving platform
and system level fuel efficiency improves agility, while concurrently reducing
deployment times and support / logistics requirements. The excerpts in the
chart
below are examples from over a dozen specific statements that stress the
importance of improving the efficiency of weapons platforms and systems to
meet the new and diverse threats to our national security. These observations
contained in Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 are completely consistent with the
findings of the task force. Further, each of the approximately 100 technologies
the task force reviewed that improved the fuel efficiency of platforms also
improved military capability.
Other passages within Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 describe future visions
of military capability that require platforms that are more quickly deployable and
more self-sufficient. Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 also note that the future force
must be achieved mostly with the legacy systems still in the inventory. As a
result, this task force concluded that the “rules” by which retrofits are justified
on
the basis of economics and capability must be changed to capture all of the
benefits of improving efficiency, to include force structure changes enabled
by
making platforms and systems more efficient.
This task force studied how unconstrained fuel requirements present a
burden to military forces and impair capability. The task force concluded
“dramatic improvements in fuel efficiency of platforms and systems are
critical
enablers of Joint Vision 2010 / 2020 objectives.”
SDI BHR 68
FUTURE INTERVENTIONS ARE INEVITABLE

INTERVENTION IS INEVITABLE
Zalmay Khalilzad, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of

Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, Conflict in the 21st Century, 1998
P. 11
We are convinced that the United States will remain engaged as a major player on
the global scene through the first years of the 21st century. Indeed, despite the
occasional eruption of isolationist sentiments, we believe that the nation simply has
little choice in the matter. The sheer magnitude of the U.S. economy; the country’s
dense and increasing web of commercial, cultural, political, and security ties to other
nations and actors; and its sheer pervasiveness and prominence make the United
States the globe’s “500-pound gorilla” whether we like it or not. With the end of
the global East-West competition, the United States can be more selective in its
military involvement around the world than was the case during the Cold War.
However, as a powerful actor with global interests, the United States will remain
likely to become involved in a variety of foreign contingencies, ranging from forward
defense of a threatened ally to disaster relief and other varieties of humanitarian
assistance. The U.S. military will be called upon to play a major role in some such
undertakings. As such, it seems desirable that the armed forces, including the Air
Force, remain “fullservice” providers. It is difficult to identify what existing deployable
capabilities the military can afford to divest itself of in the face of the possible menu
of challenges confronting the United States over the next quarter century.
SDI BHR 69
READINESS UNIQUENESS
Readiness low now
The Huffington Post, February 8 2008 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/02/08/war-
demands-strain-us-mil_n_85797.html
WASHINGTON — A classified Pentagon assessment concludes that long battlefield
tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with persistent terrorist activity and other threats,
have prevented the U.S. military from improving its ability to respond to any new crisis,
The Associated Press has learned.
Despite security gains in Iraq, there is still a "significant" risk that the strained U.S.
military cannot quickly and fully respond to another outbreak elsewhere in the world,
according to the report.
Readiness low now

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia's Fourth Congressional District, May 23 2008
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ga04_johnson/2008_05_23_memorial_day_release.html
WASHINGTON -- Congressman Hank Johnson, a member of the House Armed Services
Committee who has worked tirelessly to ensure that our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and
Airmen not only have the best equipment available, but that their families have the
housing, healthcare and standard of living that they deserve, voted last night for the
Defense Authorization bill. Army readiness, he said, has dropped to unprecedented
levels.
“Thanks to the war in Iraq which is draining our military resources, Army National
Guard units have, on average, only 63 percent of their required equipment and many
stateside units are not fully equipped to respond during an emergency,” said Rep.
Johnson. “Equally important, our military personnel deserve pay raises, access to
affordable health care and better educational benefits to help them re-enter the
workforce.”
SDI BHR 70
FUTURE DECLINES IN READINESS ARE COMING NOW

DEFENSE BUDGETS ARE TIGHT NOW AND NEW MONEY WON’T BE PROVIDED
Lawrence P. Farrell 8
Jr. April 200
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2008/April/President.htm
And never have we seen the pileup of modernization programs such as we see now —
several new Navy ships and fighter jet programs; the Army’s Future Combat Systems;
new vehicles for the Army and the Marines; and several huge programs for the Air
Force (airlift, refueling, fighters, rescue helicopter, new bomber, space). Beyond these
programs of record lurk more needs not yet defined or entered into formal programs.
The Congressional Budget Office has recently released an analysis that estimates that
the current spending plan for defense — the force structure and programs of record —
are under-funded by $100 billion a year. When one adds in service expressed needs
that are not approved, the amount grows larger.
The mismatch between defense needs and resources is only going to get
worse, says the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. “Actually
implementing the Defense Department’s existing force structure, readiness
and modernization plans would require providing even greater increases for
defense in coming years, and sustaining those higher levels of funding for
decades,” according to CSBA. “Given growing concerns about the federal deficit and
the high costs associated with the projected retirement of the baby boomer
generation, it seems doubtful that such increases will be provided.”
Adding all this up, we see real and unmet needs for the services. All
services, but especially the Air Force and the Navy, have substantial
modernization requirements. The rising federal budget, the continuing
budgets deficits, the weakening economy and the coming change of
administrations portend challenges and uncertainty going forward. All this
comes at a time when the services need several years of generous support
to get well. The United States has always had a strategy of fighting in the opponent’s
back yard, penetrating his territory, and maintaining the offensive. We don’t want to
be pressed back to the defense, only able to protect our territory and airspace rather
than carrying the fight to the enemy.
SDI BHR 71
READINESS IMPACTS
READINESS IS KEY TO PREVENT NUMEROUS CONFLICTS IN ASIA THAT
CAN LEAD TO USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Goh Chok, Senior Minister of Singapore, International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 4,
2004 (http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-
2005/2004-speech-archive/keynote-address-prime-minister-goh-chok-tong)
In Asia, as in Europe, unease with America’s overwhelming global dominance is high. But Asia is more
keenly aware than Europe of the vital role that the US plays in maintaining global stability.
No matter what their misgivings, only a few Asian countries, and certainly no major US ally, opposed
the US on Iraq. There is a clearer appreciation in Asia than in Europe that the fundamental issue in Iraq
now is the credibility and resolve of the US. This is because Asia still faces many serious security
challenges. Kashmir, North Korea and cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei are
potential flashpoints. If things go terribly wrong, the conflicts could even turn nuclear. The US is
central to the management of all three potential flashpoints. All three conflicts also have a direct
impact on the global struggle against terrorism. Let me conclude therefore with a few words on each.
Potential Flashpoints in Asia The India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir is a longstanding one, difficult to
resolve because of religion and history. If a conflict breaks out, it is not difficult to imagine Kashmir
becoming a new theatre for jihad and a fertile ground for breeding terrorists. But India and Pakistan
know that a conflict over Kashmir will have devastating consequences for each other and the entire
South Asian region. The US holds the ring. The desire of both Islamabad and New Delhi to maintain
good relations with the US gives Washington leverage that it exercised in 2001 to avert a possible
nuclear war. North Korea is another potential trouble spot. The terrorists could try to exploit the
situation to acquire materials for WMD. Fortunately, the six-party talks have lowered tensions and the
issue is being managed. Whatever their differences, the key actors share a common interest in the
peaceful containment of the issue. I have been told by several leaders who have met Kim Jong Il that
he is a rational, well-informed man who calculates his moves. He must know that an outbreak of
conflict with the US will lead to the very outcome that he fears most: regime change or even the
disappearance of North Korea as a sovereign state. He may go to the brink but not step over the edge.
The credibility of the US military option is vital to maintaining peace.
SDI BHR 72
AN EFFECTIVE U.S. MILITARY IS KEY TO DETER THE OUTBREAK OF

SINO-INDIAN WAR WHICH GO NUCLEAR
Michael Swaine, et al, Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 1998
p. 54-55
Preventing or ending the outbreak of “distant wars” may also be worthwhile for other
reasons. For one, a conflict could change the local balance of power in a given area down
the line. Thus, even if a conflict does not engage U.S. interests or the interests of its allies
immediately, American attention and possibly intervention—by diplomatic or other means—
may still be warranted if the outbreak or persistence of such conflict threatens to tilt the
local balance of power to the disadvantage of the United States at some future point in time.
A Sino-Indian conflict or a renewed Iran-Iraqi war would be pertinent examples in this regard.
Another important case where U.S. intervention may be warranted is when conflict between
two third countries threatens to involve WMD. Here, a breakdown of the evolving taboo
against WMD use as well as the pernicious demonstration effects that would surely accrue
from successful WMD use remain sufficient reason for speedy U.S. efforts at preventing (or,
if prevention is unsuccessful, rapidly terminating) such conflicts even if no tangible American
interests are seen to be immediately at risk. An Indo-Pakistani war would be the best
example of such a possibility.
FUTURE WARS INVOLVING COMPETITION OVER ENERGY ARE COMING

