State-Sponsored Mass Murder

State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides Author(s): Matthew Krain Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jun., 1997), pp. 331-360 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174282 . Accessed: 04/05/2012 14:30
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State-Sponsored Mass Murder

THE ONSET AND SEVERITY OF GENOCIDES AND POLITICIDES
MATTHEWKRAIN
Departmentof Political Science Indiana University
The author argues that openings in the political opportunitystructure,rather than the levels of concentrationof power, best predictthe onset of genocides or politicides and which states will engage in the most severe state-sponsoredmass murder.These and other hypotheses are tested. Analysis of logit models reveals that civil war involvement is the most consistent predictorof the onset of genocides or politicides, and other political opportunitystructurevariables have some effects, especially when in structurevariables.Analysis of negative combinationwith at least one of the other political opportunity structure variablesbest accountfor the binomialevent-countmodels also reveals thatpolitical opportunity structure degree of severity of a given genocide or politicide.In sum, openings in the political opportunity what affects the onset and degree of severity of genocides and are more importantin understanding politicides than othermore static variables.
Despite all the progress humankindhas made in the past millennium, the problem of state-sponsored mass murder'has remained. In fact, the 20th century has been the bloodiest in human history (Rummel 1992). Recent cases of genocide and
have been plaguedby definitional and mass murder stateterrorism on 1. The literatures state-sponsored problems. Terms such as state-sponsoredmass murderand state terrorismcan be (and often are) easily mass murderand confused and thereforeneed elaboration.The main differencebetween state-sponsored The purposebehind policies of state-sponsoredmass state terrorism,for instance,is one of intentionality. murdersuch as genocide or politicide is to eliminatean entiregroup(Gurr1986, 67). The purposebehind is policies of state terrorism to "inducesharpfear andthroughthatagency to effect a desiredoutcome in a conflict situation"(Gurr1986, 46). The formerrequiresmass killings to accomplishits goal. The latter's success is dependenton the persuasivenessof the fear tactics used. Mass killings may not be necessaryto goal. accomplishthe particular In most cases, these two phenomenado not coexist. Nevertheless,sometimesactionsmay serve the dual In mass murderand state terrorism. Nazi Germany,Jews were forced to wear purposeof state-sponsored yellow Starsof David. This servedas both a terrortactic,makingthe Jews feel obvious and singled out and identification,facilitatingquickerextermitherebyimmobilizingpotentialresistance,and as bureaucratic nation(Kuper1981, 125). We can contrastthis with the blue andwhite checkeredscarvesthe KhmerRouge made the EasternZoners wear. The EasternZoners were not aware of the significance of the scarves as identifiersof potentialtargets,therebyeliminatingthe scarves'terrorpotential(Kieran 1991, bureaucratic 224). The mutual coexistence of state-sponsoredmass murderand state terrorismis also evident in the MarissaMyers,KarenRasler,AmandaRose, AUTHOR'SNOTE:Thanksaregiven to YorkBradshaw, Michael Rubner,R. J. Rummel,WilliamR. Thompson,RichardTucker,and two anonymousreviewers for theirvaluablecommentsand suggestionson previousdraftsof this article.
JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION,Vol. 41 No. 3, June 1997 331-360 ? 1997 Sage Publications,Inc.
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politicide2in Bosnia, Rwanda,Burundi,Somalia,Angola, andIraqreinforcethe notion mass murder as prevalenttodayas it has ever been (Harff1992; is thatstate-sponsored Gurr 1994). Only recently has the study of genocide and othertypes of mass killing become a focus of research,despite the assertionthatthe study of such phenomenais the most importantgoal of social science (Horowitz 1976, 1980). In fact, Rummel's (1995) most recent work is the first majorcross-national,longitudinal,quantitative murder. Rummelfinds that,althoughwar explorationof the causes of state-sponsored the dead andrebelliondeadareassociatedwith state-sponsored murder, effects of high concentrationsof power within a polity overridethese effects. The end result is the assertion that "Power kills; absolute Power kills absolutely" (Rummel 1994, 1). Although this may explain in which regimes one should expect to find genocides or politicides, it does not explainat whatpointduringthese regimes'lifetimes one should of expect to find them.I arguethatthe occurrence openingsin the political opportunity structureratherthan the degree of concentrationof power best predicts onset and differing degrees of severity of genocides and politicides. This study tests these and mass murder. otherhypothesesregardingwhat factorsaffect state-sponsored APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF STATE-SPONSOREDMASS MURDER mass murder does not occurin a vacuum.It has been hypothesized State-sponsored thatconditionsboth internaland externalto the aggressorstatehave an impacton the onset and severity of genocide and politicide. The study of state-sponsoredmass that with the assumption thesephenomenawere somehow was firstundertaken murder unique and requirednew theories to account for them. Three main foci emerged. of Psychologists focused on the dehumanization the individual and the inaction of bystanders(Charny1982; Staub 1989).3Sociologists looked at both economic hegemony explanations(Sartre1968; Gurr1986) andthe societal conditionsnecessaryfor the emergenceof the genocidal state (Horowitz 1976, 1980; Kuper1977; Fein 1979). Political scientists examinedthe natureof the stateas terrorist (Stohl andLopez 1984,
out Indonesianassault on East Timor.Indonesiacardried what is undoubtedlya policy of politicide against to the East Timorese,killing an estimatedone quarter one half of the populationof the island (Carey 1990; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 411). However, as Harff (1986) points out, the Indonesiangovernmenthad a second reason for the assault.The atrocitiesin East Timorwere meantas a warningto otherislands under the control of Indonesianot to attemptto break away and declareindependence,a terrortactic of deadly proportions. 2. Genocides are mass killings in which the victim group is defined by association with a particular communalgroup. Politicides are mass killings in which "victimgroups are defined primarilyin terms of theirhierarchical positionor politicaloppositionto the regimeanddominantgroups"(Harffand Gurr1988, are 360). Interestingly, many of the instancescoded by Harffand Gurras "politicide" consideredby much of the literatureto be instances of state terrorism(e.g., Argentina,Chile, El Salvador)(Lopez 1984, 63). mass murder. and Evidentlythereis some overlapbetween state terrorism some kinds of state-sponsored betweencriminalsandvictims, in literature psychology on the relationship 3. Thereis also a substantial known as victimology.Key works from this approach specifically addressingthe phenomenonof genocide are Jacobsen(1973) and Dadrian(1974). Separovic(1973) gives a good summaryof the overall approach.
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1986), the effect of regime type on democide4propensity(Rummel 1995), and how internalandexternalupheavalleadsto genocideandpoliticide(Harff1984, 1986; Gurr 1986). Yet almost all these studies agree that factors both internaland externalthat change the domestic power structureplay a role in instigating and perpetuating mass murder. questiondeals with the extent of this role. Do such My state-sponsored factors play a more significant role in determiningthe onset and severity of statewithin a given polity? sponsoredmass murderthanthe degree of power concentrated I believe so, despite Rummel's (1995) argumentthat power concentrationis the determiningfactor. on Recently,much work in the literature political violence has focused on theories of political opportunitystructure.An assumptionof these theories is that "political violence is a function of the political opportunities constraintsof the immediate and environment" (Schock 1996, 104). Elites do theirbest to keep opportunities political for challenging the status quo at a minimum. However, openings in the political opportunitystructureoften lead to challenges to the elites because they signal the vulnerabilityof the state (Tarrow1994). Even when this is not the case, elites may perceive themselves to be potentiallyweakenedand vulnerable. of When openingsin the structure politicalopportunities changethe configurations of power, this in turnaffects the strategiesused by the elites againsttheir (potential) shifts ... influchallengers(Kriesi 1995). As Boudreau(1996, 186) notes, "Structural ence the probableramifications collective action,andthereforechangehow particiof pantsbehave."In many cases, the elites will choose to accommodatetheir opposition to placate the populace or close off openings in the political opportunitystructure. Such is the processthatleadsto majorreforms(Tarrow1994;Krain1996). At the other or extreme,fearingthataccommodation even small-scaleor medium-levelrepression will not suffice, the elites may choose to engage in the severest form of repression, These elites remove the threatposed by an opening in state-sponsoredmass murder. structure eliminatingall those who might take advantage the political opportunity by of that opening, even if the threatappearsto be minimal at best. Unfortunately, such radicaldecisions aremorelikely duringandafterperiodsof structural changebecause conditionsduringthese times not only open up the opportunity engage in genocide to or politicide but also close off other options or make them appear too costly to implement(Melson 1992, 274).5Althoughnot all openingsin the politicalopportunity structurelead to state-sponsored mass murder,such openings should make genocide or politicide more probable. Openings in the otherwisestatic (andpartiallyclosed) political opportunitystructure will occur if at least one of the following four factors changes: "theopening up of the access to participation, shifts in rulingalignments,the availabilityof influential allies, and cleavages within and among elites" (Tarrow1994, 86). We alreadyknow
4. Democide, as defined by Rummel (1994), is an overarchingterm describing all kinds of statesponsoredmurder(includinggenocide, politicide,massacres,mass murder, killing by quota, and terror). 5. This may help explain why victims of state-sponsored mass murderoften do not appearto be direct and immediatethreatsto the governmentyet are neverthelesstargeted.As Starr(1994a, 486) suggests, the elite's aim of political survivalmay often resultin "apparently incommensurable behaviors."
