DDI09 XO Counterplan Generic-2

XO CP and AFF answers
Dartmouth 2K9
Executive Order CP
****1NC****.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................3 ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................3 General 1NC...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................4 Generic 1NC...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................5 Nuke Terror Module................................................................................................................................................................................................................................6 Heg Module (1/2)....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................7 Heg Module (2/2)....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................8 ****Solvency****..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................9 Solvency--Funding................................................................................................................................................................................................................................10 SolvencyGeneric Reform...................................................................................................................................................................................................................11 Solvency-- Terrorism.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................12 SolvencyMilitary...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................13 SolvencyNew Agencies.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................14 SolvencyXOs are fast and effective....................................................................................................................................................................................................15 SolvencyXOs are fast.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................16 ****AT: Perm****...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................17 AT: Perm do both..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................18 AT: Perm do both (congressional actor).................................................................................................................................................................................................19 AT: Perm do both (court actor)..............................................................................................................................................................................................................20 AT: Perm do the CP (1/2)......................................................................................................................................................................................................................21 AT: Perm do the CP (2/2)......................................................................................................................................................................................................................22 ****2NC PREZ POWERS****.............................................................................................................................................................................................................23 2NC EXTXO key to Prez Power (1/2)................................................................................................................................................................................................24 2NC EXTXO key to Prez Power (2/2)................................................................................................................................................................................................25 2NC EXTObamas Campaign Promises.............................................................................................................................................................................................26 2NC EXTPrez Powers (nukes)...........................................................................................................................................................................................................27 2NC EXTPrez Powers (heg)..............................................................................................................................................................................................................28 Impact CalculusPrez Powers (nukes)..................................................................................................................................................................................................29 Impact CalculusPrez Powers (heg).....................................................................................................................................................................................................30 AT: XOs dont increase Prez Powers......................................................................................................................................................................................................31 2NC EXTNuclear Terror Attack Impact.............................................................................................................................................................................................32 2NC EXTXOs key to Heg..................................................................................................................................................................................................................33 2NC EXT--XOs key to Heg...................................................................................................................................................................................................................34 ****Normal Means****........................................................................................................................................................................................................................35 Normal MeansGeneric (1/2)...............................................................................................................................................................................................................36 Normal MeansGeneric (2/2)...............................................................................................................................................................................................................37 Normal MeansNatives.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................38 Normal MeansCivil Rights.................................................................................................................................................................................................................39 Normal MeansEducation....................................................................................................................................................................................................................40 Normal MeansMedicare, Medicaid, unemployment insurance, social security......................................................................................................................................41 ****AT: Rollback****..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................42 AT: Congress Rolls back.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................43 ****Politics Shield****........................................................................................................................................................................................................................44 XO to politics....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................45
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Dartmouth 2K9
XO link to politics.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................46 ****Theory****...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................47 Agent CPs Good..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................48 Agent CPs Bad.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................49 Severance Bad.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................50 Severance Perms Good..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................51 ****AFF****.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................52 AFFXOs Government problems....................................................................................................................................................................................................53 AFFXOs bigger problems..............................................................................................................................................................................................................54 AFF--Supreme Court Rollback..............................................................................................................................................................................................................55 AFF--Congress Rollback.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................56 AFFNo Solvency Generic..................................................................................................................................................................................................................57 ****AFF--Politics****.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................58 AFF--XO costs Pol Cap.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................59 AFF--XOs perceived by congress...........................................................................................................................................................................................................60 ****AFF--Prez powers****..................................................................................................................................................................................................................61 2ACPrez Powers...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................62 AFFSOP ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................63 AFF-EXT--SOP Impact.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................64
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Dartmouth 2K9
****1NC****
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General 1NC
TEXT: The President of the United States should ___________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________________ Contention 1: Competition A. Definitional: The means all parts theyre definitionally bound to defending all branches
Merriam-Webster's Online Collegiate Dictionary, No Date, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>
B. <<Specific Solvency>> Contention 2: Net Benefit Obama has to use his power to follow through on campaign promisesor hes going to lose it all. Haque, Director of the Havas Media Lab, 2009
Umair Haque, Director of the Havas Media Lab, How to Build (and Use) Thick Power http://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/haque/2009/05/ power.html 5-21-09 He's ba-a-ack! Like a supervillain who's impossible to vanquish, Dick Cheney's moseyed on into town once again. What's Cheney's game? Simple: to utilize kryptonite to rob Obama of his superpower. Here's how next-generation strategy can help Obama win Cheney's game instead. Obama's power is thick power. Thick power is a distant cousin of soft
power. Like soft power, it is built by setting an example. When we can set an example that inspires others we are able to lead and others follow. In the right hands, and in the right context witness Obama upsetting both Hillary and McCain thick power is like having superpowers. But thick power has it's kryptonite. If you can be cowed, intimidated, bullied, or persuaded into backing away from your principles, the example you set collapses. People no longer find it credible, and your ability to lead vanishes. The problem Obama has isn't Dick Cheney. Dick Cheney is irrelevant; he's just another evil old dude with (surprisingly fashionable) bad 80s glasses. Obama's real problem is staying true to his principles because setting an example is built on principles. Cheney's game is simple: to be Lex Luthor to Obama's Clark Kent. Cheney's goal is to dilute the thickness of Obama's power. How? By scaring and bullying Obama into betraying his principles, so Obama can no longer lead by example. Cheney's game is about using the kryptonite
of compromise to rob Obama of his superpowers. Unfortunately, Obama's playing right into his hands, with moves like this. What should Obama and every player who wants to utilize and grow thick power do instead? First: respond with a restatement of principles. Obama shouldn't ignore Cheney entirely. Thick power means others count, especially when they're evil because they give you a chance to put your principles in even starker contrast. Second: use it or lose
it. That means: don't betray a single principle. How does thick power break? When one principle goes, the rest often collapse like dominoes because principles are mutually reinforcing elements of a larger system of beliefs. Instead of betraying principles, double down, and begin employing them more fully by, for example, investing in a Manhattan Project 2.0. Third: force the adversary to utilize thin power, setting a
counter-example. Obama should call Cheney's bluffs because the best way to defuse thin power is to make people use it. Thin power is about controlling others and no one likes to be controlled. If Obama called Cheney's bluff, Cheney would be forced to call on Republicans and my guess is more than one would refuse his call. Dick Cheney is one evil old dude but the fact that he's missed the real point of thick power tells us he's not that smart. Thick power realizes
increasing returns: it builds alliances and allies create a powerful incentive to live up to your principles, again amplifying the thickness of your power. See the awesome? We've come full circle to a key
theme: in a hyperconnected world, good (usually) beats evil. To win Cheney's game, all
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Dartmouth 2K9
Generic 1NC
Use of executive order is key to maintaining presidential powers Mayer 01 Kenneth R., Professor of political science at University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power, Princeton University Press, p.28-29, 2001 This theoretical perspective offered by the new institutional economics literature provides a way of making sense of the wide range of executive orders issued over the years, and is the centerpiece of my approach. The common theme I find in significant executive orders is control: executive orders are an instrument of executive power that presidents have used to control policy, establish and maintain institutions, shape agendas, manage constituent relationships, and keep control of their political fate generally. 128 Within the boundaries set by statute or the Constitution, presidents have consistently used their executive poweroften manifested in executive ordersto shape the institutional and political context in which they sit. There are, to be sure, limits on what presidents can do relying solely on executive orders and executive power, and presidents who push too far will find that Congress and the courts will push back. Yet the president retains significant legal, institutional, and political advantages that make executive authority a more powerful tool than scholars have thus far recognized. This emphasis on control allows for a longer-term view than that generally taken by informal approaches to presidential leadership. I conclude that presidents have used executive orders to alter the institutional and political contexts in which they operate. The effects of any one effort in this regard may not be immediately apparent, and in many cases presidents succeed only after following up on what their predecessors have done. In this respect I view presidential leadership as both strategic and dynamic, a perspective that brings into sharper relief the utility of executive power to the presidency. I also differ with Neustadt on this score, as he looks at how presidents can be tactically effective within a particular structure context over which they have no control. <<INSERT SPECIFIC MODULE
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Dartmouth 2K9
Nuke Terror Module

Prez power key to stop nuclear terrorism Taylor and Thomas, writers for Newsweek Magazine, 2009
Stuart Taylor Jr and Evan Thomas, Writers for Newsweek Magazine, Obamas Cheney Dilemma 1-10-09, http://www.newsweek.com/id/178855 In times of war and crisis, as presidents such as Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt discovered, the nation needs a
strong chief executive. The flaw of the Bush-Cheney administration may have been less in what it did than in the way it did itflaunting executive power, ignoring Congress, showing scorn for anyone who waved the banner of civil liberties. Arguably, there has been an overreaction to the alleged arrogance and
heedlessness of Bush and Cheneyespecially Cheney, who almost seemed to take a grim satisfaction in his Darth Vaderesque image. The courts, at first slow to respond to arrogations of executive power after September 11,
have pushed back. Many federal officials have grown risk-averse, fearing that they will be prosecuted or dragged before a congressional committee for fighting too hard against terrorism. (A growing number of CIA officials buy insurance policies to cover legal fees.) Obama, who has been receiving intelligence briefings for weeks, already knows what a scary world it is out there. It is unlikely he will wildly overcorrect for the Bush administration's abuses. A very senior incoming official, who refused to be quoted discussing internal policy debates,
indicated that the new administration will try to find a middle road that will protect civil liberties without leaving the nation defenseless. But Obama's team has some strong critics of the old order, including his choice for director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, who has spoken out strongly against coercive interrogation methods. In Obama's spirit of nonpartisanship, the new crowd would do well to listen to Jack Goldsmith, formerly a Bush Justice Department official, now a Harvard Law School professor. At Justice, Goldsmith was the head of an obscure but critically important unit called the Office of Legal Counsel. OLC acts as a kind of lawyer for the executive branch, offering opinionsclose to bindingon what the executive branch can and cannot do. It was an OLC lawyer, John Yoo, who in 2001 and 2002 drafted many of the memos that first gave the Cheneyites permission to do pretty much whatever they wanted in the way of interrogating and detaining suspected terrorists (and eavesdropping on Americans to catch terrorists). Goldsmith, who became head of OLC in 2003, quietly began to revoke some of these permissions as illegal or unconstitutional. The revolt of Goldsmith and some other principled Justice lawyers was a heroic story, kept secret at the time. Now
Goldsmith worries about the pendulum swinging too far, as it often does in American democracy. "The presidency has already been diminished in ways that would be hard to reverse" and may be losing its capability to fight terrorism, he says. He argues that Americans should now be "less worried about an out-of-control presidency than an enfeebled one." Nuclear Terrorism leads to global nuclear war, devastating the planet. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, political analyst for Al-Ahram Newspaper, 04
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Political Analyst for Al-Ahram Newspaper, Extinction! http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm, 8-2609
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
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Dartmouth 2K9
Heg Module (1/2)

