IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT VIRGINIA

Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff, Case No. 10CV1427 File Stamped - 12/21/10 v.

HSBC Mortgage Corporation (USA), Defendant,

Debra Bassett, Defendant,

Howard N. Bierman, Defendant,

Jared Slater, Defendant

COMPLAINT

AND

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Jeffrey Brown, Pro se, [for the present time] for a complaint against the Defendants, and states as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. This court has subject matter jurisdiction under the laws of the United States of America, Article III 2, U.S. Constitution; 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985 and 1986 (failure to prevent) as conferred by the U.S. Constitution 28 USC 1331 and 1343and 2254 under the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 14thAmendments. This action involves constitutional charges, grounds, questions, and jurisdiction is supplemented by 28 USC 1367(a) and challenges the constitutional violations of state and federal law, procedure and practice by state and federal officials and officers of the court. Plaintiff also brings this main action through civil RICO statute.

2. This action is brought within the time constraints of 42 USC 1983 and particularly under the continuing organizational complicity and fraud scope, central to this complaint.

VENUE

3. Venue is proper because individual parties are (or were at the time) residents and citizens of the State of Virginia and the United States.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff, Plaintiff Jeffrey Brown, is a citizen of the United States and resident of Fairfax County, Virginia.

5. Defendants:

a. HSBC Mortgage Corporation (USA),

b. Debra Bassett,

c. Howard N. Bierman, d. Jared Slater

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS

6 Plaintiff has a degree in dentistry (DDS), an MBA, and formerly a real estate sales licensewith

extensive and advanced training in the field of computers, document recording, and data entry. Plaintiff

had a well established business as a dentist with over 20 years of success in that field where extensive

knowledge in managing files and records were a must. The training of the MBA made it possible for

Plaintiff to easily understand and research both Virginia and Federal codes/statutes and understand

their meaning readily.

7. The ability to perform exemplary research has made it possible for Plaintiff to

come forward quite readily as a Pro Se litigator. Plaintiff has always believed in an honorable existence

and in providing support for honorable causes. In all dealings Plaintiff has stood for the side of honor

and righteousness with unfailing dedication to the truth.

BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

8. In late 2009, Plaintiff and his wife were performing a routine audit of their various personal documents and discovered that they had never received a complete alleged loan package after closing with HSBC Mortgage Corporation, USA, in 2008. More specifically, a copy of the original loan application, copy of the note itself, rescission documents, and a complete Deed of Trust were either lacking or missing. In fact, all that Plaintiff received at the so-called closing table was a six page copy of the alleged Note and a five page copy of the Deed of Trust.

9. In response to Plaintiff's request for ALL documents related to the alleged loan package, Plaintiff received a very incomplete response from HSBC Mortgage Corporation, USA (herein called HSBC) only receiving a full sized copy of the alleged adjustable rate note in violation of USC Title 18 > Part I> Chapter 25, 472, 473, 474,

474A, and 475. Additionally, Plaintiff noticed that this alleged 'note' had an additional page with an inverted notary impression and it appeared that something had been omitted from this copy.(See Exhibit A- Loan Documents received from HSBC) The received copy of the Deed of Trust (at the closing table) was only five pages long (see Exhibit B)In addition, Plaintiff noticed that none of the loan application, rescission documents, nor the Home Equity Brochure were included, thus making Plaintiff even more concerned and suspicious. Plaintiff then called Premier Relationship Manager, Soraya Teymourian, because of the improper response received in Exhibit A. In response to phone call with Ms. Teymourian, Plaintiff wrote a letter see Exhibit C - requesting the opportunity to view the ORIGINAL complete set of alleged loan documents.

10. On January 29, 2010, Plaintiff went to Fairfax County Land Records to obtain a true and certified copy of the Deed of Trust See Exhibit D- a document which is 19 pages long which in no way resembles Exhibit B which was received at closing. 11. On Feb 4, 2010, Plaintiff received phone call see Affidavit Exhibit E. On February 17, 2010, Plaintiff made the realization that there was no longer an alleged Note, and hence there could no longer be a Debt or Obligation. By their own admission, and on several occasions, HSBC no longer held an alleged Note or even a proper Deed of Trust.

12. On Feb 17, Plaintiff NOTICED HSBC Mortgage Corporation, USA, Debra Bassett (Trustee), MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration System), and various government agencies see Exhibit Fwith a Qualified Written Request (QWR) as per TILA and RESPA (and note that within Exhibit F are various references to sub-exhibits used on

that day). Plaintiff did the Noticing out of the belief that a fraud was indeed committed that there was most likely no longer a note, and thus there was no longer an obligation to continue payments toward this alleged Note. This entire NOTICE package was recorded in the public record of Jefferson County, WV.

13. On February 24, 2010,in response to RESPA/TILA QWR, Plaintiff received a letter from HSBC Mortgage Corporation, USA, with unsubstantiated claims see Exhibit G. HSBC claimed that Plaintiff had received the following: a copy of the Mortgage Note, Deed of Trust, Truth in Lending Statement, HUD-1 Statement, and funding details from the loan file. Plaintiff in truth received an edited version of the alleged Note, and an incomplete version of the Deed of Trust at closing. .Defendant HSBC violated Section 6 of RESPA by their failure to acknowledge Plaintiff's request for information, and ALSO by failure to resolve the issues within 60 business days.

14.Additionally, Plaintiff states that neither Debra Bassett, Trustee, nor HSBC made any attempt to respond to Plaintiff's QWR. Hence, both of these Defendants are in direct violation of Section 6 of RESPA.

15. Because of Defendants' Non Response to RESPA/TILA request, Plaintiff provided Defendants HSBC and Bassett with Notice of Revocation of Power of Attorney and Notice of Appointment of Successor Trustee see Exhibit H - also on public record with Jefferson County, WV.

16.Plaintiff states that Defendants HSBC and Bassett were given another opportunity to cure the defects in their lack of response or non-responses see Exhibit I This time

Plaintiff used a Notary to Present the Notices in an effort to not be ignored by Defendants HSBC and Bassett.

17.On or after May 20, 2010, Plaintiff received correspondence from HSBC -see Exhibit J- a further example of HSBC's failure to properly respond and attempt to 'steamroll' over Plaintiff without due cause. 18. On May 20, 2010, Plaintiff posted multiple Notices in the Fairfax Times see Exhibit K . In response to correspondence from HSBC dated June 03, 2010 (see Exhibit L), Plaintiff sent another request for debt validation this time to HSBC Officer and Director, Stephen Tich, and requested once again for someone to verify the alleged debt. See Exhibit M. 19.In response to Exhibit M, once again Defendants sent a full sized copy of the alleged Note (Exhibit N), violating USC Title 18 > Part I> Chapter 25, 472, 473, 474, 474A, and 475. Additionally, by THEIR OWN ADMISSION in this correspondence dated June 25, 2010, they admit that Plaintiff saw the original signed loan documents on February 17 of 2010. Plaintiff accepts their admission that they no longer have proper documentation for the alleged loan and thus cannot enforce any Loan/Note/obligation because they cannot produce such documents to verify the alleged note.

20. On June 12, 2010, Plaintiff moved the 'good faith' payments that would have been sent to HSBC to an account for holding at Bank of America. See Exhibit O. Plaintiff

took this action out of fear that HSBC would attempt to steal the funds from Plaintiff's account at HSBC without cause.

21.After MANY attempts to validate any debt with HSBC, Plaintiff realized that no such debt actually existed and as a courtesy sent Notice to Stephen Tich, Officer and Director of HSBC - see Exhibit P. 22. On August 25, Plaintiff received correspondence -see Exhibit Q.