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that some of these factors have direct impacts on levels of many types of political violence (Skocpol 1979; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975). Thus it should be expected that they would have some effect on the most extreme forms of political violence, mass murder. This shouldbe especially truein times of what Gamson state-sponsored and Meyer (1996, 280) call "big opportunity," which are "times in which the entire state system is seen to break down and to be vulnerableto political challenges." can Althoughother,smalleropportunities activateor enable social movementactivity or other forms of collective action, I expect that only times of big opportunitycan enable the massive effortrequiredto kill thousandsor millions of one's own population. Next, I discuss which types of big opportunityshould be most likely to enable mass murder. state-sponsored A substantialliteratureon the consequences of war has suggested that the four warfare(Thompson factors discussed earlierare often direct results of international 1993). Indeed, works rangingfrom Skocpol's (1979) study of revolutionsto Kriesi's (1995) study of new social movementsfind thatchanges in the international political effects on the opportunitystructure(often caused by war) have importantstructural national political opportunitystructure.The smaller but growing literatureon the consequences of civil wars suggests a similarconnection between these factors and internalconflicts (Eisenstadt1978; Krain1996). In addition,many studies have documentedthe effects of wars and civil wars on general preconditionsfor genocides and politicides. For example, Melson (1992) argues that revolutions create the conditions that allow genocidal movements and permit their leaders to come to power in the first place and impose their radical ideology, therebylegitimizing mass murderin the eyes of the populace by making it state sponsored.Following the work done by Laswell (1962) on the "garrison state," and Gurr(1988) documentsthe establishment expansionof the secretpolice and other institutionsof the "coercivestate"as a directresultof wars and civil wars. Eisenstadt (1978) arguesthathostile international pressureslead to greaterisolation of the elites, which in turn leads to an increasedprobabilitythat these elites will use repression. Some preliminaryquantitativework has verified this hypothesis. A wide variety of studies finds that threateninginterventionsexacerbatedomestic conflict in general (Pearson1974; Stohl 1980). Morespecifically,Poe andTate(1994) have foundstrong, and persistenteffects of international civil wars on humanrights and repression,and McNitt (1995) has found thatthe greaterthe externalthreat,the greaterthe numberof detentions and the greaterthe use of tortureby the state. Thus wars and civil wars appearto help createan environmentin which large-scalerepressionis common state practice. Some work has alreadybeen done on the effect of disequilibriumwithin society, massmurder. example, For causedby upheavalorcrises,on policies of state-sponsored although Melson (1992, 283) admits that new regimes resulting from secession, decolonization, and extraconstitutional changes of government are less likely to commit acts of "totaldomestic genocide,"he assertsthat such a regime will "aggressively maintainthe establishedorder,and to do that it may use coercion, repression, In massacre,andeven partialgenocide againstchallengers." additionto wars andcivil
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wars, extraconstitutional changes and decolonizationare two other phenomenathat structure shiftingrulingalignments,creatingaccess by open the political opportunity to new allies, and creating cleavages between and among the ruling elites. These factors should help cause or exacerbateinstancesof state-sponsored mass murder. Indeed, Harff (1986, 167) finds that genocides and politicides are the result of "abruptchange in the political communitycaused ... by the formationof a state throughviolent conflict, when nationalboundariesare reformed,or when a war is lost."Mazian(1990) sees genocide as occurring underthe cover of war and as a result of structural within the domesticpolitical power relations.Fein (1979) finds changes thatwarandinternalinstabilityareconditionsthatfosterstate-sponsored mass murder. RobertMelson (1992) finds thatrevolutions,in combinationwith wars, are necessary but not sufficientconditionsfor large-scalegenocide. Argumentsaboutconflictualsocieties eruptinginto chaos afterthe exit of a colonial power are present in the literatureas well (Kuper 1977). Although Rummel (1994, 1995) finds that democracieskill their citizens less often thannondemocracies,Gurr (1994) shows that transitionsto democracy often have murderousconsequences. These domestic power transfersoften upset the equilibriumof the state, creatingnew opportunitiesfor bloody internalconflict (Gurr 1994, 361-63). The connection between openings in the political opportunitystructureand genocides or politicides one. appearsto be an important My assertionis that the mere status of a state-be it economic (i.e., place in the world economy), political (i.e., regime type, power concentration),or social (i.e., ethnic composition)-does not help us to understandwhy genocides or politicides occur at particular points duringa given regime and not at otherpoints. For instance, Hutuslaughtered Rwandain 1994 and in why were the Tutsi andTutsi-sympathizing not a decadebefore?Why werethe Bengaliskilled in 1971 insteadof a few yearslater? structure. The answerslie in the events thatopen the political opportunity The presence of such openings should increase the probabilityof the onset of mass murderand the level of its severity.New elites takingpower or state-sponsored old elites trying to hold onto power can and must reconsolidatepower quickly and efficiently. Major structuralchanges such as wars, civil wars, extraconstitutional during which changes, or decolonizationcreate "windows of political opportunity" the elites may and must more freely act to consolidate power and eliminate the opposition (Tarrow1994). Failureto do so may threatenthe state's ability to extract resourcesfrom the population,protectitself, wage war,or furtherbuild the apparatus of the state, all key functionsthateffective states must undertake (Tilly 1975; Rasler and Thompson 1989). A regime that does not consolidate its power may be less efficient in these tasks, calling into question its legitimacy and increasingthe possibility of a challengerarisingfrom within (Tilly 1978). Often duringthese periods of postupheavalconsolidation,this leads to brutalsuppressionof the opposition and of regime (Harffand Gurr1988). groupsthat are perceivedto be threatsto the current Thus I constructthe following hypotheses regardingthe effects of war and civil war involvement, extraconstitutional changes, and decolonizationon the probability mass murder: of onset and the severityof state-sponsored
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1: is in of war, Hypothesis If a state engaged anexternal theprobability theonsetof agenocide and of orpoliticide thedegree its severity be greater that a state engaged will than for not in anexternal war. 2: in of Hypothesis If a stateis engaged a civil war,theprobability theonsetof a genocide and of orpoliticide thedegree its severity be greater thatfora state engaged will than not in a civil war. 3: an the of Hypothesis If a state experiences extraconstitutional change, probability theonset or of a genocide politicide thedegreeof its severity be greater thatfor a and will than statethatdoesnotexperience extraconstitutional an change. 4: of the of history decolonization, probability theonset Hypothesis If a statehasa recent or of genocide politicide thedegree its severity and of should greater thatfor a be than statewithout recent a of history decolonization. In many ways, Rummel's (1995) work is the culminationof much research on state-sponsoredmass murderto date. Rummel'sprojectis a massive data collection effort, documented in a series of books: case studies of the major mass murders (Rummel 1990, 1991, 1992), a major theoreticaloverview (Rummel 1994), and a volume devoted to laying out the data(Rummelforthcoming).The connectionthathe mass murder also drawson his andothers' posits betweenwarfareandstate-sponsored previousfindingsthatdemocracies(forthe most part)do not fighteach other(Rummel 1983; Bremer 1992). This assertion leads him to the hypothesis that democracies because "democracies shouldbe less likely to sanctionmass murder createan oasis of peace" (Rummel 1992, 47). Others contend that this assumption is false because do Rummel's democracies fightnondemocracies 1992).Nevertheless, quiteoften(Bremer fewer "democide" victims findings indicatethatdemocracieshave killed substantially He thanotherformsof government. findsthatdemocracieshavekilled about1,000,000 regimes have killed 115,000,000, of whom 95,000,000 people, whereas totalitarian were killed by communistregimes (Rummel 1994, 1995). It Certainly,the databearthis relationshipout ratherdramatically. is hardto argue with the notion that democraciesengage in state-sponsoredmass murderless than othertypes of regimes. But using factoranalysis on a dataset stretchingfrom 1900 to 1987, Rummel finds that this relationshipbetween power concentration(i.e., the degree to which power is centralizedin a small numberof institutions) and stateto sponsoredmass murderis singularlyimportant, the exclusion of all other factors. The relationshipbetween war dead and rebellion dead, for example, which appears significant if analyzed alone, becomes insignificantonce concentrationof power is includedin the analysis (Rummel 1995). of of Rummel'sfocus on the structure statesandthe distribution powerwithinthem structure is reminiscentof the othermore static or stabletype of political opportunity with the more rather (Boudreau1996; GamsonandMeyer 1996). This contrasts nicely structure discussed earlier. elements of political opportunity volatile (less permanent) of preconditionof Although I expect that a high concentration power is an important a state'sabilityto commitgenocide orpoliticide,I believe thatopeningsin the political opportunitystructure play the more significantrole in determiningthe probabilityof onset and degree of severity. Although the more static elements may tell us where state-sponsoredmass murder should be more or less likely, the less permanent structure shouldallow us to determinewhen these openingsin the politicalopportunity
