Nuclear Power Supplement #2

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 1
Nuclear Power Supplement #2
Index
Index................................................................................................................................................................................1
Nuclear Power Inevitable................................................................................................................................................2
US Nuclear Leadership Decreasing................................................................................................................................3
Global Increase Nuke Power =’s Prolif...........................................................................................................................4
NPT Can’t Stop Prolif.....................................................................................................................................................5
NSG Can’t Stop Prolif....................................................................................................................................................6
Poverty Add-on / Impact.................................................................................................................................................7
Cooperative Non-Proliferation Solvency........................................................................................................................8
Cooperative Non-Proliferation Solvency........................................................................................................................9
Cooperative Non-Proliferation Solvency .....................................................................................................................10
Modeling Solvency.......................................................................................................................................................11
Modeling Solvency.......................................................................................................................................................12
Yucca/Waste Solvency..................................................................................................................................................13
Blackouts Solvency.......................................................................................................................................................14
Ban Nuclear Power CP Answers...................................................................................................................................15
Spending Answers.........................................................................................................................................................16
GNEP is Normal Means................................................................................................................................................17
Nuke Power Key to Idaho.............................................................................................................................................18
Neg – Nuke Power Not Inevitable................................................................................................................................19
Neg – Cooperative Non-Prolif Fails/Bad.....................................................................................................................20
Neg – Cooperative Non-Prolif Fails/Bad......................................................................................................................21
Neg – Cooperative Non-Prolif Fails/Bad......................................................................................................................22
Nuclear Power Inevitable

Massive increase in global nuclear power is inevitable
Waterman, July 8, 2008 (Homeland and National Security Editor at UPI)

Shaun, UPI,
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Nuke_Watchdog_Warns_About_Nuclear_Power_And_P
roliferation_Dangers_Part_One_999.html
The report says global demand for power is likely to rise by 100 percent by 2030. "Nuclear energy is
likely to be in great demand because of the large price increases for oil and natural gas and the fact that
nuclear power produces no carbon (or other) emissions." Robinson bluntly says the expansion of civil
nuclear energy generation is not just inevitable, it is already under way. "You just have to read the
newspapers to see that this is the case," he told United Press International. The report cites a list prepared
by the State Department in 2007 of a dozen countries planning to join the nuclear power club, or "giving
serious consideration" to it, within the next 10 years -- including the former Soviet Central Asian nations of
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan; Islamic giants Indonesia, Egypt and Turkey; and Poland and the Baltic states.
Fifteen other nations -- including Algeria, Ghana, Libya, Malaysia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen -- have
"longer-term plans or studies under way," according to the State Department list. While wealthier countries
"can try to buy their way out" of the looming energy crunch, "the Third World does not have that option," and
there are few real alternatives to nuclear power for many countries. There has proved to be no silver bullet in
renewable or other alternative energy sources." The report says there are currently 435 nuclear reactors
operating around the world, with 28 new ones currently under construction. It says 222 more are being
planned. "It's a pretty depressing prospect," Robinson concluded.
US Nuclear Leadership Decreasing

The US isn’t a leader in nuclear power in the present system
ISAB 2008 (International Security Advisory Board which is composed of 8 US ambassadors,

2 senators, and 20 Foreign Policy Experts, April 7)
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105587.pdf
This paper traces the history of the United States in leading the production and
commercialization of nuclear power plants while also enjoying a dominant position in the
nuclear supply market for several decades. The United States exercised a leadership role in
shaping a global nonproliferation regime, in parallel with its civilian (non-defense) nuclear
power efforts. Today the United States no longer enjoys such a dominant position, having not
ordered a new U.S. nuclear power plant for more than 30 years. In the emerging expansion of
civil nuclear power around the world, the United States is far from being a dominant supplier of
plants, equipment, or fuel, and has no real international role in the reprocessing or spent fuel
storage industries.
Global Increase Nuke Power =’s Prolif

The global increase in nuclear power guarantees proliferation

In addressing these tasks, we noted that the rise in nuclear power worldwide, and particularly within
Third World nations, inevitably increases the risks of proliferation. What the United States must do is to
find ways to mitigate those risks. In our work to address these requests, we looked broadly and tried to
imagine the full set of possible U.S. actions: new international treaties, the imposition of new requirements
on current signatories of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (referred to as the NPT), and
a plethora of much lesser measures. However, as the discussion within the body of this report will show, we
concluded that — to realistically make progress in strengthening proliferation protections — it will be
necessary to set our sights considerably lower than seeking a new nonproliferation treaty. We concluded that
the current international climate is quite unpropitious for gaining support from non-nuclear weapon states to
accept stricter measures against proliferation. While the root causes for this current condition can be debated,
we believe that incremental measures, rather than either revolutionary or comprehensive changes, will
be far more likely to succeed in the near term.
NPT Can’t Stop Prolif