23.On or after September 08, 2010, Plaintiff received correspondence from the Bierman law firm-see Exhibit R. (Let it be known that Howard Bierman also appears to be the owner of Equity Trustees) As evidenced by already received correspondence, several times over, HSBC ONLY has an incomplete alleged copy of the Note in their possession, therefore the claim that the Bierman law firm has referenced a Deed of Trust, cannot be true. Additionally, the Bierman group states that the Secured Party is HSBC. If indeed they had seen the true Deed of Trust, as the Plaintiff has put into Exhibit D - then they would clearly have seen that MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems) is the beneficiary according to the Deed. Hence, this initial statement to Plaintiff is wrought with fraud, ab initio. In addition, the Bierman/Equity Trustee firm confirms in Exhibit Rthat the alleged Note cannot be produced. Additionally, Defendants Bierman and Slater (the responsible party for Equity Trustees, according to Plaintiff's call in to Equity Trustees of Arlington, Virginia) have referenced Section 55-59.1 (B) of the Code of Virginia which they themselves are in direct violation of. At the top of the Bierman law firm correspondence, it states they are a debt collector while at the bottom of the correspondence they declare themselves to be Attorneys for the Secured Party. Who

are these parties claiming to be debt collectors, trustees, and attorneys all at the same time? And since they do not know who the secured party is, they have no standing to attempt any foreclosure against Plaintiff.

24. Pursuant to being threatened with an attempted fraudulent foreclosure sale by either the Bierman firm or Equity Trustees, Plaintiff felt it necessary to check the Land Records for Fairfax County. As suspected, there was no transfer of trustee status as of 10/12/2010, which was 2 days prior to the attempted sale of Plaintiff's property. See Exhibit S- a certified copy of Land Records documents showing NO ACTIVITY for the past two years. This fraudulent activity is in direct violation of Virginia code 55-59.1 (Notices required). In fact, according to Exhibit T, Defendants did not record their fraudulent appointment (which they had conveniently backdated) of substitute trustee until 10/18/2010, nor did they bother to notify the Plaintiff of their fraudulent substitution in violation of VA Code 26-50, and 8.01-428(A)(i).

25.Plaintiff has done further research and has determined that the aforementioned fraud committed by Bierman and/or Equity Trustees is NOT a singular incident. See Exhibit U. In fact, because of the deceptive practices activity of the Bierman law firm, the Court of Appeals in Maryland has changed how foreclosure cases will be handled see Exhibit V. Plaintiff believes the Bierman/Equity Trustees firms to be part of the foreclosure mill industry which has done so much damage to so many peoples' lives. Plaintiff appears to be only one of several THOUSAND people who deserve relief from the fraud committed by the Bierman firm and Equity Trustees.

26. In further support of the fraud allegations, Plaintiff has done extensive research. Plaintiff believes that HSBC neverloaned any money at all. In fact it is believed they credited/deposited the promissory note signed by Plaintiff, used that deposit to pay the seller, and continued to use Plaintiff's good name and credit for their own profit and criminal enterprise. Additionally, research by Plaintiff indicates that the original loan application now has a CUSIP number attached to it. Plaintiff believes that if indeed HSBC took the approach of obtaining a CUSIP number for the loan application, they then illegally converted the application to an instrument to purchase a bond and used that bond to obtain a loan from the government to pass through money to buy real property. If such is the case, they can indeed make the case that there is a loan, but Plaintiff's name is on it and that loan is with the government, not HSBC. Again, if true, HSBC only committed a fraudulent conversion of an application to an instrument, and any foreclosure action would be having the government force the bank to pay them back. It would be very interesting to actually see the ORIGINAL documents and how they have been manipulated AFTER signatures were put on to complete them. Such manipulation/alteration of security instruments and using such securities for their own gain is considered to be bank fraud 18 USC 1343 -'Fraud by wire, radio, or TV', 18 USC 1344 Bank fraud -'whoever knowingly executes a scheme to defraud a financial institution', and 18 USC 1349 'Attempt and conspiracy'.

CONCLUSION

27.Plaintiff strongly believes that HSBC, et al., have shown indications of criminal activity and with no evidence to the contrary upon multiple attempts to acquire documents and information to verify the alleged debt, that there is indeed reason to believe there is no obligation by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff felt that any continued involvement with HSBC, et al, might be construed as a violation of US Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 1, 4 , therefore, Plaintiff has discontinued any financial connection to the alleged loan. Plaintiff to this day has set alleged loan payments aside in a separate account awaiting finalization of this action.

28. Plaintiff believes that Defendants have CLEARLY committed fraud by making a 1) False representation of 2) a material fact which was made 3) knowingly with 4) an intent to mislead 5) and reliance by the party misled and 6) resulting damage to the party misled (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co v. Remley, 270 Va 209,218 618 S.E.2d 316, 321 (2005). Plaintiff believes that Defendants have clearly used their superior knowledge of the Federal Reserve Banking System Rules and legal system to commit the frauds they have been accused of.

29. Plaintiff's belief that fraud has been perpetrated upon Plaintiff by Defendants is further supported by Exhibit W - a certified copy of the Walker Todd expert testimony affidavit. This affidavit leads one to believe that out of pure ignorance and having been deceived into believing that payments were owed, the plaintiff began to render monthly installments to their mortgage servicer in payment of a fictitious and imaginary loan. Plaintiff also believes based on this (and other) testimony that the alleged Note, Application, etc. were all fraudulently monetized without the knowledge of the Plaintiff.

Because of the fraudulent nature of this action, Plaintiff is led to believe that he is still the original and only holder in due course. Absent any proof or presentment of an ORIGINAL WET INK SIGNATURE PROMISSORY NOTE OR LOAN CONTRACT, Defendants have no right to attempt to foreclose upon the Title to the plaintiff's real property, despite the fact that the plaintiff is a private Banker and the Holder in Due Course.

30. As a resident of the State of Virginia, Plaintiff believes that Defendants are in direct violation of the following Virginia codes: 8.5A-109 , 13.1-502, 13.1-503, 55-59.1(B), 26-50, 8.01-428(A)(i), 8.01-32, 8.3A-203, 8.01-28, 6.2-406, 18.2-246.3 (A) and (B), and 18.2-216. See the following References section for these Virginia codes.

31. By Virginia Code 8.1A-103, Plaintiff now brings forward various UCC violations pertaining to mail fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, and RICO. In regard to RICO, Defendants are in direct violation of Section 1962(c) prohibiting a pattern of racketeering activity and since Plaintiff was indeed injured, Plaintiff has the right to treble damages and attorney fees under section 1964(c). Defendants are in violation of RICO statutes evidenced by perpetrating a continuity of schemes of fraud against the Plaintiff and MANY others as evidenced by Exhibit U and US Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, Adv.Pro.No. 08-01789 SIPA v. Madoff. The Defendants scheme to defraud violates mail and wire fraud statutes (18 USC Sections 1341 and 1343) by mailing incomplete copies of loan documents and making fraudulent statements as to who the Trustee is or was by making false reference to the Deed of Trust which they apparently have never seen. In addition, the Hobbs Act applies wherein Defendants are

using 'color of official right' to attempt to steal Plaintiff's property, and under 'color of law' conspire to extort property from Plaintiff knowing full well that there is no Note, and thus no obligation. Plaintiff has indeed lost substantial amounts of money in defense of Plaintiff's property while Defendants continue their assault and attempt to extort what is not theirs to begin with.