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events will occur.Nevertheless,to test Rummel's (1995) findings, I hypothesize the following: in of 5: that number institutions more are power a small Hypothesis States centralize political with the onsetandhigh degreeof severityof genocidesand likely to be associated than that political power. politicides states decentralize Manytheoristswho focus on conditionswithinthe aggressorstatearguethatgroups withinsociety areat the greatestrisk (Gurr1993). Most thatarethe most marginalized often these theoristsreferto ethnic groups(Kuper1977, 1981; Vanden Berghe 1990; Gurr1993, 1994), althoughothersocial groupingsare consideredas well.6Ethnicity, however, appearsto many theoriststo be an extremelypowerful identifier.Rummel (1992) asserts that cross-cuttingcleavages curtail the potential for state-sponsored mass murderand finds thatthereis virtuallyno relationshipbetween democide and a series of cleavage variables(diversity,culture,religion, regionalvariation)(Rummel 1995, 21). But Kuper (1977) argues that ethnicity sweeps away other cross-cutting cleavages and is a powerful driving force in internalconflict. Gurr's (1993, 1994) minorities-at-risk projectassumes thattherewill be serious ethnopoliticalconflict in or countrieswhere minoritiesarethreatened pose a threatto the current regime. Chalk (1989, 153) asserts that one of the two main types of genocide is the eliminationof "smallrelatively isolated groups"on the frontiersof expandingsocieties. Following of distributions Chalk'sassertion,one mightexpect thatsymmetricor near-symmetric power, resources,or populationswould yield the least violent situations.Conversely, if Chalk is correct,the existence of large majoritygroups and significantly smaller of minoritygroupsshouldlead to the greaterprobability onset andthe greaterseverity To test Chalk'stheory,I hypothesizethe following: of genocide or politicide. in stateincreases, the 6: Hypothesis As the level of ethnichomogeneity an aggressor and or of probability the onsetof genocide politicide thedegreeof its severityshould increase. withinthe worldeconomy-have Finally,poorercountries-the most marginalized often been associatedwith the most serious cases of genocide or politicide. Freeman (1991, 188) arguesthat this is so because "theweakness of many states in the world economic system and the economic expectationsof their peoples may lead to rebelThese internaleffects should be furtheramplifiedby lions and ruthlessrepressions." how external actors react to marginalizedstates experiencingstate-sponsoredmass murder.Stohl (1987) arguesthat economic interestscloud the judgment of potential intervenerswithin the internationalsystem, creating bystanders.This is similar to Sartre's(1968) claimthateconomicinterestscan constraingenocidalactions,butwhen the thereareno economic motives for international constraint, probabilityof intervenGurr's(1986, 61) hypothesisthat"peripheral tion is lessened.These arguments support
6. Therearenumerousexamples of nonethnic-based genocides or politicides,rangingfromthe Baha'is in Iran (Bigelow 1992) to the kulaksin the Soviet Union (Kuper 1981). The most obvious example of a nonethnic-basedgenocide is the Holocaust, in which many victims were identified by religion, sexual preference,or disability.
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status in the world system increasesthe likelihood thatregimes that rule by violence can do so with impunity."Nations that have no interestin economic relations with stateshave less incentiveto interveneandstop the killing (Gurr1994, 359). murderous Therefore,modifying Gurr'sstatement,I hypothesizethe following: within worldeconomy morelikely the are 7: that Hypothesis States aremoremarginalized of or to be associated the onsetandincreased with than severity a genocide politicide within worldeconomy. statesthatareless marginalized the RESEARCH DESIGN In this section I detail how I shall test the above hypotheses.Separatetests will be mass murder. run to determinewhat affects the onset and severity of state-sponsored The time frameused in this study,1948 to 1982, was the broadest possible rangewithin the constraintsof availabledata (the reasons for which will be detailedlater).7In the following section I operationalizethe variablesand then proceed with the empirical tests.
OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES
Dependent Variables: Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides I rely on Harff and Gurr's(1988) data set, which presentsa list of genocides and politicides from 1945 to 1987.8 It is one of only two comprehensivedata sets on Harffand Gurr's(1988, 363) main mass-murder state-sponsored currentlyavailable.9 criterionfor inclusion is that "in each instanceone or more identifiablegroups were the target of deliberate attempts by a ruling group to 'bring about its physical destructionin whole or part.'" Guidelines for inclusion in the data set are stated as follows: were noncombatants deliberincludes thosein which(a)many Thelistof episodes only and or toll atelykilled,(b)thedeath washigh(inthethousands more), (c) thecampaign for in included alllasted atleast here one.... Thekillings theepisodes wasa protracted and six months. 1988,366-67) (Harff Gurr The dataused in this studyarethe countryin whichthe genocideorpoliticideoccurred, in of of theduration theepisode,andthenumber victims.Thesedataarepresented Table1.
in Harff here anddiscuss them further the section on operationalization. 7. I summarizethe constraints and Gurr's(1988) genocide andpoliticidedatarunonly from 1945 to 1988, yielding the potentialupperand data lower boundsfor this study.But marginalization aredifficultto accountforbefore 1948, therebyfurther data changes constrainingthe study to all years beyond thatthreshold.Furthermore, on extraconstitutional are difficult to accountfor beyond 1982, yielding a new upperthresholdfor the study-hence the choice of a 35-year time span, 1948 to 1982. 8. The dataset has been updatedat least twice since 1988. The first appearsin Harff(1992). However, the only significantchange was the additionof the recentSomaliapoliticideto the list of cases. The second appearsin Gurr(1994), in which threeotherrecentcases-Angola, Burundi,and Iraq-were added. mass murderwith which I am familiaris the one being 9. The only other data set on state-sponsored compiled by Rummel (forthcoming)and not yet availablein its full form.
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TABLE1
Genocides and Politicides, 1948 to 1982

Country People's Republicof China(I) Sudan NorthVietnam Pakistan(I) People's Republicof China(II) Iraq Angola Algeria Paraguay Rwanda Laos Zaire (I) South Vietnam Indonesia(I) Burundi Nigeria People's Republicof China(III) Guatemala India Philippines Guinea Equatorial Uganda (I) Pakistan(II) Chile Ethiopia(I) Cambodia/Kampuchea Indonesia(II) Argentina Zaire (II) Burma Afghanistan Uganda (II) El Salvador Iran Syria Duration 1950-1951 1952-1972 1953-1954 1958-1974 1959 1959-1975 1961-1962 1962 1962-1972 1963-1964 1963-1965 1964-1965 1965-1972 1965-1966 1965-1973 1966 1966-1975 1966-1982+ 1968-1982 1968-1982+ 1969-1979 1971-1979 1971 1973-1976 1974-1979 1975-1979 1975-1982+ 1976-1980 1977-1982+ 1978 1978-1982+ 1979-1982+ 1980-1982+ 1981-1982+ 1981 Numberof Victims 800,000-3,000,000 100,000-500,000 15,000
?a
65,000
,a
40,000 12,000-60,000 900 5,000-14,000 18,000-20,000 1,000-10,000 475,000 500,000-1,000,000 103,000-205,000 9,000-30,000 400,000-850,000 30,000-60,000 1,000-3,000 10,000-100,000 1,000-50,000 100,000-500,000 1,250,000-3,000,000 5,000-30,000 30,000 800,000-3,000,000 60,000-200,000 9,000-30,000 3,000-4,000
?a
1,000,000 50,000-200,000 20,000-70,000 10,000-20,000 5,000-25,000
SOURCE:Harffand Gurr(1988, 364-65); Harff(1992, 32-6). a. Harffand Gurr(1988) and Harff(1992) have no values listed for these cases.