Presidential powers key to solving numerous global problems and preserving hegemony Deans 2k (Bob Deans, The American Presidency: White House Power Growing, The Atlanta Journal Constitution, 1/23/00) Yet the U.S. presidency, long regarded as the most powerful institution in the world, arguably has assumed more authority and reach than at any time in its history. While no one can doubt the growing impact of the Internet, Silicon Valley and Wall Street on the daily lives of all Americans, only the president can rally truly global resources around American ideals to further the quest for equality and to combat the timeless ills of poverty and war. It is that unique ability to build and harness a worldwide consensus that is widening the circle of presidential power. ''The presidency will remain as important as it is or will become more important,'' predicted presidential scholar Michael Nelson, professor of political science at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tenn. The voice of all Americans The taproot of presidential power is the Constitution, which designates the chief executive, the only official elected in a national vote, as the sole representative of all the American people. That conferred authority reflects the state of the nation, and it would be hard to argue that any country in history has possessed the military, economic and political pre-eminence that this country now holds. And yet, the nation's greatest strength as a global power lies in its ability to build an international consensus around values and interests important to most Americans. On Clinton's watch, that ability has been almost constantly on display as he has patched together multinational responses to war in the Balkans, despotism in Haiti, economic crises in Mexico, Russia, Indonesia and South Korea, and natural disasters in Turkey and Venezuela. The institutions for putting together coalition-type action --- the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization among them --- are hardly tools of American policy. But the United States commands a dominant, in some cases decisive, position in each of those institutions. And it is the president, far more than Congress, who determines how the United States wants those institutions to be structured and to perform. ''Congress is a clunky institution of 535 people that can't negotiate as a unit with global corporations or entities,'' said Alan Ehrenhalt, editor of It is the president, indeed, who appoints envoys to those institutions, negotiates the treaties that bind them and delivers the public and private counsel that helps guide them, leaving the indelible imprint of American priorities on every major initiative they undertake. ''That means, for example, that we can advance our interests in resolving ethnic conflicts, in helping address the problems of AIDS in Africa, of contributing to the world's economic development, of promoting human rights, '' Governing magazine. ''It's the president who is capable of making deals with global institutions.'' said Emory University's Robert Pastor, editor of a new book, ''A Century's Journey,'' that elaborates on
the theme.
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Dartmouth 2K9
Heg Module (2/2)

U.S. hegemony prevents nuclear war Khalilizad 95
(Zalmay Khalilizad, director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program @ RAND & former US Ambassador to Afghanistan "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Spring, Proquest)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values understood as democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
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Dartmouth 2K9
****Solvency****
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Solvency--Funding
Presidents have discretionary spending to fund their objectives. Pika 02 (Joseph A Pika, John Anthony Maltese, and Norman Thomas, professors of political science, The Politics of the Presidency, 5th edition, p. 233) In addition to budgeting, presidents have certain discretionary spending powers that increase their leverage over the bureaucracy. They have substantial nonstatutory authority, based on understandings with congressional appropriations committees, to transfer funds within an appropriation and from one program to another. The committees expect to be kept informed of such "reprogramming" actions.81 Fund transfer authority is essential to sound financial management, but it can be abused to circumvent congressional decisions. In 1970, for example, Nixon transferred funds to support an extensive unauthorized covert military operation in Cambodia. Nevertheless, Congress has given presidents and certain agencies the authority to spend substantial amounts of money on a confidential basis, the largest and most controversial of which are for
intelligence activities.
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SolvencyGeneric Reform
Executive Orders have empirically led to social reform. LeRoy, Professor for the University of Illinois, 96
Michael LeRoy, Associate Professor for the Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations and College of Law, University of Illinois, Presidential Regulation of Private Employment: Constitutionality of Executive Order 12954 Debarment of Contractors who Hire Permanent Striker Replacements LexisNexus.com 3-02 Second, many of these orders served as models for legislation. As a result of their experimentation, they occasionally provided Congress with blueprints for workable and politically feasible legislation . This explains in part why Congress initially focused on race discrimination in enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Presidential orders had focused on this form of discrimination since 1941 and therefore developed a lengthy track record. It is notable
that every employment discrimination law regarding race, gender, age, and disability followed rather than preceded a related executive order.
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Solvency-- Terrorism
Presidential powers key for effective counter-terrorism Lansford and Pauly 03 Tom Lansford, assistant professor of political science, University of Southern Mississippi, Gulf Coast Campus. Robert J. Pauly, Jr., adjunct professor of history and political Science at Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, and Midlands Technical College. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04/06/lansfordpauly_exec/lansfordpauly_exec.html Furthermore, American foreign policy is rooted in the notion of the sole organ theory which holds that the president is the sole source of foreign and security policy.15 This theory has served as the underpinning for the dramatic twentieth-century expansion of executive power. For instance, the Supreme Court decision United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation (1936) gave executive agreements the weight of law (and thereby bypassed the senatorial approval required of treaties), while Goldwater v. Carter (1979) confirmed the ability of the president to withdraw from international treaties without congressional consent.16 The result of this concentration of power has been the repeated presidential use of the U.S. military throughout the nations history without a formal congressional declaration of war and an increased preference by both the executive and the legislature for such actions.17 One feature of this trend was consistency in U.S. foreign policy, especially during the Cold War era. Even during periods when the United States experienced divided government, with the White House controlled by one political party and all or half of the Congress controlled by the party in opposition, the executive was able to develop and implement foreign and security policy with only limited constraints.18 Given the nature of the terrorist groups that attacked the United States on 11 September 2001, such policy habits proved useful since a formal declaration of war was seen as problematic in terms of the specific identification of the foe and the ability of the Bush administration to expand combat operations beyond Afghanistan to countries such as Iraq.
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SolvencyMilitary
XOs can solve military actions Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 2 Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive Direct Action pg.33 University Press of Kansas, 2002 Among the standard executive orders issued by each administration is a variety of actions concerning military personel including adjustments of rates of pay and allowances for the uniform services and amendments to the manual for court marshall. Particularly during periods of heightened national security activity, orders are regularly used to transfer responsibility, people or resources from one part of the government to the military or the reverse. Many orders have been used to manage public lands, but it is often not recognized that frequently the lands are part of military reservations or sites. In fact, many of the orders issued by presidents in time of war or national emergency are very focused actions of this sort. Even in peace time there are manifold organizational issues to detail for statuettes but that require action beyond the Department of Defense. President Clintons order of succession of officers to act as secretary of the army is a typical
example. (pg. 33)
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SolvencyNew Agencies
XOs fund new agencies Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 2 Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive Direct Action pg.30 University Press of Kansas, 2002 Even so, many presidents have taken it upon themselves to create new agencies, eliminate existing organizations, and reorganize others by executive order with or without congressional approval. Louis Fisher points out that there was so much of this activity during the New Deal that the Senator Richard Russell sponsored legislation to prevent the use of executive orders to create new agencies without legislative support and requiring that funds could not be used to support such an agency for more than one year in order to give Congress authority to consider the action and to give or withhold its consent. According to Fisher, Although Russell was a Democrat, like Roosevelt, he said that the President was not vested: with one scintilla of authority to create by an Executive Order an action agency of Government without the approval of Congress of the United States. Reviewing the language of one of Roosevelts executibe orders, Russell concluded that it has not a
leg to stand on or even a finger with which to catch hold of anything. (p30)
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SolvencyXOs are fast and effective

XOs are easy, fast, and convenient at passing significant policies Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 2 Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive Direct Action pg.59 University Press of Kansas, 2002 Executive orders are often used because they are quick, convenient, and relatively easy mechanisms for moving significant policy initiatives. Though it is certainly true that executive orders are employed for symbolic
purposes, enough has been said by now to demonstrate that they are also used for serious executive branch agencies under the authority of the orders. Unfortunately, as is true of legislation, it is not always possible to know from the title of orders which are significant and which are not, particularly since presidents will often use an existing order as a base for action and then change it in ways that make it far more significant than its predecessors.
The relative ease of the use of an order does not merely arise from the fact that presidents may employ one to avoid the cumbersome and time-consuming legislative process. They may also use this device to avoid sometimes equally time-consuming administrative procedures, particularly the rulemaking processes required by the Administrative procedures, particularly the rulemaking processes required by the Administrative Procedure Act. Because those procedural requirements do not apply to the president, it is tempting for executive branch agencies to seek assistance from the White House to enact by executive order that which might be difficult for the agency itself to move through the process. Moreover, there is the added plus from the agencys perspective that it can be considerably more difficult for potential adversaries to obtain to launch a legal challenge to the presidents order than it is to move an agency rule to judicial review. There is nothing new about the practice of generating executive orders outside the White House. President Kennedys executive order on that process specifically provides for orders generated elsewhere. (59) XOs create momentum for a new administration
Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 2
Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive Direct Action pg.69 University Press of Kansas, 2002 Executive orders can also be used to hit quickly with policies aimed at important problems, providing a strong and immediate sense of momentum for a new administration. These messages are sent to reassure an administrations supporters that the issue positions for which they campaigned are going to be acted upon. In the case of symbolic order, which are often used for this purpose, the reward can be given to allies without a serious commitment of political resources in Congress, legal resources in administrative rulemaking, or financial resources in Congress, legal resources in administrative rulemaking, or financial resources associated with building really substantive programs. They also serve to send a message to potential adversaries that the administration is truly in charge and moving. Those seeking to mobilize opposition in such conditions find themselves reactive and defensive. (69)
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SolvencyXOs are fast