32. By their own admission, Defendants no longer have (or may have never had) a complete set of alleged loan documents. See Exhibit R. Also, by their own admission, (see Exhibit A) HSBC admits that they only have a copy of the alleged note and nothing else in their own document package (And for the record, this copy is the one which includes an additional page beyond what the Plaintiff was given originally a copy which has apparently been altered, leading Plaintiff to believe that any allonges have been removed prior to this copy being made). When Plaintiff requested ALL original loan related documents, what should have been received at a minimum would have been the following: 1) The original loan application with assigned CUSIP number 2) The alleged Note 3) The Deed of Trust 4) Rescission Documents (which were never received - in violation of 15 USC 1602(u) and Reg Z226.23n48) 5) The required Home Equity Brochure (also never received, thus violating 15 USC 1637A(e)), or similar and 6) The GAAP bookkeeping entries showing transfer of funds (i.e. show the true creditor per 15 USC 1602(f) and 15 USC 1638(a)(1).

33. The failure by HSBC to honor this request for information is in direct of violation of Section 2605(e)(2)(C) of RESPA (see REFERENCES). During the time of the QWR,

Plaintiff remained in honor by continuing to make payments toward the alleged loan, thus giving HSBC ample time to respond and correct any errors.

34.Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, before a Commercial Bank or Loan Company can declare a breach, they must first make a presentment of the Promissory Note (UCC 3-501) and the presentment must be dishonored (UCC3-502). Then the Bank or Loan Company must mail a Notice of Dishonor (UCC3-503), however, if the maker of the Promissory Note or Instrument claims to be the Holder in Due Course the debt is discharged without recourse pursuant to section (UCC3-601). Tender of payments is referred to under section (UCC3-603) and any and all alterations to the instrument void the instrument and the obligation is discharged by cancellation or renunciation under section (UCC3-604).

35. Pursuant to 15 USC > Chapter 41 >Subchapter I > Part B > 1635 (see REFERENCES), Plaintiff gave multiple Notice of Rescission efforts during the time payments were made to HSBC toward the alleged loan. Because the alleged creditor, HSBC, did not respond within the required 20 days, HSBC now owes back to Plaintiff ALL monies paid to date and return of property to Plaintiff. Because HSBC never provided Plaintiff with Rescission documents, pursuant to 1635f, Plaintiff is within proper time frame to demand enforcement of rescission.

36. Plaintiff believes it to be VERY clear that multiple portions of the alleged loan documents were actually securitized. Securitization is defined as turning any document into a financial transaction. Doing so without the document drafter's consent is considered forgery, altering, obliterating and falsification of a document. It may also be

considered falsifying evidence. This becomes Uttering Counterfeit Obligations when transmitted, transferred, securitized or otherwise invested and is in violation of USC TITLE 18 472;473;474. As the Plaintiff is the creator of ANY of the alleged loan documents, the Plaintiff, not the Bank, nor the servicers should be making the huge profits attested to by such experts as Neil Garfield in his well known affidavit regarding banking activities. In a public document, see Exhibit X, Westpac openly ADMITS that they have securitized residential mortgages and offer these Special Investment Vehicles to investors! Their correspondence openly and directly links this Australian banker to JP Morgan of New York. Plaintiff wonders when the US banks will openly admit they have securitized loan documents and will try to just as eloquently explain to the uneducated masses that their actions are legal and acceptable means of doing business? Will they admit the loans have been long since paid off and that the customers' signatures and good credit are being used illegally and criminally? Highly unlikely. At this point in time, Plaintiff will continue research into these and other matters, including an understanding of how the banks violate IRS regulations as they steal from the people.

37. Plaintiff further believes that Defendants commission of fraud should be investigated by proper authorities with respect to violation of 15 USC>Chapter 2B>78ff (See REFERENCES). This code specifically states the penalties for false and misleading statements along with the failure to file information accordingly. Penalties for Defendants range from $5,000,000 per individual defendant to $25,000,000 for HSBC Mortgage Corporation, along with imprisonment for all involved for defrauding Plaintiff and attempting to steal Plaintiff's house which has long since been paid for and now they

continue to use Plaintiff's good name and credit to continue making profits for their criminal enterprises.

REFERENCES Under Virginia code 8.5A-109. Fraud and forgery. (a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit, but a required document is forged or materially fraudulent, or honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant: (1) the issuer shall honor the presentation, if honor is demanded by (i) a nominated person who has given value in good faith and without notice of forgery or material fraud, (ii) a confirmer who has honored its confirmation in good faith, (iii) a holder in due course of a draft drawn under the letter of credit which was taken after acceptance by the issuer or nominated person, or (iv) an assignee of the issuer's or nominated person's deferred obligation that was taken for value and without notice of forgery or material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the issuer or nominated person; and (2) the issuer, acting in good faith, may honor or dishonor the presentation in any other case. (b) If an applicant claims that a required document is forged or materially fraudulent or that honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant, a court of competent jurisdiction may temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer from honoring a presentation or grant similar relief against the issuer or other persons only if the court finds that: (1) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable to an accepted draft or deferred obligation incurred by the issuer; (2) a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may be adversely affected is adequately protected against loss that it may suffer because the relief is granted; (3) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief under the law of this Commonwealth have been met; and (4) on the basis of the information submitted to the court, the applicant is more likely than not to succeed under its claim of forgery or material fraud and the person demanding honor does not qualify for protection under subsection (a) (1). 13.1-502. Unlawful offers and sales.

It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities, directly or indirectly,

(1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or

(2) To obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(3) To engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 13.1-503. Unlawful advice. A. It shall be unlawful for any person who receives directly or indirectly any consideration from another person primarily for advising such other person as to the value of securities or their purchase or sale, whether through the issuance of analyses or reports or otherwise, 1. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud such other person, 2. To engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon such other person, 3. Acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the account of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this subdivision shall not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker-dealer if such broker-dealer is not acting as an investment advisor in relation to such transaction, or 4. To engage in dishonest or unethical practices as the Commission may define by rule. B. In the solicitation of advisory clients, it shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact, or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not

misleading. C. Except as may be permitted by rule or order of the Commission, it shall be unlawful for any investment advisor to enter into, extend, or renew any investment advisory contract unless it provides in writing: 1. That the investment advisor shall not be compensated on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any portion of the funds of the client; 2. That no assignment of the contract may be made by the investment advisor without the consent of the other party to the contract; and 3. That the investment advisor, if a partnership, shall notify the other party to the contract of any change in the membership of the partnership within a reasonable time after the change. D. Subdivision 1 of subsection C of this section shall not prohibit an investment advisory contract which provides for compensation based upon the total value of a fund averaged over a definite period, or as of definite dates or taken as of a definite date. E. "Assignment" as used in subdivision 2 of subsection C of this section includes any direct or indirect transfer or hypothecation of an investment advisory contract by the assignor or of a controlling block of the assignor's outstanding voting securities by a security holder of the assignor. If the investment advisory is a partnership, no assignment of an investment advisory contract is considered to result from the death of withdrawal of a minority of the members of the investment advisor having only a minority interest in the business of the investment advisor, or from the admission to the investment advisor of one or more members who, after admission, will be only a minority of the members and will have only a minority interest in the business. F. The Commission may by rule or order adopt exemptions from subdivision 3 of subsection A and subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of subsection C of this section where such exemptions are consistent with the public interest and within the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of this chapter.