Onset of genocide or politicide is coded as a dichotomousvariable-1 if the year of onset correspondsto any countryyear withinthe time window,0 in all cases where there is an absence of genocide or politicide. Between 1948 and 1982, the period of examinationin this study,there were 35 instances of the initiationof a genocide or politicide. that mass murder startedaround Table1 shows therelevantcases of state-sponsored that occurredbefore 1948 but appearedpartially within 1948 or after.All episodes
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the time frame of examination(1948-1982) are omitted.Three of the observationsPakistan I (1958-74), Iraq (1959-75), and Burma (1978)-have no data for the "numberof victims." Severity estimatesfor these cases are eithertoo incredible,too large in range,or unavailable.Therefore,althoughI can include them in my examination of the factorsaffectingthe onset of genocide or politicide, I have no choice but to code them as missing when examiningseverity. of The Severity was measuredas the "number victims" (Harff and Gurr 1988).1? in numberof victims is reported manycases in rangesof best estimates.11 such cases, In I employ the mean of these estimatedbounds.12 War is Presenceor absenceof warparticipation denotedby a dichotomousvariable,with in 1 for any countryparticipating at least one war withinthe time frameexaminedand in 0 for any countrynot participating a war in thatperiod. Waris operationalizedas of all international wars, as determined the Correlates War(COW)dataset (Singer by wars of any type (interstatewars, extrasystemic and Small 1994). All international wars, and colonial wars) are counted.13 Civil War Presenceor absenceof a civil waris denotedby a dichotomousvariable,with 1 for any countryexperiencingat least one civil war within the time frameexaminedand 0 for any countrynot experiencinga civil war in thatperiod.Civil war is defined as an internalwar in which at actionwas involved,(b) thenational (a) military government the timewas actively of to resistance measured theratioof fatalities theweaker involved, effective (as (c) by on resulted the stronger forces)occurred bothsidesand(d) at least1,000battledeaths and the during civilwar.(Singer Small1994)
warnsagainstthe use of body countsto determinewhether 10. Althoughmost of the genocideliterature a genocide exists, that question is not the one I am looking to answer here. In this study,the existence of is mass murder a given for each case. I am merelylooking to place themon a severityscale. state-sponsored This is not done to demean particular genocides or other mass murders,as has been suggested by some authorswhen the issue of measuringsome genocides againstthe others(especially the Holocaust)is raised. Rather,I have created a continuumfrom light repressionto genocide or politicide. In this conception, genocide is the ultimateexpressionof stateviolence, andtheHolocaustis theultimateexpressionof genocide nearestto the endpointof the continuum. mass murderhave an inherentflaw-the more successful the policy, 11. All data on state-sponsored of the less we may know aboutit (Lopez and Stohl 1984). Also, therewill be underreporting fatalities by of the aggressorsin most cases to hide the extent of the atrocity.Therewill also be overreporting fatalities by the victims to highlightthe degreeof the atrocity(Rummel1992). As a result,no such datacan be precise. 12. To ensurerobustnessof the results,I also estimatemodels using dataat the minimumand maximum numberof victims reported.Thereis little differencein resultsbetween those two models, and thereforethe resultsare not reportedhere. Space considerations precludethe inclusionof all tests andresults.Only those results deemed most crucial or most interestinghave been includedin the text. All excluded results have little bearingon the findings of this study.All resultsnot reported,such as tests of otheroperationalizations of variables,are availablefrom the authoron request. 13. The new, relaxed inclusion criterion(1,000 annualaveragebattle deaths sustainedper year by all is participants) used. For more details, see Singer and Small (1994).
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Extraconstitutional Changes The presence or absence of extraconstitutional changes is denoted by a dichotomous variable,with 1 for any countryexperiencingat least one such change within the time frameexaminedand0 for any countrynot experiencingan extraconstitutional change in that period. Extraconstitutional changes are "forced changes in the top in governmentelite and/orits effective controlof the nation'spower structure a given and successful rebellions are also included. Unsucyear" (Banks 1971, xv). Coups cessful coups arenot counted.The dataareextractedfromBanks's(1971) cross-polity data for the years 1948 to 1966 and from the Polity II data set (Gurr,Jaggers, and Moore 1989) for 1967 to 1982, the last year for which Banks's data are updated. Because of the lack of dataon extraconstitutional changesbeyond thatyear,the upper limit for the range of this study must be 1982. Decolonization The presence or absence of decolonizationis denotedby a dichotomousvariable, with 1 for any country having recently experienced decolonization and 0 for any countrythathas not. Dates of decolonizationare found in Strang(1991). It should be noted at this point thatthe above four variables,representing openings in the political as structure,are all operationalized dichotomousvariables.This is conopportunity variables sistent with the strategy used in most examinationsof "big opportunity" (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 280). Ethnic Fractionalization index I have constructeda continuousvariablebased on an ethnicfractionalization for all countriesin each of the threedecadesfromTaylorandHudson's(1972) measure of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. Although they are often used in studies of the this sort, the Taylorand Hudsondatamisrepresent truenatureof ethnic cleavages in many societies. Linguistic cleavages do not always correspondwith ethnic ones, creating,for example, misleadinglylower scores for LatinAmericaandhigherscores for Africa. Although linguistic differences are often important,most ethnopolitical conflict centerson the primarycleavage of ethnicity(Kuper1977). of the Operationalizing variablerequiresfirst calculatingthe proportion the population of each ethnic groupto the total populationof the countryand then squaringit. thatnumberfrom 1 to for Next, I sum the squaredproportions all groupsand subtract measure.A low score, such as Japan's .01 (the come up with the fractionalization minimum), indicates asymmetrybetween groups-a huge majority (99%) of one A group and a very small minority(1%) of another. high score, such as Nigeria's .87, indicatesmany groupswith small or relativelyequalpercentagesof the population.In Nigeria, Igbo, Yoruba,Hausa, and Fulani all make up substantialproportionsof the population. Associates(1959); Kurtz(1970); Bacheller Datawere collectedfromDan Golenpaul Connor(1979); BanuaziziandWeiner(1986); Morrison,Mitchell, and Paden (1979);
342
(1989); and Phandis(1990). Multiple sources were used to controlfor source bias or error. index is identicalto the TaylorandHudsonmeasurein manycases butdiffers My significantlyin LatinAmerica,Africa, and a few select cases in otherregions. Yet the two measuresarehighly correlated (.84) for the time periodthatthey have in common. Therefore, I will use my ethnic fractionalizationindex because it provides data covering a broadertime frame,whereasthe Taylorand Hudson index is both limited
and inaccurate.14
Marginalization I operationalizemarginalization withinthe world economy as a country'spercentage of worldtrade.This measureis computedby calculatingthe totalimportsplus total exports of a given nation divided by the total imports plus exports of the world economy. The data were collected from the International MonetaryFund'sDirection of TradeYearbook supplements(1968, 1973, 1980, 1987, 1992). Missing datafor the easternbloc nations,whose dataweretypicallyreported only every 5 or 10 years,were interpolatedwheneverpossible. High scores on this index indicate greatercentrality within the world economy.Low scores indicategreatermarginalization.15 Marginalization data are available only after 1947. Thus the earliest year that this study can possibly consider is 1948. Combined with the upper-boundrestriction based on limitationsin the extraconstitutional changes variable,this gives the study a range of 35 years, from 1948 to 1982. Power Concentration is as Power concentration operationalized the degreeto which power resides in the institutionsof government,as determined the Polity II dataset (Gurr,Jaggers,and by Moore 1989). The Polity II coding for power concentrationis a composite 10-point indicatorbuilt on othervariables,such as the regulationof participation, regulationof executive recruitment,competitivenessof executive recruitment,constraintson the The chief executive, monocratism,and centralization. rangeof possible scores for the variableis describedas follows: concentration power is is where Institutional political competition divisiveandunregupower leastin polities is different individuals institutions, and lated,where political authority dispersed among from The havesomeautonomy central andwhereperipheral authority. opposite regions
14. I ran models using both indices to check for robustness.Indeed, results using either index were nearly identical.As such, the resultsusing the Taylorand Hudson (1972) index are not reportedhere (see footnote 12). They are availablefrom the authoron request. as 15. Some scholars define marginalization levels of poverty.Therefore,as an alternatemeasure, I coded gross nationalproductper capitafor these nationsfor the first year of each time period. Data were Tables(WorldBank 1989). Grossnationalproduct(GNP) collectedfromTaylorandJodice(1983) andWorld were highly correlated. Nevertheless,I ranall models using GNP per capita per capitaand marginalization instead of the marginalizationindex. For the most part, many of these results were similar to the index results.Space considerations marginalization precludeincludingall tests andresultshere (see footnote in 12). As such, I reportonly the resultsfor marginalization the text of this article.
