Clive Gilbert

Did international demands for an end to empires significantly influence Britains approach to decolonisation in the 1950s?
After the Second World War, British colonial policy was the subject of an unprecedented degree of international scrutiny. The rise of two global superpowers had decisively shifted the focus of international diplomacy away from Britain and demoted her to the status of a second class power. Britains relationship with America a traditionally anti-imperialist state was seen by policy makers in Whitehall as a vital determinant of British power and prestige. The League of Nations had been replaced by the United Nations, which from the end of the war acted as a major forum for international discussion and provided an environment where anti-colonialist governments could vocalise their concerns in concert. This presented a series of challenges for colonial policy makers who were charged with the responsibility of weighing the needs of each colony against the pressure from UN members. In fact, the chief response from the Colonial Office and the British delegation to such interference was to assert British interests more rigorously and seek to resist actions which they believed fell outside the bounds of the organisations remit. The late 1940s and early 1950s witnessed a struggle to anaesthetise the influence of anti-colonial sentiment on British colonial policy while maintaining a healthy relationship with the United States. This double-edged campaign continued well into the 1950s, only to be jeopardised by the disastrous Suez crisis. Gordon Martel however, has argued that Suez had not substantially affected Anglo-American relations and may have even been followed by a more rigorous approach to exploit the new superpowers strength and resources in view to applying a more efficient colonial policy. The diplomatic struggle over colonial policy at the UN during the late 1940s and early 1950s encapsulated Britains response to international demand for decolonisation. The disagreements almost transcended Cold War allegiances as Britain faced increasing criticism from diverse sources. UK delegation member Fletcher-Cooke expressed his alarm at the increasingly hostility of the UN 4th Committee towards the imperial powers. During 1949 the Committee became less receptive to the authority of imperial states on colonial questions and tended to vote on issues which British officials regarded as being far beyond the provisions of the Charter. While the delegations of Australia and New Zealand were handicapped by rigid instruction from their

Clive Gilbert Governments, possibly influenced by concurrent elections, the so-called imperialist hard core of Belgium, France and Britain seemed to be deteriorating due to their governments divergence over the Trusteeship Council Non Self-Governing Territories Resolutions. These factors had opened the floodgates for the anti-colonial protestations of moderate Scandinavia, the critical Arab Bloc, and most importantly, the United States. The USSR on the other hand, according to Fletcher-Cooke, was content to stand back and observe the controversies, deriving what advantages they can from the embarrassments of administering authorities. Britains apparent departure from international opinion seemed to British officials to imply a threat to its position as a world power. As the UN encroached on the prerogatives of the imperial governments, they lost their claim to global influence and moral supremacy. The Colonial Office believed that the anti-colonialists were failing to take account of the fact that the welfare of colonial peoples remained high on their list of priorities, working to develop political and economic stability in the territories with a view towards more autonomous styles of government. The most serious implication of Britains conflict with the 4th Committee was the marked difference in opinion with its American counterpart that these developments revealed. The Unites States had a deep tradition of anti-imperialism stretching back to its own past as a British colony. Americans romanticised its achievements as a former subject of the British crown which evolved into the international super power that emerged from the Second World War. The United States saw itself as a model for other newly independent nations to adopt and felt a responsibility to support colonial territories to self-determination. The idealism which dictated Woodrow Wilsons approach to the end and the aftermath of the First World War was reminiscent of the position of the American government in 1940s and 1950s. This has to be juxtaposed with the United States conviction that the United Nations should be the forum through which all international relations should be conducted and that the American government was obliged to bolster its reputation and influence whenever possible. Although by 1950 Anglo-American relations were firmly united against the threat of Soviet Communism, the difference in the two states attitude towards colonialism appeared to signal a rift between their governments which disturbed officials on both sides. This division also dissipated any hope that the anti-colonialism displayed at the United Nations could be tamed without Britain having to implement policies that London 2

Clive Gilbert perceived as imprudent and ultimately irresponsible. The resolve of British officials to not concede a potentially politically debilitating defeat at the hands of the anti-colonial lobby led to an initiative to begin special discussions with the US State Department to forge a better transatlantic understanding. The exploratory talks were first suggested by the British Ambassador to the United States, Oliver Franks, in a memorandum to Ernest Bevin at the Foreign Office in 1950 outlining the potential for reconciliation. Franks argued that the root of the disagreements was to be found in the United States misinterpretation of British intentions in the colonies. Britain, he argued, should reiterate clearly to the State Department the fundamental aims of British colonial policy, providing evidence of Britains support for self-government in the territories. Britains ultimate success in opening constructive lines of communication with the American government demonstrates the determination of London officials to stay above the international criticism that its imperial role stimulated and ensure that British interests and experience remained the chief determinant of colonial policy. The role of the special relationship in safeguarding Britains great power status and the metropoles free hand in the colonies was a recurring theme throughout the 1950s. The granting of Libyan independence in 1951 under the auspices of a UN sponsored British protectorate is another early example of Anglo-American cooperation on colonial issues. Since 1949, the British Chiefs of Staff had viewed North Africa and the Mediterranean as two pivotal regions on which Britains international status depended. If British interests in these regions were compromised, Londons ability to defend the equally vital Middle East from Soviet influence would be placed at risk. It is instructive to note that the British strategy for coordinating an offensive from Libya should the Soviet Union attempt to invade the Middle East assumed that the British effort would have to withstand the full force of the Red Army only until the United States decided to enter the fray. Thus, British policy makers greeted calls for Libyan independence with some trepidation. The US State Department was one of the chief proponents of independence in North West Africa, quickly extinguishing Londons plans to make Libya one of the British Empires foremost military and strategic bases. It was clear that London would have to concede direct control of Libyan defences and military officials stressed the importance of cooperating with America after British administrators handed over power to the Africans. In this case, the Anglo-American alliance was able to unite around fears that the region might fall under extremist or Egyptian influence. 3