55-59.1. Notices required before sale by trustee to owners, lienors, etc.; if note lost. A. In addition to the advertisement required by 55-59.2 the trustee or the party secured shall give written notice of the time, date and place of any proposed sale in execution of a deed of trust, which notice shall include either (i) the instrument number or deed book

and page numbers of the instrument of appointment filed pursuant to 55-59, or (ii) said notice shall include a copy of the executed and notarized appointment of substitute trustee by personal delivery or by mail to (i) the present owner of the property to be sold at his last known address as such owner and address appear in the records of the party secured, (ii) any subordinate lienholder who holds a note against the property secured by a deed of trust recorded at least 30 days prior to the proposed sale and whose address is recorded with the deed of trust, (iii) any assignee of such a note secured by a deed of trust provided the assignment and address of assignee are likewise recorded at least 30 days prior to the proposed sale, (iv) any condominium unit owners' association which has filed a lien pursuant to 55-79.84, (v) any property owners' association which has filed a lien pursuant to 55-516, and (vi) any proprietary lessees' association which has filed a lien pursuant to 55-472. Written notice shall be given pursuant to clauses (iv), (v) and (vi), only if the lien is recorded at least 30 days prior to the proposed sale. Mailing of a copy of the advertisement or a notice containing the same information to the owner by certified or registered mail no less than 14 days prior to such sale and to lienholders, the property owners' association or proprietary lessees' association, their assigns and the condominium unit owners' association, at the address noted in the memorandum of lien, by ordinary mail no less than 14 days prior to such sale shall be a sufficient compliance with the requirement of notice. The written notice of proposed sale when given as provided herein shall be deemed an effective exercise of any right of acceleration contained in such deed of trust or otherwise possessed by the party secured relative to the indebtedness secured. The inadvertent failure to give notice as required by this subsection shall not impose liability on either the trustee or the secured party.

B. If a note or other evidence of indebtedness secured by a deed of trust is lost or for any reason cannot be produced and the beneficiary submits to the trustee an affidavit to that effect, the trustee may nonetheless proceed to sale, provided the beneficiary has given written notice to the person required to pay the instrument that the instrument is unavailable and a request for sale will be made of the trustee upon expiration of 14 days from the date of mailing of the notice. The notice shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the last known address of the person required to pay the instrument as reflected in the records of the beneficiary and shall include the name and mailing address of the trustee. The notice shall further advise the person required to pay the instrument that if he believes he may be subject to a claim by a person other than the beneficiary to enforce the instrument, he may petition the circuit court of the county or city where the property or some part thereof lies for an order requiring the beneficiary to provide adequate protection against any such claim. If deemed appropriate by the court, the court may condition the sale on a finding that the person required to pay the instrument is adequately protected against loss that might occur by reason of a claim by another person to enforce the instrument. Adequate protection may be provided by any reasonable means. If the trustee proceeds to sale, the fact that the instrument is lost or cannot be produced shall not affect the authority of the trustee to sell or the validity of the sale.

C. Failure to comply with the requirements of notice contained in this section shall not affect the validity of the sale, and a purchaser for value at such sale shall be under no duty to ascertain whether such notice was validly given.

D. In the event of postponement of sale, which may be done in the discretion of the trustee, no new or additional notice need be given pursuant to this section. 8.01-428. Setting aside default judgments; clerical mistakes; independent actions to relieve party from judgment or proceedings; grounds and time limitations.

A. Default judgments and decrees pro confesso; summary procedure. - Upon motion of the plaintiff or judgment debtor and after reasonable notice to the opposite party, his attorney of record or other agent, the court may set aside a judgment by default or a decree pro confesso upon the following grounds: (i) fraud on the court, (ii) a void judgment, (iii) on proof of an accord and satisfaction, or (iv) on proof that the defendant was, at the time of service of process or entry of judgment, a person in the military service of the United States for purposes of 50 U.S.C. app. 502. Such motion on the ground of fraud on the court shall be made within two years from the date of the judgment or decree.

B. Clerical mistakes. - Clerical mistakes in all judgments or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or from an inadvertent omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or upon the motion of any party and after such notice, as the court may order. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending such mistakes may be corrected with leave of the appellate court.

C. Failure to notify party or counsel of final order. - If counsel, or a party not represented by counsel, who is not in default in a circuit court is not notified by any means of the

entry of a final order and the circuit court is satisfied that such lack of notice (i) did not result from a failure to exercise due diligence on the part of that party and (ii) denied that party an opportunity to pursue post-trial relief in the circuit court or to file an appeal therefrom, the circuit court may, within 60 days of the entry of such order, modify, vacate, or suspend the order or grant the party leave to appeal. Where the circuit court grants the party leave to appeal, the computation of time for noting and perfecting an appeal shall run from the entry of such order, and such order shall have no other effect.

D. Other judgments or proceedings. - This section does not limit the power of the court to entertain at any time an independent action to relieve a party from any judgment or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not served with process as provided in 8.01-322, or to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.

E. Nothing in this section shall constitute grounds to set aside an otherwise valid default judgment against a defendant who was not, at the time of service of process or entry of judgment, a servicemember for purposes of 50 U.S.C. app. 502.

8.01-32. Action on lost evidences of debt. A. A civil action may be maintained on any past-due lost bond, note, contract, open account agreement, or other written evidence of debt, provided the plaintiff verifies under oath either in open court or by affidavit that said bond, note, contract, open account agreement, or other written evidence of debt has been lost or destroyed. B. Where a true and accurate copy of the written evidence of debt exists, which copy was produced in the normal course of business, the court shall accept such copy into evidence and shall give effect to its terms as if the original had been placed into evidence. C. In the event of any inconsistency between this section and any applicable provisions of 8.3A-309, the provisions of that section shall control.

 8.3A-203. Transfer of instrument; rights acquired by transfer. (a) An instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument. (b) Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument, including any right as a holder in due course, but the transferee cannot acquire rights of a holder in due course by a transfer, directly or indirectly, from a holder in due course if the transferee engaged in fraud or illegality affecting the instrument. (c) Unless otherwise agreed, if an instrument is transferred for value and the transferee does not become a holder because of lack of endorsement by the transferor, the transferee has a specifically enforceable right to the unqualified endorsement of the transferor, but negotiation of the instrument does not occur until the endorsement is made. (d) If a transferor purports to transfer less than the entire instrument, negotiation of the instrument does not occur. The transferee obtains no rights under this title and has only the rights of a partial assignee.

8.01-28. When judgment to be given in action upon contract or note unless defendant appears and denies claim under oath.

In any action at law on a note or contract, express or implied, for the payment of money, or unlawful detainer pursuant to 55-225 or 55-248.31 for the payment of money or possession of the premises, or both, if (i) the plaintiff files with his motion for judgment or civil warrant an affidavit made by himself or his agent, stating therein to the best of the affiant's belief the amount of the plaintiff's claim, that such amount is justly due, and the time from which plaintiff claims interest, and (ii) a copy of the affidavit together with a copy of any account filed with the motion for judgment or warrant and, in actions pursuant to 55-225 or 55-248.31, proof of required notices is served on the

defendant as provided in 8.01-296 at the time a copy of the motion for judgment or warrant is so served, the plaintiff shall be entitled to a judgment on the affidavit and statement of account without further evidence unless the defendant either appears and pleads under oath or files with the court before the return date an affidavit or responsive pleading denying that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant on the claim. A denial by the defendant in general district court need not be in writing. The plaintiff or defendant shall, on motion, be granted a continuance whenever the defendant appears and pleads. If the defendant's pleading or affidavit admits that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant a sum certain less than that stated in the affidavit filed by the plaintiff, judgment may be taken by the plaintiff for the sum so admitted to be due, and the case will be tried as to the residue. 6.2-406. (Effective October 1, 2010) Disclosure of terms of mortgage application. A. Any lender making, or broker arranging, loans secured by a first mortgage or first deed of trust on owner occupied residential real estate consisting of one- to four-family dwelling units shall provide, at the time an application for such a loan is submitted by a loan applicant, to the loan applicant a written statement that: 1. Describes when, if ever, the interest, points, and fees quoted will be locked in; 2. States that all the loan terms not legally locked in are subject to change until settlement, which shall be initialed by the loan applicant and lender or broker; and 3. Provides a good faith estimate of the processing time required for the loan. The estimate shall take into account the time needed for the performance of any local government inspections or other functions necessary to close the loan. B. The requirements of subsection A shall not apply to any lender making 10 or fewer loans secured by a first mortgage or first deed of trust on such owner occupied residential real estate in any 12-month period.