XOs are quick and useful when there is a short timeframe Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 2 Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive Direct Action pg.69 University Press of Kansas, 2002 Executive orders are particularly useful to address specific problems or temporary situations when there is no time for legislation. It is not always necessary to declare an emergency in order to take such actions, but it is in an administrations best interest to rescind the orders as soon as the emergency or special situation passes. They are useful to institute investigations or studies aimed at future policymaking in a way that can calm politically troubled waters without committing the administration to any particular course of action. To point this out is
not to support the cynical use of such commissions, but there have been any number of important commissions that led to significant policy development. (pg 69)
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****AT: Perm****
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AT: Perm do both

Permutation does not solve- political micromanagement cripples policy, weakens public confidence in government Dilulio, Analyst for the Brookings Institute, 93
John Dilulio Analyst for the Brookings Institute, Improving Government Performance 1993 www.brookings.com/improvegov.html
Political micromanagement and the mismatch of governments tools with its problems have crippled public management, increased government inefficiency, and impeded performance. Perhaps worst of all, they have provoked a widespread distrust of the American system: by elected officials, who cannot understand why
administrators do not produce better results; by administrators, who complain about constant interference by elected officials as they try to do their jobs; and by citizens, who curse elected officials and administrators both for squabbling among themselves and for overlooking why they are there to begin with.
Anything except the Executive Branch acting alone creates a government where the court reigns supreme through tyranny Paulson, Associate Law Professor, 93
Michael Stokes Paulson, Associate Professor of Law at University of Minnesota Law School, The Merryman Power And The Dilemma Of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, Cardozo Law Review, v.15, 10-93 Lincoln's words upon becoming President in his First Inaugural strike the same theme even more strongly: The candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people,
is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, ... the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Not only does a judicial decision not bind the executive and the legislature in making subsequent policy, Lincoln argued, but the contrary suggestion, that the political branches must acquiesce in Supreme Court judgments as supplying the rule governing all their actions, is inconsistent with democratic self-government: "the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their
Government" to the judiciary. Lincoln was thus a vigorous advocate of what we today would call "nonacquiescence."
We must reject every instance of tyranny Petro, Law Professor, 1974

Sylvester Petro, Professor of Law at Wake Forest University, Toledo Law Review, 1974
It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Thus it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhensyn. Ask Milovan Dijilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper
ordering any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then
every invasion of freedom must be empathically
identified and resisted with an undying spirit.
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AT: Perm do both (congressional actor)

The perm still links to the D/A, only unilateral executive action solves the DA. Moe and Howell, Fellow for the Hoover Institution and Harvard Professor, 99
Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, senior fellow for the Hoover Institution and Associate Professor for the Government Department at Harvard University, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A theory, LexisNexus.com 12-99
If the president had the power to act unilaterally in this same situation, as depicted in Figure 1B, things would turn out much more favorably. He would not have to accept Congress's shift in policy from [SQ.sub.2] to [SQ.sub.2*] and could take action on his own to move the status quo from [SQ.sub.2*] to V--using his veto to prevent any movement away from this point. V would be the equilibrium outcome (as it was in the earlier case of
unilateral action). And although the president would still lose some ground as policy moves from the original [SQ.sub.2] to V, unilateral action allows him to keep policy much closer to his ideal point--and farther from Congress's ideal point--than would otherwise have been the case. He clearly has more power over outcomes when he can
act unilaterally. Turn: the Perm destroys prez powers, making the perm the least attractive option. Bellia, Law Professor at Notre Dame, 02
Patricia L Bellia, Associate Law Professor for Notre Dame Law School, Executive power in Youngstowns shadows, LexisNexus.com, 02
Justice Jackson suggested that presidential powers "are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." (59) He offered the following grouping of presidential actions and their legal consequences: 1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. 2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,
his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case
only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. (60)
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AT: Perm do both (court actor)

Unilateral Presidential Action is key, the Executive branch works best when the courts shut up. Bellia, Law Professor at Notre Dame, 02
Patricia L Bellia, Associate Law Professor for Notre Dame Law School, Executive power in Youngstowns shadows, LexisNexus.com, 02 To the extent that Justice Jackson's approach suggests that law has little role to play when Congress is silent, that approach contains the seeds of a misplaced political question doctrine, allowing courts to skirt questions of executive power
even when other justiciability requirements are met. Once this route of judicial deference is open, it is all too tempting for courts to follow it--not only when Congress is silent, but when the President's conduct conflicts with congressional policy. In short, courts tend to avoid exploring the President's constitutional foreign
affairs powers--express or implied--instead finding congressional authorization in questionable circumstances or simply assuming that presidential action should stand as long as Congress is silent. This failure to develop a coherent theory of presidential power, I argue, has an impact far beyond the specific questions about the distribution of powers in the few separation of powers cases that courts actually face. Executive Branch lawyers
regularly encounter complicated questions about the President's foreign affairs power. To the extent that courts' consideration of executive power questions would limit the acceptable and persuasive forms of argument available to the Executive Branch, courts' silence compromises one of the most effective restraints on executive conduct. And to the extent that courts' consideration of executive power questions would
affirm the Executive Branch's mode of analysis, courts' silence unnecessarily prompts others to doubt the legitimacy of Executive Branch views.
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AT: Perm do the CP (1/2)

1. Congress appropriates funding for social services
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/bill-categories/social-services/
Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 - Title I: Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency and Related Provisions - Subtitle A: Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency - Amends part A (General Provisions) of title XI of the Social Security Act (SSA) to direct the Commissioner of Social Security to establish a Ticket to Work and SelfSufficiency Program (TWSSP) under which a disabled beneficiary may use a TWSSP ticket issued by the Commissioner to obtain employment, vocational rehabilitation services, or other support services, pursuant to an appropriate individual beneficiary work plan that meets specified requirements. Includes among such requirements goals for earnings and job advancement, at the Commissioner's expense, from a participating employment network, public or
private. Allows State agencies administering or supervising the administration of the State plan under title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to elect to participate as an employment network. Sets forth requirements applicable to agreements between State agencies and employment networks. Describes employment network payment systems, including an outcome payment system and an outcome-milestone payment system. (Sec. 101) Provides that during any period for which an individual is using a TWSSP ticket, the Commissioner and any applicable State agency may not initiate a continuing disability or similar review to determine whether the individual is or is not disabled. Requires payments to employment networks: (1) out of the social security trust funds in the case of SSA title II (Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance) (OASDI) disability beneficiaries who return to work; or (2) from the appropriation for making Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments under SSA title XVI, in the case of SSI disability beneficiaries who return to work. Establishes within the Social Security Administration the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Advisory Panel to advise the President, the Congress, and the Commissioner with respect to TWSSP work incentive issues, and those issues under OASDI, SSI, Medicare (SSA title XVIII), and Medicaid (SSA title XIX) as well. Authorizes appropriations. Subtitle B: Elimination of Work Disincentives - Amends SSA titles II and XVI (Procedural and General Provisions) to prescribe specified measures designed to eliminate work disincentives. Prohibits review of an individual's disability status on the basis of work activity. Provides for expedited reinstatement of entitlement to OASDI or of eligibility for SSI disability benefits. Subtitle C: Work Incentives Planning, Assistance, and Outreach - Amends SSA title XI part A to direct the Commissioner to establish a community-based work incentives outreach program for disabled beneficiaries that includes technical assistance to organizations and entities designed to encourage disabled beneficiaries to return to work. (Sec. 121) Authorizes appropriations for FY 2000 through 2004. (Sec. 122) Authorizes the Commissioner to make certain minimum payments in each State to the protection and advocacy system established under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act for the purpose of providing services to disabled beneficiaries, services which may include advocacy, or other services that such a beneficiary may need to secure or regain gainful employment. Authorizes appropriations for FY 2000 through 2004. Title II: Expanded Availability of Health Care Services - Amends SSA title XIX to provide for expanding State Medicaid options for workers with disabilities, including options to: (1) eliminate income, assets, and resource limitations for workers with disabilities who buy into Medicaid; and (2) provide opportunity for employed individuals with a medically improved disability to make such a buy. Provides that Federal funds paid to a State for Medicaid payments may not generally be used to supplant the level of State funds expended for a fiscal year for programs to enable working disabled individuals to work.
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XO CP and AFF answers [continued without deletion]
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AT: Perm do the CP (2/2)

(Sec. 202) Amends SSA title II to extend the period of Medicare coverage for OASDI disability insurance beneficiaries. Directs the Comptroller General to report to Congress on specified consequences of such extension.
Directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to: (1) award grants to eligible States to support establishment of State infrastructures to support working disabled individuals as well as to enable State
(Sec. 203) outreach campaigns on infrastructure existence; and (2) submit a recommendation to specified congressional committees on whether such grant program should be continued after FY 2010. Makes appropriations for FY 2000 through 2011.
2. Perm do the CP is severance because it does not have congress acting. Severance is a voting issue: If you have to take out part of the plan, the CP competes a. Moving Target bad- They avoid clash and change the debate by severing out of DA links and the CPs net benefits- huge time and strat skew, we base our 1NC strat off of the plan text. b. This allows the affirmative to just advocate the CP in the 2AC, they have to win CPs are bad to win the perm c. Kills education- they can avoid any clash in policy comparison d. The perm isnt an advocacy, if you sever its no longer a test of competetiveness e. If aff can advocate the perm, they no longer have to be topical. f. Voter for Fairness
[SDI Theory]
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****2NC PREZ POWERS****
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2NC EXTXO key to Prez Power (1/2)

