Toyota in crisis: denial and mismanagement

Victor L. Heller and John R. Darling

Victor L. Heller is Director of Executive Education and Associate Professor of Marketing at the Center for Professional Excellence, The University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas, USA. John R. Darling is Distinguished Visiting Professor of Management at The University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas, USA.

Introduction
We are now at the start of what may become the most dramatic change in international order in several centuries . . . What we are facing isnt the single shift of corporate leaders . . . as much as an avalanche of ceaseless change . . . creating unprecedented disruption and dislocation (Ramo, 2009). In essence, corporations may be entering a period of unprecedented crises, from the airline industry to the mining industries. When a corporate crisis approaches, it is much easier to seize and act upon it early, but it must be realistically recognized. Once a corporate crisis has passed through the threshold of the initial pre- (preliminary) crisis, it is much more difcult to act effectively and thus the opportunity to more easily deal with it passes. Worldwide crises, from a global environmental crisis to a loss of national identity, are impacting corporations. Additionally, the world is truly becoming a corporate, interrelated marketplace, with walls, both physical and psychological, falling, barriers collapsing, boundaries blurring, and technology attening the overall landscape, and at the forefront is the consumer-centric age (Friedman, 2008). Friedman, 2006 refers to this phenomenon as a triple convergence of the elimination of all walls, ceilings and oors to create a new at world platform. Pink (2005) describes this as a seismic though as yet undetected shift now under way . . . moving from an economy and a society built on the logical, linear, computer-like capabilities of the Information Age to an economy and a society built on the inventive, empathic big-picture capabilities of the Conceptual Age. The corporate leaders implications in managing a crisis in this new age are, indeed, complex and surreal in comparison to previously existing conditions. In todays triple-convergence world, virtually every corporation in every nation can expect a crisis to be on the horizon. The constant potential of crises has also taught the corporate world that a crisis can occur with little to no warning, anytime and anywhere. It can happen to any corporation, large or small, at every state of development, in every industry, and operating locally, nationally or internationally. It is, in other words, the safest of assumptions that a crisis looms on the horizon of every corporation. This has been referred to as a Black Swan. situation. This condition is an improbable and unnerving event with three basic characteristics: it is unpredictable; it causes massive impact; and after the fact, an explanation is concocted or invented that makes it appear less random and more predictable than it was (Taleb, 2007). However, Black Swans are not necessarily bad news merely reality. If corporate leaders will accept this, then they will be in the right frame of mind to accept the contention that forms a basic premise of this article: with proper advanced contingency planning and preparation, and appropriate recognition and response, there can often be a positive opportunity side to a crisis.

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JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STRATEGY

VOL. 32 NO. 5 2011, pp. 4-13, Q Emerald Group Publishing Limited, ISSN 0275-6668

DOI 10.1108/02756661111165426

Fink (1986) has identied four distinct phases of a corporate crisis paradigm focusing on the pre-crisis, acute crisis, chronic crisis and crisis resolution stages. These phases provide the analytical foundation for the present case analysis. Utilizing the Fink paradigm, the objective of this article is to explore the efforts necessary for successful corporate crisis management, particularly when consumer safety threatens the reputation of the corporation. The case analysis focuses on corporate leadership of the infamous Toyota 2009-2010 defective acceleration recall, or lack thereof, shown in an effort to deal effectively with the evolving crisis.

