The Decline of the Ottoman Empire, C.

1798-1913: Robert Johnson Puts the Decline of a Once-Great Empire into an International Context.
by Robert Johnson For decades, the decay of the power of the Ottoman Turks in the eastern Mediterranean was known to the British as 'The Eastern Question'. Lord Morley, a Liberal politician of the late nineteenth century, described it as 'that intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, rival peoples and antagonistic faiths'. It was typical of the Europeans to dismiss the Turks as incapable of running an empire, for they regarded them as 'Oriental' and therefore inherently unable to modernise. In short, they were seen as racially inferior. The old regime's gradual disintegration seemed to reinforce these views. It is not surprising that the Ottoman Empire, racked by rebellions, corruption in the administration, financial weaknesses and military defeats, was labelled the 'Sick Man of Europe'. The decline of the Ottoman system, as with the demise of all empires, created dangerous instabilities and fostered new ambitions amongst the region's powers. However, what Morley and his type did not acknowledge was that the interference of the Great Powers made the situation far worse. In a short article, one cannot do justice to the complex narrative of the period, but a broad overview offers a chance to assess the patterns and contours of change and continuity. It seems important today, in light of recent conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, to reappraise the history of south eastern Europe, and therefore of the Ottoman Empire that governed it for so long. Misha Glenny, in his excellent study The Balkans, criticises the paradigmatic way in which historians have traditionally approached this subject. He argues convincingly that 'Balkanisation', for example, is hardly a precise tool for analysis and misleads scholars into thinking that extreme nationalism, territorial fragmentation and 'ancient hatreds' (which together define that term) are the only valid explanations for events there over the last 100 years. In fact, what is striking is how far Great Power rivalries fuelled and distorted the conflicts in the region. It was the European powers that accelerated the process of fragmentation, and, finally, after the First World War, presided over the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. There are five key areas which stand out as explanations for the decline and fall of the Turkish empire, besides European intervention: (1) the moribund nature of the Ottoman government and the empire's relative decline economically; (2) the spread of nationalism in the Balkans; (3) the attempts to revive Turkey by the 'New Ottomans' and 'Young Turks'; (4) the German attempts to generate a sphere of influence in the Middle East, and (5) the impact of the Balkan Wars. The Waning of the Ottoman Empire In contrast to the early modern expansionist period of the Ottoman Empire, backed by its efficient military-bureaucratic structure, it was the inherent conservatism of the nineteenth-century regime which allowed the whole system to stagnate. The emphasis on tradition stifled the intellectual vibrancy that had characterised Islamic culture before the 1500s, and compromised its former military supremacy. All this was happening at a time when western Europe was developing rapidly. New advances in agriculture, in technology, in transport and in communications gave the West the ability to project its power beyond Europe. The Ottoman Empire did not develop a strong bourgeois class,