XOs increase presidential power Kreider, Political Science Dept of Wilkes U, 06
Kyle Kreider, Political Science Department of Wilkes University, Review of Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency: Legislating from the Oval Office http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/warber0606.htm, 6-06
Warber concludes with a cursory examination of President George W. Bushs use of executive orders and some thoughts on where future research should go. While his political opponents and some members of the media criticize President Bush for his penchant for acting unilaterally (in both domestic and foreign affairs), expanding the powers of the presidency, and sometimes bypassing the expertise found in Congress, the results demonstrate that Bush has not significantly departed from previous presidents regarding the types and quantity of executive orders that he issued during his first term (p.124). However,
what has been different under President Bush is his willingness to change existing public policy by revoking, superseding, or amending executive orders made by previous presidents. Yearly averages show President Bush to be second only to President Carter in revising inherited executive orders.
Executive Orders increase presidential power, and are faster than congressional legislation. Gale Group, 06
Gale Group, President assumes arbitrary power http://www.thefreelibrary.com/President+assumes+arbitrary+power-a0147389580 2006 Obviously, the office of president is becoming more powerful almost daily. There seems to be little or no restraint holding back the nation's chief executive. Presidents have for years taken the nation to war even though the Constitution clearly grants such life-and-death power solely to Congress. If a president feels the need to assert his
will, he simply issues an executive order, has it published in the Federal Register and, bingo, he gets his way. Even if they win executive orders are controversial, they are critical to increasing positive prez power Alissa C. Wetzel J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University School of Law, 8
(Alissa C. Wetzel, NOTE: BEYOND THE ZONE OF TWILIGHT: HOW CONGRESS AND THE COURT CAN MINIMIZE THE DANGERS AND MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS. Valparaiso University Law Review Fall, 2007 42 Val. U.L. Rev. 385)
For two centuries, executive orders have allowed Presidents to exercise enormous power. At times, that power has been used to implement important measures to advance the country. At other times, executive orders have bred scandal and national shame. Upon closer examination of 200 years of Constitutional dialogue among the three branches of government concerning how much unilateral power a President ought to have, however, it becomes clear that although executive orders may appear tyrannical based on the broad power they afford Presidents, in practice executive orders are useful tools of the Presidency, able to be checked by Congressional oversight and controlled by the Court. If correctly wielded, such Congressional and judicial oversight can guarantee that executive orders will not allow Presidents to become the despots so feared by the founding generation. Instead, by moving out of the zone of twilight and exercising proper oversight Congress and the Court can ensure that the President is able to [*430] administer the executive branch effectively, pass measures quickly, and occasionally rise above political divisions and do the right thing.
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2NC EXTXO key to Prez Power (2/2)

XO key to prez powers Gilman, Prof of law, 7
Michele Estrin Gilman. Associate Professor and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D,. University of Michigan Law School, IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED, SIGN AN EXECUTIVE ORDER: PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE EXPANSION OF CHARITABLE CHOICE, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal April, 2007) 15 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1103
The case study of the CCEOs suggests that one way to think about the President's powers within the zone of twilight is to focus on efficiency and accountability, which are, after all, the underlying reasons for and benefits of having a unitary executive. Purely theoretical contentions about the virtues or vices of a unitary executive make untested assumptions about these constitutional values. n584 By contrast, the CCEOs demonstrate that we cannot presume that the President serves these values when he engages in policymaking. n585 Yet where these values are furthered, we have less to fear from presidential policymaking and more confidence that the President is taking care that the laws are faithfully executed pursuant to some norm other than his personal preferences. Moreover, putting some boundaries on the zone of twilight would make exercises of presidential power more transparent because the President would have to articulate a basis for his actions. In turn, the President's rationale could be judged on its merits, rather than forcing courts to engage in an often fruitless search for legislative intent that usually results in the aggrandizement of executive power. In searching for a line between presidential lawmaking and gap- filling we should not forget that the Framers of the Constitution have given us valuable benchmarks by which to judge presidential action. We best serve both original understandings and modern
realities by returning to the touchstones of accountability and efficiency.
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2NC EXTObamas Campaign Promises

The Entrenched double standards that the US has created for itself means that it will be hard for Obama to secure all weapon materials, means that Obama must spend power to pass his plan. Krieger, member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 03
David Krieger, member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, http://www.wagingpeace.org/ articles/2003/10/06_krieger_nuclear-911.htm Is a Nuclear 9/11 in Our Future? 10-6-03
The great difficulty in preventing a nuclear 9/11 is that it will require ending the well-entrenched nuclear double standards that the US and other nuclear weapons states have lived by throughout the Nuclear Age. Preventing nuclear terrorism in the end will not be possible without a serious global program to eliminate nuclear weapons and control nuclear materials that could be converted to weapons.
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2NC EXTPrez Powers (nukes)

If Obama doesnt use his presidential powers now to secure nuclear weapon materials, the promise wont be fulfilled. Extend Buel in 8 saying that leads to nuclear war. Obama needs to use executive orders to get prez power, thats Taylor and Thomas. Lack of prez power means securing nuclear weapons wont get passed. Empirical ev Farley, writer for the LA Times, 05
Maggie Farley, Writer for the Los Angeles Times, Entrenched stands threaten nuclear nonproliferation conference http://seattletimes. nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002260984_nuke03.html 5-3-05
At a key U.N. disarmament conference yesterday, the United States lashed out at Iran and North Korea for their purported pursuit of atomic weapons and demanded that Iran dismantle its uranium-enrichment facilities. But Iran said it had an "inalienable right" to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and might restart its oncesecret nuclear-energy program. The entrenched conflicts may set up the conference for failure, diplomats said. Obama cannot waver on campaign issues lest he show the wrong signal. Editorial, the Globe and Mail, 09
Editorial, The Globe and Mail, The Rule of Law Prevails http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/ docview.do? docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T7026846164&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T7026846168& cisb=22_T7026846167&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=303830&docNo=4, 1-23-09
By acting swiftly in announcing that he would close the prison for suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, within a year, President Barack Obama vindicated the rule of law. Any wavering - by declaring that he needed to know who would be tried, and how, and what would happen with the others would have sent exactly the wrong signal.
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2NC EXTPrez Powers (heg)

Presidential leadership is necessary for preventing multiple scenarios of hotspot nuclear war South China Morning Post 00,
(December 11, 2008, found at LexisNexis Academic Database)
A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world. For better or worse, the person who rules the United States influences events far beyond the shores of his own country. Both the global economy and international politics will feel the effect of political instability in the US. The first impact will be on American financial markets, which will have a ripple effect on markets and growth across the world. A weakened US presidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world. The Middle East, the conflict between India and Pakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way relations between China and Taiwan play out, will be influenced by the authority the next US president brings to his job. There are those who would welcome a weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for example, feel they would benefit from a less interventionist American policy in the Middle East. Even within the Western alliance, there are those who would probably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for example, might feel that a less assertive US might force the European Union to be more outward looking. But the dangers of having a weak, insecure US presidency outweigh any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and military power cannot be wished away. A president with a shaky mandate will still command great power and influence, only he will be constrained by his domestic weakness and less certain about how to use his authority. This brings with it the risks of miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that heightens conflict. There are very few conflicts in the world today which can be solved without US influence. The rest of the world needs the United States to use its power deftly and decisively.
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Impact CalculusPrez Powers (nukes)

Presidential powers is the biggest impact in the round A. Magnitudepresidential leadership is necessary to prevent ___________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ B. Probabilitythe President is key to formulating international coalitions and galvanizing efforts towards resolutions to problems. The president is the image of the United States, Congress is too large to fulfill the Presidents role C. Timeframethe decline of presidential leadership would lead to a fracturing of the world community The perception of a strong president gives the perception of a resolved America, loss of that perception causes a quick slide to our impacts D. Turns Case <insert analysis here>
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Impact CalculusPrez Powers (heg)

Presidential powers is the biggest impact in the round A. Magnitudepresidential leadership is necessary to prevent multiple nuclear wars across the planet and is uniquely key to solve global crises, such as economic collapse and disease, thats Deans B. Probabilitythe President is key to formulating international coalitions and galvanizing efforts towards resolutions to problems. The president is the image of the United States, Congress is too large to fulfill the Presidents role C. Timeframethe decline of presidential leadership would lead to a fracturing of the world community The perception of a strong president gives the perception of a resolved America, loss of that perception causes a quick slide to our impacts D. Turns Case <insert analysis here>
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AT: XOs dont increase Prez Powers

1. Extend Taylor and Thomas in 9 specifying Obamas nonpartisanship as the reason his XO is key to his prez power.
2. And, each executive order expands Presidential Powers, thats Mayer in 1. 3. President can strategically act to expand powers of the executive branch via unilateral policies with little opposition from the other branches Moe and Howell 99
(Terry M and William G., senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and Associate Professor in the Government Department at Harvard University, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A theory, Presidential Studies Quarterly 29.4, December 1999)
Shorn of its details, the argument we offer here is pretty simple. Presidents have incentives to expand their institutional power, and they operate within a formal governance structure whose pervasive ambiguities-combined with advantages inherent in the executive nature of the presidential job--give them countless opportunities to move unilaterally into new territory, claim new powers, and make policy on their own authority. Congress has only a weak capacity for stopping them, because its collective action problems render it ineffective and subject to manipulation. The Supreme Court is capable of taking action against presidents, but is unlikely to want to most of the time and has incentives to be sympathetic. This does not mean that presidents are unchecked in their quest for power. They can only push Congress or the Court so far before these institutions react, so there are constraints on how far presidents can go. They will moderate their actions accordingly. Moreover, presidents are political animals, and this is an important check in itself on what they are willing to do. Generally speaking, they want to take actions that are popular, and they know that bold action in one realm of policy could have political repercussions that undermine the presidential agenda in other realms. Thus, even if presidents figure they can take unilateral actions that will go unchecked by Congress or the Court, they may often decide not to move on them or to take much smaller steps than their defacto powers would allow. The grander picture, then, is not one of presidents running roughshod over Congress and the Court to dominate the political system. Rather, it is a picture of presidents who move strategically and moderately to promote their imperialistic designs--and do so successfully over time, gradually shifting the balance of power in their favor.
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2NC EXTNuclear Terror Attack Impact