AND THE U.S. MILITARY IS KEY TO DETER THEM
Sandra I. Erwin Nov 2007

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2007/November/Facing.htm
As they draw up their weapon procurement budgets, Navy planners are being asked to consider how
ships, aircraft and other technologies would be relevant in various “alternative futures” such as
humanitarian operations in Third World countries, counterterrorist interdictions on the water and
full-blown wars at sea against rising naval powers like China.
“We have to be prepared for different views of the world,” says Vice Adm. John G. Morgan Jr., deputy chief of
naval operations for plans and strategy.
The increasing importance of oil as a global strategic commodity means the United States will
be expected to help protect the oceans and waterways that serve as conduits for fuels, experts
say. Disruptions of oil supplies potentially could ignite tensions around the world and even
degenerate into armed conflicts, they warn.
To prevent the escalation of oil-related wars, the United States should rely on the Navy and the
other sea services to engage in “resource diplomacy,” says Robert D. Hormats, vice chairman of
Goldman Sachs International. The intent would be to “reassure China and others that they would
not lose access to oil supplies, so they don’t feel they have to expand their navy to deal with
this,” Hormats tells a recent conference in Washington, D.C.
The high efficiency of the commercial shipping industry that moves most of the world’s
commodities creates an environment where any disturbance would wreak havoc on global
markets, Hormats says. “If there is interdiction of supply there would be major disruptions to oil,
food” and other critical goods. “We get as much oil from West Africa as from the Middle East,” says
Hormats. There are “volatile areas with not much protection.”
An ongoing standoff between Canada and Russia over the control of Arctic waters also could be
a bellwether for future confrontations over natural resources. Researchers speculate that significant
supplies of yet-to-be-discovered oil and hydrocarbons exist underneath Arctic Ocean sediments. Over time,
says Morgan, there will be “increased competition for resources offshore.”
SDI BHR 73
READINESS DETERS NORTH KOREAN CONFLICT
Zalmay Khalilzad et al, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of
Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, “The United States and Asia”
2001 (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1315/MR1315.sum.pdf)
To help shape events in Asia in the interests of ensuring peace and stability, the United
States must successfully manage a number of critical challenges. Among these—the one
that must occupy the immediate attention of the United States—is Korea. The U.S. military
posture in Northeast Asia must continue to deter and defend against North Korea. Over
the longer term, however, it is possible that the North Korean threat will disappear as a
result of the political unification of the Korean peninsula, an accommodation between North
and South, or a collapse of the North Korean regime. The June 2000 summit meeting
between South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il offers
evidence that the political-military situation in Asia may change much more quickly than had
once been thought.
KOREAN CONFLICT LEADS TO EXTINCTION
Africa News ‘99

(10-25, Lexis)
Lusaka - If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and
probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever
since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the
hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact
the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice
that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an
occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns
out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries
in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their
government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to
speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The
American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north.
America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised
zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small
North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South
Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be
known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact
to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has
the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from
America itself. Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the
same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at
the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-
personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is
common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The
DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as
a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing
medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly
shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she
was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military
tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore
significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards
normalising relations with North Korea.
SDI BHR 74
Lack of US readiness will lead to conflicts with China and Russia
Doyle M. John (writer for Aviation week & Space Technology) February 25th 2008
Found on LexisNexis
Congressional defense committee leaders, concerned about the readiness of the U.S. military
after Iraq, especially in dealing with a future potential competitor such as China or Russia are
planning ways to salvage defense spending in post-Bush Washington.
I believe that the Defense Dept. must look beyond Iraq to the long-term threats that we face, says Rep. John
Murtha (D-Pa.), chairman of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee. To Murtha, countries like China
and Russia are merely economic competitors for now. But we take one hell of a chance if we don’t
make sure we are prepared in case any potential enemy makes a mistake, he adds.
“China, if it thinks we’re not prepared, or Russia, or any other country, or they perceive us being
weak, we could have a military confrontation down the road,” Murtha warns.
He’s not the only lawmaker worried about potential rivals. There are folks on the other side of the
Pacific who seem to be on a collision course with our nation, says Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss.),
chairman of Armed Services seapower and expeditionary forces subcommittee. We have a law that says
we?ll defend Taiwan. And quite frankly, the Chinese have a law that says they’ll come to take it back, Taylor
adds. He wants to maintain the growing inventory of mine-resistant heavy vehicles now in Iraq.
PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY STRENGTH ARE KEY TO DETERRENCE

Donnelly, 2003---Resident Scholar at AEI (Thomas, Resident Scholar at AEI, 2/1.
ttp://www.aei.org/publications /pubID.15845/pub_detail.asp)
The preservation of today's Pax Americana rests upon both actual military strength
and the perception of strength. The variety of victories scored by U.S. forces since
the end of the cold war is testament to both the futility of directly challenging the
United States and the desire of its enemies to keep poking and prodding to find a
weakness in the American global order. Convincing would-be great powers, rogue
states, and terrorists to accept the liberal democratic order--and the challenge to
autocratic forms of rule that come with it--requires not only an overwhelming response
when the peace is broken, but a willingness to step in when the danger is imminent.
The message of the Bush Doctrine--"Don't even think about it!"--rests in part on a logic
of preemption that underlies the logic of primacy.
US READINESS IS KEY TO deterring Asian nuclear conflicts
Alagappa, 2003 – Director East-West Center Washington (Asian Security Order, Page 19-
20)
Though its alliance network, forward deployment, and the extended deterrence
provided by its nuclear capability, the United States plays an important role in the
management of the three serious security conflicts and in stabilizing relations among
major powers. Washington deters war on the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan
Strait, and American leadership has been crucial in defusing tensions in these conflicts
as well as the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir. Because of the mistrust among
Japan, China, Russia, and the two Koreas, it is often argued that only the United States
can play a stabilizing role in Northeast Asia-by binding Tokyo and preventing the
development of a militarily powerful Japan, and by checking the growing power and
influence of China that is feared by several Asian countries.
SDI BHR 75
SDI BHR 76
U.S. readiness key to Solve china and rusia rise to power and war
Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D March 14, 2008 (the heritage foundation “Liberty's Best Hope: Why
American Leadership Is Needed for the 21st Century”)
http://www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/hl1069.cfm
But prevailing in wars is not enough. We also have to learn to better calibrate our diplomacy and our military power.
To paraphrase Teddy Roosevelt, we need to "speak more softly but get a bigger stick." Words matter--they matter a
great deal; but actions need to be consistent with our words. I would go so far as to say that our actions should even
speak louder than our words.
We have to do a much better job of persuading people that we are a leader who cares as much about our friends and
as much about our allies as we do about ourselves--about how to integrate the interests of other peoples into a global
vision of interests and values that we, and only we the United States as a global leader, can best represent. This is
partly the challenge of a more effective public diplomacy, but it also is about a President being capable of
articulating a grand vision that is as inspiring as it is convincing.
Now, if you think that I am advocating a "soft," "go along to get along" kind of diplomacy, you would be mistaken. I
am also saying in this book that sometimes we have to be tougher with our friends and our allies. There is a double
standard in diplomacy, believe it or not--something I did not really notice and see too much until I was at the State
Department. And that is, when our allies are tough with us, that's great; they are simply standing up for themselves.
But when we do it, we are accused of being "arrogant" because we are a great power.
Sorry, but you can't have it both ways. We need to change the culture of negotiations with our allies, whereby we
establish clear linkages between what we want and what they want. For example, if they want to talk about climate
change at a G-8 summit, that's fine; but we should insist on putting on the agenda that we should also be talking
about what they should be doing for the common defense of Iraq.
As for "getting a bigger stick," we must regain our military strength. Our military power is simply inadequate to our
claims of global leadership: Our forces are underfunded; they are underresourced; and they are wearing out. We
need a renewed commitment to restoring American military strength if we are to reclaim that mantle of world
leadership. This means modernizing our forces; it means better integration of the National Guard and reserves; and it
means funding them, which we estimate costs at least 4 percent of gross domestic product. It also means building a
comprehensive ballistic missile defense system.
This renewed military power is necessary to defend liberty itself, but it also is necessary as an insurance policy
against a resurgent Russia and a rising China. I argue in this book that our policies toward these two countries are
terribly muddled. We desperately want to be friends with them, and yet they don't seem to want to return the favor--
at least on terms that we understand. They do not behave in ways that are consistent with our understanding of
freedom and international responsibility.
It's best, frankly, that we admit this and understand this. We don't have to make them into enemies as a result of this
misunderstanding, but neither should we be pretending that they are our friends and that they have the same stake
that we do in freedom and international stability. They do not share that with us. They are not our enemies, but they
are also not like us, and we should not make the mistake of concluding that they are.
SDI BHR 77
Readiness key to stability in the middle east and the rest of the word
Jim Garamone-April 17, 2000 (American Forces Press Service “America's

Military: A Force for Global Stability, Prosperity” )
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45061
In this post-Cold War world, the U.S. military works in a number of ways to encourage stability.
Cohen said the International Military Education and Training program introduces officers to the
way the U.S. military does business. The IMET program stresses civilian control of the military
and the way a military works in a democracy.
Further, simple military-to-military contacts encourage stability. In speaking with U.S. sailors in
Manama, Bahrain, Cohen told them their mere presence and demeanor encourages stability.
"How you conduct yourselves, how you carry yourselves, how you relate to the community you
are stationed in or deployed to, all of that sends a signal to people," he said. "They look to you to
see if you are someone they admire and respect or even fear. You send a signal to countries such
as Iraq or anyone else in the neighborhood that you are not anyone they want to take on.
"By the same token, you send message to our allies -- that you are a military they want on their
side." Cohen said throughout his recent visit to the Middle East that the U.S. military is the most
admired institution in United States.
"Everybody understands how good you are," Cohen told the sailors and Marines aboard the USS
Stennis. "What we want to do is remind people of that connection [between their well-being and
prosperity] and the types of sacrifices you make."
SDI BHR 78
Readiness key to deter launch of nuclear weapons
Department of Defense, last updated July 14 2008

http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr95/roles.html
The focus of U.S. planning for major theater conflict is on the need to be able to project
power and to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile
regional powers. Today, such states are capable of fielding sizable military forces that
can cause serious imbalances in military power within regions important to the United
States, with allied or friendly states often finding it difficult to match the power of a
potentially aggressive neighbor. Such states may also possess WMD. Hence, to deter
aggression, to prevent coercion of allied or friendly governments and, ultimately, to
defeat aggression should it occur, the United States must prepare its forces to assist
its friends and allies in confronting this scale of threat.
The planning for fighting and winning these MRCs envisages an operational strategy
that, in general, unfolds in the following ways:
Halt the invasion.