 18.2-246.3. Money laundering; penalties. A. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to conduct a financial transaction where the person knows the property involved in the transaction represents the proceeds of an activity which is punishable as a felony under the laws of the Commonwealth, another state or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the United States. A violation of this section is punishable by imprisonment of not more than forty years or a fine of not more than $500,000 or by both imprisonment and a fine. B. Any person who, for compensation, converts cash into negotiable instruments or electronic funds for another, knowing the cash is the proceeds of some form of activity which is punishable as a felony under the laws of the Commonwealth, another state or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the United States, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Any second or subsequent violation of this subsection shall be punishable as a Class 6 felony.

18.2-246.3. Money laundering; penalties. A. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to conduct a financial transaction where the person knows the property involved in the transaction represents the proceeds of an activity which is punishable as a felony under the laws of the Commonwealth, another state or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the United States. A violation of this section is punishable by imprisonment of not more than forty years or a fine of not more than $500,000 or by both imprisonment and a fine. B. Any person who, for compensation, converts cash into negotiable instruments or electronic funds for another, knowing the cash is the proceeds of some form of activity which is punishable as a felony under the laws of the Commonwealth, another state or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the United States, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Any second or subsequent violation of this subsection shall be punishable as a Class 6 felony.

18.2-216. Untrue, deceptive or misleading advertising, inducements, writings or documents.

Any person, firm, corporation or association who, with intent to sell or in anywise dispose of merchandise, securities, service or anything offered by such person, firm, corporation or association, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale or distribution or with intent to increase the consumption thereof, or to induce the public in any manner to enter into any obligation relating thereto, or to acquire title thereto, or any interest therein, makes, publishes, disseminates, circulates or places before the public, or causes, directly or indirectly to be made, published, disseminated, circulated or placed before the public, in a newspaper or other publications, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster, blueprint, map, bill, tag, label, circular, pamphlet or letter or in any other way, an advertisement of any sort regarding merchandise, securities, service, land, lot or anything so offered to the public, which advertisement contains any promise, assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading, or uses any other method, device or practice which is fraudulent, deceptive or misleading to induce the public to enter into any obligation, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.

The actions prohibited in this section, shall be construed as including (i) the advertising in any manner by any person of any goods, wares or merchandise as a bankrupt stock, receiver's stock or trustee's stock, if such stock contains any goods, wares or merchandise put therein subsequent to the date of the purchase by such advertiser of such stock, and if such advertisement of any such stock fail to set forth the fact that such stock contains other goods, wares or merchandise put therein, subsequent to the date of the purchase by such advertiser of such stock in type as large as the type used in any other part of such advertisement, including the caption of the same, it shall be a violation of this section; and (ii) the use of any writing or document which appears to be, but is not in fact a

negotiable check, negotiable draft or other negotiable instrument unless the writing clearly and conspicuously, in at least 14-point bold type, bears the phrase "THIS IS NOT A CHECK" printed on its face. 8.3A-309. Enforcement of lost, destroyed, or stolen instrument.

(a) A person not in possession of an instrument is entitled to enforce the instrument if (i) the person was in possession of the instrument and entitled to enforce it when loss of possession occurred, (ii) the loss of possession was not the result of a transfer by the person or a lawful seizure, and (iii) the person cannot reasonably obtain possession of the instrument because the instrument was destroyed, its whereabouts cannot be determined, or it is in the wrongful possession of an unknown person or a person that cannot be found or is not amenable to service of process.

(b) A person seeking enforcement of an instrument under subsection (a) must prove the terms of the instrument and the person's right to enforce the instrument. If that proof is made, 8.3A-308 applies to the case as if the person seeking enforcement had produced the instrument. The court may not enter judgment in favor of the person seeking enforcement unless it finds that the person required to pay the instrument is adequately protected against loss that might occur by reason of a claim by another person to enforce the instrument. Adequate protection may be provided by any reasonable means. 2605(e)(2)(C) of RESPA states: (C) after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a written explanation or clarification that includes-(i) information requested by the borrower or an explanation of why the information requested is unavailable or cannot be obtained by the servicer; and

(ii) the name and telephone number of an individual employed by, or the office or department of, the servicer who can provide assistance to the borrower. 1635. Right of rescission as to certain transactions (a) Disclosure of obligors right to rescind

Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any consumer credit transaction (including opening or increasing the credit limit for an open end credit plan) in which a security interest, including any such interest arising by operation of law, is or will be retained or acquired in any property which is used as the principal dwelling of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required under this section together with a statement containing the material disclosures required under this subchapter, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Board, of his intention to do so. The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously disclose, in accordance with regulations of the Board, to any obligor in a transaction subject to this section the rights of the obligor under this section. The creditor shall also provide, in accordance with regulations of the Board, appropriate forms for the obligor to exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this section.

(b) Return of money or property following rescission

When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a) of this section, he is not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the obligor,

including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a rescission. Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the boligor any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction. If the creditor has delivered any property to the obligor, the obligor may retain possession of it. Upon the performance of the creditors obligations under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the creditor, except that if return of the property in kind would be impracticable or inequitable, the obligor shall tender its reasonable value. Tender shall be made at the location of the property or at the residence of the obligor, at the option of the obligor. If the creditor does not take possession of the property within 20 days after tender by the obligor, ownership of the property vests in the obligor without obligation on his part to pay for it. The procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court.

(c) Rebuttable presumption of delivery of required disclosures

Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, written acknowledgment of receipt of any disclosures required under this subchapter by a person to whom information, forms, and a statement is required to be given pursuant to this section does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery thereof.

(d) Modification and waiver of rights

The Board may, if it finds that such action is necessary in order to permit homeowners to meet bona fide personal financial emergencies, prescribe regulations authorizing the modification or waiver of any rights created under this section to the extent and under the circumstances set forth in those regulations.

(e) Exempted transactions; reapplication of provisions

This section does not apply to

(1) a residential mortgage transaction as defined in section 1602 (w) of this title;

(2) a transaction which constitutes a refinancing or consolidation (with no new advances) of the principal balance then due and any accrued and unpaid finance charges of an existing extension of credit by the same creditor secured by an interest in the same property;

(3) a transaction in which an agency of a State is the creditor; or

(4) advances under a preexisting open end credit plan if a security interest has already been retained or acquired and such advances are in accordance with a previously established credit limit for such plan.

(f) Time limit for exercise of right An obligors right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding

the fact that the information and forms required under this section or any other disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the obligor, except that if

(1) any agency empowered to enforce the provisions of this subchapter institutes a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this section within three years after the date of consummation of the transaction,

(2) such agency finds a violation of this section, and (3) the obligors right to rescind is based in whole or in part on any matter involved in such proceeding, then the obligors right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the earlier sale of the property, or upon the expiration of one year following the conclusion of the proceeding, or any judicial review or period for judicial review thereof, whichever is later.

(g) Additional relief

In any action in which it is determined that a creditor has violated this section, in addition to rescission the court may award relief under section 1640 of this title for violations of this subchapter not relating to the right to rescind.