343
traits-institutional control of competitionand executive recruitment, concentrationof nationalpower in a unitarystateheadedby a strongexecutive-signify a high degree of institutionalpower. (Gurr,Jaggers,and Moore 1989, 40) Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1989) are careful to note that many of the categories that make up the composite index are defining properties of either democratic or autocratic polities, making it impossible to call power concentration a proxy variable for either the degree of democracy or autocracy. "While the highest concentrations of institutional power are to be found in highly autocratic polities, high power concentrations are not uncommon among modern democracies" (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989,40). Thus I run supplementary models using the Polity II democracy scale and then the autocracy scale in place of the power concentration scale. Next I run models using different codings of the democracy scale. I employ a model using a democracy dummy variable, coded 1 if the democracy scale score is greater than or equal to 6, coded 0 if the democracy scale score is less than 6.16 I also employ a model using an ordinal scale, with the democracy scale scores of 0 to 3 coded as 1, 4 to 6 coded as 2, and 7 to 10 coded as 3.17In addition, I run another model employing a total power variable similar to the one used by Rummel (1995), as well as one using total power squared (also used by Rummel [1995]), to test whether these variations on the power concentration variable yield different results. My total power variable is coded as Autocracy Scale + (9 - Democracy Scale).18 Because of the possibility of score variation within one time period, all variables in this section (above) are coded as an average of their scores for the time frame of interest. Duration of Genocide or Politicide Duration is a continuous variable measured by the number of years in which a state engaged in a given genocide or politicide. This measure will only be used in the second set of tests on severity. Duration is not used in the first set of tests because duration of the event is irrelevant when explaining the onset of that event.
16. The choice of thresholdbeyondwhich countriesareconsidereddemocraciesis based on precedent. linkage, suchas ModelskiandPerry(1991) andBremer(1992), Manystudiesexaminingthe democracy-war have used a thresholdof 6. 17. Although FreedomHouse (Gastil 1985) looks at civil liberties and Polity II looks at institutional variables,this ordinalcoding is akin to the ordinalthree-category coding of the FreedomHouse data:not free, partly free, and free. A similar scheme has been used by Starr(1994b) to examine the diffusion of Freedom democracy.In addition,ModelskiandPerry(1991) findthatthe two indices arestronglycorrelated. House data are not employed in this study due to its limited temporalrange (1973-present). 18. Rummel (1995) relies on "diversesources"(among which are the Polity II scales) to compile his Scale. Rummel'sTotalPowerScale is actually coded Democracy Scale, AutocracyScale, and Totalitarian as Totalitarian Scale + (9 - Democracy Scale). Thus I am unable to use the precise coding that Rummel Scale for two reasons:first,the Polity II dataset does not have a Totalitarian (1995) uses for his TotalPower Scale, nor does Rummelsay which sourceswere used to compile it. Second, Rummel'sotherscales, which could form the componentsof a revised TotalPowerScale, are also compiled using multiple(unspecified) still sources. My revised coding of TotalPower makessense in light of Rummel'stheoreticalargumentsand is as close as I can come to duplicating variable.Nevertheless,thereadershouldkeep these discrepancies this in mind when comparingmy resultswith Rummel's.
344
METHODOLOGY Using the variablesabove, I rantwo types of models: logit models examining the onset of genocide andpoliticideandnegativebinomialevent-countmodels examining least squares(OLS)regressionis inappropriate when onset is the severity.An ordinary dependentvariablebecause the relationshipbetween the independentvariables and the dependentvariableis nonlinear.I employ logit models in thatinstancebecause of the dichotomousnatureof the dependentvariable:onset is coded as 1 for presentor 0 for absent(AldrichandNelson 1984; Long forthcoming). Annualobservationsfrom 1948 to 1982 acrossall countrieswithinthe statesystem (as determined by Singer and Small [1994]) are used in the logit models. The independentvariablesare lagged from 1 to 5 years (lag = t-1 to lag = t-5) to examine long- and short-termeffects and to establish robustnessof effect. A variablethat is significant across all 5 lagged years may turn out to be more importantto our mass murder of thana variable understanding whataffectsthe onset of state-sponsored that is only significant across one or two lags. The independentvariables are not examined at time (t) because of the difficulty in establishinga temporalsequence of events and hence causality.Such results would be misleading and are thereforenot presentedhere. An event-countmodel is employedwhen severityis examinedbecauseof the nature of the dependentvariable(as discussed earlier,severity is a count of the numberof victims in a given genocide or politicide).Event-countmodels aremeremodifications of the basic regressionmodel, using maximumlikelihood estimatorsand accounting for both distributionand a continuousunderlyingprocess (King 1989b, 128). Events mass murderare, such as the numberof killings by the state duringstate-sponsored for the most part, not independentof each other and thus have a distributionunlike that of an OLS regression'sdependentvariable. A common strategyused by researchersin cross-nationallongitudinalstudies of this sort is to employ OLS regression,despite the natureof the dependentvariable. But many problems arise when event-count data are analyzed by standardOLS procedures. Estimators can be inefficient, biased, or inconsistent. OLS does not account for the unique propertiesinherentin counts of events, such as their inability to take on negative integervalues. For example, one cannotobserve negative deaths. Yet OLS regression models assume that negative integers are part of the normal distributionof events. The answers that one gets using OLS are therefore not just modiinefficient but are also substantivelymeaningless(King 1989b, 126). Standard fications to an OLS model's dependentvariable,such as taking the log or adding a small constant,have been shown to bias the estimatesas well (King 1988). In general, event-count models can more accuratelyaccount for the way in which events are distributed(King 1988). Thus, when estimatingmodels of the frequency counts of event-countmodels should be used. events, the more appropriate Thereis morethanone type of event-countmodelthatcan be employed.The choice of count model is dependenton the type of dispersion of the correlateddependent variable. These models are based on the assumptionthat events have a particular distribution. Event-count models have an exponential functional form, with the
345
TABLE2
Two Tests of the Appropriateness Poisson Models for ExaminingSeverity of

Test of Poisson distribution dependentvariable(severityof genocide or politicide) of = 10.96*** = 5.6 x 107*** = -2.8 x 107 Log-likelihood Likelihoodratiotest of full negativebinomialmodel versus full Poisson modela Coefficient Goodness of fit X2 Coefficient [ln(alpha)] 2 Log-likelihood a. See also Table4. ***p < 0.001. = = = 3.59*** 5.22 x 107*** -326.76
variance of the dependent variable equal to the expected value of the dependent = variabletimes the degree to which the events are independent,such that V(Y/) X,i2, an extraparameter the degree thatXi> 0 and(2 > 0, with &2 being assuming measuring of independenceof the events (King 1989a, 126). Independence amongevents makes (2 = 1, making the varianceequal to the mean. The simplest event-countmodel, the In Poisson regressionmodel, meets this stringentrequirement. the study of domestic and internationalconflict, however, events are often not independent.Correlated
events create situations of either overdispersion (C2 > 1) or underdispersion (o2 < 1),
which can be accounted for by more complex count models, such as the negative binomialmodel (Liao 1994; Long forthcoming).Negative binomialmodels include a aboutthe truerates at which the events randomcomponentreflectingthe uncertainty cases (Gardner, of interestoccurfor individual Mulvey,andShaw 1995).This allows for the rigidindependence eventsassumption. of a morevariable by dispersion relaxing Table 2 shows the results of the goodness-of-fit chi-squaretest, which will help for determinewhat type of event-countmodel is most appropriate this study.The null The overwhelmingsignificance of is thatthe dataare Poisson distributed. hypothesis the goodness-of-fit chi-squareindicatesthatthe Poisson regressionmodel is inappropriatehere. To double check this result,I rana likelihoodratio (LR) test of a negative binomialmodel for the overallmodel (shownagainlaterin Table4) againstthe Poisson the model of the same data.I have reproduced results in Table2 to demonstratethat, here. The large chi-squarevalue and high indeed, the Poisson model is inappropriate of level of significanceconfirmthatthe assumptionof a strictPoisson distribution the datais inappropriate. Preciseannualdataon genocideandpoliticideseverityarenot available.Therefore, the unit of analysis used in the negative binomial models is the nation-state.Each observationconsists of aggregatedvalues for all variables across countries for the entire35-yearperiod(1948-1982). I runtwo models, one includingthose independent variablesused in the logit models examiningonset andone includinga controlvariable for genocide or politicide duration.The additionof this variableallows me to avoid