beyond the old merchant elites, and there was therefore economic as well as intellectual stagnation. The conservatism of the privileged ruling elite in Constantinople, corrupt military leaders and the relative decline of the Ottoman economy compared with the industrial, commercial and financial 'takeoff' of the West left the empire in a dilapidated state. Rising inflation, worsened by financial mismanagement, embezzlement of state revenue and fierce competition from the West, reduced the empire's vitality still further. Yet any physical protest by the empire's impoverished subjects was met with severe repression since the army was the last institution, and a remarkably resilient one, to be able to uphold Turkish rule. But, given its weaknesses, it was not surprising that there were still calls for the internal reform of the Ottoman Empire. In the absence of any responsible assembly, reform had to be initiated by the Sultan. Yet the empire was burdened with a succession of weak rulers with few skills and no training: a situation that simply encouraged conservatism. The provinces of the empire enjoyed a wide measure of autonomy but this made any centralised direction of reform even more difficult; and, since officials often purchased their positions, there was a tendency to increase regional taxation to get their costs reimbursed. Nepotism and bribery also flourished. However, this was a period in which the costs of the state were increasing. The provincial cavalry armies which had protected the frontiers of the empire were rendered obsolete by the Europeans' advances in musket technology. When Napoleon Bonaparte landed an invasion force in Egypt in 1798, he defeated the Mameluke horsemen decisively. To modernise, the Ottomans had to pay for the new technology. Yet their traditional exports in silks, textiles and spices were being rapidly undercut by robust European currencies, faster ships that could carry greater volumes of cheap goods, and mass produced textiles that were more cost-effective than hand-made fabrics. However, in the face of this new competition, the conservative leaders fell back on their faith in the 'inherent superiority' of Islam. In doing so they lost any effective power over the periphery of their empire, and, by the twentieth century, over Turkey itself. Nationalism and Rebellion The Ottoman Empire was already in retreat in the late eighteenth century, and the Sultan Selim III came to power determined to reverse the technological and organisational inferiority of his army. However, his reforms failed to prevent the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in 1798 and it was clear that his changes had not gone far enough. As a result, new elite infantry regiments, clothed and equipped in the western style, were established. However, the creation of the nizam-i-jedid infantry threatened the position of the traditional military-political caste of the Janissaries (an ancient military force that had considerable political influence), and, with the backing of the Ulema (Islamic clergy), they deposed Selim in favour of the more conservative Mustapha IV. It was this conservativism, rather than nationalism, that provoked uprisings in the Balkans. Although the earliest 'nationalist' revolts against the Ottoman Empire can be traced to the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the idea of the nation-state had entered the consciousness of the people in western Europe, the majority of the Balkan peoples were as yet unfamiliar with such concepts. In 1804, Serbs rebelled against the cruelties of the Janissaries rather than against the Sultan, but the rebels came to demand regional autonomy as the revolt developed. By 1807, Serbs had been so radicalised that they embarked on a massacre of Turks in Belgrade. The Sultan responded with a programme of repression which seemed to have restored order by 1812, although a second revolt in 1815 ended with substantial concessions to the Serbians. The better known revolt in Greece in 1821 was also initiated by exasperation with conservative and authoritarian rulers, but it was helped in the early stages by divisions amongst the Turks. Ali Pasha, the Turkish governor of Albania, central Greece and Macedonia, launched an attack on the Sultan's forces in 1817 which tied down large numbers of troops. Despite this inadvertent assistance, the declaration of independence at Epidauros went unheeded as the Greek rebels were divided into a number of rival factions. Indeed, the situation was complex. Local conflicts in the Balkans had sometimes cut across ethnic and religious lines, and temporary alliances between otherwise rival groups were frequent. Nationalism was an idea confined to an educated class, especially those

engaged in commerce and consequently in contact with the West. The revolt was intensified by the arrival of Egyptian troops under Mehemet All (and the massacre of Christians) which galvanised the European powers into action. Threats of European intervention, and the threat of further military reform, spurred the Janissaries into rebellion at this critical moment, but the Sultan, Mahmud II, crushed and then disbanded them. The following year, his fleet was utterly destroyed at Navarino Bay and his Egyptian allies were forced out of Greece, but Mahmud declared a Jehad on all Christian states in the hope of winning over the conservative Ulema and rousing the empire to greater resistance. It was a disaster: Russian forces defeated the Turkish army and the map of the Balkans was redrawn. It was, perhaps, the first great rent in the rotting fabric of the Ottoman Empire. Beyond the Balkans, nationalism in the empire was also negligible. In North Africa, local Muslim elites had replaced or interbred with the original Arab conquerors and a specifically 'Turkish' rule had never been achieved. It was little surprise therefore that first Egyptian and then European influence began to increase in Ottoman North Africa. The Egyptians effectively threw off Turkish suzerainty (in all but religious affairs) in 1831 and the Ottoman Empire was only preserved by the interventions of first Russia (1833), and then Britain (1841-56). Nevertheless, Russian annexations north of the Black Sea eventually extended as far as the Caucasus mountains, replacing Turkish rule there. In these peripheral parts of the empire, resistance to 'foreign' rule was tribal, centred on charismatic local chiefs like Imam Shamyl, or based on regional identity. As the nineteenth century wore on, the Tsars were concerned about the instability the retreat of the Ottoman Empire would produce at the fringes of their own empire, and they sought to take advantage whenever the Ottomans seemed about to collapse. But it was not until the end of the century that nationalist aspirations featured in their calculations. The 'New Ottomans' and the 'Young Turks' Following the death of Mahmud in 1839, a new attempt to reform the empire commenced under the title of Tanzimat. Although difficult to define, the reforms involved greater westernisation, from the adoption of European clothing to newspapers, schooling, and, above all, military change. Some of these had already begun before the 1840s, and it is unclear how many of these changes were internally generated or simply imported from outside by default. Nevertheless, a group inspired by changes in the justice system, or adalet, called themselves 'New Ottomans' and they promoted the idea of fatherland (vatan), and constitutional freedom (hurriget). Whilst not yet 'nationalist', they felt that loyalty to the empire was paramount. Ironically, the modernisation of the financial system made the Ottomans more and more dependent on the support of the European powers, and the Austrian stock market crash of 1873, which coincided with the Great Depression in the West, led to emergency measures throughout the empire. It was these measures that provoked unrest in Herzogovina, and this inspired similar rioting in Bosnia and Bulgaria. By 1875, the Balkans were aflame and the new Turkish armies were engaged in a bitter counter-insurgency conflict. Once again, European intervention tipped the balance. The Russians drove the Turks out of the Balkans in 1877-8 and the Great Powers demarcated the new frontiers of the region. Abd-ul Hamid II was exasperated, but warmed to the Germans for their support which did not entail any territorial concessions. It was to be a fateful liaison. Incensed by the interventions of the European powers, Abd-ul Hamid II reversed the policy of Tanzimat and fell back on a traditional conservative strategy. By the late 1880s, as the relative weakness of the empire became ever more apparent, the Sultan embraced an atavistic pan-Islamic ideology. The ugliness of this policy was evident in 1894-5 when Christian Armenians, who had revolted against the Turks, were subjected to a genocidal policy of mass murder. Yet, hopes of a more liberalised regime had not been abandoned. The 'Young Turks' (or, more accurately, the Committee of Union and Progress) were originally a band of Turkish exiles influenced by the West who aimed to create a constitutional monarchy. They were soon united with nationalist army officers, and, in protest against conciliatory policies in Macedonia,