Build up U.S. and allied/coalition combat power in the theater while reducing the
enemy's.
Decisively defeat the enemy.
Provide for post-war stability
.
The United States will never know with certainty how an enemy will fight and how U.S.
forces will perform in future conflicts. Moreover, the contributions of allies to the
coalition's overall capabilities will vary from place to place and over time. Thus,
balanced U.S. forces are needed in order to provide a wide range of complementary
capabilities and to cope with the unpredictable and unexpected.
SDI BHR 79
U.S. readiness key to global economy stability
Thayer 2006 [Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota,
Duluth, The National Interest, November -December, “In Defense of Primacy”, lexis]
Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states

around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With
its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically
liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and
commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of
capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity
that stems from this economic order is a global public good from
which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third
World. The United States created this network not out of altruism
but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This
economic order forces American industries to be competitive,
maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well
because the size of the economy makes the defense burden
manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military
technology, helping to ensure military prowess.
Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic

network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service
diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career
confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India.
Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the
only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third
World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and
globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy. (4) As
a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of
the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the
economic prosperity it provides.
SDI BHR 80
ADD-ONS
ENERGY DEPENDENCE
ARMY ENERGY POLICY IS KEY TO BREAK CYCLE OF OIL DEPENDENCE

AND PROVIDE A GLOBAL MODEL FOR SOLVING PEAK OIL

The open and relatively cheap access to energy primarily determines a society’s
quality of life, particularly the energy of liquid fuels that provide for the increasing
transportation needs of all developed and developing economies. Any disruption of access to
or substantial increases in the price of energy would have a devastating effect on the
economy and way of life in the United States. A recent cable television movie entitled “Oil
Storm” dramatically depicted the wide spread chaos, disruption to normal society, and loss of
life that would result from the incapacity of the oil supply to satisfy demand and from the
resulting sizeable increases in the price of oil.i Unlimited access to oil is believed to be an
American right and we have already fought major wars in the Middle East partly to ensure
continued access to cheap oil. The National Commission on Energy Policy conducted a
simulation of oil supply disruptions in June 2005 and concluded that oil cost is highly sensitive to
supply, U.S., foreign & military policy are constrained by our oil dependence, and the U.S. is
vulnerable to attacks on the oil infrastructure.ii The report, “Winning the Oil End Game”, by the
Rocky Mountain Institute describes how our oil addiction has become a source of
weakness. It erodes prosperity by its volative price, creates dangerous new revalries,
destabilizes the climate with its emissions, undermines our security, and tarnishes our
moral standing in the world.iii
The 20th Century will be known as the age of cheap oil, but it is beginning to dawn on
many that the 21st Century will not see the same easy access to low-cost oil that
fueled the unprecedented technological advances of
the last century. We are either at or very near the era when the demand for oil will
outstrip the ability of the earth to supply the needs of the global society.iv As Kenneth
Deffeyes, a geologist and observer of the oil industry over the past several decades
has noted, “For the first time since the industrial revolution, the geological supply of an
essential resource will not meet the demand.”v The nation and the global
community need a unique organization to show the way to transform the
energy infrastructure and resolve the countless challenges that will end our
addiction to oil. The U.S. Army is that unique institution with all the
advantages of disciplined organizational leadership and technical knowledge
to pilot this essential energy transformation.
SDI BHR 81
ECONOMY
MILITARY COMMIT TO ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SAVES THE ECONOMY
Colonel Michael J. Hornitschek is Vice Commander, 62nd Airlift Wing, McChord Air
Force Base, Wash Air Force Journal of Logistics, Fall, 2006
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_3_30/ai_n18618914/pg_1?tag=artBody;
col1
Energy Research and Development The final required element in the DoD's quest for foreign oil
independence is the re-creation of R&D accomplishments on the scale that allowed America's
aerospace engineers to send Neil Armstrong to the moon. After decades of successful innovation
since Apollo, President Bush and others have stated that today America's global innovation
leadership position is under attack by the effects of globalization. On the positive side, US
companies can significantly reduce costs by outsourcing both menial and intellectual work for
pennies on the dollar in a globalized world. On the negative side, the growing lack of interest (and
ability) on the part of American students to pursue engineering and science degrees, coupled with
a reverse brain-drain of R&D talent back to new renaissance countries like India and China, has
left the US with a quickly aging science and engineering community and the prospect of losing its
position of science and technology leadership in the world. To illustrate, last year in Germany 36
percent of undergraduate students earned degrees in math and science, in China 59 percent, and
in Japan 66 percent-in the US the figure was only 32 percent. (124) In 2004, China graduated
over 600,000 engineers, India 350,000, and America only about 70,000. (125) Underscoring the
President's acknowledgment of this problem in his 2006 State of the Union Address, (126) the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the
21st Century best articulates the alarm in their 2005 report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm, in
which they state, It is easy to be complacent about the US competitiveness and
preeminence in science and technology. We have led the world for decades, and we continue
to do so in many research fields today. But the world is changing rapidly, and our advantages
are no longer unique. Without a renewed effort to bolster the foundations of our
competitiveness, we can expect to lose our privileged position. For the first time in
generations, the nation's children could face poorer prospects than their parents and
grandparents did.... The US faces enormous challenges because of the disadvantage it faces
in labor costs. Science and technology provides the opportunity to overcome this disadvantage
by creating scientists and engineers with the ability to create entirely new industries
(emphasis added)--much as has been done in the past. (127) In response to their alarm, the
committee identified two challenges tightly coupled to scientific and engineering prowess:
creating high-quality jobs for Americans and responding to the nation's need for clean, affordable,
and reliable energy. (128) The NAS identifies a nexus of opportunity that simultaneously
strengthens the economy and national security while simultaneously solving America's
looming energy crisis--the intense application of an R&D commitment that promises
intellectual and financial reward for those Americans already inspired, and those yet to be
inspired in the sciences. With a DoD commitment to lead its own energy revolution, the US
could create an entirely new, leading-edge commercial sector for the global market; a
sector that could propel the US economy for decades and turn this nation into a new energy
or energy technology exporter, much like the US achieved in the 1940s and 1950s when it
dominated the export of petroleum development technology.
SDI BHR 82
COMPETITIVENESS ADVANTAGE
A) A DOD COMMITMENT TO EFFICIENCY WOULD INCREASE U.S.

COMPETITIVENESS
The link to national security also includes the stimulus that a stronger DoD
focus on fuel efficiency would exert on the commercial market through spin-
off
technologies and products, affecting both domestic and foreign markets.
Efficiency makes U.S. companies more competitive in an increasing number
of
foreign markets where efficiency is more highly valued. Markets in an
increasing
number of allied nations place a higher value on efficiency than the US. These
include Western and Central Europe, where positions on global climate change
and the Kyoto Protocol differ sharply with those of the U.S. This foreign
emphasis on greater efficiency also has the potential to decrease foreign military
sales (FMS), an important component of modernization because increased
production rates lower system unit cost.