346
using annualdata while still accountingfor how the numberof years a genocide or politicide lasts affects the severity of thatevent. FINDINGS
LOGIT ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING ONSET
The results of the logit analysis on factors affecting the onset of state-sponsored nor mass murder shown in Table3. Neithermarginalization ethnicfractionalization are aresignificantin any of the models, allowing me to rejectoutrightthe hypothesesthat either affect the onset of genocides or politicides. However, the most informative negative resultin Table3 is the lack of significanceof the degree of power concentration in four of the five lagged models. The logit regressions for models using the Democracy Scale, AutocracyScale, TotalPowerScale, TotalPowersquared,democracy dummy, and democracyordinalvariablesall yielded results nearly identical to the model using the power concentrationvariable. As such, these results are not reportedhere due to space considerations(see footnote 12). Civil war involvement appearsto be the best predictorof genocide or politicide. Civil war involvementis the only variableto retainsignificanceacross all five lagged models. The war result was not as robust,claiming significance only at times t-3 and t-4. Extraconstitutional changes are only significantat time t-3 and barely significant at that. Decolonization predicts failure perfectly and therefore drops out from the model in times t- 1 to t-3, butit is significantin the final two lagged models. This result makes intuitive sense because decolonization involves a more gradualprocess of structuralchange that may delay its effects. Civil wars and other forms of conflict should have both immediate and longer-term effects on regime policy. In sum, althoughdecolonizationandwarinvolvementappearto have some effect in more than one lagged observation,civil war involvementis the most consistentpredictorof the mass murder.19 onset of state-sponsored But statistical significance is only part of the logit results. One can also look at probabilitiesto determinethe magnitudeof effects. To illustratethe magnitudesof the effects, Figures 1 to 6 graphically depict expected probabilities for the onset of state-sponsoredmass murder,based on interactionsof theoreticallyinterestingcombinations of significant variables,holding all other variablesat constantlevels. This
19. But might therebe anotherexplanation?Might some of the cases coded by Harffand Gurr(1988) as genocides or politicidesbe, in fact, civil wars?If so, the effects of the civil warvariablemay be the result of a tautology. I maintainthat there is a strong difference between civil wars and state-sponsoredmass murder.The formerare conflict events. The latterare policies. Althoughthey may happensimultaneously or as the resultof one another, they aredifferentphenomena.Nevertheless,to check the validityof the strong cases in which a civil effects of civil wars, I ran anotherlogit model, this time recodingall "questionable" war and a mass murderwere potentiallythe same case. Such cases were then consideredonly a civil war. Essentially,I removedthe questionablecases fromthe list of genocides and politicidesto see if the strength These cases wereAlgeria(1962), Rwanda(1963-1964), Nigeria(1966), of the civil warvariablewas durable. Guatemala(1966-1982+), PakistanII (1971), Afghanistan(1978-1982+), and El Salvador(1980-1982+). The resultsremainedrelativelyconsistent,with only slight changes in levels of significanceof the civil war variable.As such, the results are not presentedhere due to space considerations(see footnote 12).
Krain /STATE-SPONSORED MURDER 347 MASS

TABLE3
Logit Models, by Time Lag: Onset of Genocides and Politicides, 1948-1982

Variable
War Civil war Extraconstitutional changes
Lag= t- 1
.529743 (.86) 1.373372*** (3.04) -.507552 (-.94)
Lag= t-2
Lag= t-3
Lag= t-4
Lag= t-5
.593000 1.511681*** (.95) (3.17) 1.293511*** .937119* (2.70) (1.81) -.673908 (-1.10) .692668* (1.67)
1.157831** .484787 (2.05) (.64) 1.608053*** 1.988338*** (3.43) (4.08)
-.126231 -.325655 (-0.23) (-.52) a a a Decolonization 1.787592* 1.766244* (1.67) (1.63) Ethnic fractionalization .698074 .053798 .212324 .454476 -.113922 (-.14) (1.01) (.08) (.29) (.58) -.006706 -.001575 -.000369 .000753 .000952 Marginalization (-1.08) (-.13) (-.47) (.72) (.50) .150072 Power concentration .113892 .207829** .075302 .026331 (1.51) (1.12) (1.95) (.70) (.23) Constant -6.018962*** -5.609751*** -6.516868*** -5.909768*** -5.449485*** (-9.47) (-9.51) (-8.95) (-8.58) (-7.90) N 4,318 3,353 3,068 3,973 3,644 18.96 15.22 10.12 16.87 16.21 X2 -149.85251 -134.02992 -171.36545 -161.58204 -117.49116 Log-likelihood NOTE: t-values in parentheses. a. Variablepredictsfailureperfectly,dropped(observationsnot used). *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
analysis is not used for the first two time lags (t-1 and t-2) because there is no other competing significant variable against which the effects of civil wars needs to be compared. Figure 1 depicts the probabilityof the onset of a genocide or politicideby civil war and for and war occurrenceor nonoccurrence levels of power concentration time t-3. Figure2 depicts the same variablecombinationbut for an additionallag, time t-4. All othervariablesare held constantat theirmeans, except decolonizationand extraconNote thatwhen neithercivil stitutionalchanges, which areheld constantat 0 ("off').20 has wars nor wars occur in eithermodel, power concentration little effect by itself on the probabilityof onset, ceteris paribus.This is true both at time t-3, when power concentrationis significant (p < .05), and at time t-4, when it is not. Even at the the maximumlevel of power concentration probabilityof onset in cases not experiencing a civil waror a waris less than 1%.Conversely,in cases whereboth a civil war
structure 20. In these examinationsof probabilitiesandeffects, I hold the volatile politicalopportunity variablesconstantat 0 insteadof at theirmeans because a mean of a dichotomousvariableis substantively meaningless.If one knows thatdecolonization,forexample,is not a significantfactorin explaininggenocide or politicideonset, thenit standsto reasonthatholdingit constantateither0 or 1 shouldmakelittledifference. To check this, I reexaminedeffects of the significantvariableson the onset for all figures while holding variablesconstantat 1. The resultswere nearly identicaland, because of space these political opportunity considerations,are not presentedhere (see footnote 12).
348
0 6
ni CgWsar,War
<
-CCMlC Wr, N War
de
Oo
_
~~~~~............
0d
2 Power
4 6 Concentrotion
Probability of the Onset of Genocide or Politicide for Lag = t-3, by Levels of Power Concentration and Occurrence/Nonoccurrence of Civil Wars and Wars NOTE: Extraconstitutional changes and the decolonizationare held constantat 0 ("off'), and marginalization and ethnic fractionalization held constantat theirmeans. are Figure 1:
and a war occur, the probabilityof onset ranges from about three to six times that percentageat time t-3 and from aboutthreeto eight times thatpercentagein time t-4. According to Figure 1, civil wars alone have only a slightly smallereffect on the probability of onset than do wars in time t-3, despite the disparity in significance in apparent Table3. Figure2 shows thatcivil wars have more thantwice the effect on genocide or politicide onset as do wars. In addition,althoughsignificant at time t-4 (p < .05), wars alone do not appearto increasethe probabilityof onset by more than about 1%.These resultsreinforcethe significancelevel findings from Table 1, which show that civil war is a strong, consistent predictorof the onset of state-sponsored mass murder. Another interestingfinding in Figures 1 and 2 is the confirmationof Melson's wars occur together (or one (1992) propositionthat when internaland international after another),the chances of the onset of a state-sponsoredmass murderincrease Both figures show thatthe combinedeffects are two to threetimes that substantially. of the effect of the strongestvariablealone. Figure 3 depicts the probabilityof the onset of a genocide or politicide by civil wars, extraconstitutional changes, and levels of power concentrationfor time t-3. Figure4 depictsthe same time periodbut substituteswarsfor civil wars.The variables areheld constantat theirmeans,exceptpoliticalopportunity structure variables,which are held constant at 0 ("off'). Both Figures 3 and 4 demonstratethat, on its own,
349
0
*-CvrnWar, NoWar No CMl War,w,
-0
-.
NoCii.