sparked a revolt in July 1908. Initially successful, they were able to call the first Turkish Parliament in November that year, but these modernisers were clearly split and it was not long before the militarist faction gained the upper hand. Abd-ul Hamid's brief counter-revolution in 1909 ended in failure and he was deposed in favour of a military junta-triumvirate under Enver, Talaat and Jemal. From then on, the ethos of the old Ottoman Empire, which had tended to devolve actual power (whilst retaining a centralised authority), was eroded in favour of Turkish nationalist interests. Such policies were bound to antagonise the other races of the empire, especially the Arabs. Therefore, we might say the empire was doomed even before the First World War had broken out.

German Intervention
From the late 1890s, the Kaiser's militarist elite had cultivated an alliance with Abd-ul Hamid in the hope of rendering Turkey a client state. The Kaiser's protestations of friendship, which he broadcast ostentatiously in 1898, were hollow. In reality he harboured a desire for Ostpolitik. This entailed the creation of a German Empire, or at least a sphere of economic and political influence, over the entire Middle East. The Germans despatched a military mission, offered to support the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway, and established consular officials to inculcate the population with pro-German sympathies. German commerce certainly increased markedly in this period, and German bankers and financiers grew in number. Germany also obtained mining rights. In an effort to neutralise rivals, German officials circulated stories of setbacks to the British Empire and the fantastic idea that the Kaiser had secretly converted to Islam in order to lead a pan-Islamic Jehad against all unbelievers. Nevertheless, Turkey's nationalist and military leaders had their own objectives, to regenerate the Ottoman Empire and extend it eastwards into Persia, the Caucasus and even into Russian Turkestan. Enver Pasha, the leading member of the triumvirate, seemed to embody this new ambition and his grandiose schemes eventually led to a military disaster in 1915 in the Erzerum campaign against Russia. Turkish-German co-operation was therefore strained and German officials, like Ambassador Baron Konrad von Wangenheim, had to work hard to preserve a friendship with the 'Young Turks', having backed the old Sultan. Despite Turkey's participation in the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, the relationship between Germany and Turkey was not close. It would be far more accurate to say that Turkey fought the war for its own interests, particularly the acquisition of modern military and naval expertise. The Impact of the Balkan Wars The Balkan Wars (1912-13) seemed to confirm that Turkey--ousted from Libya in 1911 by Italy and with no remaining military or naval presence in the Persian Gulf--was a spent force. There can be little doubt the wars were significant in the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire. The formation of the Balkan League, made up of Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria, proved that 'ancient hatreds' could be curbed in the face of a common Turkish threat. Conscious of the weakened state of the Ottomans, the League demanded concessions from Turkey in Macedonia (a province it had attacked and seized in 1896). Montenegro did not wait for Turkey's response and launched its attack in October 1912, and the other states joined in. Again, the European powers intervened, and there was considerable debate between them about Serbia's access to the Adriatic. It was the ambiguity about the territorial settlement of 1912 which provoked a second Balkan War in 1913. Although the Turks recovered a little of their territory in that second conflict against Bulgaria, the wars confirmed that Turkey could no longer wield power in south-east Europe: it was now confined to a toehold near Constantinople. The implications of this were far-reaching. For the Balkan states themselves, the wars radicalised politics and decision-making, tested their armed forces and fostered a spirit of national sacrifice. For the Serbs, the Albanians, the Bulgarians and the Greeks, the consequences of the Balkan Wars could only be either survival or foreign occupation--and the latter meant a return to repression. But with victory, Serbia believed that, having defeated one empire, it could challenge the next, namely Austria. Others drew their lessons from the Balkan wars too. The Arabs believed that a revival of their fortunes was imminent. The British and French were encouraged to believe that a thrust against Turkey in the Dardenelles in 1915 would bring the whole Ottoman edifice down. Hence the decline of the Ottoman