It is noteworthy that the automobile manufacturing industry is looking more

seriously than ever at changes in engine and platform technology that would
yield significant fuel economy improvements. This has been motivated by public
demand, the need to respond to the global warming threat and potential future
governmental requirements. In areas where technology sponsored by DoD has
set the pace, such as aircraft systems, development of advanced technologies
could once again stimulate commercial spin-offs that would help make U.S.
companies more competitive in foreign markets where efficiency is already
highly
valued. This is one way in which the U.S. military’s leadership in technology
can
improve the environment while improving military capability and U.S.
competitiveness.
SDI BHR 83
TERRORISM
AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY IS KEY TO DETER TERRORISM
COHEN 99
William, Former U.S. Secretary of Defense
http://www.fas.org/man/docs/adr_00/index.html
The terrorist threat has changed markedly in recent years, due primarily to five
factors: changing terrorist motivations; the proliferation of technologies of mass
destruction; increased access to information, information technologies, and mass
media; a perception that the United States is unwilling to accept casualties; and the
accelerated centralization of vital components of the national infrastructure.
DoD divides its response to terrorism into two categories. Antiterrorism
refers to defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals
and property to terrorist acts. Counterterrorism refers to offensive measures
taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Both fall under the rubric
of combating terrorism. Force protection is the umbrella security program involving
the coordinated efforts of key U.S. departments and agencies designed to protect
military and civilian personnel, their family members, and U.S. property.
DoD has initiated a wide range of actions designed to enhance antiterrorism, requiring threat and force protection to be constantly evaluated
and giving commanders increased resources and flexibility to be fully responsive to changes in the threat. The Department has established
programs to expand protection measures worldwide where appropriate. At all levels, the Department has developed and carried out policies,
processes, and programs designed to integrate force protection into the culture and institutional fabric of the United States military.
Because intelligence represents the first line of defense, DoD has implemented procedures to improve its collection and use of terrorism-related
intelligence, getting the needed product into the hands of the local commander as rapidly as possible. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is
engaged in an aggressive long-term collection and analytic effort designed to provide information that can help local commanders detect, deter,
and prevent terrorist attack. Close working relationships between DIA and other members of the national intelligence community are being
strengthened, and intelligence exchanges with U.S. friends and allies have been increased.
DoD is also taking steps to improve force protection, including programs for U.S. military forces, family members, and DoD civilians. DoD has
actively worked to enhance training and awareness of the terrorist threat facing U.S. forces. In 1998, the Department began to implement a set
of worldwide, prescriptive standards for antiterrorism and force protection. Vulnerability assessments conducted by the Joint Staff, combatant
commanders, and the Services provided an effective means to evaluate and improve installation commanders’ antiterrorism readiness programs.
Based on findings in these assessments, the Joint Staff developed a planning tool that provides installation commanders with mechanisms to
develop comprehensive, tailored antiterrorism and force protection plans for their specific facilities. The Department also worked with the
Department of State to ensure that rigorous force protection programs are provided for U.S. forces overseas.
DoD’s counterterrorism capabilities provide the offensive means to deter,
defeat, and respond vigorously to all forms of terrorist attack against U.S.
interests, wherever they may occur. The Department has significantly
increased the resources allocated to these sensitive activities, and efforts
are under way to maximize readiness so that U.S. counterterrorism forces
are trained and equipped to meet any future forms of terrorism. U.S. counterterrorism
forces receive the most advanced and diverse training available and continually exercise to maintain proficiency and to develop new skills. They
regularly train with their foreign counterparts to maximize coordination and effectiveness. They also engage with counterpart organizations in a
variety of exchange programs which not only hone their skills, but also contribute to the development of mutual confidence and trust.
Overwhelming US force is necessary to deter terrorist attack

The Australian, 9-30-02
The Bush strategy acknowledges the historic legal argument that the legitimacy of a
pre-emptive strike depended on "the existence of an imminent threat -- most often a
visible mobilisation of armies, navies and air forces preparing to attack". But rogue
states and terrorists know an attack by conventional means would fail and so will rely
on covert deployment of weapons of mass destruction. "The greater the threat, the
greater is the risk of inaction -- and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack," it says. "To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries, the US will, if necessary, act pre-emptively." To that end, the US military --
which already has a budget bigger than that of the top 20 other big defence spenders
combined -- must continue to dominate the world so it deters any future military
competition.
SDI BHR 84
Readiness key to deter and stop terrorism

Department of Defense, last updated July 14 2008
http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr95/roles.html
As long as terrorist groups continue to target American citizens and interests, the
United States will need specialized units available to defeat such groups. From time to
time, the United States might also find it necessary to strike terrorists at their bases
abroad or to attack assets valued by the governments that support them.
Countering terrorism effectively requires close day-to-day coordination among

Executive Branch agencies. The Department of Defense will continue to cooperate
closely with the Departments of State and Justice, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency in an ongoing effort against
international terrorists. Positive results will come from integration of intelligence,
diplomatic and rule-of-law activities, and through close cooperation with other
governments and international counterterrorist organizations.
The United States has made concerted efforts to punish and deter terrorists and those
who support them. For example, on June 26, 1993, following a determination that Iraq
had plotted an assassination attempt against President Bush, President Clinton ordered
a cruise missile attack against the headquarters of Iraq's intelligence service in order
to send a firm response and deter further threats.
SDI BHR 85
SPILL OVER
MILITARY EFFICIENCY IN THE MILITARY WILL SPILL OVER TO THE PRIVATE
SECTOR AND SPUR RENEWABLE DEVELOPMENT
French 07
This paper will examine the use and conservation of energy for both army
mobility and facility operations. The military has been on the forefront of
many social, medical and technological changes; therefore we can use our
credibility and resources to be the vanguard of change to renewable energy into
mainstream society. As a voracious consumer of energy, it will be financially and
politically feasible for the army to decrease dependence on fossil fuel. To do
so would facilitate use of alternative energy by the public and private sector.
Additionally, it is more conducive to a positive public image of being environmentally
and fiscally responsible consequentially allowing greater access to local training sites-
further decreasing our requirement for mobility fuel.
DOD ENERGY POLICIES SPILL OVER TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
French 07
The Army can use our credibility and resources to lead the change to
renewable energy in American society. The Army has been at the forefront of
many social (racial integration, equal pay and promotion), medical (prosthetics,
medical evacuation, and anti-shock trousers) and technological changes (the internet
and robotics).
The Army has an opportunity to change its current energy strategy to a
strategy that applies alternate sources of energy because its voracious
consumption of fossil fuels significantly contributes to a long logistics tail.
This leadership could also influence the use of alternative renewable public
and private energy. This paper will discuss the financial feasibility, public
perceptions and environmental considerations.
DOD ACTION DRIVES DOWN THE PRICE OF ENERGY INNOVATIONS

THAT SPILL OVER
French 07
The Army’s large procurement requirements can facilitate driving

innovation, raising standards and reducing cost. Those we contract with will
need to comply with our energy standards and consequently drive costs
down through economies of production so that the public and private sectors
can afford renewable energy.
SDI BHR 86
A TRANSFORMATION OF ENERGY USE IN THE MILITARY PROVIDES

THE MODEL FOR TRANSFORMING ALL OF SOCIETY
col1
An uncertain world energy prospect, a vital national defense mission, and the unique
organizational capacity and situation of the DoD invites one to ask if an
opportunity exists for the DoD to serve as an example for a national
transformation toward a new energy future. Based upon the first three elements
of Dr John P. Kotter's popular eight-step model for organizational transformation, this
article presents a methodology for determining if the DoD can lead an immediate,
coherent, and viable long-term strategy toward a vision of replacing petroleum as its
primary energy source in order to maintain all necessary strategic and operational
capability for US security to 2050 and beyond.
The three-part approach begins in the first section by scoping the dimensions of the
American energy security problem to create a sense of urgency. It continues in second
section by examining the method in which an assured energy-guiding coalition and a
DoD grand energy vision can be formulated within the context of the specific security
responsibilities and desired capabilities of the DoD, as well as responsibilities of the
DoE. The methodology finishes in the third section by highlighting the process by
which a grand strategy can be developed that supports a new DoD energy vision.
While there are a multitude of possible and competing DoD energy visions suitable for
separate debate, the analysis in this article is accomplished under the structure of a
conceptual three-phase hydrogen- and electric-based military transformation strategy
that supports a 2050 post-petroleum vision aligned with President Bush's State of the
Union goals. If the above methodology demonstrates a feasible approach for guiding
the DoD energy transformation to serve the Department's own requirements, it can
then be argued that the lessons learned and knowledge gained from such an endeavor
could be applied toward a larger national energy transformation. The DoD-to-civilian
transition model has been successfully applied in other major societal
changes to include racial integration, sexual equality, and the benefits of networked-
based information sharing (Arpanet/ Intemet) to highlight a few. The creation of a
broadly supported post-petroleum DoD vision and transformation strategy
could not only preserve a relevant military force, but also lead a positive,
bipartisan, interagency, and economic demonstration for preserving
American security overall.
SDI BHR 87
DOD ENERGY TRANSFORMATION SPILLS OVER TO SOLVE PEAK OIL
col1
The Department of Energy confirms that the production of petroleum will peak
sometime this century--it is perhaps the most fundamental strategic problem
the DoD, the US, and the world will all inevitably have to face in the next 100
years. The Kotter-based organizational change methodology presented in this article
demonstrates just one approach for guiding DoD energy transformation to serve the
Department's own requirements. The lessons learned and knowledge gained
from such an endeavor could be reasonably applied toward a much larger
national energy transformation. The DoD-to-civilian transition model has
been successfully applied in other major societal changes; there is no reason
to believe this grand challenge to be any different. The creation of a broadly
supported post-petroleum DoD vision and transformation strategy could not
only preserve a relevant military force, but also lead a positive, bipartisan,
interagency, and economic demonstration for preserving American security
overall. The DoD possesses the capacity to succeed in making war without oil the
catalyst of true transformation.
SDI BHR 88
RENEWABLES
ENERGY EFFICENCY SPURS RENEWABLES