The NPT is inadequate – only new efforts can prevent proliferation

Even though, on the whole, the NPT has been highly useful in preventing proliferation, there has
not been universal nor uniform success. Some nations did not participate at all (e.g., India,
Israel, Pakistan), while others have pursued nuclear weapons in clear violation of the Treaty.
Some have successfully achieved nuclear weapons, despite the concerted efforts of the
international community, but doubtless the rate has been considerably slowed because of these
efforts. President Kennedy’s prediction of March 21, 1963, that “personally I am haunted by the
feeling that by 1970 there may be ...10 nuclear (weapons) powers instead of four, and by 1975,
15 or 20,” did not come true. However, this success cannot be attributed to the power of the
NPT alone, nor to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN
organization that now implements the NPT. For all of the years since its creation, the NPT has
been an important psychological and political barrier to proliferation, while the IAEA itself has
continued to grow in capabilities and performance.
Unfortunately, in recent years, the NPT regime has begun to face even more difficult challenges.
The cases of North Korea and Iran have demonstrated that nations can pursue nuclear weapons
while claiming that they are only interested in peaceful nuclear energy applications. There have
now been more than 10 independent states — above the original five depositary states — with
either actual nuclear weapons, or at least in possession of feasible designs. Although these totals
still number below what President Kennedy feared we would have to face, these nevertheless
stand as a very sobering statistic for us. These historical data best demonstrate the continuing,
and in fact, urgent need by all nations of the world to direct both greater vigilance and actions to
prevent further proliferation (and to roll-back actual proliferation). We believe that, unless there
are additional efforts to shore up the implementation of the NPT, we run the risk that the primary
objective of the NPT will not be achieved.
NSG Can’t Stop Prolif

Nuclear suppliers group fails to solve proliferation

We evaluated the need for a set of legal prohibitions that would make it a crime to traffic in
actual nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons design, special nuclear materials, and technology
(including enrichment and reprocessing systems), perhaps with strong international enforcement,
such as through the International Court of Justice. Although the Nuclear Suppliers Group still
exists and it generates a trigger list that the countries involved are to self-police, history shows
that its effectiveness is inadequate. An additional problem today is that not all suppliers are
members of the Suppliers Group.
Poverty Add-on / Impact

Fast reactors are key to save the lives of millions across the globe
Sackett 98 (Deputy Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory, John)

Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 65, #2, p. 51-54
But that has now changed. For the past three years, the United States has had no reactor development
program. All have been canceled. Our own program, the Integral Fast Reactor, was canceled in 1994 and
we are now involved with closure of our facilities and development of the fuel disposal technologies for our
own reactor fuel as well as others' fuel. The consequence of this dramatic change in the U.S. position is
that we, as a nation, are rapidly losing our ability to influence international affairs in nuclear
technology.
Reestablishing U.S. leadership is one of the most important challenges we face in the future. Now, the
reality is of course that nobody can know the future, not even those of us in the scientific community. But I
would like to talk with you today about some thoughts on what the future may - and should hold for nuclear
technology. And why.
I don't want to talk about some specific technical point. Nor about a particular program or a detailed budget
item. I want to talk about The Big Picture.
And, as sure as we are warmed today by a nuclear reactor we call the sun, I want to talk about why the future
must be a nuclear future.
We sit here today in the birthplace of nuclear power: Idaho Falls, Idaho. That's a little mind boggling to say.
My town. Your town. Where our kids were born and raised. Just a little upstream from where I grew up in
Twin Falls. But we are the birthplace of one of the greatest forces for good the world has ever seen.
Today, nuclear power - with its origins here in our hometown - accounts for 17 percent of the world's
electrical power production. Twenty-two percent of American electrical production is nuclear. Some
countries, notably France, Belgium, and Japan have significantly larger portions of their electrical power
produced by nuclear reactors - up to 75 percent. Literally millions of lives are made better, safer and
healthier because of the work done in the past five decades in Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Commendable, yes. Yet still today almost half of the people of the world have no access to electricity at
all! And the world's population is estimated to double by the middle of the next century. Most of the
increase will be in the nations that are now energy and economically poor. What is their future?
Did you know that the average life span for people with no access to electricity is 45 years?
The average life span for people with access to even a small amount of electricity jumps to about 65
years. On one hand, these developing countries already recognize that abundant energy is the key to
overcoming poverty, hunger and disease and are reaching out for their share of the quality of life that
we have been enjoying for decades.
Cooperative Non-Proliferation Solvency