Not only would a Nuclear Terrorist Attack be horrific, the economic implications would only exacerbate the situation. Diamond, Writer for USA Today, 08
John Diamond, Writer for USA Today, A financial apocalypse isnt nearly as scary as a nuclear one http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/ lnacademic/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T7019638019 10-9-08 As the Saga Foundation -- a non-profit organization focused on the threat of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction -- argued in a recent white paper, the vast damage at and around a nuclear ground zero would
be dwarfed in scope by the national and global economic aftershocks. These aftershocks would stem not only from the explosion itself but also from a predictable set of decisions a president would almost certainly have to make in grappling with the possibility of a follow-on attack. Assuming, as the experts believe likely, that such a weapon would have to be smuggled into the country, the president could be expected to close the nation's borders, halt all freight commerce and direct a search of virtually any moving conveyance that could transport a nuclear weapon. Most manufacturing would then cease. In a nation that lives on just-in-time inventory, these developments could empty the nation's shelves in days. The effects of post-attack decision-making go far beyond this example. If U.S. intelligence determined that one or more countries had somehow aided and abetted the attack, we would face the prospect of fullscale war. Even short of that, the nation would demand, and the president would almost certainly order, a level of retaliation at the suspected locus of the attacking group that would dwarf the post-9/11 military response. The possibility of follow-on attacks could transform our notions of civil liberties and freedom forever. And as former 9/11 Commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton has pointed out, a nuclear terrorist attack would prompt a collapse in public faith in the government's ability to protect the American people. Think
your 401(k) hurts now? The presidential nominees, and the American people, should reconsider the tendency to view these two issues -- economic crisis and the threat of catastrophic terrorism -- as separate problems. A nuclear attack on a
U.S. city would not only devastate the target and kill possibly hundreds of thousands, it would also create instantaneous national and global economic ripple effects with incalculable consequences. To put it in personal terms, if you think things are tough in the nation's financial sector now, imagine what your 401(k) -- or your paycheck -- might look like six months after a nuclear detonation in Lower Manhattan or downtown Washington. Saga's study merely began what must become a much larger-scale effort to understand in
the fullest detail possible the consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism, not only the attack itself but also the decisions that would almost certainly follow. The idea is not to depress people but to motivate them.
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2NC EXTXOs key to Heg

Not only would a Nuclear Terrorist Attack be horrific, the economic implications would only exacerbate the situation. Diamond, Writer for USA Today, 08
John Diamond, Writer for USA Today, A financial apocalypse isnt nearly as scary as a nuclear one http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/ lnacademic/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T7019638019 10-9-08 As the Saga Foundation -- a non-profit organization focused on the threat of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction -- argued in a recent white paper, the vast damage at and around a nuclear ground zero would
be dwarfed in scope by the national and global economic aftershocks. These aftershocks would stem not only from the explosion itself but also from a predictable set of decisions a president would almost certainly have to make in grappling with the possibility of a follow-on attack. Assuming, as the experts believe likely, that such a weapon would have to be smuggled into the country, the president could be expected to close the nation's borders, halt all freight commerce and direct a search of virtually any moving conveyance that could transport a nuclear weapon. Most manufacturing would then cease. In a nation that lives on just-in-time inventory, these developments could empty the nation's shelves in days. The effects of post-attack decision-making go far beyond this example. If U.S. intelligence determined that one or more countries had somehow aided and abetted the attack, we would face the prospect of fullscale war. Even short of that, the nation would demand, and the president would almost certainly order, a level of retaliation at the suspected locus of the attacking group that would dwarf the post-9/11 military response. The possibility of follow-on attacks could transform our notions of civil liberties and freedom forever. And as former 9/11 Commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton has pointed out, a nuclear terrorist attack would prompt a collapse in public faith in the government's ability to protect the American people. Think
your 401(k) hurts now? The presidential nominees, and the American people, should reconsider the tendency to view these two issues -- economic crisis and the threat of catastrophic terrorism -- as separate problems. A nuclear attack on a
U.S. city would not only devastate the target and kill possibly hundreds of thousands, it would also create instantaneous national and global economic ripple effects with incalculable consequences. To put it in personal terms, if you think things are tough in the nation's financial sector now, imagine what your 401(k) -- or your paycheck -- might look like six months after a nuclear detonation in Lower Manhattan or downtown Washington. Saga's study merely began what must become a much larger-scale effort to understand in
the fullest detail possible the consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism, not only the attack itself but also the decisions that would almost certainly follow. The idea is not to depress people but to motivate them.
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2NC EXT--XOs key to Heg

XOs maintain U.S. government credibility Cooper, Gund Professor 2 Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive Direct Action pg.28 University Press of Kansas, 2002 Many of the executive orders issued by presidents have been delegations of authority originally conferred on the president by statute to various agencies or officers of the executive branch. Although these are rarely controversial matters in the contemporary era, they were matters of contention in earlier times. For one thing, it is more common now for Congress to assign statutory obligations directly to specific agencies,
sometimes precisely for the purpose of preventing White House frustration of legislative intentions. In an earlier period, particularly up to and through World War II, Congress often assigned responsibilities to the president as head of
the executive branch. Although it was understood that no president could personally attend to all of these duties, there was concern about the legality of subdelegations to subordinate officials and, more generally, about the possible loss of accountability that could result if authority drifted out of the very visible office of the president and down into the bureaucracy. These concerns were exacerbated by the
Brownlow Commissions warnings about the loss of integration and effective organizational control of the executive branch by the president. The problem seemed to grow more worrisome during the war years when a host of agencies was created to govern wide-ranging domestic activities as well as military and war production functions. In the early postwar years, there was a wave of legislation that presented the president with many new obligations, including creation of what is now known as the national security agencies. By the late 1940s, it was becoming clear that the president had responsibilities under some eleven hundred different statutes. (28)
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****Normal Means****
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Normal MeansGeneric (1/2)

Congress appropriates funding for social services
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/bill-categories/social-services/
Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 - Title I: Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency and Related Provisions - Subtitle A: Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency - Amends part A (General Provisions) of title XI of the Social Security Act (SSA) to direct the Commissioner of Social Security to establish a Ticket to Work and SelfSufficiency Program (TWSSP) under which a disabled beneficiary may use a TWSSP ticket issued by the Commissioner to obtain employment, vocational rehabilitation services, or other support services, pursuant to an appropriate individual beneficiary work plan that meets specified requirements. Includes among such requirements goals for earnings and job advancement, at the Commissioner's expense, from a participating employment network, public or
private. Allows State agencies administering or supervising the administration of the State plan under title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to elect to participate as an employment network. Sets forth requirements applicable to agreements between State agencies and employment networks. Describes employment network payment systems, including an outcome payment system and an outcome-milestone payment system. (Sec. 101) Provides that during any period for which an individual is using a TWSSP ticket, the Commissioner and any applicable State agency may not initiate a continuing disability or similar review to determine whether the individual is or is not disabled. Requires payments to employment networks: (1) out of the social security trust funds in the case of SSA title II (Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance) (OASDI) disability beneficiaries who return to work; or (2) from the appropriation for making Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments under SSA title XVI, in the case of SSI disability beneficiaries who return to work. Establishes within the Social Security Administration the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Advisory Panel to advise the President, the Congress, and the Commissioner with respect to TWSSP work incentive issues, and those issues under OASDI, SSI, Medicare (SSA title XVIII), and Medicaid (SSA title XIX) as well. Authorizes appropriations. Subtitle B: Elimination of Work Disincentives - Amends SSA titles II and XVI (Procedural and General Provisions) to prescribe specified measures designed to eliminate work disincentives. Prohibits review of an individual's disability status on the basis of work activity. Provides for expedited reinstatement of entitlement to OASDI or of eligibility for SSI disability benefits. Subtitle C: Work Incentives Planning, Assistance, and Outreach - Amends SSA title XI part A to direct the Commissioner to establish a community-based work incentives outreach program for disabled beneficiaries that includes technical assistance to organizations and entities designed to encourage disabled beneficiaries to return to work. (Sec. 121) Authorizes appropriations for FY 2000 through 2004. (Sec. 122) Authorizes the Commissioner to make certain minimum payments in each State to the protection and advocacy system established under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act for the purpose of providing services to disabled beneficiaries, services which may include advocacy, or other services that such a beneficiary may need to secure or regain gainful employment. Authorizes appropriations for FY 2000 through 2004. Title II: Expanded Availability of Health Care Services - Amends SSA title XIX to provide for expanding State Medicaid options for workers with disabilities, including options to: (1) eliminate income, assets, and resource limitations for workers with disabilities who buy into Medicaid; and (2) provide opportunity for employed individuals with a medically improved disability to make such a buy. Provides that Federal funds paid to a State for Medicaid payments may not generally be used to supplant the level of State funds expended for a fiscal year for programs to enable working disabled individuals to work.
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(Sec. 202) Amends SSA title II to extend the period of Medicare coverage for OASDI disability insurance beneficiaries.
Normal MeansGeneric (2/2)