– Less Fuel”
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Reduce Fuel

Demand at Forward Operating Bases.
Last summer, in order to “improve the security posture of the al-Anbar province of
Iraq,”
Command officials certified as “priority 1” a Joint Staff Rapid Validation and Resourcing
Request on behalf of Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, seeking a “renewable and
self-sustainable energy solution to support forward operating bases, combat outposts
and observation posts throughout MNF-W’s battlespace.” The Resourcing Request
went on to say “[b]y reducing the need for [petroleum-based fuels] at our
outlying bases,
we can decrease the frequency of logistics convoys on the road, thereby
reducing the
danger to our Marines, soldiers, and sailors.”
This is a two part problem – end use inefficiency drives up electrical demand,
and
increases the difficulty of meeting power requirements using renewable
energy.
Conversely, efficiency is the key enabler – improving end use efficiency
reduces
demand and makes it possible to satisfy a greater proportion of the load
using
renewable sources.
The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF) at Fort Belvoir has taken on this request for
action.18 It was created in 2003 to quickly address material needs in connection with
the global war on terror, especially in cases where existing systems acquisition and
procurement processes are incapable of responding to urgent requests. REF’s goal is
to respond to requests from operating forces by fielding a solution within 90 days when
possible. Four off-the-shelf renewable energy supply systems are currently being
tested before shipment to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Although
the purchase price for these systems is higher than for a similar capacity diesel
generator, MG Zilmer’s request showed that they are expected to pay for themselves
by
offsetting fuel use in just 3-5 years depending on conditions.19 It was not clear to the
Task Force whether this payback calculation was based on FBCF. The Task Force
suspects it was not, and that based on the true cost of delivering fuel to al-Anbar
province the payback would be measured in months, not years. After this time, the
energy produced by these systems is essentially free of cost when compared to other
options. MG Zilmer’s request listed a requirement for 183 systems of various power
capacities. At least one U.S. manufacturer has estimated that this quantity could be
produced in six months to one year.20
Another system being utilized by the Army’s REF in Afghanistan is enhanced insulation
for tents. The insulation dramatically curbs demand for air conditioning, thus reducing
power demand and therefore fuel demand. The expected payoff for this system is
measured in months rather than years, and fuel resupply costs and risks are
SDI BHR 89
significantly reduced.
SDI BHR 90
POLITICS
NORMAL MEANS IS TO DO THE PLAN THROUGH THE QUADRENNIAL
DEFENSE REVIEW WHICH HAPPENS IN 2009
col1
The world's looming energy situation has the potential to dictate historic force
structure decisions. The DoD's primary mechanism to assess force composition
relative to threats and Joint Vision 2025 goals is the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). This comprehensive approach produces force structure decisions that
the Services are subsequently expected to execute. In the February 2006
QDR, no force structure decisions were made based on fuels or energy
limitations. The next opportunity to formally adjust force structure will occur
in 2009.140 Four years from now, the state of world and DoD petroleum supplies may
be much more acute, at which point the DoD would likely be required to
address energy efficiency and consumption as part of its force structure
decision matrix. Attention to detail and proper QDR energy-related course
corrections would be one of the most effective tools available to ensure the
DoD reaches its goal of long-term relevancy.
SDI BHR 91
THE PUBLIC IS TOO IGNORANT TO KNOW ABOUT THE PLAN. THEY

DON’T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT GOVERNMENT POLICY
SCHULTE 6-3-2008
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/06/03/the-ignorant-american-voter.html
Unfortunately, Americans are doing little to educate themselves about their

leaders and their policies, says bestselling author and George Mason University
historian Rick Shenkman in his new book Just How Stupid Are We? Facing the Truth
About the American Voter. Shenkman cites some damning facts to make his case that
Americans are ill-prepared to guide the world's most powerful democracy. Only 2 of 5
voters can name the three branches of the federal government. And 49
percent of Americans think the president has the authority to suspend the
Constitution. But, for Shenkman, the severity of the problem snapped into focus after
Sept. 11, 2001, when polls showed that a large number of Americans knew
little about the attacks and the Iraq war that followed. He blames some of the
public's misunderstanding on the White House message machine, but he argues that
Americans did little to seek the truth. "As became irrefutably clear in scientific polls
undertaken after 9/11...millions of Americans simply cannot fathom the twists and
turns that complicated debates take," Shenkman writes.
SCHULTE 6-3-2008
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/06/03/the-ignorant-american-voter.html
Americans are getting what little information they have about the candidates from 30-
second commercials, and that's insufficient as a basis for deciding how you're going to
vote and what you think about our politics. In the past, people got most of their
information from newspapers—that was a much better source. And when they
were members of large mass groups like political parties or labor unions where their
party bosses or labor bosses helped guide their thinking about politics, they had a
better grasp of who at least was going to butter their bread better. Today people are
really on their own, and the book tries to demonstrate that people can't handle their
responsibilities as well as they ought to. In a competitive capitalistic society like ours,
where there is a great emphasis on entertainment, people are not inclined to sit
down and study a newspaper and figure out what's actually going on in
politics. That leads to very superficial politics.
SDI BHR 92
BUSH’S POPULARITY IS SO LOW THAT HE CAN’T GET CREDIT FOR A

SUCCESS BUT CAN ONLY GET BLAME. THE LINK CAN ONLY GO IN OUR
DIRECTION
Tom Holsinger 3-7-06

http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002617.html
My point is that it no longer matters what Bush says, because they ain't listenin'
no more. He was silent too long.
I suspect that even deeds by the Bush administration won't change this. It may
be that the public will give Bush credit for success, but IMO they won't pay attention to
what he says even then.
But it may also be that the public will NOT give Bush credit for success at this
point - that they'll blame him for what goes wrong without crediting him for
what goes right. That has happened when a President sufficiently honks off
the American people.
SDI BHR 93
ENERGY CONSERVATION IS NO LONGER POPULAR
SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS.COM 7-2-2008

http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/16329
Perhaps it shouldn't come as a surprise, but the results of a new poll are
disheartening, showing that Americans are increasing their support for more
oil exploration and drilling, as opposed to increased conservation measures.
The survey, conducted by the Pew Research Center, also shows an increasing
proportion of country's citizens favor developing new sources of energy,
rather than protecting the environment.
As the price of gasoline is beginning to cramp our free-spending lifestyles, we are
choosing to trade whatever is of any worth to continue down this path.
At some point down the road there will be no Alaska Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
(ANWR) to lay at the feet of the oil companies. There will be no untapped oil fields on
the coastal shelves--not to mention no more pristine ecological systems, no more clean
beaches, no more clean air and no more stable climate patterns.
Where will we draw the line? When will we say, enough is enough--it's time to make
some sacrifices?
No time soon, according to this survey, which shows changes in American
opinions over just the last five months.
50% now support drilling in ANWR, up from 42%.

47% rate energy exploration as more important that conservation, up from
35%.
Change was also noted among young people, liberals, Democrats and women--groups
that have consistently opposed increasing fossil fuel exploration.
51% of people ages 18-29 now support expanding exploration, up from 26% in
February. The gender gap has disappeared on the issue, too, as well as the gap
between Democrats and Republicans.
In other bad news, the Energy Information Administration said that participation in
green pricing/marketing programs has decreased among electricity customers, further
supporting the notion that Americans are unwilling to pay a price for protecting the
planet.
After three years of gains from 2003-2005 in the number of participants in programs
that allow customers to pay a fee to support the generation of clean, renewably based
power, participation dropped in 2006. (Numbers are not yet available for 2007.)
The number of programs available to customers increased slightly in 2006, from 442 to
484. But nationwide, participation decreased 32% from 942,772 to 645,167.
Without strong leadership on this issue, or a reversal in the tide of public opinion, dark
days lie ahead.
SDI BHR 94
THEIR LINKS ARE OUT OF DATE. OPINION AMONG CRITICAL VOTING