(h) Limitation on rescission

An obligor shall have no rescission rights arising solely from the form of written notice used by the creditor to inform the obligor of the rights of the obligor under this section, if the creditor provided the obligor the appropriate form of written notice published and adopted by the Board, or a comparable written notice of the rights of the obligor, that was

properly completed by the creditor, and otherwise complied with all other requirements of this section regarding notice. 18.2-246.5. Forfeiture of business license or registration upon conviction of sale or distribution of imitation controlled substance; money laundering. Any person, firm or corporation holding a license or registration to operate any business as required by either state or local law shall forfeit such license or registration upon conviction of a violation of (i) 18.2-248 relating to an imitation controlled substance or (ii) 18.2-246.3 relating to money laundering. Upon a conviction under this section the attorney for the Commonwealth shall notify any appropriate agency. 18.2-172. Forging, uttering, etc., other writings. If any person forge any writing, other than such as is mentioned in 18.2-168 and 18.2-170, to the prejudice of another's right, or utter, or attempt to employ as true, such forged writing, knowing it to be forged, he shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony. Any person who shall obtain, by any false pretense or token, the signature of another person, to any such writing, with intent to defraud any other person, shall be deemed guilty of the forgery thereof, and shall be subject to like punishment. 18.2-178. Obtaining money or signature, etc., by false pretense.

A. If any person obtain, by any false pretense or token, from any person, with intent to defraud, money, a gift certificate or other property that may be the subject of larceny, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof; or if he obtain, by any false pretense or token, with such intent, the signature of any person to a writing, the false making whereof would be forgery, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.

B. Venue for the trial of any person charged with an offense under this section may be in the county or city in which (i) any act was performed in furtherance of the offense, or (ii) the person charged with the offense resided at the time of the offense.

6.2-1418. (Effective October 1, 2010) Suspension or revocation of authority.

A. The Commission may suspend or revoke the authority of an association to do business upon any of the following grounds:

1. Any violation of the provisions of this chapter or regulations adopted by the Commission pursuant thereto, or a violation of any other law or regulation applicable to the conduct of its business;

2. A course of conduct consisting of failure to perform written agreements with borrowers;

3. Failure to account for funds received or disbursed to the satisfaction of the person supplying or receiving such funds;

4. Failure to disburse funds in accordance with any agreement connected with, and promptly upon closing of, a mortgage loan, taking into account any applicable right of rescission;

5. Conviction of any felony or misdemeanor involving fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit;

6. Entry of judgment against such association involving fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit;

7. Entry of a federal or state administrative order against such association for violation of any law or regulation applicable to the conduct of its business;

8. Refusal to permit an investigation or examination by the Commission;

9. Failure to pay any fee or assessment imposed by this chapter; or

10. Failure to comply with any order of the Commission.

B. For the purposes of this section, acts of any officer, director, or principal stockholder shall be deemed acts of the association. 6.2-1624. (Effective October 1, 2010) Civil penalties. In addition to the authority conferred under 6.2-1619 and 6.2-1622, the Commission may impose a civil penalty not exceeding $2,500 upon any mortgage lender or mortgage broker required to be licensed under this chapter who it determines, in proceedings commenced in accordance with the Commission's Rules, has violated any of the provisions of this chapter or any other law or regulation applicable to the conduct of the mortgage lender's or mortgage broker's business. For the purposes of this section, each separate violation shall be subject to the civil penalty herein prescribed, and each day after the date of notification, excluding Sundays and holidays, as prescribed in 2.23300, that an unlicensed person engages in the business or holds himself out to the general public as a mortgage lender or mortgage broker shall constitute a separate violation. 6.2-1619. (Effective October 1, 2010) Suspension or revocation of license.

A. The Commission may suspend or revoke any license issued under this chapter to a mortgage lender or mortgage broker upon any of the following grounds:

1. Any ground for denial of a license under this chapter;

2. Any violation of the provisions of this chapter or regulations adopted by the Commission pursuant thereto, or a violation of any other law or regulation applicable to the conduct of the mortgage lender's or mortgage broker's business;

3. A course of conduct consisting of the failure to perform written agreements with borrowers;

4. Failure to account for funds received or disbursed to the satisfaction of the person supplying or receiving such funds;

5. Failure to pay when due reasonable fees to a licensed appraiser for appraisal services that are (i) requested from the appraiser in writing by the mortgage broker or mortgage lender or an employee of the mortgage broker or mortgage lender and (ii) performed, in accordance with the terms of the contract with the appraiser and all regulatory requirements related to such appraiser and appraisal, by the appraiser in connection with the origination or closing of a mortgage loan for a customer of the mortgage broker or mortgage lender;

6. Failure to disburse funds in accordance with any agreement connected with, and promptly upon closing of, a mortgage loan, taking into account any applicable right of rescission;

7. Conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving fraud, misrepresentation or deceit;

8. Entry of a judgment against the licensee involving fraud, misrepresentation or deceit;

9. Entry of a federal or state administrative order against the licensee for violation of any law or any regulation applicable to the conduct of his business;

10. Refusal to permit an investigation or examination by the Commission;

11. Failure to pay any fee or assessment imposed by this chapter; or

12. Failure to comply with any order of the Commission.

B. For the purposes of this section, acts of any officer, director, member, partner, or principal shall be deemed acts of the licensee. 6.2-1707. (Effective October 1, 2010) Other conditions for mortgage loan originator licensing. In addition to the findings required by 6.2-1706, the Commission shall not issue a mortgage loan originator license unless it finds that: 1. The applicant has never had a mortgage loan originator license revoked by any governmental authority; 2. The applicant has not been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony in a domestic, foreign, or military court (i) during the seven-year period preceding the application for licensing and registration; or (ii) at any time preceding such date of application if such felony involved an act of fraud, dishonesty, breach of trust, or money laundering; 3. The applicant has completed the pre-licensing education requirement described in 6.2-1708; 4. The applicant has passed a written test that meets the test requirement described in 6.2-1709; and 5. The applicant has become registered through, and obtained a unique identifier from, the Registry.

 6.2-1716. (Effective October 1, 2010) Suspension or revocation of license. The Commission may suspend or revoke any license issued under this chapter based upon: 1. Any ground sufficient for denial of the issuance of a license under this chapter; 2. Any violation of the provisions of this chapter or regulations adopted by the Commission pursuant thereto, or a violation of any other law or regulation applicable to the conduct of the licensee's licensed activities; 3. Conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit; 4. Entry of a judgment against a licensee involving fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit; 5. Entry of a federal or state administrative order against a licensee for violation of any law or any regulation applicable to the conduct of his licensed activities; 6. Refusal to permit an investigation or examination by the Commission; 7. Failure to pay any fee or assessment imposed by this chapter; 8. Failure to comply with any order of the Commission; or 9. Failure to maintain registration with, or a unique identifier from, the Registry. Note: Remainder of this page is blank 6.2-1719. (Effective October 1, 2010) Civil penalties. The Commission may impose a civil penalty not exceeding $2,500 upon any individual required to be licensed under this chapter who it determines, in proceedings commenced in accordance with the Commission's Rules, has violated any of the provisions of this chapter or any other law or regulation applicable to the licensee's activities. For the purposes of this section, each separate violation shall be subject to the civil penalty herein prescribed, and each day that an unlicensed individual acts as or holds himself out to the general public as, a mortgage loan originator shall constitute a separate violation. US Code Title 15>Chapter 2B>78ff

(a) Willful violations; false and misleading statements Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter (other than section 78dd 1 of this title), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made

unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this chapter, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any statement in any application, report, or document required to be filed under this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, or by any self-regulatory organization in connection with an application for membership or participation therein or to become associated with a member thereof which statement was false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, except that when such person is a person other than a natural person, a fine not exceeding $25,000,000 may be imposed; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation. (b) Failure to file information, documents, or reports Any issuer which fails to file information, documents, or reports required to be filed under subsection (d) of section 78o of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder shall forfeit to the United States the sum of $100 for each and every day such failure to file shall continue. Such forfeiture, which shall be in lieu of any criminal penalty for such failure to file which might be deemed to arise under subsection (a) of this section, shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States and shall be recoverable in a civil suit in the name of the United States. (c) Violations by issuers, officers, directors, stockholders, employees, or agents of issuers (1) (A) Any issuer that violates subsection (a) or (g) of section 78dd1 of this title shall be fined not more than $2,000,000. (B) Any issuer that violates subsection (a) or (g) of section 78dd1 of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by the Commission. (2) (A) Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, or stockholder acting on behalf of such issuer, who willfully violates subsection (a) or (g) of section 78dd1 of this title shall be fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. (B) Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, or stockholder acting on behalf of such issuer, who violates subsection (a) or (g) of section 78dd1 of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by the Commission.