War,N0War
C:
Ic
Pwer
Concentrtion
oO
Power Concentrotion
Figure 2: Probability of the Onset of Genocide or Politicide for Lag = t-4, by Levels of
Power Concentration and OccurrencelNonoccurrence of CivilWars and Wars
NOTE:Extraconstitutional changes and the decolonizationare held constantat 0 ("off'), and marginalizaare tion and ethnic fractionalization held constantat theirmeans.
extraconstitutional changehas only a nominaleffect on the probabilityof genocide or onset. This, coupledwith the fact thatit is only significantin time t-3, allows politicide me to reject the hypothesisthatextraconstitutional changes have a meaningfuleffect mass murder. on the onset of state-sponsored Figure5 depictsthe probabilityof the onset of a genocide or politicideby civil war, for decolonization,and levels of power concentration time t-4. All othervariablesare held constantat their means, except decolonizationand extraconstitutional changes, that despite the fact that which are held constantat 0 ("off'). Figure 5 demonstrates in onset(see Table1), thandecolonization determining civil warsarefarmoresignificant when examined separatelytheir overall effects on the probabilityof onset are nearly identical. Their combined effect is four to five times greaterthan either individual effect, rangingfrom an increasein the probabilityof onset of 10%to 17%. Figure6 depicts the same variablecombinationas in Figure5 but for an additional lag, time t-5. Again, the combinedeffect is between four and five times greaterthan any individual effect, at an increase in the probabilityof the onset of genocide or politicide of about 18% or 19%.Here, however, civil wars' effect is slightly greater than decolonization'swhen examined separately,althoughnot as great as one might expect given the differentialin levels of significancereportedin Table 1. To summarize, my analysis has so far shown that power concentration,ethnic and fractionalization, changes have either small marginalization, extraconstitutional
350
0
C^j-' --cbu i i ii
mNxtnt-Co Che,!
ChvUWr, wCIvUlWar, No No Chl
0
.D
." -"
fotdel ii xtr.Cagtkt levlatlChagM
.....-.
- No ChRWar,ltn-CosiufItidul
Chugm
CCul(M
War, No mrtr-Couttmadeal
c
.-0
0
a-o
0Dod O
>?
a.
d.
2 2 4 4 8. 6 6
00 o0
Power Concentrotion
Figure 3: Probability of the Onset of Genocide or Politicide for Lag = t-3, by Levels of Power Concentration and Occurrence/Nonoccurrence of CivilWars and Extraconstitutional Changes
NOTE: Warsand decolonizationare held constantat 0 ("off'), and marginalization ethnic fractionaliand zation are held constantat theirmeans.
of or insignificanteffects on the probability the onset of state-sponsored mass murder.

Civil war involvement has the greatest consistent effect on the probability of genocide
or politicide onset, ceteris paribus.When it is significant,war involvement also has an importanteffect on the probabilityof onset. Overall, one can say that civil war involvement is the most consistent predictor of the occurrence of a genocide or politicide, and major conflict involvement in general (war and civil war) has the
greatest effect on the probability of genocide or politicide onset. Thus the hypotheses
that war and civil war increasethe probabilityof genocide or politicide onset cannot be rejected. In addition,althoughnot strongly significantor having strong effects on its own, decolonization,in combinationwith civil war,has a largeeffect (up to an almost 20% increase in the probability)on the onset of state-sponsoredmass murder.This is consistent with Kuper(1985) and Zolberg,Suhrke,and Aguayo (1989), who discuss the bloodinessof postdecolonization statesthatplungeinto civil warimmediatelyafter What is puzzling is thatthis relationshipholds only if the independent independence. variables are lagged 4 or 5 years. It may be that the slow natureof the process of or decolonizationmakeselites reluctant unableto use the most severemeasuresat their until a few years of fighting have elapsed. This slow process should also disposal
351
0
Chagu -War, -xtra-C..srtita.aa W-ait, No"x_r'-Con""ht0"l C"spgI - NWaNr, xtra-CusMutmuBCbhuanu Wa * r,No IXxtr-Cuutteaoul Chasgu -lfw X
to 4P
C
q O
._ ,
__
O0
4 6 2 Power Concentrotion
for of Figure4: Probability the Onset of Genocideor Politicide Lag= t-3,by Levels of of and PowerConcentration Occurrence/NonoccurrenceWarsand Extraconstitutional Changes
NOTE: Civil wars and decolonization are held constant at 0 ("off'), and marginalizationand ethnic fractionalization held constantat theirmeans. are
makingit possible to use genocidal practices elongate the "window of opportunity," even 5 years afterdecolonization.
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING SEVERITY
Table 4 presentsthe results of two negative binomial event-countmodels testing what affects the severity of state-sponsoredmass murder.Model 1 contains all examinedin the logit analysesof factorsaffectingonset.Model 2 variables independent adds to this a controlvariablefor the durationof the genocide or politicide. that Model 1 demonstrates powerconcentration, decolonization,ethnicfractionalihave no significanteffect on severity,all else held constant. zation,andmarginalization War,civil war, and extraconstitutional changes appearto have the only significant effects on severity. The output of these models is easily interpretable. According to the derivative suggested by King (1989b, 123), each independentvariable'seffect on interpretation the count of the dependentvariableof interestequals its coefficient estimatetimes the sample mean of that dependentvariable.Because the dependentvariable's mean is
352
_-* _-
r -... '''..
No av War,DtcolBtztk B No Clvl War,No Decolonaton
O c O 0 0o ?. co
dO
Power Concentrotion
Figure 5: Probability of the Onset of Genocide or Politicide for Lag = t-4, by Levels of Power Concentration and Occurrence/Nonoccurrence of Civil Wars and Decolonization
NOTE:Warsand extraconstitutional and changes are held constantat 0 ("off'), and marginalization ethnic are fractionalization held constantat theirmeans.
57744.37 in this instance, we can say that, all other things being equal, wars are associated with an average 4.843026 x 57744.37 = 280,000 additional deaths in any given genocide or politicide. Civil wars are associated with an average 5.173411 x 57744.37 - 300,000 additional deaths in a state-sponsored mass murder, all else held constant. Extraconstitutional changes are associated with an average 10.3956 x 57744.37 = 600,000 additional deaths in any given genocide or politicide, ceteris paribus. Thus we can say that extraconstitutional changes appear to have twice the effect of wars or civil wars on the severity of genocides or politicides. However, model 2 paints a slightly different picture. First, when including a control for the duration of state-sponsored mass murders, significances change. Duration itself is highly significant (p < .01). An increase in duration by 1 year is associated with an average 2.16629 x 57744.37 - 125,000 additional deaths, all else held constant. Where power concentration was not significant before, it is now highly significant < .01) but in the wrong direction. According to this model, as power concentration (p increases, severity decreases! An increase in power concentration by one unit is associated with an average 2.604743 x 57744.37 - 150,000 fewer deaths in a state-sponsored mass murder, all else held constant. This runs directly counter to the hypothesized effect and counter to Rummel's (1995) results.
353
CO
o
- CIvU tsWr,Durehatau
NOTE: Ctr Wars and ex.
l s mar, held constant at 0 are ("off),
and
ginalization and ethnic
C 0
Co CPower ncentralttion of Civil Wars and 8 8
of C C and ,Noncentration OccurrenceNonoccurrence

q.. . . . .. . .. . .. . . ......
O0 o0
2 2
4 4
6 6
Power Concentrotion
Figure 6: Probability of the Onset of Genocid0 fer
deas
r Lag = 5, by Levels
of Power Concentration and Occurrence/Nonoccurrence of Civil Wars and Decolonization NOTE:Warsand extraconstitutional and changes are held constantat 0 ("off ), and marginalization ethnic are fractionalization heldconstantattheir fractionalization held constant theirmeans. are means.
Ethnic fractionalization is also now significant (p < .05) where it had not been before. The direction suggests that the more homogeneous the population, the more the severity increases. It appears that more symmetric distributions of populations lead to an average of .07694997 x 57744.37 = 4,500 fewer deaths per 1% change in the degree of ethnic fractionalization, all else held constant. This finding is consistent with Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo's (1989, 235) proposition that "countries marked by an extremely high degree of heterogeneity ... may be less likely to experience the types of conflict that lead to major refugee flows." Thus we cannot reject Chalk's (1989) hypothesis that the existence of large majorities and significantly smaller minorities should lead to more severe mass murder. Civil war's effects become slightly more significant (p < .01), but the average increase in deaths with which it is associated remains about the same (5.203107 x 57744.37 - 300,000). War's effects, however, decrease from model 1 to model 2. All other things being equal, wars are associated with an average 3.547137 x 57744.37 205,000 additional deaths in any given genocide or politicide, 75,000 deaths less than predicted in model 1. In addition, civil war's effects are now much more pronounced when compared to war's effects, where before they were nearly identical.