BLOCKS HAVE SHIFTED THIS YEAR TO VIEW CONSERVATION AS LESS
IMPORTANT
PEW RESEARCH CENTER 7-1-2008

http://people-press.org/report/433/gas-prices
Amid record gas prices, public support for greater energy exploration is spiking. Compared with just a few
months ago, many more Americans are giving higher priority to more energy exploration, rather
than more conservation. An increasing proportion also says that developing new sources of
energy - rather than protecting the environment - is the more important national priority.
The latest nationwide survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, conducted June 18-29
among 2,004 adults, also finds that half of Americans now support drilling in Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge, up from 42% in February.
The public's changing energy priorities are most evident in the growing percentage that views
increased energy exploration - including mining and drilling, as well as the construction of new power
plants - as a more important priority for energy policy than increased conservation and regulation.
Nearly half (47%) now rates energy exploration as the more important priority, up from 35% in February. The
proportion saying it is more important to increase energy conservation and regulation has declined by 10
points (from 55% to 45%).
In surveys dating to 2001, majorities or pluralities had consistently said that greater energy conservation
and regulation on energy use and prices was more important than increased energy exploration.
Partisan Gap over Energy Exploration Disappears
Much of the increase in support for energy exploration has come among groups that previously
viewed this as a less important priority than energy conservation - young people, liberals,
independents, Democrats, women and people who have attended college.
Fully half of people ages 18 to 29 (51%) now say expanding energy exploration is a more important priority
for energy policy than increasing energy conservation and regulation; only about a quarter of young people
(26%) expressed this view in February. The proportion of liberals who say expanded energy exploration is the
more important priority also has doubled (from 22% to 45%).
The gender gap in attitudes about whether greater exploration or greater conservation is the more important
priority has disappeared, as women have become much more supportive of expanded exploration (up 18
points).
Similarly, more independents (19 points) and Democrats (16 points) view increased energy
exploration as the more important priority. About the same proportions of Democrats (46%) and
Republicans (43%) now say expanded exploration, rather than increased conservation, should take
precedence; in February, far more Republicans than Democrats expressed this view.
SDI BHR 95
AT: WITHDRAW TROOPS C-PLAN
WITHDRAWAL WOULD CAUSE MULTIPLE WARS IN ASIA
Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D. VP of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies at The Heritage
Foundation, “United States Military Forces in Asia Maintain the Peace and Advance
Democracy” 1-10-2003 (http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm185.cfm)
America’s primary regional security interests are best served by preserving the stability of Northeast
Asia, an area plagued by war for most of the past century. Without an American military presence,
deep historical animosities and territorial disputes among Russia, China, Japan, and the two
Koreas would lead to a major race for military dominance. A delicate balance has existed since
the end of World War Two, when Japan renounced offensive military force and rejected nuclear
weapons. Pulling out US troops would destroy that balance. America’s military presence in
Northeast Asia has provided the glue for security arrangements that offered protection to its
allies and reassurances that helped avert an arms race among enemies that have fought each
other for centuries. America’s bilateral security treaties with Japan and South Korea, respectively,
ensure that United States military, political, and economic interests in the region are protected. The
forward presence of U.S. troops also serves to protect the democracies of South Korea and
Taiwan from hostile threats by Leninist dictatorships in North Korea and China. Japan depends
on the presence of U.S. military forces. It maintains its peace constitution, eschews the development of
an offensive military force, and feels secure in a nuclear age without a nuclear arsenal because of
American security guarantees. For South Korea, the presence of U.S. combat forces has created the
conditions that permitted democracy and a market economy to flourish. In South Korea, the voters
elected a candidate that wants to pursue dialogue with North Korea. They elected a candidate who
emphasized engaging North Korea regardless of North Korea’s reactions or reciprocity. Even though
there have been protests, both South Korean presidential candidates, and the majority of the citizens
of South Korea, continue to recognize the stability and security that the U.S. presence in Korea
provides. It is imperative for Americans to remember that in the final analysis, the forward deployment
of U.S. troops serves American interests even as it advances our values.
THE IMPACT IS EXTINCTION
Ogura and Oh ‘97

(Toshimaru and Ingyu, Teachers – Economics, Monthly Review, April)
North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament.
Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient
technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates
a new nightmare in this region - nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic
affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot
conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagration.
SDI BHR 96
U.S. TROOPS ARE KEY TO PREVENT CHINESE AGGRESSION

Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, Washington Quarterly, Spring,
1995
The United States should continue to pursue economic relations with China and encourage its
integration in global economic and security regimes. It should also use the leverage of economic
relations, which are very important to China, to continue to encourage Chinese cooperation in
restraining nuclear and missile proliferation in places like Korea and Iran. But Chinese cooperation is
likely to remain limited. While the United States continues to cooperate with China, it should be
cautious in transferring to it technologies that have important military implications. It should also
ensure that China's neighbors, such as Taiwan and the member states of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, have the means to defend themselves. Working with other powers, especially Japan,
Korea after unification, and Indonesia, the United States should preclude Chinese regional hegemony
by maintaining adequate forces in the region. Without a U.S. presence in the region, as Chinese power
grows, some states in the region are likely to appease China and move closer to it, while others such
as Indonesia, Japan, and Vietnam would seek to balance it.
CHINESE-US WAR LEADS TO EXTINCTION
Straits Times ‘2K

(6-25, Lexis)
THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a
full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would
better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale
would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear
war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any
US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines
and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not
end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may
seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly
upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own
nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war?
According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War,
the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean
War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen
Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of
nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability,
there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US
estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to
go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use"
principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies,
told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by
that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear
weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that
come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war.
While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be
ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above all else.
SDI BHR 97
TROOP PRESENCE KEY TO ASIAN ECONOMY

Michael Swaine, et al, Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 1998
p. 54-55
First, the region is characterized by some of the highest rates of sustained economic growth in modern
history, rates that are likely to remain at relatively high levels for at least another two decades. So long
as the region does not experience a major war that disrupts both trade and domestic growth, and so
long as the stabilizing effects of American regional presence more or less persist, it is likely
that the region as a whole will continue to average growth rates in the region of 6–8 percent annually.
With the exception of Japan, which, as a mature economy, will grow at about 2.5 percent, the four “tigers”— Hong
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—are expected to grow at about 6.5 percent, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) states at about 8 percent, and even the late industrializers— China, India, and Vietnam—are
expected to grow at between 6.5 percent and 7.5 percent over the next two decades.11
U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IS KEY TO FREE TRADE
Floyd Spence, R-South Carolina, Chair of Subcommittee on Military Procurement, Roll Call,
5-14-2001
The decade since the end of the Cold War has been a period of rapid economic globalization - the
interrelation of the economies of nations primarily through trade. Increasingly the economic health of
an individual country may be greatly affected by other nations or by events in other parts of the world.
As a result of this burgeoning economic globalization, many of the finished goods and raw materials
that move among countries are carried across the world's oceans in ships. As the world's sole
remaining superpower, the United States has an interest in ensuring that the orderly flow of goods and
materials constituting legal trade among nations is not disturbed. The ships of the U.S. Navy forward
deployed around the world help ensure the stability that fosters this seaborne commerce. Navy forces
provide a near continuous presence of combat capability in distant geographic regions of interest to
the United States. Moreover, this ability to quickly provide a military response does not require a large
U.S. military presence in a host nation nor prior permission from our allies.
FORWARD DEPLOYMENT IS KEY TO DETERRENCE

Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Policy,
March 1, 2004
As part of its sharp-power strategy to address these priorities, the United States maintains a system of
alliances and bases intended to promote stability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Overall, as of
the end of September 2003, the United States had just over 250,000 uniformed military members
stationed outside its frontiers (not counting those involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom); around 43
percent were stationed on NATO territory and approximately 32 percent in Japan and South Korea.
Additionally, the United States has the ability to transport significant forces to these theaters and to
the Middle East should tensions rise, and it preserves the ability to control the sea lanes and air
corridors necessary to the security of its forward bases. Moreover, the United States maintains the
world's largest intelligence and electronic surveillance organizations. Estimated to exceed $ 30 billion
in 2003, the U.S. intelligence budget is larger than the individual military budgets of Saudi Arabia,
Syria, and North Korea.
SDI BHR 98
MILITARY WITHDRAWAL CAUSES RAPID PROLIFERATION GLOBALLY

Stephen Peter Rosen, Professor of National Security at Harvard, National Interest, Spring
2003
Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could
give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the
withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that
all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave
the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much
less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less
secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in
which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively
rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq
and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the
acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major
regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This
would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the
costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of
the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is
unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.
PROLIF CAUSES EXTINCTION
Stuart Taylor, Senior Writer with the National Journal and editor at Newsweek, Legal Times,
9-16-2002
The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation, another five or
10 potentially unstable nations may go nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that
one or more bombs will be set off anonymously on our soil by terrorists or a terrorist
government. Even an airtight missile defense would be useless against a nuke hidden in a
truck, a shipping container, or a boat.
[Continues…]
Unless we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for "a world filled with
nuclear-weapons states, where every crisis threatens to go nuclear," where "the survival of
civilization truly is in question from day to day," and where "it would be impossible to
keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal
organizations." So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who
served as a career arms-controller under six presidents and led the successful Clinton
administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The only way to avoid
such a grim future, he suggests in his memoir, Disarmament Sketches, is for the United
States to lead an international coalition against proliferation by showing an unprecedented
willingness to give up the vast majority of our own nuclear weapons, excepting only those
necessary to deter nuclear attack by others.
SDI BHR 99
ABANDONING MILITARY READINESS WOULD ON BALANCE CAUSE

MORE WARS
Posen and Ross 97

(Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science in the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program at MIT,
Andrew Ross, Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College, International Security,
Winter 1997)
The United States can, more easily than most, go it alone. Yet we do not find the arguments of the neo-
isolationists compelling. Their strategy serves U.S. interests only if they are narrowly construed. First,
though the neo-isolationists have a strong case in their argument that the United States is currently
quite secure, disengagement is unlikely to make the United States more secure, and would probably
make it less secure. The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely
precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring
regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United
States would have to look to their own military power; local arms competitions are to be
expected. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the U.S. nuclear guarantee were
withdrawn. Some states would seek weapons of mass destruction because they were simply unable to
compete conventionally with their neighbors. This new flurry of competitive behavior would
probably energize many hypothesized immediate causes of war, including preemptive motives,
preventive motives, economic motives, and the propensity for miscalculation. There would like be
more war. Weapons of mass destruction might be used in some of the wars, with unpleasant
effects even for those not directly involved.
SDI BHR 100
THE COUNTERPLAN WOULD TRIGGER A SHIFT IN POWER THAT