Directs the Comptroller General to report to Congress on specified consequences of such extension.
Directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to: (1) award grants to eligible States to support establishment of State infrastructures to support working disabled individuals as well as to enable State
(Sec. 203) outreach campaigns on infrastructure existence; and (2) submit a recommendation to specified congressional committees on whether such grant program should be continued after FY 2010. Makes appropriations for FY 2000 through 2011.
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Normal MeansNatives
Congress appropriates funding for social services to natives The Senate 7-10 (111th congress. 1st session, H.R. 2997. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010. 7-10-09. < http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2997/text> Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, CommentsClose CommentsPermalink That the following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, and for other purposes, namely:
Office of Tribal Relations
For necessary expenses of the Office of Tribal Relations, $1,000,000, to support communication and consultation activities with Federally Recognized Tribes, as well as other requirements established by law.
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Normal MeansCivil Rights

Congress appropriates funding for civil rights The Senate 7-10 (Title 1, point 11. 111th congress. 1st session, H.R. 2997. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010. 7-10-09. < http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2997/text> Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, and for other purposes, namely: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights For necessary expenses of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, $888,000. Office of Civil Rights For necessary expenses of the Office of Civil Rights, $23,922,000.
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Normal MeansEducation
Congress appropriates funding for education social services (Title 1, Point: National Institute of Food and Agriculture)111th congress. 1st session, H.R. 2997. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010. 7-10-09. < http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2997/text> Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, and for other purposes, namely:
For payments to agricultural experiment stations, for cooperative forestry and other research, for facilities, and for other expenses, $708,004,000 (increased by $3,519,000), as follows: to carry out the provisions of the Hatch Act of 1887 (7 U.S.C. 361a-i), $215,000,000; for grants for cooperative forestry research (16 U.S.C. 582a through a-7), $28,000,000; for payments to eligible institutions (7 U.S.C. 3222), $48,000,000, provided that each institution receives no less than $1,000,000; for special grants (7 U.S.C. 450i(c)), $70,676,000; for competitive grants on improved pest control (7 U.S.C. 450i(c)), $15,945,000; for competitive grants (7 U.S.C. 450(i)(b)), $210,000,000 (increased by $3,000,000), to remain available until expended; for the support of animal health and disease programs (7 U.S.C. 3195), $2,950,000; for the 1994 research grants program for 1994 institutions pursuant to section 536 of Public Law 103-382 (7 U.S.C. 301 note), $1,610,000, to remain available until expended; for rangeland research grants (7 U.S.C. 3333), $983,000; for higher education graduate fellowship grants (7 U.S.C. 3152(b)(6)), $3,859,000, to remain available until expended (7 U.S.C. 2209b); for a program pursuant to section 1415A of the National Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. 3151a), $4,000,000, to remain available until expended; for higher education challenge grants (7 U.S.C. 3152(b)(1)), $5,654,000; for a higher education multicultural scholars program (7 U.S.C. 3152(b)(5)), $981,000 (increased by $519,000), to remain available until expended (7 U.S.C. 2209b); for an education grants program for Hispanic-serving Institutions (7 U.S.C. 3241), $10,000,000; for competitive grants for the purpose of carrying out all provisions of 7 U.S.C. 3156 to individual eligible institutions or consortia of eligible institutions in Alaska and in Hawaii, with funds awarded equally to each of the States of Alaska and Hawaii, $3,196,000; for a secondary agriculture education program and 2-year post-secondary education (7 U.S.C. 3152(j)), $983,000; for aquaculture grants (7 U.S.C. 3322), $3,928,000; for sustainable agriculture research and education (7 U.S.C. 5811), $14,399,000; for a program of capacity building grants (7 U.S.C. 3152(b)(4)) to institutions eligible to receive funds under 7 U.S.C. 3221 and 3222, $20,000,000, to remain available until expended (7 U.S.C. 2209b); for payments to the 1994 Institutions pursuant to section 534(a)(1) of Public Law 103-382, $3,342,000; for resident instruction grants for insular areas under section 1491 of the National Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. 3363), $1,000,000; for distance education grants for insular areas under section 1490 of the National Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. 3362), $1,000,000; for competitive grants for the purpose of carrying out section 7526 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 to eligible institutions, $3,000,000; for a new era rural technology program pursuant to section 1473E of the National Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. 3319e), $1,000,000; and for necessary expenses of Research and Education Activities, $38,498,000, of which $2,704,000 for the Research, Education, and Economics Information System and $2,136,000 for the Electronic Grants Information System, are to remain available until expended.
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Normal MeansMedicare, Medicaid, unemployment insurance, social security

Congress appropriates funding for Medicare, Medicaid, unemployment insurance and social security Senate Report 9
(110-410 - DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND EDUCATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 2009. Library of Congress, THOMAS. < http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/? &sid=cp110IbClz&refer=&r_n=sr410.110&db_id=110&item=&sel=TOC_19176&>) For fiscal year 2009, the Committee has increased funding for a variety of activities aimed at reducing fraud, waste, and abuse of taxpayer dollars. These program integrity initiatives have been shown to be a wise investment of Federal dollars resulting in billions of dollars of savings from Federal entitlement programs--unemployment insurance,
Medicare and Medicaid, and Social Security. Congress appropriates funding for Medicare and Medicaid Senate Report 9
(110-410 - DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND EDUCATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 2009. Library of Congress, THOMAS. < http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/? &sid=cp110IbClz&refer=&r_n=sr410.110&db_id=110&item=&sel=TOC_19176&>)
Medicare and Medicaid outlays accounted for nearly $1 out of every $5 of the total Federal outlays. Fraud committed against Federal health care programs puts Americans at increased risk and diverts critical resources from providing necessary health services to some of the Nation's most vulnerable populations.
Health Care Program Integrity- In fiscal year 2006,
The Committee has included $198,000,000 for Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control [HCFAC] activities at the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. No discretionary funds were provided for this activity in fiscal year
2008.
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****AT: Rollback****
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AT: Congress Rolls back

Congress supports Obama fully, support on Israel proves. Gorenberg, political writer, 7-2
Gershom Gorenberg, political writer for southjerusalem.com, Obama isnt Blinking, and Congress Still has his Back July 2, 2009 http://southjerusalem.com/2009/07/obama-isnt-blinking-and-congress-still-has-his-back/
A key reason that President Obama can avoid blinking is that Congress has his back. I spoke this morning with Rep. Robert Wexler, one of Israels most dependable supporters in Congress. The level of Congressional support for the presidents policies is substantial, and thats reflected by public statements of prominent members of Congress, he told me. I also spoke this week with a foreign policy aide to a key senator. He gave the same assessment: The president has a great deal of confidence and support from Congress. Congress has shown repeated inaction on rolling back XOs- only acting once more than 25 years ago. Olson, Attorney, 99
William Olson of William Olson, PC, Attorneys at Law, The Impact of Executive Orders on the Legislative Process http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-wo102799.html October 27, 1999 Congress has done little more than the courts in restricting presidential lawmaking. Nevertheless, Congress did make one bold step to check executive powers in the related arenas of executive orders, states of emergency and emergency powers. The Congressional concern led to the creation of a Special Senate Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, co-chaired by Sens. Frank Church (D-ID) and Charles Mathias, Jr. (R-MD), more than 25
years ago.
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****Politics Shield****
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XO to politics
XOs avoid politics Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 2 Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive Direct Action pg.45 University Press of Kansas, 2002 For one thing, the president who acts by order in foreign policy actions starts in most cases from a strong foundation of legal and political authority. Unfortunately, many administrations have jumped from this general authority to make broad and dangerous assertions of power, even in the face of contradictory congressional action. For reasons already indicated, the Supreme Court has historically deferred to such actions, at least in situations in which the president could assert a foreign policy emergency. Further, there have been a number of enactments, such as the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, that offer the president a wellspring of statutory authority to take emergency actions in the foreign policy arena. In an effort to prevent abuses of this wide-ranging authority, Congress provided in the National Emergencies Act
for the possibility of a legislative veto that would terminate an emergency. However, the Supreme Court struck down the legislative veto in 1983. Although the Congress responded by amending the Emergencies Act in 1985 to provide for a veto by joint resolution must go to the president for signature.
There are other characteristics that make the tool attractive. It is a device that send a powerful message. It can be done quickly and can mobilize a variety of agencies. Indeed, such executive orders can in many important respects control access to the marketplace and to the U.S. economic infrastructure that is central not only to American firms but also to the operation of multinational firms and the financial activities of many governments around the world. It also controls access to technology. The use of the executive order, relative to many diplomatic techniques, is a very public and therefore a powerful move. (45) XO doesnt link to politics Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 2 Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive Direct Action pg.48 University Press of Kansas, 2002 Often presidents issue executive orders in what may appear to be a public relations event for reasons other that those announced when the order is issued. Presidential orders can be effective devices for paying political debts, demonstrating action for a constituency, responding to adversaries, or sending political signalsreal or symbolic. Orders that are largely symbolic rewards for support often make strong statements of policy but provide no new resources . They typically call for awareness by federal authorities
of some concern and frequently create interagency or advisory committees for consultation, but they rarely require much beyond consultation and reporting. They also commonly contain clauses serving notice that the order establishes no legally cognizable rights that would justify judicial review. (48)
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XO link to politics
Executive orders attract no Congressional battles Moe and Howell 99
(Terry M and William G., senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and Associate Professor in the Government Department at Harvard University, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A theory, Presidential Studies Quarterly 29.4, December 1999)
Our aim here is to highlight an institutional basis for presidential power that has gone largely unappreciated to this point but that, in our view, has become so pivotal to presidential leadership, and so central to an understanding of presidential power, that it virtually defines what is distinctively modern about the modern American presidency. This is the president's formal capacity for taking unilateral action and thus for making law on his own. Often, presidents do this through executive orders. Sometimes they do it through proclamations or executive agreements or national security directives. But whatever vehicles they may choose, the end result is that presidents can and do make new law--and thus shift the existing status quo--without the explicit consent of Congress. The fact is, presidents have always acted unilaterally to make law. The Louisiana Purchase, the freeing of the slaves, the internment of the Japanese, the desegregation of the military, the initiation of affirmative action, the imposition of regulatory review--these are but a few of the most notable examples. Most presidential orders are far less dramatic, of course. But they are numerous and often important, and it appears the strategy of unilateral action has grown increasingly more central to the modern presidency. Executive orders are not perceived, means no links to politics. LeRoy, Professor for the University of Illinois, 96
Michael LeRoy, Associate Professor for the Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations and College of Law, University of Illinois, Presidential Regulation of Private Employment: Constitutionality of Executive Order 12954 Debarment of Contractors who Hire Permanent Striker Replacements LexisNexus.com 3-02
Third, some orders diffused political responsibility for controversial policy innovations. New laws and Supreme Court decisions are widely reported, sometimes with detailed analysis and commentary. In contrast, an executive order tends to be less visible unless a president decides to make it newsworthy. This low visibility may have checked otherwise hostile public opinion on race discrimination orders.
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****Theory****
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Agent CPs Good