(3) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) upon any officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder of an issuer, such fine may not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such issuer.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE MATERIAL: FORECLOSURE ACTIONS AND CASES LAWFULLY DISMISSED (NOT LETTING BANK FORECLOSE WITHOUT LAWFUL VALIDATION AND PRODUCTION) BY THE COURTS DUE TO BANK'S FAILURE TO VALIDATE & PRODUCE AS STIPULATED BY LAW AND COMMITTED BANK FRAUD AGAINST THE BORROWER FROM THE BAR ASSOCIATION'S OFFICIAL WEB SITE :... this Court has the responsibility to assure itself that the foreclosure plaintiffs have standing and that subject matter jurisdiction requirements are met at the time the complaint is filed. Even without the concerns raised by the documents the plaintiffs have filed, there is reason to question the existence of standing and the jurisdictional amount. Over 30 cases are covered by the BAR at: http://www.abanet.org/rpte/publications/ereport/2008/3/Ohioforeclosures.pdf

A national bank has no power to lend its credit to any person or corporation . . . Bowen v. Needles Nat. Bank, 94 F 925 36 CCA 553, certiorari denied in 20 S.Ct 1024, 176 US 682, 44 LED 637.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Taylor - Mayer, J., Supreme Court, Suffolk County / 9/07

American Brokers Conduit v. ZAMALLOA - Judge SCHACK 28Jan2008

Aurora Loan Services v. MACPHERSON - Judge FARNETI 1 1Mar2008

A bank may not lend its credit to another even though such a transaction turns out to have been of benefit to the bank, and in support of this a list of cases might be cited, which-would look like a catalog of ships. [Emphasis added] Norton Grocery Co. v. Peoples Nat. Bank, 144 SE 505. 151 Va 195.

In the federal courts, it is well established that a national bank has not power to lend its credit to another by becoming surety, indorser, or guarantor for him.' Farmers and Miners Bank v. Bluefield Nat 'l Bank, 11 F 2d 83, 271 U.S. 669.

Bank of New York v. SINGH - Judge KURTZ 14Dec2007

Bank of New York v. TORRES - Judge COSTELLO 11Mar2008

Bank of New York v. OROSCO - Judge SCHACK 19Nov2007

Citi Mortgage Inc. v. BROWN - Judge FARNETI 13Mar2008

The doctrine of ultra vires is a most powerful weapon to keep private corporations within their legitimate spheres and to punish them for violations of their corporate charters, and it probably is not invoked too often. Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First National Bank, 103 Wis 125, 79 NW 229. American Express Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 194 NW 430.

"It has been settled beyond controversy that a national bank, under federal Law being limited in its powers and capacity, cannot lend its credit by guaranteeing the debts of another. All such contracts entered into by its officers are ultra vires . . ." Howard & Foster Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Union, 133 SC 202, 130 SE 759(1926).

. . . checks, drafts, money orders, and bank notes are not lawful money of the United States ... State v. Neilon, 73 Pac 324, 43 Ore 168.

American Brokers Conduit v. ZAMALLOA - Judge SCHACK 11 Sep2007

Countrywide Mortgage v. BERLIUK - Judge COSTELLO 1 3Mar2008

Deutsche Bank v. Barnes-Judgment Entry

Deutsche Bank v. Barnes-Withdrawal of Objections and Motion to Dismiss

Deutsche Bank v. ALEMANY Judge COSTELLO 07Jan2008 Deutsche Bank v. Benjamin CRUZ Judge KURTZ 21May2008

Deutsche Bank v. Yobanna CRUZ - Judge KURTZ 21May2008

Deutsche Bank v. CABAROY - Judge COSTELLO 02Apr2008

Deutsche Bank v. CASTELLANOS / 2007NYSlipOp50978U/- Judge SCHACK 11May2007

Deutsche Bank v. CASTELLANOS/ 2008NYSlipOp50033U/ - Judge SCHACK 14Jan 2008

HSBC v. Valentin - Judge SCHACK calls them liars and dismisses WITH prejudice **

Deutsche Bank v. CLOUDEN / 2007NYSlipOp5 1 767U/ Judge SCHACK 1 8Sep2007

Deutsche Bank v. EZAGUI - Judge SCHACK 21Dec2007

Deutsche Bank v. GRANT - Judge SCHACK 25Apr2008

Deutsche Bank v. HARRIS - Judge SCHACK 05Feb2008

Deutsche Bank v. LaCrosse, Cede, DTC Complaint

Deutsche Bank v. NICHOLLS - Judge KURTZ 21May2008

Deutsche Bank v. RYAN - Judge KURTZ 29Jan2008

Deutsche Bank v. SAMPSON - Judge KURTZ 16Jan2008

Deutsche v. Marche - Order to Show Cause to VACATE Judgment of Foreclosure 11 June2009

GMAC Mortgage LLC v. MATTHEWS - Judge KURTZ 10Jan2008

GMAC Mortgage LLC v. SERAFINE - Judge COSTELLO 08Jan2008

HSBC Bank USA NA v. CIPRIANI Judge COSTELLO 08Jan2008

HSBC Bank USA NA v. JACK - Judge COSTELLO 02Apr2008

IndyMac Bank FSB v. RODNEY-ROSS - Judge KURTZ 15Jan2008

LaSalleBank NA v. CHARLEUS - Judge KURTZ 03Jan2008

LaSalleBank NA v. SMALLS - Judge KURTZ 03Jan2008

PHH Mortgage Corp v. BARBER - Judge KURTZ 15Jan2008

Property Asset Management v. HUAYTA 05Dec2007

Rivera, In Re Services LLC v. SATTAR / 2007NYSlipOp5 1 895U/ - Judge SCHACK 09Oct2007

USBank NA v. AUGUSTE - Judge KURTZ 27Nov2007

USBank NA v. GRANT - Judge KURTZ 14Dec2007

USBank NA v. ROUNDTREE - Judge BURKE 11Oct2007

USBank NA v. VILLARUEL - Judge KURTZ 01Feb2008

Wells Fargo Bank NA v. HAMPTON - Judge KURTZ 03 Jan2008

Wells Fargo, Litton Loan v. Farmer WITH PREJUDICE Judge Schack June2008

Wells Fargo v. Reyes WITH PREJUDICE, Fraud on Court & Sanctions Judge Schack June2008

Deutsche Bank v. Peabody Judge Nolan (Regulation Z)

Indymac Bank,FSB v. Boyd - Schack J. January 2009

Indymac Bank, FSB v. Bethley - Schack, J. February 2009 ( The tale of many hats)

LaSalle Bank Natl. Assn. v Ahearn - Appellate Division, Third Department (Pro Se)

NEW JERSEY COURT DISMISSES FORECLOSURE FILED BY DEUTSCHE BANK FOR FAILURE TO PRODUCE THE NOTE

Whittiker v. Deutsche (MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS) Whittiker (PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION) Whittiker (DEFENDANT WELTMAN, WEINBERG & REIS CO., LPAS RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION) Whittiker (RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEARSONS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT ITS MOTION TO DISMISS)

Novastar v. Snyder * (lack of standing) Snyder (motion to amend w/prejudice) Snyder (response to amend)

Washington Mutual v. City of Cleveland (WAMU's motion to dismiss)

2008-Ohio-1177; DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v. Parsons (SJ Reversed for lack of standing)

Everhome v. Rowland

Deutsche - Class Action (RICO) Bank of New York v. TORRES - Judge

COSTELLO 1 1Mar2008

37.