Conceptual framework
Nature of crisis management In analyzing the nature of crises and corporate crisis management, corporate leaders must rst understand that crisis management and mismanagement are not the same. Often, due to inappropriate or inadequate planning, or the absence of any kind of scenario planning, corporations engage in crisis-type situational reactions. Without ordered priorities, corporate leaders seldom know which situations call for immediate attention and which do not: what can be considered a pre-crisis activity, event, or issue. As a result, corporate leaders are often unable to continue functioning in the face of true crisis situations. This is considered mismanagement! Corporate crisis management comprises a systematic approach for dealing with real crises (activities, events, or issues) so that the corporation continues to function as normally as possible. Additionally, corporate crisis management is not a quick-x solution to the crisis activities, events or issues challenging the corporation. However, reaction time is often very narrow. Corporate crisis management entails forecasting, identifying, studying and acting upon crisis issues, and establishing procedures to prevent or cope with the crisis. Perhaps it may be that what corporate leaders do not know is much more important than what they do know. Crisis management is systems based. It is not solely represented by a separate operational unit within an organization. It is typically a combination of operating units brought together to manage a particular situation with every leader communicating (Goleman, 2002). Thus, crisis management does not require all employees, or even a large number of them, to stop working in their areas to address the crisis. In essence, effective corporate crisis management provides corporate leaders with a systematic, orderly response to crisis situations. This response paradigm permits the corporation to continue its day-to-day operations while a particular crisis is being resolved. Furthermore, systematic corporate crisis management creates an early detection or warning system. The contemporary-based quantum skills of seeing intentionally, thinking paradoxically, feeling vitally alive and involved, knowing intuitively, acting responsibly, and trusting lifes processes can be of enormous value for effective corporate crisis management. Understanding and using these quantum skills helps corporate leaders address issues more intentionally and creatively, and to give them a deeper sense of meaning and fulllment. Denition of a crisis The term corporate crisis management is commonly used because it can apply to a wide variety of circumstances that might disrupt the normal course of activities in an organization.

Once a corporate crisis has passed through the threshold of the initial pre- (preliminary) crisis, it is much more difcult to act effectively and thus the opportunity to more easily deal with it passes.

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 Toyotas pre-crisis stage began in the fall of 2007 when the rm recalled 55,000 automobiles for oor mats that ran the risk of sliding forward and trapping the gas pedal.

Some corporations prefer to replace the word crisis with the word issue. Instead of calling it crisis management, it might be referred to as issues management, or, in the case of more optimistic corporate leaders, opportunity management. However, the label is not the important thing. What matters is the overall process used to systematically and continuously audit the environment and operations in all corporate areas, and plans for how a crisis, however interpreted, can be appropriately managed. How a corporate crisis is dened depends on a number of variables, including the nature of the event; the importance of the issue to the stakeholders involved; the impact on other corporations and industries; how many and how quickly individuals inside and/or outside of a particular corporation need to be helped or informed; who needs interpretation of the events and how accessible those individuals are; how much interaction with the media is necessary; what the media choose to emphasize; how many people need emergency care; how much the corporation needs to assert control and demonstrate that it is capable of responding; and how quickly the corporation needs to respond. Anatomy of a crisis The real challenge for corporate leaders is not just to recognize a crisis, but also to recognize it in a timely fashion and with a will to address the issues represented. What are the early warning signs? What analyses serve to give early warning of change and possibility of a future corporate crisis? In all corporations, the process may move beyond the corporation to determine the interaction of external and internal environments and factors in the various operational arenas involved. A corporate crisis has been dened as a turning point for better or worse, a decisive moment, or crucial time. A corporate crisis can also be described as a situation that has reached a critical phase. A crisis is, therefore, an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending thereby involving corporate leaders with either a distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome or a distinct possibility of a highly desirable and extremely positive outcome. A crisis may not be necessarily bad but merely characterized by a certain degree of risk and uncertainty (Fink, 1986). Corporate crisis planning is the art of removing much of the risk in uncertainty, thereby allowing more control over the destiny of an organization by the meaningful management exerted by its corporate leadership. Crises can be of a short duration or a long duration, with minor or major impacts on a particular rm. A crisis in a corporation can therefore consist of as many as four different and distinct phases, although in some cases these phases can be so closely related that they fuse together in close proximity. These phases are: 1. pre- (preliminary) crisis stage; 2. acute crisis stage; 3. chronic crisis stage; and 4. crisis resolution stage. The operative word with regard to the anatomy of a crisis is, of course, for corporate leaders to recognize and begin to take control of the crisis situation. The corporate leadership has to recognize the pre-crisis in order to intervene proactively. Not all crises have all four of the

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crisis stages noted above, but each of the four is very common to any major crisis (see Figure 1).