The US must increase civilian nuclear power to persuade new nuclear nations to accept
safeguards that will prevent prolif

Shaun, UPI,
http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/07/09/Report_urges_tough_safeguards_for_gl
obal_nuclear_power_expansion/UPI-56651215613600/
The United States should embrace a global expansion of civil nuclear power generation, in order to
ensure that it and other supplier nations can build safeguards into the growing market, says a report from
a State Department advisory panel.
The report highlights a vigorous debate about the extent to which regulatory regimes -- even of the tough
kind it advocates -- can actually provide safeguards against a nation determined to thwart them.
The US needs to develop new nuclear technology to exchange with new nuclear nations to
prevent prolif – solves better than the IAEA

Shaun, UPI,
Although some experts contest this premise, the report goes on to recommend that, rather than seeking to
strengthen the existing global proliferation control regime by renegotiating a tougher Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the United States instead should focus on reaching deals with other nations that
already produce nuclear fuels -- the "supplier nations" -- to provide aspirant nuclear power nations with
fuel and technology in exchange for tough, enforceable pledges that they will not develop their own fuel
production capacities. Fuel production systems, like uranium enrichment using centrifuges or reprocessing
spent fuel into plutonium, are among the most proliferation-risky technologies, because they can so easily
be used to produce weapons material instead. The regime of safeguards the report advocates would
"have a lot more teeth than the IAEA," Robinson told United Press International. He said the International
Atomic Energy Agency, which is charged with enforcing the NNPT, is "a gentlemen and ladies' agreement"
with no provision for surprise or otherwise aggressive inspections. The United States and other nations have
promoted voluntary "additional protocols" -- which allow more intrusive inspections and more robust
safeguards -- but Robinson said these are being "slow-rolled.""You could hardly find a less propitious time
for renegotiation," he concluded.

Proliferation is inevitable in the quo – only by developing and leveraging new nuclear power
technology can the US hope to prevent prolif

Shaun, UPI,
Some experts say the proliferation cat is effectively halfway out of the bag already. "The ability of
governments to prevent the proliferation of dangerous technologies has drastically declined and
continues to decline," said Brian Finlay of the Stimson Center.
The report says supplier nations should jointly establish mechanisms for assessing compliance with pledges
to forgo enrichment and reprocessing capability in return for fuel, and "develop criteria and procedures for
shutting off fuel and hardware supply in the event that a recipient is found to be non-compliant."
In other words, countries that engaged in freelance reprocessing or enrichment activities would lose
their future source of fuel and technology, and -- importantly -- be subject to "take back" provisions by
which material they had already received could be confiscated.
"What we are proposing is to write in real prohibitions … real safeguards … explicitly into the supply
contracts," said Robinson. "That's the quid pro quo" for getting fuel and technology from the United
States and other supplier nations.
Leveraging nuclear technology is the best way to solve proliferation

That is, we believe the best route for progress in strengthening the proliferation protections — for
preventing nuclear power capabilities from being misused — will be through supply-side agreements,
which should contain strict prohibitions against diversion of materials or facilities for weapons production.
For example, we believe there must be explicit provisions that commit the receiving nations from having
indigenous enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. Suppliers must bind the receivers to these conditions.
This will require some new approaches to be successful, because the majority of suppliers are not as well
connected to their governments as is the case in the United States. Thus, we believe that it may be possible
to require such policies as placing a clause within any contracts written to bring nuclear energy use
into countries that seek new or additional nuclear generating capabilities. An obvious corollary action, if
such an approach is to be pursued, is that it will be critical for all nuclear supplier states to demand that such
provisions must be agreed to before nuclear-generating capabilities would be supplied.