Empire seemed to put Europe on the trajectory to war in 1914. Yet the notion that south-east Europe had become 'Balkanised', or territorially fragmented and driven by irreconcilable and extremist politics based on ethnic divisions, and was driving the Great Powers into war, is perhaps misleading. As Glenny argues, it was also, to a large extent the vortices of a decaying empire, and the interventionism of the Great Powers, that made conflicts there far worse. This pattern was to be repeated elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire in its last years. In the end, the Turkish army of 1914-18, besieged on all sides, bolstered a mouldering edifice longer than it deserved, until a combination of internal revolts and foreign intervention finally overwhelmed it. Further Reading Misha Glenny, The Balkans, 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers (London, 1999) Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks (London, 1997) Sevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913 (Cambridge, 1987) M.E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923 (London, 1977) Erik J. Zuercher, Turkey: A Modern History (London, 1998). Issues to Debate * Why was the Ottoman Empire considered the 'Sick Man of Europe' by the end of the nineteenth century? * Why did attempts to reform the Empire prior to 1914 fail? * What combination of factors finally ended the Ottoman Empire? About the Author Dr Rob Johnson is the Course Manager of History at Richard Huish College and the author of several books, including British Imperialism: Histories and Controversies (Palgrave, 2002), Hitler and Nazi Germany (Studymates, 3rd edn., 2004) and European History 1870-1918 (2004).

Timeline 1798 French invasion of Egypt 1804 Serbian Revolt 1806 Russo-Turkish War over Moldavia and Wallachia (ends with Treaty of Bucharest, 1812) 1815 Second Serbian revolt 1817 All Pasha Revolt in Albania 1821 Revolt by Ypsilanti in Romania and Greeks in Morea 1824 Egyptian intervention in Greece 1828 Russo-Turkish War ends with Treaty of Adrianople 1830 Declaration of Independence for Greece, French conquest of Algeria 1831 Egyptians defeat Turks, prompting Russian assistance 1839 Renewal of war between Egypt and Turkey, British intervention

1853 Dispute over Holy Places escalated into war between Turkey and Russia 1854-6 Crimean War 1875 Revolts in Bosnia and Herzogovina, spreading across the Balkans 1877 Russo-Turkish War, ends with Treaty of San Stefano 1878 Congress of Berlin revised terms of San Stefano, loss of Cyprus to Britain 1882 Invasion of Egypt by Britain 1885 Revolt of Eastern Rumelia leads to the Bulgarian Crisis (1886-7) 1895 Repression of the Armenian Christians 1896-7 Crete Crisis, Turkey loses control of the island 1898 Kaiser Wilhelm II tours the Ottoman Empire 1908 Young Turk Revolt 1909 Failure of the conservative counter-revolution 1908-9 Bosnian Crisis, Austria annexes the province 1911 Italy invades Libya 1912 Balkan League created, First Balkan War 1913 Second Balkan War 1914 Turkey joins the Central Powers in the First World War, Turkish offensive on the Suez Canal failed, British land at Basra 1915 Failure of the Ezerum Offensive, Massacre of the Armenians, Turks check British at Kut et Amara and the Allies at Gallipoli 1917 British offensive in Palestine and Mesopotamia, Arab Revolt 1918 Collapse of the Turkish army and the Ottoman Empire
Questia Media America, Inc. www.questia.com Publication Information: Article Title: The Decline of the Ottoman Empire, C. 1798-1913: Robert Johnson Puts the Decline of a Once-Great Empire into an International Context. Contributors: Robert Johnson - author. Journal Title: History Review. Issue: 52. Publication Year: 2005. Page Number: 3+. COPYRIGHT 2005 History Today Ltd.; COPYRIGHT 2006 Gale Group