TRIGGERS EXTINCTION
Joseph Nye, Former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Bound to Lead,
1990 p. 17
Perceptions of change in the relative power of nations are of critical importance to

understanding the relationship between decline and war. One of the oldest generalizations
about international politics attributes the onset of major wars to shifts in power among the
leading nations. Thus Thucydides accounted for the onset of the Peloponnesian War which
destroyed the power of ancient Athens. The history of the interstate system since 1500 is
punctuated by severe wars in which one country struggled to surpass another as the leading
state. If, as Robert Gilpin argues, “international politics has not changed fundamentally over
the millennia,” the implications for the future are bleak. And if fears about shifting power
precipitate a major war in a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, history as we know it
may end.
SDI BHR 101
AT: OFFSHORE BALANCING
OFFSHORE BALANCING FAILS AND RESULTS IN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE AND

NUCLEAR WARS
Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, Washington Quarterly, Spring,
1995
It is possible that in a balance of power system the United States would be in a relatively privileged position as
compared to the other great powers. Given the relative distance of the United States from other power centers, it
might be able to mimic the former British role of an offshore balancer. As in the nineteenth century, the
United States and other great powers would compete and cooperate to avoid hegemony and global wars. Each
great power would protect its own specific interests and protect common interests cooperatively. If necessary, the
United States would intervene militarily to prevent the emergence of a preponderant power. But there are also
several serious problems with this approach. First, there is a real question whether the major powers
will behave as they should under the logic of a balance of power framework. For example, would the West
European powers respond appropriately to a resurgent Russian threat, or would they behave as the European
democracies did in the 1930s? The logic of a balance of power system might well require the United States to
support a non-democratic state against a democratic one, or to work with one undesirable state against another.
For example, to contain the power of an increasingly powerful Iran, the United States would have to strengthen Iraq.
The United States may, however, be politically unable to behave in this fashion. For example, after the Iraqi victory
against Iran in 1988, balance of power logic indicated that the United States should strengthen Iran. However,
because of ongoing animosity in U.S.Iranian relations, the nature of Iran's regime, and moral concerns, the United
States could not implement such a strategy. There are many other examples. To expect such action is therefore
probably unrealistic. Second, this system implies that the major industrial democracies will no longer see
themselves as allies. Instead, political, and possibly even military, struggle among them will become not
only thinkable but legitimate. n5 Each will pursue its own economic interest much more vigorously, thereby
weakening such multilateral economic institutions as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
the liberal world trading order in general. This would increase the likelihood of major economic
depressions and dislocations. Third, the United States is likely to face more competition from other major powers
in areas of interest to it. For example, other powers might not be willing to grant the United States a sphere of
influence in the Americas, but might seek, as Germany did in World War I, to reach anti-U.S. alliances with Latin
American nations. Similarly, as noted above, another great power might decide to support a potential hegemon in
the Persian Gulf. Finally, and most important, there is no guarantee that the system will succeed in its own
terms. Its operation requires subtle calculations and indications of intentions in order to maintain the
balance while avoiding war; nations must know how to signal their depth of commitment on a given issue without
taking irrevocable steps toward war. This balancing act proved impossible even for the culturally similar and
aristocratically governed states of the nineteenth-century European balance of power systems. It will be
infinitely more difficult when the system is global, the participants differ culturally, and the governments
of many of the states, influenced by public opinion, are unable to be as flexible (or cynical) as the rules of the
system require. Thus, miscalculations might be made about the state of the balance that could lead to
wars that the United States might be unable to stay out of. The balance of power system failed in the past,
producing World War I and other major conflicts. It might not work any better in the future -- and war among
major powers in the nuclear age is likely to be more devastating.
SDI BHR 102
OFFSHORE BALANCING CAUSES IRANIAN REGIONAL AGGRESSION

AGAINST OIL SHIPPING
Kenneth Pollack, Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs, July / August 2003
The most conservative approach to Persian Gulf security would be to return to the initial American
strategy of offshore balancing. When tried in the 1970s and 1980s, this approach failed because Iran and Iraq
were still quite strong and the United States' over-the-horizon posture was not a sufficient deterrent. Today,
however, Iran and Iraq are much weaker and are likely to remain so (at least until Iran acquires nuclear weapons).
Washington, meanwhile, has repeatedly demonstrated that it will intervene in the Persian Gulf to protect its
interests and prevent aggression. So the strategy might work better this time around. In this approach, the United
States would dramatically reduce its military footprint in the region, leaving only the bare minimum of the current
arrangements in place. The headquarters of the 5th Fleet would remain in Bahrain (where a U.S. Navy flag has been
welcome for 50 years), but fewer American warships would ply the waters of the Gulf. The air force would retain its
huge new base at al Udeid in Qatar, again because the Qataris seem pleased to have it there. The army might keep
some prepositioned equipment in Kuwait and Qatar and might regularly rotate in battalions to train on it -- if those
states were comfortable with such guests. In addition, if a future Iraqi government were amenable, the United
States might retain an air base and some ground presence there. Alternately, army bases in the region might be
dispensed with altogether, and instead the United States could simply rely on equipment stored on container ships
stationed at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. On the political level, the United States would preserve its informal
relationships with the GCC states and possibly add a similar association with a friendly new Iraqi government. It
would continue to contain Iran by making clear that any Iranian aggression would be met by an American military
response. And it would continue its efforts to secure European, Japanese, and Russian support in pressuring Tehran
both economically and diplomatically so as to end Iran's support for terror and its unconventional weapons
programs. This smaller military footprint would go a long way toward alleviating the internal problems caused by
the presence of U.S. combat forces in the Persian Gulf region -- so not surprisingly, this is the strategy that the Gulf
Arabs themselves favor. With Saddam gone, their overriding goal now is to minimize domestic discontent, and they
believe that the United States can keep peace in the region with a minimal presence. This approach would also be
popular in certain quarters of the American military, which would be glad to shed the burdens of policing an
inhospitable and less than luxurious region far from home. On the other hand, the mere fact that the Persian Gulf
states are so enamored of this strategy ought to give American planners pause. With the exception of Kuwait after
the Iraqi invasion, most of these countries have shown a distressing determination over the years to ignore their
problems -- both external and internal -- rather than confront them. Although returning to a mostly over-the-horizon
presence could provide the Persian Gulf states with the leeway they need to push through reforms, it is equally
likely that they will see the withdrawal of U.S. forces as a panacea for all their problems and decide that internal
reforms are therefore unnecessary. A reduced U.S. military and political presence, in turn, would weaken
Washington's ability to press its local allies to make the tough choices they need to for their own long-term well-
being. A return to an over-the-horizon posture would also risk re-creating some of the same problems
that made the strategy untenable the first time around. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, a
minimal American presence in the region might tempt it to new aggression. The GCC countries have
often shown a willingness to accommodate powerful, aggressive neighbors, and a reduced American
presence could increase their willingness to do so again -- giving Iran, say, an unhealthy degree of
control over oil flows. Finally, a limited American presence might tempt other outside powers -- such as
China -- to fish in the Gulf's troubled waters at some point down the road.
SDI BHR 103
OFFSHORE BALANCING LINKS TO ALL OF OUR OFFENSE

Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, “From
Preponderance to Offshore Balancing” International Security, Summer 1997
Offshore balancing is a strategy for the multipolar world that already is emerging. Its underlying premise is that it
will become increasingly more difficult, dangerous, and costly for the United States to maintain order in, and control
over, the international political system as called for by the strategy of preponderance. Offshore balancing would
define U.S. interests narrowly in terms of defending the United States’ territorial integrity and preventing the rise of
a Eurasian hegemon. As an offshore balancer, the United States would disengage from its military
commitments in Europe, Japan, and South Korea. The overriding objectives of an offshore balancing strategy
would be to insulate the United States from future great power wars and maximize its relative power position in the
international system. Offshore balancing would reject the strategy of preponderance’s commitment to
economic interdependence because interdependence has negative strategic consequences. Offshore
balancing also would eschew any ambition of perpetuating U.S. hegemony and would abandon the
ideological pretensions embedded in the strategy of preponderance. As an offshore balancer, the
United States would not assertively export democracy, engage directly in peace enforcement operations,
attempt to save “failed states” (like Somalia and Haiti), or use military power for the purpose of humanitarian
intervention.
SDI BHR 104
Lack of hard power leads to an attack on American soil