Role of corporate leadership It is through the development and implementation of meaningful strategic corporate leadership that effective crisis management becomes a reality for the organization. In this regard, there is a profound difference between management and leadership, but corporate executives should recognize that both are important. To manage means to bring about, to accomplish, to have responsibility for, and to conduct to lead means to perceive, to inuence, and to guide in direction, course, action or opinion. The distinction is crucial when it comes to successful crisis management, particularly when crises occur across cultural boundaries as in the case of Toyota. Effective corporate leadership in dealing with crises requires individuals who do not depend on hierarchy and subordination. These contemporary corporate leaders help to create enhanced capacity in their people. To be successful in todays Black Swan or crisis-intensive world, corporate leaders must develop and nurture new skills at all levels of the organization that are congruent with the perspective of corporations as human-based systems that are fundamentally encased in highly changeable, interactive, systemic working conditions, rather than stable, machine-like operations. The basic principles of quantum mechanics and relationships provide meaningful insights into a world that is objective and subjective, logical and irrational, linear and nonlinear, orderly and chaotic and a world in which the process of observation somehow affects that which is observed.

Brief history of Toyota

The Toyota Motor Company was established in 1933 as a Japanese domestic truck manufacturer. In 1945, Toyota entered into automobile manufacturing. By the mid-1950s, Toyota had initiated its international marketing efforts based on a philosophy of localizing research, development, design and production of its vehicles to meet local government standards and local market needs and wants. By localizing production, Toyota was able to build long-term relationships with local suppliers, vendors and labor. By the end of the 1960s, Toyota was developing a worldwide presence with manufacturing facilities in Brazil, South Africa, Thailand, Malaysia, and the USA. Figure 1 Phases of a typical crisis cycle

Preliminary Crisis

Crisis Resolution

Acute Crisis

Chronic Crisis

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 The real challenge for corporate leaders is not just to recognize a crisis, but also to recognize it in a timely fashion and with a will to address the issues represented.

In 2001, Toyota adopted a Code of Conduct, known as the Toyota Way 2001, designed as a guideline for all employees (Liker, 2004). The Toyota Way statement incorporated 14 principles: 1. Base your management decisions on a long-term philosophy, even at the expense of short-term nancial goals. 2. Create continuous process ows to bring problems to the surface. 3. Use pull marketing distribution and promotion systems to avoid overproduction. 4. Level out the manufacturing workload. 5. Build a culture of stopping to x problems to get quality right the rst time. 6. Recognize standards as the foundation for continuous improvement and employee empowerment. 7. Use visual control so problems are not hidden. 8. Use only reliable, thoroughly tested technology that serves people and processes. 9. Develop corporate leaders who thoroughly understand the work, live the philosophy, and teach it to others. 10. Have exceptional people and teams who follow the companys philosophy. 11. Respect the extended network of partners and suppliers by challenging them and helping them improve. 12. Personally overview issues to thoroughly understand the situations. 13. Make decisions slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering all the options, and then implement decisions rapidly. 14. Become a learning organization through relentless reection and continuous improvement. Today, Toyota continues to be positioned as a world leader in the manufacturing of automobiles, measured both in unit sales and in net sales.

The crisis situation

Toyotas pre-crisis stage began in the fall of 2007 when the rm recalled 55,000 automobiles for oor mats that ran the risk of sliding forward and trapping the gas pedal. This oor mat and gas pedal issue became a public concern when in August 2009 a 2009 Lexus suddenly accelerated out of control, hit another car, fell down an embankment and caught re. By October 2009, the National Highway Trafc Safety Administration had initiated nine separate investigations into claims of acceleration by Toyota automobiles during the previous decade. Toyota announced that month that it was recalling the oor mats on 4.2 million vehicles, and company ofcials instructed dealers to remove the gas pedal and shorten it so it would not interfere with the oor mats. In January 2010, Toyota ofcials announced a second recall of an additional 2.3 million vehicles because of continued problems with the gas pedal. Toyota claimed the second

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recall was unrelated to the oor mat recall, but also announced that 1.7 million Toyota vehicles were affected by both recalls. This second recall accounted for over 50 percent of Toyotas US annual sales. That same month, Toyota ofcials announced that 2 million vehicles in Europe were recalled for the same problem (Brennan, 2010). As of January 2010, Toyota ofcials had recalled approximately 4.2 million vehicles for the pedal entrapment/oor mat problem, and an additional 2.3 million vehicles for the accelerator pedal problem. By January 2010, 34 deaths were alleged due to the pedal entrapment/oor mat problems over a ten-year period (Schepp, 2010).