The Offense 1. Key to negative ground, half of all CPs run are agent CPs 2. Tests the affirmative plan- 90% of policy is implementation, we prove their policy is 90% bad Elmore, Prof. Public Affairs at University of Washington, PolySci Quarterly 79-80, p. 605, 1980
The emergence of implementation as a subject for policy analysis coincides closely with the discovery by policy analysts that decisions are not self-executing. Analysis of policy choices matter very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood in answering the question, "What percentage of the work of achieving a desired governmental action is done when the preferred analytic alternative has been identified?" Allison estimated that in the normal case, it was about 10 percent, leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of implementation.
3. Gives the affirmative ground- They can run any DAs they have to our agent 4. Makes the aff defend their plan, why would they specify ____________ if we cant have a debate on it. The Defense 1. Its predictable, theyre constantly run and we didnt pick some obscure actor 2. Lit checks abuse- There arent many agencies that someone will advocate should do the plan 3. Debate has changed. As topics got bigger, affs defended plans instead of the whole resolution, reciprocally, Its now only the negatives job to disprove the plan. 4. Not a voter- Its an argument to reject the CP
[SDITheory]
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Agent CPs Bad

1. The CP is topical, theyre affirming the resolution and taking out topical ground 2. Bad for education- kills critical thinking, and we argue courts v. congress every year instead of the resolution. 3. Steals aff ground and forces us to debate against ourselves. 4. There are 140 agencies just under the USFG they can choose- unfair neg bias. 5. Justifies stupid arguments as time sucks- The FDA wouldnt pass the plan get over it. 6. Voter for fairness and education
[SDI theory]
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Severance Bad
2. Perm do the CP is severance because it does not have congress acting. Severance is a voting issue: If you have to take out part of the plan, the CP competes a. Moving Target bad- They avoid clash and change the debate by severing out of DA links and the CPs net benefits- huge time and strat skew, we base our 1NC strat off of the plan text. b. This allows the affirmative to just advocate the CP in the 2AC, they have to win CPs are bad to win the perm c. Kills education- they can avoid any clash in policy comparison d. The perm isnt an advocacy, if you sever its no longer a test of competetiveness e. If aff can advocate the perm, they no longer have to be topical. f. Voter for Fairness
[SDI Theory]
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Severance Perms Good Offense 1. Best policy option- You vote for our advocacy aka the plan text, not our representations 2. Key to protect the 1AR from neg block bias 3. We still operate in topical ground, youre still affirming if you vote on the perm Defense 1. The plan text is our advocacy, the reasons we advocate dont have to stay fixed 2. We dont justify racist discourse- reject it when it happens, speaker points and judge intervention check. 3. Its reciprocal- The neg gets to kick DAs, Ks and reasons to not advocate the plan, we get to kick justifications for the plan. 4. No ground loss- If their links are true they can prove our representations either still stand, or would be replicated in a fiated plan passage. 5. Not a voter- at best its a reason we dont get the perm
[SDI theory]
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****AFF****
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AFFXOs Government problems XOs create numerous intra-governmental problems Cooper, Gund Professor 2 Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive Direct Action pg.71 University Press of Kansas, 2002 Significant problems can accompany the use of executive orders. In general terms, they include creating or exacerbating interbranch and intergovernmental tensions, inviting external criticism of the White House, weakening cabinet department credibility and effectiveness, undermining the administrative law system, possibly exposing administrators and the government tmore broadly to liability, and being seen in certain instances as taking the easy way out. The practice of using executive orders to make an end run around Congress has a mixed record of success, as the saga of the Clinton striker replacement order demonstrates. Indeed, Clinton, Reagan, Carter, Nixon, and Johnson, among recent presidents, encountered significant difficulties, both political and legal, by challenging the legislature using executive orders. It is true that if an administrations primary
purpose is to put up a symbolic fight in defense of a constituent group, the White House may not consider it all bad to wage a battle, knowing full well that the administration will ultimately lose. (71)
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AFFXOs bigger problems

XOs can worsen the problem Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 2 Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive Direct Action pg.72 University Press of Kansas, 2002 Even when there is real cause for emergency orders, there are reasons for caution. For example, experience over time suggests that emergency actions frequently leave messes to be cleaned up after the fact that can be troublesome in instances where the emergency actions did not contemplate these future normalization issues. That was certainly the case in the New Deal period and in wartime. This holds true even after the real emergency ends. It is not always clear just when the effects of the emergency really end. When Congress enacts legislation is often written quickly and in loose terms. Such legislation can remain in the statute books long after the emergency that gave rise to it has ended. The fact that the legislation that granted
some of the powers accorded FDR to deal with the depression has never been repealed is now used by some of the conspiracy theorists on the far right to justify their attacks on government.
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AFF--Supreme Court Rollback

The Supreme Court will Strike any XO they please Cooper, Professor for the University of Vermont, 02
Phillip, Professor at the University of Vermont, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action, p. 77
Despite the apparent deference by the judiciary to the president's orders, this chapter has plainly demonstrated any number of instances in which the White House has lost in court. Executive orders, both legal and illegal, can expose officials to liability. It is an old argument, developed long before the battle over the
so-called Nuremberg defense, that illegal orders do not insulate a public official from liability for his or her actions. The classic example harks back to Little v. Barreme 13 1 during the Washington administration. Even legal orders can
expose the government to liability. Though the federal courts have often upheld dramatic actions taken by the president during difficult periods, they have not been hesitant to support claims against the government later. The many cases that were brought involving the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation
after World War I provide examples of just how long such postorder legal cleanup can take and how much it can Cost. 112 Later, in a 1951 case, the Supreme Court subjected government to claims by business for the damages done to their interests during the government's operation of the coal mines during World War II after FDR seized the mines in 1943.133
Thus, the legal issues that may arise are concerned with both the validity of orders and with addressing the consequences of admittedly legitimate decrees.
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AFF--Congress Rollback
Congress has the power to undo any executive order Bedell, Acting General Counsel, 99
Robert Bedell, Office of Management and Budget Acting General Counsel, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Lexisnexus.com, 10-27-99
With regard to the impact that Executive Orders may have on the prerogatives of the Congress, I think that in very few instances -- primarily where the Constitution or the Congress itself has assigned a responsibility or authority to the unreviewable discretion of the President -- are the prerogatives of Congress unalterably affected by an Executive Order. Congress can act to undue what a President has done by Executive Order in most instances. The prerogative of Congress to legislate is accordingly not unalterably
affected by most Executive Orders. As a practical matter, if Congress chooses to over-ride a feature of an Executive Order by enacting a statute, the President may require that each House approve that legislation by a 2/3 vote, often a tall order. But this is the case with any legislation as provided in the Constitution. The real question is whether the President
has the requisite authority to do what he proposes in an Executive Order, and I believe that Congress retains its full panoply of prerogatives to deal with it.
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AFFNo Solvency Generic

XOs dont do a thing for social reform. Editorial, Roanoke Times, 7-7
Editorial, Roanoke Times, Discrimination Should be Illegal LexisNexus.com 7-7-09
The court may be correct. An executive order is a thin shield in such matters. "It looks as if they're saying the executive order in 2006 doesn't basically do anything," Michael Hamar, who says he was fired from the Virginia Museum of Natural History in Martinsville after the museum's executive director discovered his sexual orientation, told The Washington Blade. The power of an XO depends largely on the recipients of the benefits Long, Prof of Political Science, 49
(Power and Administration Norton E. Long . Public Administration Review, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Autumn, 1949), pp. 257-264 article consists of 8 pages. Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/972337)
for all but the top of the hierarchy of the administrative structure the question of power is irrelevant. Legislative authority and administrative orders suffice. Power adequate to the function to be performed flows down the chain of command. Neither statute nor executive order, however, confers more than legal authority to act. Whether congress or President can impart the substance of power as well as the form depends upon the line-up of forces in the particular case. A price control law wrung from a reluctant Congress by an amorphous and unstable combination of consumer and labor groups is formally the same as a law enacting a support price program for agriculture backed by the disciplined organizations of farmers and their congressmen. The differences for the scope and effectiveness of administration are obvious. The Presidency, like Congress, responds to and translates the pressures that play upon it. The real mandate contained in an Executive order varies with the political strength of the group demand embodied in it, and in the context of other group demands.
It may be urged that
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****AFF--Politics****
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AFF--XO costs Pol Cap

Executive Orders which require funding force the president to spend political capital. Moe and Howell, Fellow for the Hoover Institution and Harvard Professor, 99
Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, senior fellow for the Hoover Institution and Associate Professor for the Government Department at Harvard University, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A theory, LexisNexus.com 12-99 Nonetheless, the appropriations constraint remains very real. Presidents are obviously best off if they can take unilateral actions that do not require legislative appropriations, and they will have incentives to do just that.
Similarly, presidents will obviously not want to initiate major new programs through unilateral action, for even if the courts were to regard egregious instances of presidential lawmaking as constitutional, their need for substantial budgetary outlays would inevitably single them out for special legislative attention and lead to a decision process that is no different than what would have occurred had presidents simply chosen to seek a legislatively authorized program from the beginning. When presidents do take unilateral
actions that require legislative funding, both the actions and their funding requirements are likely to be moderate and to take legislative preferences into account.
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AFF--XOs perceived by congress