Increasing the development advanced nuclear power plants in the US is key to
sustaining leadership and preventing proliferation

The Council report assessed the ability of the United States to advance its nonproliferation
objectives if it continues to have erosion in its own nuclear power industries and infrastructures.
The U.S. influence on these issues will also suffer if we continue to decline participation in
international supply chains for nuclear power plants and components. It notes that the U.S.
Enrichment Corporation (USEC) today has only a 30% market share worldwide. The report
concludes that if the United States is to exercise strong and specific influence on the worldwide
expansion of nuclear power, while also placing strong emphasis on protections against misuse of
civil nuclear power infrastructures for nuclear weapons proliferation by foreign nations, we must
remain an active player in advanced nuclear power systems, uranium enrichment services, and nuclear
fuel technologies. It suggests that the United States must achieve growth in its domestic nuclear power
industry as well.
Modeling Solvency
Solutions to the nuclear waste problem ensure global modeling

Perhaps the greatest challenge we identified — in terms of the timescale to create a new regime
for nonproliferation within the expanding civil nuclear power efforts — is: “What do we do
about reprocessing, spent fuel storage, and disposition?” The intense differences between the
industry, the Department of Energy, the Congress, the State of Nevada (and its representatives
and a key Senator), and the courts over the issue of a U.S. repository have resulted in gridlock.
Meanwhile, the crowded local storage of spent fuel at the operating reactor sites continues to
grow. The Department of Energy, through its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership efforts is
currently evaluating some major ideas for how to make progress on these problems, which would
offer hope that the United States would be positioned to take on the larger problem of solutions
for waste reprocessing, storage and disposition, and for transmutation of selected fuel products
that might provide a model for global handling of nuclear power spent fuel and wastes.
Domestic increases in nuclear power are key to controlling market decisions regarding
technology use and spur global modeling

I do wish to state, in the strongest terms, that it is in the United States' best interest to be an active player
with a leadership role in nuclear technology. Our economic stability, our environment, our national
security - all are impacted significantly by whether and how nuclear technology is used in the rest of
the world. Electrical power generation will be driven by market considerations in the United States.
This means a lot of natural gas in the short term. In the near term, our domestic interests can be met with or
without nuclear power. But the issues go way beyond domestic market considerations. The issues are global,
and only those countries that are active players will be at the table when decisions are made. For example:
Russia and the Middle East hold about 70% of the natural gas known in the world. Without nuclear power,
will Europe substitute natural gas supplied by Russia? I doubt that they would make themselves so
vulnerable. China is pushing steadily to increase its stake in nuclear power, with approximately 20 plants on
order and more planned to eventually replace the polluting soft coal that it now depends on.
Japan welcomed the greenhouse gases treaty; its economy stands to benefit because its energy production is
largely dependent on nuclear, which emits no greenhouse gases.
And what about India and Pakistan? If no other event makes the case for United States leadership in nuclear
science and technology, those nations' recent actions should. How can they develop their own energy and
economic security, which both plan to do with nuclear power, while the rest of the world can be assured that
it will not lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons? Only this week Russia announced the sale of two large
nuclear reactors to India. If the leadership of the U.S. is reestablished in nuclear power technology, our future
here in Idaho will be decided also. We are the one location in the United States with the facilities and
expertise necessary to design, develop and demonstrate nuclear power concepts. If the U.S. is to lead,
much of what is done will take place in Idaho. Our future locally, therefore depends upon national and
international decisions. Still, in order for the United States to take what I consider to be its appropriate
place of leadership globally, we need to tend to business at home.
Modeling Solvency
US support for advanced reactors will be modeled and solves waste and prolif

If the United States opts out, then we can watch as France, Japan, China, Russia and other nations
develop and deploy this necessary technology. And then we can buy it from them when we need it
ourselves. If the United States chooses to lead, much of that work will be done here in Idaho because this is
the place in the United States with the facilities and expertise to do it.
My remarks are not about this budget year. Or the next two years. Or four or six. I am talking about the long
term. There is plenty of clean-up work to keep us very busy for a few years, but only for a few years. After
that, the nation and we lose essential capability.
Now is the time to decide what role we want to have and what work we will do in this country. There is a
great deal of work that needs to be done - that will be done somewhere, some time - which we can and should
do here. This includes developing the next generation of power reactors, increasing the efficiency of
current generation reactors, developing proliferation-resistant fuels, showing that we can take care of
our wastes, and rendering the material from weapons of mass destruction useless for that purpose.
While these critical actions are taking place, be assured that a world of people looking for nonpolluting
sources of electricity will turn to nuclear.
We must be ready to respond when that call comes. And it will come.
We must be prepared to take nuclear technology to maturity, and answer the needs of an eager world.
Yucca/Waste Solvency
IFR’s solve the need to use Yucca
DOE 2008 (Department of Energy, March 26)