Crisis stages and Toyota mistakes

Pre- (Preliminary) crisis stage As noted earlier, the pre-crisis stage is the warning stage, which may be extremely short or even immediate. Regarding Toyota, the pre-crisis stage should have become obvious to corporate leaders and appropriate corrective steps should have been taken as early as the fall of 2007. In some situations, a pre-crisis awareness may be oblique and much harder to recognize, and sometimes this stage is evident, but no action is taken and an acute crisis occurs. The latter was true for Toyota. Occasionally, no action is taken as a result of a pre-crisis a lack of response that may be caused by analysis paralysis or obsessive decision making within the corporate rm. The reason why pre-crises are so important to recognize and or acknowledge early is that they are much easier to manage at this stage. In the case of Toyota, it would have been much more logical to take care of the problem before it became acute, and before it erupted and caused additional complications. For Toyota, the crisis became an international consumer safety, nancial, and public relations disaster. The ideal crisis paradigm would appear similar to Figure 2 that reects movement directly to crisis resolution. Acute crisis stage Knowing how to recognize and manage the pre-crisis stage before it erupts into the far more serious acute crisis stage is often what spells the difference between a corporation that benets during a crisis, and corporate leadership that suffers needlessly. Toyota corporate leaders failed to understand the pre-crisis to be a predecessor to an acute crisis. In many respects, the acute crisis stage is the point of no return with regard to corporate crisis management. Once Toyotas warnings ended and the corporation passed from the pre-crisis to the acute crisis stage, corporate leadership could not recover the ground lost in the process. At this stage, the key decision is to control as much of the crisis as possible. If the acute crisis cannot be controlled, corporate leaders should determine if they can exert some degree of inuence over where, how and when the crisis erupts further. In the Toyota case, with extensive media awareness, corporate leaders failed to be transparent in the face of

Figure 2 Appearance of a preferred crisis cycle

Preliminary Crisis

Crisis Resolution

Acute Crisis

Chronic Crisis

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media scrutiny. In many respects, the Toyotas corporate leadership team failed to effectively deal with the acute crisis stage and dissipate the enormous negative results that this stage brought into focus. Corporate leaders often nd difculties in managing a crisis during the acute phase because of the avalanche-like speed and intensity that often accompany and characterize this stage. The speed is dependent primarily on the type of crisis, while the intensity is usually determined by the severity and/or value of the possible outcomes. Failing to gauge the potential speed and intensity while the crisis was still in the pre-crisis stage, the Toyota corporate leadership lost the opportunity to prepare for managing and controlling the crisis through the acute state. The acute crisis stage is often the shortest of the four phases in the crisis paradigm, but because of its intensity corporate leaders may perceive it as the longest and most difcult phase. Once Toyota entered the acute crisis stage, corporate leaders and other appropriate individuals needed to assess how much immediate danger existed and determine which stakeholders, if any, were most vulnerable to the crisis and its repercussions. In a given crisis, the danger may be limited to a specic area of the corporation or to a particular population within the corporation. In Toyotas case, the focus initially was on the decisions of the North American corporate leadership. Leaders need to think creatively and ensure that all of the appropriate stakeholders know what is happening and feel involved in the corporations response to the crisis. It is difcult to understand how Toyota, whose core principles incorporated a pre-crisis detection process, could not have involved the appropriate corporate leaders at this stage of the crisis. As previously noted, Toyota corporate leadership prided itself on the principles of basing management decisions on a long-term philosophy, even at the expense of short-term nancial goals; creating continuous process ows to bring problems to the surface; building a culture of stopping to x problems to get quality right the rst time; continuous improvement and employee empowerment; using only reliable, thoroughly tested technology; reviewing issues to thoroughly understand the situations; and being a learning organization through relentless reection and continuous improvement. Chronic crisis stage During the chronic crisis stage, the crisis should come under control as quickly as possible, but because of the lack of attention during the pre-crisis stage, and the consequent magnitude of the many negative events that occur during the acute crisis stage, the chronic crisis stage will often continue to be of long duration and require signicant resources, as reected in Toyotas efforts to reestablish its lost customer trust in both the corporation and in its vehicles. If there is to be a continuing government investigation, which is certainly a signicant possibility, further US congressional reviews, government audits, continuing media coverage, and a long period of interviews and explanations, is when such lingering issues settle in. This stage will also encompass a period of recovery, of self-analysis or self-doubt, and of healing for Toyota. It may also be a time of nancial upheaval, corporate leadership changes, and/or other operational issues. For Toyota, the chronic crisis stage will exist for some time into the future based on the inter-connectedness of the automobile parts and assembly processes used in several different Toyota models, and/or assembly processes located in different assembly plants. Skillful corporate leaders often use the chronic crisis state wisely as an opportunity for further corporate crisis management scenario planning analyzing what went right, or what went wrong, and why the crisis event occurred and taking appropriate actions. With good crisis management skills, this period may also become a time for congratulations and for plaudits and testimonials of how the crisis was successfully handled. What went wrong at Toyota was not a problem of processes involving employees and middle management, but rather a problem of senior leadership in North American and Japan failing to acknowledge the issues and respond in a transparent, timely and effective way to a mechanical problem that evolved into a product safety and public relations disaster. In achieving greatness, becoming the largest automobile manufacturer in the world, Toyota corporate leaders may have lost their sense of operational