Deutsche Bank Answer Whittiker

38.

Manley Answer Whittiker

39.

Justice Arthur M. Schack

40.

Judge Holschuh- Show cause

41.

Judge Holschuh- Dismissals

42.

Judge Boyko's Deutsche Bank Foreclosures

43.

Rose Complaint for Foreclosure | Rose Dismissals

44.

O'Malley Dismissals

45.

City Of Cleveland v. Banks

46.

Dowd Dismissal

47.

EMC can't find the note

48.

Ocwen can't find the note

49.

US Bank can't find the Note

50.

US Bank - No Note

51.

Key Bank - No Note

52.

Wells Fargo - Defective pleading

Complaint in Jack v. MERS, Citi, Deutsche

GMAC v. Marsh

Massachusetts : Robin Hayes v. Deutsche Bank

Florida: Deutsche Bank's Summary Judgment Denied

Texas: MERS v. Young / 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals - PANEL: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and MCCOY, JJ.

Nevada: MERS crushed: In re Mitchell

"Neither, as included in its powers not incidental to them, is it a part of a bank's business to lend its credit. If a bank could lend its credit as well as its money, it might, if it received compensation and was careful to put its name only to solid paper, make a great deal more than any lawful interest on its money would amount to. If not careful, the power would be the mother of panics, . . . Indeed, lending credit is the exact opposite of lending money, which is the real business of a bank, for while the latter creates a liability in favor of the bank, the former gives rise to a liability of the bank to another. I Morse. Banks and Banking 5th Ed. Sec 65; Magee, Banks and Banking, 3rd Ed. Sec 248." American Express Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 194 NW 429.

"It is not within those statutory powers for a national bank, even though solvent, to lend its credit to another in any of the various ways in which that might be done." Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. L 'Herrison, 33 F 2d 841, 842 (1929).

"There is no doubt but what the law is that a national bank cannot lend its credit or become an accommodation endorser." National Bank of Commerce v. Atkinson, 55 E 471.

"A bank can lend its money, but not its credit." First Nat'l Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe . 135 Ga 614, 69 SE 1124, 32 LRA (NS) 550.

".. . the bank is allowed to hold money upon personal security; but it must be money that it loans, not its credit." Seligman v. Charlottesville Nat. Bank, 3 Hughes 647, Fed Case No.12, 642, 1039.

"A loan may be defined as the delivery by one party to, and the receipt by another party of, a sum of money upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum with or without interest." Parsons v. Fox 179 Ga 605, 176 SE 644. Also see Kirkland v. Bailey, 155 SE 2d 701 and United States v. Neifert White Co., 247 Fed Supp 878, 879.

"The word 'money' in its usual and ordinary acceptation means gold, silver, or paper money used as a circulating medium of exchange . . ." Lane v. Railey 280 Ky 319, 133 SW 2d 75.

"A promise to pay cannot, by argument, however ingenious, be made the equivalent of actual payment ..." Christensen v. Beebe, 91 P 133, 32 Utah 406.

A bank is not the holder in due course upon merely crediting the depositors account. Bankers Trust v. Nagler, 229 NYS 2d 142, 143.

"A check is merely an order on a bank to pay money." Young v. Hembree, 73 P2d 393

"Any false representation of material facts made with knowledge of falsity and with intent that it shall be acted on by another in entering into contract, and which is so acted upon, constitutes 'fraud,' and entitles party deceived to avoid contract or recover damages." Barnsdall Refining Corn. v. Birnam Wood Oil Co. 92 F 26 817.

"Any conduct capable of being turned into a statement of fact is representation. There is no distinction between misrepresentations effected by words and misrepresentations effected by other acts." Leonard v. Springer 197 Ill 532. 64 NE 301.

If any part of the consideration for a promise be illegal, or if there are several considerations for an unseverable promise one of which is illegal, the promise, whether written or oral, is wholly void, as it is impossible to say what part or which one of the considerations induced the promise. Menominee River Co. v. Augustus Spies L & C Co.,147 Wis 559-572; 132 NW 1122.

The contract is void if it is only in part connected with the illegal transaction and the promise single or entire. Guardian Agency v. Guardian Mut. Savings Bank, 227 Wis 550, 279 NW 83.

It is not necessary for recision of a contract that the party making the misrepresentation should have known that it was false, but recovery is allowed even though misrepresentation is innocently made, because it would be unjust to allow one who made false representations, even innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain induced by such representations. Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis 2d 166.

"Each Federal Reserve bank is a separate corporation owned by commercial banks in its region ..." Lewis v. United States, 680 F 20 1239 (1982).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jeffrey Brown moves and prays this Court for Judgment against Defendants in the amount of $5,000,000 (Five Million Dollars) or to be determined by a jury demanded, to compensate him for his damages including but not limited to : monetary, personal, punitive, injunctive, and specific performance relief and damages

pursuant to Virginia and US Code Violations (see REFERENCES Page); all costs and fees, to be collected by the Court; all reasonable attorney fees to be collected by the Court; Grant of Judgment and all subsequent appellate pleadings and cessation of withholding; nullification and vacation of expungment that should have been granted, preferably nunc pro tunc respectively; immediate reinstatement of all constitutional rights, immediate return of his property, injunction for cessation of all federal funds to the State of Virginia pursuant USC penalties for federal civil rights violations; willfully contrary to the Health and Welfare of the Nation under Title 42 USC 1983, 1985, and 1986; and for other relief including criminal prosecution of Defendants, as this Court deems just and proper. Jeffrey Brown also reserves the rights to compensation under Qui Tam Act as the alleged mortgage was a Fannie Mae Jumbo and the Federal government has a financial interest. Plaintiff further moves this Court to demand a Quit Claim from all Defendants in this matter, and to remove any and all derogatory credit reporting to restore Plaintiff to whole nunc pro tunc.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED TO AMEND WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT.

Signed this______ Day of December, 2010.

Respectfully Submitted,

________________________________

Jeffrey L. Brown (pro se at present) State of Virginia)

County of Fairfax)

Before me, the undersigned a Notary Public, in and for said Fairfax County and State of Virginia on this ____day of December, 2010, personally appeared JEFFREY L. BROWN to me known to be the identical person who subscribed his name to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same as his free and voluntary lawful act and deed of such, for the purposes therein set forth.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my official signature and affixed my official seal the day and year first above written.

Notary _______________________My Commission Expires:

Defendants: 1. HSBC Mortgage Corporation, USA, 2424 Walden Ave, Depew, New York 14043 2. Debra Bassett, 85 Arell Court, Alexandria, VA 22304 3. Howard N. Bierman, 4520 East West Hwy, Suite 200, Bethesda, MD 20814 4. Jared Slater, 2020 N. 14th Street, Suite 750, Arlington, VA 22201