354
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE4
Negative Binomial Event-Count Models: Severity of Genocides and Politicides, 1948 to 1982
Variable War Model #1 4.843026* Model #2 3.547137*
Civilwar
Extraconstitutional changes Decolonization Ethnic fractionalization Marginalization Power concentration Durationof genocide or politicide Constant Ln(alpha) N X2 Log-likelihood LR test versus Poisson Z2 p-value NOTE: t-values in parentheses. *p <.05. **p <.01.
(2.03) 5.173411*
(2.19) 10.395600** (3.69) -2.763294 (-.89) 7.017351 (1.32) .011059 (.22) -.195804 (-.29) -5.790347 (-.86) 3.586337** (15.41) 120 29.96 -326.7640777 5.22 x 107 <.001
(2.11) 5.203107**
(2.70) 28.292080** (3.70) 4.334349 (1.33) -7.694997* (-2.00) -.017836 (-1.11) -2.604743** (-2.97) 2.166290** (3.90) -14.749900* (-1.97) 2.752429** (11.69) 120 64.09 -309.7016009 5.22 x 107 <.001
Finally, extraconstitutional changes are associated with an average 28.29208 x 57744.37 = 1,634,000 additional deaths in any given genocide or politicide, all else held constant. When duration is accounted for, the difference between the effects of extraconstitutional changes from model 1 to model 2 is about one million deaths. Although extraconstitutional changes may not affect onset significantly, their occurrence greatly increases the severity of the subsequent genocide or politicide. The analysis of the negative binomial models' results has shown that most of the political opportunity structure variables (all except decolonization) have strong effects on the degree of the severity of state-sponsored mass murder. Extraconstitutional changes have the greatest effect, more than five times that of civil wars. Civil war's effect is one and a half times greater than that of war's, all else constant. Duration is an important factor in understanding state-sponsored mass murder. When factored in,
355
it affectsseveritydirectlyandindirectlyvia changesin the effects of the othervariables. With durationcontrolledfor, ethnic homogeneity leads to increases in severity, but do high levels of power concentration not. In fact, the opposite appearsto be true. To summarizemy results,civil wars arethe most consistentpredictorsof genocide orpoliticideonset, althoughotheropeningsin thepoliticalopportunity structure (wars, effects. Most notably,these variables decolonization)do occasionallyhave important have the greatesteffect on the probabilityof onset when combinedwith at least one of the other political opportunitystructurevariables. This is intuitive because a combinationof any two of these variablesshould create a wider (or longer) window of opportunity. Genocide and politicide are extremepolicies that may requirelarger than normal openings in the political opportunitystructure.Thus Melson's (1992) of suggestionthata combination revolutionsandwarsis a necessary(butnot sufficient) conditionfor onset is probablynot far off the mark.In addition,political opportunity variablesalso best accountfor the degree of severity of a given genocide or structure and politicide. Although other variablessuch as ethnic fractionalization power conhave some impact,it is marginalcomparedwith the effect centration may occasionally variableson severity. of "big opportunity" CONCLUSION in are what structure important understanding Openingsin the politicalopportunity affects the onset andthe degreeof the severityof genocidesandpoliticides.This study has shown thatfrom 1948 to 1982, these relationshipshave been more importantfor predictingthe occurrenceand severity of genocides and politicides than more static, environmentalcomponents of opportunity,such as levels of power concentration. Using factoranalysis,Rummel(1995) himself foundsimilarvariablesto be important, although he argued that power concentrationoverrode these effects. Whether the discrepancyis the result of a statisticalartifacthas yet to be determined.More work can in this areais necessarybefore that determination be made. However, one could I for thatpoweris a necessaryprecondition the relationships have foundto exist. argue In short,I am not willing to rejectRummel's(1994, 1) claimthat"Powerkills; absolute to Power kills absolutely." Rather,I considerit one among otherfactorscontributing structure an environmentin which openingsin the political opportunity triggeruse of genocidal (or politicidal) practices.Although power may be a prerequisite,it alone does not determinewhen in the history of a given state genocidal practices will be to policies must presentitself, even in the employed. The opportunity use murderous most powerful of states. Majorstructural change caused by wars, civil wars, decolonization, and extraconstitutional changes can provide such windows of political opportunity. on This study addsto the growingliteratures the consequencesof wars (Thompson and 1993) and civil wars (Krain 1996) and the links between international domestic affect many aspects of life, both in internapolitics (Stohl 1980). Conflict processes
356
RESOLUTION JOURNALOF CONFLICT
tional and internalrelations.The connection between large-scale conflict and statesponsoredmass murder,althoughpreviouslyhypothesized,has not been empirically verified until now. Future research on the domestic consequences of wars should its incorporate effects on the state, its policy choices, and the targetsof these policies. mass murder Finally,in thatvein, this studypresentsevidence thatstate-sponsored of shouldbe studiedin the contextof the moregeneralframework conflict andpolitical violence. Openings in the political opportunitystructurehave up until now resided primarilywithin the domain of the study of collective action and social movements. But such openings affect elites' policy choices and the choices made by opposition on groups.Concepts and findings from the vast literature political violence may help otherconflict phenomenasuch as genocides, politicides, and us to betterunderstand war and civil war consequences.This is not to say that genocides or politicides are thanthey aredeemedto be by morespecializedtheories somehow of lesser importance No one can deny the uttersavagerynecessaryto eradicateor (Horowitz 1976, 1980). attemptto eradicatean entire group.No act conceivable can be more sinister,more inhuman.But to deny that much can be learnedby analyzing state-sponsoredmass of and withina well-established successfulgeneralframework politicalviolence murder moreabouttheseunspeakable is to deny the possibilityof learning phenomena. Civil wars and wars appearto be relatedto genocides and politicides. Often they are indistinguishablefrom one another,as in Rwandafrom 1963 to 1964, Nigeria in 1966, Sri Lankafrom 1983 to 1987, or, to bringthe analysis full circle, even Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovinatoday. There are fine lines between civil wars, wars, and genocides orpoliticides,as Harff(1992, 39-41) pointsout. Otherscholarshave pointed to similar fine distinctions between revolutions and war (Walt 1991), social moverevolutions"(Tilly ments andrevolutions(Tarrow 1994), andprotests,riots,and"great There is even difficulty in drawing a very basic distinction between state1993). sponsored mass murder and state terrorism (see footnote 1), let alone between genocides, politicides, and democides (see footnotes 2 and 4). I am not arguingthat we should discardthese distinctions,nor that they have significantramificationsfor how these concepts should be viewed and studied.Rather,I believe that phenomena mass murder, state terrorism(all of which and such as war,civil war,state-sponsored shouldbe studiedas relatedphenomhave developed separateanddistinctliteratures) ena, using existing theories of conflict and political violence. Future research on state-sponsoredmass murdershould consider how theories of conflict and violence of mass murder. affect our understanding state-sponsored REFERENCES
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State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides Author(s): Matthew Krain Reviewed work(s):

State-Sponsored Mass Murder

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Krain/ STATE-SPONSORED MASSMURDER

OF JOURNAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

JOURNAL CONFLICT OF RESOLUTION

Genocides and Politicides, 1948 to 1982

1,000,000 50,000-200,000 20,000-70,000 10,000-20,000 5,000-25,000

RESOLUTION JOURNALOF CONFLICT

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Two Tests of the Appropriateness Poisson Models for ExaminingSeverity of

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Krain /STATE-SPONSORED MURDER 347 MASS

Logit Models, by Time Lag: Onset of Genocides and Politicides, 1948-1982

1.157831** .484787 (2.05) (.64) 1.608053*** 1.988338*** (3.43) (4.08)

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

-CCMlC Wr, N War

Power Concentration and OccurrencelNonoccurrence of CivilWars and Wars

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

ChvUWr, wCIvUlWar, No No Chl

fotdel ii xtr.Cagtkt levlatlChagM

of or insignificanteffects on the probability the onset of state-sponsored mass murder.

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

No av War,DtcolBtztk B No Clvl War,No Decolonaton

NOTE: Ctr Wars and ex.

l s mar, held constant at 0 are ("off),

ginalization and ethnic

Co CPower ncentralttion of Civil Wars and 8 8

of C C and ,Noncentration OccurrenceNonoccurrence

Figure 6: Probability of the Onset of Genocid0 fer

RESOLUTION JOURNALOF CONFLICT

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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1.157831 .484787 (2.05) (.64) 1.608053* 1.988338*** (3.43) (4.08)