Executive Orders are perceived by Congress. Moe and Howell, Fellow for the Hoover Institution and Harvard Professor, 99
Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, senior fellow for the Hoover Institution and Associate Professor for the Government Department at Harvard University, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A theory, LexisNexus.com 12-99
What is likely to happen in Congress, then, when presidents take unilateral action by issuing executive orders that shift the policy status quo? The answer is that legislative responses (if there are any) will be rooted in constituency. An executive order that promotes civil rights, for example, will tend to be supported by legislators from urban or liberal constituencies, because it shifts the status quo in their preferred direction, while members from conservative constituencies will tend to oppose it. The fact that this executive
order might well be seen as usurping Congress's lawmaking powers, or that it has the effect of expanding presidential power, will for most legislators be quite beside the point. Thus, if Congress tries to take any action at all in
responding to the executive order, the battle lines will be determined by the order's effects on legislative constituencies, not by its effects on Congress's power vis-a-vis the president.
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****AFF--Prez powers****
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2ACPrez Powers
1. Obama is using a lot of executive orders to follow through on his campaign promises. Dinan, Writer for the Washington Times, 09
Stephen Dinan, Writer for the Washington Times, Obamas executive orders signed at a historic pace http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do? docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T7026846164&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T7026846168& cisb=22_T7026846167&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8176&docNo=6, 2-3-09
Looking to move quickly on his campaign promises, President Obama has turned to the one tool that he has to ignore Congress and take unilateral action - he signed eight executive orders in his first 11 days in office, making him by far the most activist new president in modern history on that score. "I'm getting good at
this," Mr. Obama joked to labor union leaders and members of Congress as he sat down to sign orders six, seven and eight on Friday. Mr. Obama is treading on a path well-established in terms of executive powers, although he has not shied away from thorny topics with orders that help unions, rewrite rules for treatment of terrorist suspects and revoke President Bush's order keeping presidential records secret. Those who study presidential power say Mr. Obama is moving fast in
order to prove that he can keep his campaign promises. Obama's problem is that expectations are skyhigh, but the problems are daunting. These are ways to let the country know that he intends to make good on his commitments - even though the big problems may not be dealt with so quickly, " said John Woolley, chairman of the political science department at the University of California at Santa Barbara. 2. Congress supports Obama fully, support on Israel proves. He wont lose prez powers Gorenberg, political writer, 7-2
Gershom Gorenberg, political writer for southjerusalem.com, Obama isnt Blinking, and Congress Still has his Back July 2, 2009 http://southjerusalem.com/2009/07/obama-isnt-blinking-and-congress-still-has-his-back/
A key reason that President Obama can avoid blinking is that Congress has his back. I spoke this morning with Rep. Robert Wexler, one of Israels most dependable supporters in Congress. The level of Congressional support for the presidents policies is substantial, and thats reflected by public statements of prominent members of Congress, he told me. I also spoke this week with a foreign policy aide to a key senator. He gave the same assessment: The president has a great deal of confidence and support from Congress. 3. Executive Orders dont increase Presidential Powers. Kreider, Political Science Dept of Wilkes University, 06
Kyle Kreider, Political Science Department at Wilkes University Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency: Legislating From the Oval Office http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/warber0606.htm June 2006 A key finding of this book is that presidents have not dramatically expanded their power with [executive orders] across the modern presidency (p.128). Though Warber does not have the specific answers as to
why presidents have not increased their use of executive orders over time, he speculates the stasis in presidential directives to a number of factors, one being the continued existence of separation of powers specifically Congresss ability to pass legislation to revoke or revise executive orders and the federal courts authority to decide upon their constitutionality.
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AFFSOP
1. Executive Orders bypass all separation of powers, destroying the Constitution. Branum, Associate for Fulbright & Jaworski, 02
Tara Branum, Associate for Fulbright & Jaworski, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, LexisNexus.com, 02
Congressmen and private citizens besiege the President with demands [*58] that action be taken on various issues. n273 To make matters worse, once a president has signed an executive order, he often makes it impossible for a subsequent administration to undo his action without enduring the political fallout of such a reversal. For instance, President Clinton issued a slew of executive orders on environmental issues in
the weeks before he left office. n274 Many were controversial and the need for the policies he instituted was debatable. n275 Nevertheless, President Bush found himself unable to reverse the orders without invoking the ire of environmentalists across the country. n276 A policy became law by the action of one man without the healthy debate and
discussion in Congress intended by the Framers. Subsequent presidents undo this policy and send the matter to Congress for such debate only at their own peril. This is not the way it is supposed to be. 2. Strong constitution needed to prevent on the fly decisions risking nuclear war Hemesath, J.D./M.S.F.S. Georgetown, 2k
(J.D./M.S.F.S. Georgetown University Law Center, School of Foreign Service, 2001; B.A. University of California at Los Angeles, 1996.88 Geo. L. J. 2473. Lexis Nexis Academic) Politically, nuclear weapons wield such powerful and unique symbolic effects n70 that a decision regarding their offensive use--outside the context of a declared war or defensive maneuver--may fall under the ambit of congressional control as an act tantamount to a declaration of war. n71 Such political consequences may place the nuclear decision beyond mere tactical strategy intended for the judgement of the Commander in Chief alone. Professor Louis Henkin believes that Congress has the authority to decide the essential character of a war, and specifically, whether the conflict should be escalated to a nuclear level or not. n72 President Lyndon Johnson admitted that the decision to go nuclear is a "political decision of the highest order." n73 That nuclear engagement connotes a political decision, as opposed to a mere choice of weaponry, may place the nuclear decision beyond the scope of military decisions normally reserved for the President alone.
Regardless, proponents of the Executive position insist that nuclear weapons [*2484] are not constitutionally unique. n74 In support of their claim, nothing in the text of the Constitution indicates a special classification for particularly destructive weaponry, nor does the Constitution allow the Congress to override the President's choice of weapons. n75 Decisions regarding the type of weapons used in war are considered tactical--of a type supposed to be well within the scope of the Commander in Chief's power. n76 Furthermore, no congressional law or judicial decision has drawn an instructive distinction between nuclear and conventional weaponry. n77 Such a distinction would require artificial constructions distinguishing weapons systems that, despite differences of magnitude and technology, are basically designed to do the same thing. However, the lack of textual references to nuclear weapons in the Constitution does not adequately resolve the question of nuclear war authority. Although nuclear weapons as weapons are indistinguishable in literal constitutional terms, their uniquely pernicious and lingering effects may nevertheless define their offensive use as a quintessential act of war and thus constitutionally place them within the sphere of congressional war power via the War Powers Clause. As critics have noted, there currently exists no source of constitutional authority or judicial reasoning that would resolve this debate in favor of either side. n78
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Strong constitution needed to prevent on the fly decisions risking nuclear warCold War proves. Hemesath, J.D./M.S.F.S. Georgetown, 2k
(J.D./M.S.F.S. Georgetown University Law Center, School of Foreign Service, 2001; B.A. University of California at Los Angeles, 1996.88 Geo. L. J. 2473. Lexis Nexis Academic) It is possible that the heightened tensions of the Cold War also tainted judicial treatment of executive war powers questions. Thomas Franck has observed that a judicial decision finding nuclear weapons unconstitutional during the Cold War would have constituted the functional equivalent of unilateral disarmament, thus leaving the United States open to Soviet attack. n94 Although the unconstitutionality of nuclear weapons is a dubious proposition for a litany of other
reasons, Franck's observation demonstrates that the Cold War may have had a profoundly chilling effect on the judiciary's attitude towards policing the war powers during an era when U.S.-Soviet tensions were running high.
Fierce Cold
War tensions thus dulled congressional and judicial concerns about executive aggrandizement because of the need for a perfectly responsive counter-threat in the form of the President. As a result, the constitutional question of whether the President had the power to launch a nuclear weapon was simply not a viable issue during the Cold War.
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XO CP and AFF answers

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Nuke Terror Module

XO CP and AFF answers

Heg Module (1/2)

XO CP and AFF answers

Heg Module (2/2)

XO CP and AFF answers

XO CP and AFF answers

XO CP and AFF answers

XO CP and AFF answers

XO CP and AFF answers

XO CP and AFF answers

XO CP and AFF answers

SolvencyXOs are fast and effective

XO CP and AFF answers

SolvencyXOs are fast

XO CP and AFF answers

XO CP and AFF answers

AT: Perm do both

We must reject every instance of tyranny Petro, Law Professor, 1974

every invasion of freedom must be empathically

identified and resisted with an undying spirit.

XO CP and AFF answers

AT: Perm do both (congressional actor)

XO CP and AFF answers

AT: Perm do both (court actor)

XO CP and AFF answers

AT: Perm do the CP (1/2)

XO CP and AFF answers [continued without deletion]

AT: Perm do the CP (2/2)

XO CP and AFF answers

****2NC PREZ POWERS****

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2NC EXTXO key to Prez Power (1/2)

XO CP and AFF answers

2NC EXTXO key to Prez Power (2/2)

XO CP and AFF answers

2NC EXTObamas Campaign Promises

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2NC EXTPrez Powers (nukes)

XO CP and AFF answers

2NC EXTPrez Powers (heg)

XO CP and AFF answers

Impact CalculusPrez Powers (nukes)

XO CP and AFF answers

Impact CalculusPrez Powers (heg)

XO CP and AFF answers

AT: XOs dont increase Prez Powers

XO CP and AFF answers

2NC EXTNuclear Terror Attack Impact

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2NC EXTXOs key to Heg

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2NC EXT--XOs key to Heg

XO CP and AFF answers

XO CP and AFF answers

Normal MeansGeneric (1/2)

XO CP and AFF answers

Normal MeansGeneric (2/2)

2NC PREZ POWERS