http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepAdvancedBurnerReactors.html
The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will develop and demonstrate Advanced Burner Reactors, or
advanced fast reactors, as a key element of a new, integrated U.S. recycling capability. As they produce
power, advanced fast reactors consume transuranic elements (plutonium and other long-lived radioactive
material), potentially eliminating the need for their disposal in the geologic repository at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada.
Blackouts Solvency
Integrating IFR’s into the current nuclear portfolio solves waste and ensures a stable
energy supply
DOE 2008 (Department of Energy, March 26)

http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepAdvancedBurnerReactors.html
To destroy the transuranics in spent fuel from nuclear power plants, an advanced fast reactor takes
advantage of high-energy or fast neutrons to fission, or split apart, long-lived transuranics. The process
transmutes transuranics into shorter-lived isotopes that do not require permanent, geologic disposal while
releasing energy for electricity. The result is useful energy produced from material that would otherwise
be waste.
Current light water reactors and advanced fast reactors would work well together in an advanced
nuclear fuel cycle. Light water reactors are net producers of transuranics, while advanced fast reactors are
net consumers of transuranics. The U.S. has a long and successful history of research in developing fast
reactors, which provides a valuable base for their accelerated deployment in an integrated recycling
capability. Fast reactors may be developed in modules to promote economical production and can be
constructed at a single site to produce a plant capable of generating over a gigawatt of electricity.
Ban Nuclear Power CP Answers

Banning nuclear power in the US increases nuclear power globally and crushes US leadership

As you each well know, there are people in this country, even in this state, who advocate eliminating
nuclear power from the mix in the United States, a suggestion akin to eliminating airplanes from
transportation.
Let's think about that for a minute.
What would happen if the United States eliminated airplanes as a result of vocal and effective opposition by
groups opposed to airplanes as unsafe, polluting our skies and creating unacceptable noise over our national
parks? Well, after some grumbling and grousing, people would adjust. They would take trains where they
could. Drive more. Probably teleconference more. They would remember what it was like to get mail and
packages more slowly, and adjust.
But what would the rest of the world do? They would continue to fly, for sure. Foreign companies would rush
in to pick up Boeing's production. Foreign businesses would use their new found competitive advantage to
the greatest extent they could. Foreign travelers would continue to enjoy the advantages of flight. And
foreign researchers would increase their efforts to make better, more efficient airplanes.
Why would they do this? Because it is in their best interest to do so. And the U.S. would be at a great
disadvantage.
This same kind of thing would happen if the United States were to continue to lessen its active
participation in nuclear science, or even phase out its nuclear power production.
The rest of the world would continue to use nuclear power where it makes sense to do so, leaving the
United States on the ground, and with no chance for leadership and its citizens without the advantages
it brings.
Spending Answers
Turn – Train Wreck --The government will be forced to fund the Nuclear Waste Fund
which will collapse the budget in the quo – only resolving the nuclear waste problem
through the plan solves

Another complication is that Congress has not approved the appropriation of the Nuclear Waste
Fund for such uses. (This Fund has been collected from nuclear electricity suppliers since 1983
and currently totals more than $27 billion. The “tax” is collected at a rate of 0.1 cents per
kilowatt-hour.) The funds have been mixed into the general Federal budget, rather than being
sequestered into a separate fund for its originally intended purposes. (After the original bill had
established the Waste Fund, the Congress had later made the availability of these funds
dependent on other “appropriation ceilings being met,” in effect mixing these collected funds
within the general government treasury.) Both political parties are hesitant to allow any uses of this fund
in the near term for fear that it would “break the bank” of federal expenditures. Yet there are lawsuits
in progress against the government by the utilities to have the government take possession of the fuel
and wastes. These lawsuits were entered when the government missed its original deadline of 1998 to
take possession of the spent fuel and wastes. A “train wreck” is surely coming on this issue, and one
argument for allowing reprocessing and partitioning of the wastes is that such a strategy would
appear to make the licensing of a U.S. repository far more feasible, while still not requiring
major implementation funding for several more years.
GNEP is Normal Means

GNEP is normal means for implementing advanced reactors and ensures cooperative
nonproliferation