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 Corporate leaders often nd difculties in managing a crisis during the acute phase because of the avalanche-like speed and intensity that often accompany and characterize this stage.

balance and fell victim to the arrogance of their success and power. While corporate humility has perhaps been an essential element of Toyotas learning and improvement processes, arrogance may have became the assassin of Toyotas recognized success. Toyota has joined the ranks of a number of other corporations facing unpredictable corporate crises in the rst decade of the twenty-rst century corporations whose leaders engaged in self-righteous denial of the potential risks and took half hearted measures to resolve the challenges facing their organizations. The Toyota corporate leadership merely wished the risk to go away. When Toyota leaders became xated on their own success and the success of their company, a healthy paranoia was lost. Crisis resolution stage This is the fourth and nal stage that should be the corporate crisis managers goal during the preceding three phases. When the pre-crisis stage is spotted, the leaders objective as an effective crisis manager must be to seize control swiftly and calculate the most expedient route to achieving a resolution of the crisis. The corporate leaders goal is to focus the turning point into an opportunity, if at all possible. However, if the pre-crisis opportunity slips by unchecked, as was true at Toyota, the actions and decisions during the acute and chronic crisis stages should be guided by the primary goal of: What can be done by corporate leaders to speed up a response to resolve this crisis as quickly as possible? In reality, as might already have been discovered in any given corporation, the light of resolution at the end of the tunnel may very well be the pre-crisis light of an oncoming crisis. Because crises are not tiered on a convenient plateau system, crisis cycles often make it difcult to see where and when a corporate crisis ends and another begins, or at what stage the corporation is in when encountering multiple crises simultaneously (see Figure 3). This is especially true in situations where the ripple-effect complications of one crisis set off one or more other crises. The Toyota leadership has indicated that failure to fully recognize, admit to, and correct the critical safety problems it was facing was the wrong approach. These corporate leaders failed to face the public for several weeks and appeared less than forthcoming about critical safety issues, risking the trust of its dealers and customers worldwide. However, in March 2010, nearly three years after the beginning of the Pre-crisis stage, corporate leaders took the rst public steps to address the crisis by testifying before the US Congress, specically referring to the causes of the recall and that Toyota corporate leaders were assuring the buying public that Toyota had realigned its priorities on: rst, safety; second, quality; and, third, volume priorities aligned with the companys historical fourteen principles of management. Today, Toyota leaders have acknowledged full responsibility for realigning the corporation to address the crisis. However, a major question remains: Has this crisis permanently marred a brand that had until recently been synonymous with quality and reliability? Crisis planning and relationships It would be a useless investment of time and energy for corporate leaders to inventory all of the Black Swans, that is, all of the crises their corporations potentially may face in the future. The list may well be innite; but what is eminently more sensible, and much more manageable, is for corporate leaders to identify crisis planning processes necessary for assessing and

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Figure 3 How crisis cycles may appear