Jim Talent, fellow in military affairs at the Heritage Foundation, The Heritage Foundation,
November 21 2007, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed112107d.cfm
The biggest danger in defense and foreign policy is allowing ideology to trump reality—
trying to force circumstances on the ground to fit preexisting beliefs rather than
adjusting one's beliefs to fit circumstances on the ground. We live in a multipolar world
with threats that are highly unpredictable and therefore, taken as a whole, more
dangerous than the threats we faced during the Cold War. There is no conceivable
scenario in which a weak America is a safe America. Even isolationists should
understand the importance of military power. In the end, it would take a lot more than
4 percent of our GDP to defend a "Fortress America"—an America that allows dangers
to fester and grow until they are strong enough to attack us in our homeland.
If U.S. Heg lost the world will go through another dark age that will be more
devastating
Ferguson, 2004 – Professor of History at New York University's Stern School of Business
and Senior fellow at the Hoover Institution (Niall, “A world without power,” Foreign Policy
143, p. 32-39, July-August)
Critics of U.S. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative. If the United
States retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not China, not
the Muslim world—and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a
single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a new Dark
Age.
We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the history of world politics, it
seems, someone is always the hegemon, or bidding to become it. Today, it is the United States; a
century ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before that, it was France, Spain, and so on. The famed
19th-century German historian Leopold von Ranke, doyen of the study of statecraft, portrayed
modern European history as an incessant struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was
possible only through recurrent conflict.
SDI BHR 105
American Primacy needed to check Terrorist proliferation
Kagan, 98 – Alexander Hamilton Fellow at American University (Robert, “The benevolent

empire,” Foreign Policy, Iss. 111, pg. 24-35, Summer, Proquest)
The core argument itself is not new: The United States and the West face a new threat--
weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists--and, whether we like it or not, no
power other than the United States has the capacity, or can provide the decisive leadership,
required to handle this and other critical global security issues. Certainly not the United
Nations or, anytime soon, the European Union. In the absence of American primacy, the
international order would quickly return to disorder. Indeed, whatever legitimate concerns
people may have about the fact of America's primacy, the downsides of not asserting that
primacy are, according to The American Era, potentially far more serious. The critics "tend to
dwell disproportionately on problems in the exercise of [American] power rather than on the
dire consequences of retreat from an activist foreign policy," Lieber writes. They forget
"what can happen in the absence of such power."
U.S. heg Is the only thing keeping preventing global wars
Schmitt, 2006– Resident scholar and director of the Program on Advanced Strategic
Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (Gary, “Is there any alternative to U.S.
primacy?” The Weekly Standard, Books & Arts, Vol. 11 No. 22, February, Lexis)
And neither of them, one suspects, is very seriously intended. For the truth about America's
dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is
that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the
world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives.
To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans
—- and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of
scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony: "A world without U.S. primacy
will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a
world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping
global affairs."
SDI BHR 106
MILITARY WITHDRAWAL MAKES CONFLICTS MORE LIKELY
Thayer 2006 [Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota,
Duluth, The National Interest, November -December, “In Defense of Primacy”, lexis]
In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental
objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less
secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no
matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a
"time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or
rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the
United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing
half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect
American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens
aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak
rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international
politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then
the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the
country from such threats.
SDI BHR 107
SPENDING
THERE IS NO COST TO THE PLAN. ENERGY EFFICIENCY MEASURES
SAVE MONEY

The military services maintain huge infrastructures to ensure fuel delivery at

the right time and place. Large and small surface trucking organizations,
naval fleet tankers and aerial refueling aircraft, along with the associated
substantial maintenance and logistics organizations contribute to
considerable overhead costs.
Increases in fuel efficiency would correspondingly shrink this overhead
burden, enabling savings through reductions in logistics requirements far in
excess of the investment. These savings accrue largely during peacetime, and
represent opportunities to shift financial resources from logistics to operations, or from
“tail to tooth”, over time.
SDI BHR 108
OIL DISADS
DOD CONSUMPTION IS TOO SMALL TO DRIVE THE GLOBAL OIL

MARKET
Naval Research Advisory Committee APRIL 2006

FUTURE FUELS
http://www.onr.navy.mil/nrac/docs/2005_rpt_future_fuels.pdf
It is clear that DOD is petroleum dependent: In weight and volume limited

applications, which are typical of transportation functions, there is no substitute for the
energy density provided by liquid hydrocarbons. That said, DOD cannot drive the
market due
to its relatively minor portion of the national petroleum demand. While its
position is not
one of strength, it has some opportunity to influence the market through purchase
guarantees,
for example. If it is to ensure an adequate supply of liquid hydrocarbon fuels for its
operations into the future, DOD must look to innovative arrangements that will
stimulate
supply from domestic resources.
SDI BHR 109
AT: SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS CAN’T SOLVE

Congress provides supplemental funds when the cost of fuel far outstrips
the stabilized rates that the Services use in their budget estimates. For example,
the FY 2000 Emergency Supplemental Act, among other things, appropriated
$1.556 billion to cover the increased costs of fuel in FY 2000 and FY 2001.
These supplemental funds reached the Department in the last quarter of the
fiscal year. As a result, training scheduled in the first three quarters of the
fiscal
year was cancelled due to constrained O&M funds. This lost training cannot
be
made up with funds provided in the fourth quarter. While delayed maintenance
can still be performed, it is more costly.
More realistic fuel cost projections, identifying the real cost of fuel to the
operating forces (including the costs of air-to-air and at-sea refueling) and using
that information to buy the optimum level of fuel efficiency can all help DoD
maintain its training, weapons and facilities maintenance. This improves
overall
readiness.
SDI BHR 110
AIR FORCE
THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT INCENTIVIZE EFFICIENCY NOW

From a broader perspective, the Air Force has not established explicit
Service-wide goals for reducing battle space fuel demand. In its cost benefits
analyses that describe the economic benefits of IHPTET, the Air Force, like the
other Services, used DoD’s standard fuel price as the basis for their
calculations.
And like the other Services, this ignores the resources within the logistics
system
required to deliver the fuel to the platforms. Operational benefits were described
in terms of single platforms, which does not take into account overall capability
impact. For example, it does not address the question of how many fewer
efficient platforms would it take to execute a Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
mission than with current platforms.
SDI BHR 111
ARMY
THE ARMY IS NOT MAXIMIZING EFFICIENCY STRATEGIES NOW

Despite the Army's overarching need to improve efficiency, the use of

efficiency goals in the Army requirements determination process appears to
be
weak. For example, the Future Combat Vehicle program includes a requirement
to reduce support requirements by 90 percent, a component of which is fuel.
However, as shown in the chart above, the future Scout and Calvary systems
include no specific requirement to improve fuel efficiency. In addition, the
current
Force XXI systems include no planned upgrades that specifically target fuel
efficiency. Currently planned upgrades to these systems have small impacts on
efficiency, sometimes positively, but sometimes negatively. Because efficiency is
not an explicit requirement and the indirect but tangible benefits are not explicitly
factored into cost benefit analyses or acquisition systems engineering trade-off
studies, technologies to make systems more efficient are not implemented as
quickly as they could or should.

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SDI BHR 1

DOD AFF ENERGY EFFICIENCY

(1)SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED INCENTIVES ARE VITAL FOR

PRESENT POLICIES OF THE DOD DO NOT ACCOUNT FOR THE REAL

The Defense Science Board Task Force 01

from current practices.

DESPITE SOME EFFORTS TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY THE OVERALL

Defense Science Board Feb 2008

Defense Science Board Feb 2008

How systems are operated also significantly affects fuel consumption.

ACCOUNTING FOR THE TRUE COST OF FUEL WOULD INCENTIVIZE

NYGREN, MASSIE & KERN 2005

INCREASING INCENTIVES IS THE MOST IMPORTANT WAY TO

The Department of Defense should provide incentives in the United

ADVANTAGE 1: MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

A) MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS CONSTRAINED NOW

INITIALLY, WE NOTE THAT THE U.S. MILITARY WILL INEVITABLY BE

to seize or neutralize weapons of mass destruction will be especially important in this

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 2008

THE LACK OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY IS A CRITICAL RESTRAINT ON

Defense Science Board Feb 2008

B) MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS CRITICAL TO PREVENT GLOBAL

A LESS EFFECTIVE MILITARY FORCE MAKES WAR MORE LIKELY

a weak military is worse than none at all – it will invite aggression or

U.S. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS KEY TO PREVENT CONFLICT

could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to

finally,U.S. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS THE KEY TO SOLVING A

A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point

a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to

Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from

requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.

primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence

international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime,

, American primacy within the international

American primacy helps keep a

number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey,

once states are governed democratically, the

likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because

Third, along with the growth

Economic spin-offs foster the

development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps

World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and

About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines

responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and

THERE IS no other state, group of

states or international organization that can provide these global benefits.

MAINTAING EFFECTIVE U.S. LEADERSHIP IS THE KEY TO PREVENTING

AFGHANISTAN IS COLLAPSING INTO INSTABILITY AND THE U.S. CAN’T

IN AFGHANISTAN MANY TROOPS ARE TIED UP PROTECTING THE

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN ADVANTAGE LINKS

Defense Science Board Feb 2008

THE QUANTITIES OF FUEL USED IN AFGHANISTAN ARE MASSIVE

INCREASES IN FUEL EFFICIENCY WOULD FREE UP LOTS OF TROOPS

Defense Science Board Feb 2008

UNCHECKED INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN WILL UNLEASH A

The conditions for unrest are ripe and the

will certainly resist any new Taliban

the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces

uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is

The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic

FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN WILL ENSURE WIDESPREAD WAR IN THE

“The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,” he

SUCH A CONFLICT WOULD UNLEASH A WAVE OF TERRORISM AND