GNEP was described as “a comprehensive strategy to increase U.S. and global energy security, reduce the
risk of nuclear proliferation, encourage clean development around the world, and improve the environment.”
The goal of the recently established program is to seek both energy and security in advanced energy
initiatives. This is to be achieved by working with partner nations to deploy advanced reactors and
advanced recycling of spent nuclear fuel, supporting developing countries to deploy secure and cost-
effective reactors, and ensuring a reliable supply of nuclear fuel for developing nations (if they will
agree to use nuclear power only for civilian purposes and will forego uranium enrichment and
reprocessing of spent fuel that could lead to nuclear weapons development). The program also
aims to develop technologies that can dramatically reduce nuclear waste volumes while avoiding
separating out plutonium during the reprocessing of fuel and to effectively eliminate the nuclear
byproducts that might be used by either unstable (national) regimes or terrorists to make nuclear
weapons.
Nuke Power Key to Idaho

Increasing support for nuclear power is key to the future of Idaho

If the leadership of the U.S. is reestablished in nuclear power technology, our future here in Idaho will
be decided also. We are the one location in the United States with the facilities and expertise necessary
to design, develop and demonstrate nuclear power concepts. If the U.S. is to lead, much of what is done
will take place in Idaho. Our future locally, therefore depends upon national and international
decisions.
Neg – Nuke Power Not Inevitable

Global nuclear power isn’t inevitable – its all dependent on what the US does

Shaun, UPI,
"There's a reason no one in the private sector wants to do this with their own money," Sokolski said. "Nuclear
power is a hard sell, literally. ... What the (U.S.) nuclear industry is doing is asking for government handouts,
in the form of tax credits, loan guarantees and insurance caps."
Reprocessing is also not economically feasible without government financial support. "Working with
plutonium requires special safety measures which are very expensive," Sokolski said.
The idea that new technologies could help make generation or reprocessing economical is "atomic pie in
the sky. The advances required are as far off as making fusion-generation practical, in terms of
technology."
Expansion is "not inevitable, it is contingent" on U.S. policy changes. "Maybe nuclear power won't
expand. It shrank by 2 percent last year," he said.
Nuclear power isn’t inevitable – its too expensive for other nations to develop

Shaun, UPI,
But critics challenge their premise, saying the idea that the growth of nuclear power generation is
inevitable is a canard. Many of those 435 reactors currently operating are due to be retired in the next
20 to 30 years, points out Henry Sokolski, a proliferation expert who worked for Wolfowitz in the Bush I
administration and currently sits alongside him on the congressionally mandated blue-ribbon panel
examining the threat of terrorist attacks using nuclear material or other weapons of mass destruction.
Nuclear energy is too expensive and too risky to be a commercially viable venture without government
support, he told UPI.
Neg – Cooperative Non-Prolif Fails/Bad

Cooperative proliferation agreements will fail – countries won’t abide by them

Shaun, UPI,
"To make nuclear technology and fuels available on the basis of political pledges not to misuse them,"
he said of the report's recommendations, "when several countries have a track record of doing exactly
that, is putting the nuclear energy cart in front of the nuclear safeguards horse."
Sokolski is particularly critical of the report's recommendation that the United States abandon its 30-year-old
abjuration of reprocessing spent fuel into plutonium -- and work with other supplier nations to increase
global reprocessing capacity.
Even when reprocessing plants are in allied countries like Japan, ensuring there is no leakage or diversion
is almost impossible, he said, because of the volumes of material involved and the very small amount --
about 22 pounds -- of material needed to make a bomb.
Monitoring will fail to prevent new proliferation

Shaun, UPI,
Monitoring any large-scale reprocessing plant creates huge accounting problems," Sokolski told UPI. "The
margin of error the IAEA expects in such operations -- 1 or 2 percent -- leaves you each year with enough
material unaccounted for to make multiple bombs."
Worse, he said, the separated plutonium made from reprocessing "is very easy to fashion into a bomb. It can
be done in days or weeks, if not hours." So a monitoring process actually provides little safeguard. "By
the time you notice it's missing, it could already be too late."