Preliminary Crisis Acute Crisis Chronic Crisis Crisis Resolution

Crisis Resolution Preliminary Crisis Acute Crisis Chronic Crisis

Acute Crisis Chronic Crisis Crisis Resolution Preliminary Crisis

Chronic Crisis Crisis Resolution Preliminary Crisis Acute Crisis

dealing with future crises. At the heart of this exercise would be appropriate information systems, planning procedures, and decision-making techniques. At the center of any meaningful system for problem-recognition and aligned decision-making lies a soundly based information system. An essential element of this system would be the capabilities to describe the corporations current situation and to make solid projections about its future. A continuous corporate-oriented environmental scan, which is a product of the collection of relevant data on economic, social, government, technological, competitive and other developments over a period of time, would connect the corporation with the larger world, and would identify trends and forecasts for possible impact on the corporation and its operations. The irony of the crisis planning process is that planning has often been seen as less important in times of calm; but it is virtually impossible in times of crisis as the corporate constituencies may often move to protect their own special interests. Comprehensive planning must become an integral part of a corporations mode of operation in good times and bad. The uncertainties of the future call for a more inclusive process in decision-making, based on concern about the future success of corporations, and a continued afrmation of the importance of their positions in the domestic and international marketplaces. It also requires involvement by all affected stakeholders in the interactive and decision-making processes, and a true sense that decisions are made openly and that a realistic climate of fairness exists. Such is the challenge that now faces Toyota for the future.

Summary and conclusions

Ralph Waldo Emerson counseled, Do not go where the path may lead; go instead where there is no path and leave a trail. Crisis management in an organization can often be a positive new trail for a corporation if responsible leaders will reect true leadership skills, seize the opportunities available to make a difference in the corporation and the lives of the

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stakeholders they are called upon to serve, and throughout this exciting journey remember that in the arena of crisis management, of successful managerial corporate leadership, corporate leaders can be a very great many. Whether or not Toyota corporate leaders have successfully forged a new trail by addressing the crisis will not be known for some time. But what was obvious was that crisis management did not seem to be in the Toyotas leadership thinking. Was Toyotas response atypical or would it be typical for any corporate leadership team? Unfortunately, such corporate responses as those of Toyota may be too familiar. A slow initial pre-crisis response, minimizing the acute crisis through foot-dragging on the product recall, poor communication with the public about the problem in the chronic crisis stage, and too little compassion and concern for consumers adversely affected by the product during the crisis resolution may too often be typical. Today, Toyota is working on processes to engage the voices of stakeholders around the world to inform corporate leaders in a timely manner of potential problems. Sales regions have been given more local authority. Finally, corporate leadership has created an Automotive Center of Quality Excellence and created a new corporate position for product safety. None of these corporate decisions will recover the over $2-billion the recall cost Toyota in direct costs for repairs and upgrades to existing models, as well as, litigation costs. But hopefully, in the long run these decisions may help to restore Toyotas reputation and ensure a healthier nancial future.

Keywords: Automotive industry, Crisis management, Crisis resolution, Leadership, Strategy

References
Brennan, R. (2010), Toyota announces January 2010 recall for 2.3 million vehicles to x sticky accelerator pedal, 21 January, available at: http://autos.aol.com (accessed 13 March 2010). Fink, S. (1986), Corporate Crisis, Corporate Leaders: Planning for the Inevitable, American Corporate Leaders Association, New York, NY. Friedman, T. (2006), The World Is Flat, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, NY. Friedman, T. (2008), Hot, Flat and Crowded, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, NY. Goleman, D. (2002), Primal Corporate Leadership: Learning to Lead with Emotional Intelligence, Harvard University Press, Boston, MA. Liker, J. (2004), The Toyota Way: 14 Management Principles from the Worlds Greatest Manufacturer, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. Pink, D. (2005), A Whole New Mind, Riverhead Books, New York, NY. Ramo, J. (2009), The Age of the Unthinkable, Little Brown and Company, New York, NY. Schepp, D. (2010), As death tolls mount, Toyota vows to win back customers, 16 February, available at: www.dailynance.com (accessed 15 March 2010). Taleb, N. (2007), The Black Swan, Random House, New York, NY.

About the authors

Victor L. Heller is the Director Executive Education and an Associate Professor of Marketing at the University of Texas at San Antonio. He is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: victor.heller@utsa.edu John R. Darling is a Distinguished Visiting Professor of Management, The University of Texas at San Antonio; and concurrently a Distinguished Visiting Professor International Business, Aalto University, School of Business, Helsinki, Finland.

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