Turn – Leveraging nuclear technology will cause 3rd world nations to backlash destroying global
non-proliferation regimes
Shaun, UPI,
http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/07/10/The_nuclear_cycle_and_the_hostility_c
ycle/UPI-76571215698060/
The recommendation of a State Department advisory panel that the United States band together with other
existing nuclear powers to build safeguards into the growing market for reactor capacity risks fanning
nationalistic hostility in the Third World to global anti-proliferation regimes, say some critics.
A task force of the International Security Advisory Board -- chaired by former Pentagon and World Bank
official Paul Wolfowitz -- produced the report, titled "Proliferation Implications of the Global Expansion of
Civil Nuclear Power," in response to a request from Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Robert Joseph.
The report says the United States must embrace a coming large expansion in global nuclear power generation
-- despite the proliferation risks it poses -- to ensure that nuclear supplier nations work together to build
tough new safeguards into the growing market.
But critics charge this kind of thinking only exacerbates suspicion about the role of the United States
and its First World allies among less developed aspirant nuclear powers.
The suggestion that existing nuclear powers should monopolize production to stop the proliferation of
fuel processing technologies that also can be used to make weapons material "causes nostrils to flair in the
Third World," said Brian Finlay of the Stimson Center.
Finlay, a proliferation expert who has worked with Third World governments on proliferation issues, said
there was "a longstanding sensitivity (among aspirant nuclear nations) to any policy that appears to be
trying to restrict technology transfer."

Turn – 3rd world nations will backlash against the US leveraging nuclear power
Shaun, UPI,
http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/07/10/The_nuclear_cycle_and_the_hostility_c
ycle/UPI-76571215698060/
Finlay's main criticism of the advisory panel's report is that it "fails to create a pathway we can move
down towards ending this adversarial relationship with the Third World."
He called for "out-of-the-box and innovative thinking about the regulation of nuclear technology" to break
what he called "the cycle of hostility" of non-nuclear but aspirant nations toward their perceived "big
brothers" who already have the technology to process and reprocess nuclear fuel.
The tough restrictions to which the report recommends aspirant nuclear nations must sign up as the quid
pro quo for getting guaranteed fuel and technology could "provoke something of a backlash" among
them, Finlay added.

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Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 1

Nuclear Power Inevitable

Waterman, July 8, 2008 (Homeland and National Security Editor at UPI)

US Nuclear Leadership Decreasing

ISAB 2008 (International Security Advisory Board which is composed of 8 US ambassadors,

Global Increase Nuke Power =’s Prolif

ISAB 2008 (International Security Advisory Board which is composed of 8 US ambassadors,

NPT Can’t Stop Prolif

ISAB 2008 (International Security Advisory Board which is composed of 8 US ambassadors,

NSG Can’t Stop Prolif

ISAB 2008 (International Security Advisory Board which is composed of 8 US ambassadors,

Poverty Add-on / Impact

Sackett 98 (Deputy Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory, John)

Cooperative Non-Proliferation Solvency

Waterman, July 9, 2008 (Homeland and National Security Editor at UPI)

Waterman, July 9, 2008 (Homeland and National Security Editor at UPI)

Cooperative Non-Proliferation Solvency

Waterman, July 9, 2008 (Homeland and National Security Editor at UPI)

Leveraging nuclear technology is the best way to solve proliferation

ISAB 2008 (International Security Advisory Board which is composed of 8 US ambassadors,

Cooperative Non-Proliferation Solvency

ISAB 2008 (International Security Advisory Board which is composed of 8 US ambassadors,

ISAB 2008 (International Security Advisory Board which is composed of 8 US ambassadors,

Sackett 98 (Deputy Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory, John)

Sackett 98 (Deputy Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory, John)

DOE 2008 (Department of Energy, March 26)

DOE 2008 (Department of Energy, March 26)

Ban Nuclear Power CP Answers

Sackett 98 (Deputy Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory, John)

Let's think about that for a minute.

ISAB 2008 (International Security Advisory Board which is composed of 8 US ambassadors,

GNEP is Normal Means

ISAB 2008 (International Security Advisory Board which is composed of 8 US ambassadors,

Nuke Power Key to Idaho

Sackett 98 (Deputy Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory, John)

Neg – Nuke Power Not Inevitable

Waterman, July 8, 2008 (Homeland and National Security Editor at UPI)

Waterman, July 8, 2008 (Homeland and National Security Editor at UPI)

Neg – Cooperative Non-Prolif Fails/Bad

Waterman, July 9, 2008 (Homeland and National Security Editor at UPI)

Monitoring will fail to prevent new proliferation

Waterman, July 9, 2008 (Homeland and National Security Editor at UPI)

Neg – Cooperative Non-Prolif Fails/Bad

Neg – Cooperative Non-Prolif Fails/Bad

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