Clive Gilbert The West agreed to subsidise the resulting Libyan federation by renting military bases from the newly instated government, ensuring Anglo-American interests would be sustained in the region for years to come. Meanwhile, London persuaded Libyan authorities to join the sterling area. This episode illustrates the aptitude with which British officials could exploit the special relationship and the United States Cold War concerns to protect Britains international power despite the anti-colonial world climate. The Suez Crisis of 1956 has often been regarded as a turning point in British foreign and imperial policy. Many have argued that the failure of the combined forces of Britain, France and Israel to topple Nassers regime demonstrated to officials in London and Paris that they were no longer in a position to mould international affairs to their liking in the same manner as their predecessors. As in most of Britains major foreign policy initiatives at the time, government ministers expected the United States to pledge their support for the campaign and provide practical assistance if necessary. Prime Minister Anthony Edens unquestioning conviction that President Eisenhowers endorsement would be forthcoming marked one of the most significant foreign policy miscalculations of modern British history and ultimately led to his resignation. However, the brief tension in Anglo-American relations was resolved when the American government invited the newly instated Prime Minster Harold Macmillan to Washington for conciliatory talks. In fact, both sides were anxious to leave the Suez debacle behind and even proceeded to coordinate a joint strategy to combat the continuing threat posed by Nassers nationalisation of the Suez Canal. They agreed that to rely on the Egyptian government to administer such a vital trade route without prejudice was intolerable and so were compelled to inject capital and shared knowledge into a solution. Martel claims that this is one of the first of many indications that Suez had had little impact on the worldview of policy makers in London. Long after 1956 many Whitehall officials were resentful of their supposed allies failure to acknowledge the menace posed by Nassers government and sought to educate Washington of its mistake by transmitting the knowledge and experience of an older power to its new international partner. Whitehalls almost patronising psychology of historical experience versus the relative naivety of other emerging centres of political and diplomatic influence remained as ingrained in post-Suez attitudes and policies as it was when officials first resisted the anti-colonialist bloc at the UN earlier in the decade.

Clive Gilbert Perhaps one of the most significant outcomes of the Suez Crisis was the burgeoning realisation that the countrys needs and ambitions might be better served in future through favourable trade and economic relations than direct colonial administration. This did not mean that Britains gradual approach to decolonisation was to be dramatically reversed. To the contrary, the Empire was to be a crucial plank for new Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyds Grand Design which aimed to use Britains special relationship with the US and its African territories to promote the creation of a European confederation with London at the helm. This ambitious plan would expand Britains sphere of influence immeasurably and possibly found a third superpower. London continued to believe it could exercise the influence of a great power, capable of winning the international community over to its cause. In fact, through the confederation, some officials even fantasised of integrating French Africa into the British sphere of influence, suggesting both the continuation of Empire and Whitehalls perception of the extent of Londons diplomatic power. The second strand of Britains post-Suez strategy involved framing its alliances in the Middle East by forming the Baghdad Pact. Although unsuccessful in enticing the United States to join this association due to fears in Washington that their involvement would alienate the Saudis and Israelis, the Americans did agree to help enforce the Military Committee of the Pact in accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine. Meanwhile, the Colonial Office remained determined to defend its stance on specific territorial questions. This is exemplified by the British response to an international outcry backing the demands of Yemeni tribes people for Britain to leave Aden. In spite of the UNs condemnation of its continuing presence in the region, Britain initiated its own propaganda campaign which justified Londons policy in resisting calls to give up this strategically vital territory. Thus, even after Suez, Whitehall adamantly refused to heed international pressure for the end of imperialism and continued to see itself as a major player on the world stage with potential to grow. To conclude, the demands of the international community for an end to empires in the 1950s had little influence on Britains approach to decolonisation. Throughout the period, Britain regarded itself as the leading international authority on all aspects of imperialism and viewed the anti-colonialist bloc as a nuisance to be ignored rather than a voice of reason plotting the way for a better global future. British officials believed that only by gradually transferring power to the natives would stable, autonomous states 5

Clive Gilbert emerge. This belief dominated their approach to decolonisation to the extent that, for the most part, the anti-colonialists merely presented a diplomatic challenge which bore no influence on colonial policy. The only practical concern for colonial and foreign policy makers in the 1950s was condition of Anglo-American relations. With the worlds leading superpower on side, London would have to answer to no one. The United States was, therefore, an integral component to Britains foreign policy, providing the key to restricting the United Nations interference in colonial policy and as a partner in defending Britains global interests more broadly. As the decade unfolded, it became clear that the feeling was mutual and British and American interests were intertwined. Americas support even emboldened Britain to set its sights beyond the Empire and aim to become a European leader, and perhaps a superpower.

Clive Gilbert Bibliography Fletcher-Cooke. 1949 Decolonisation Documents Vol III p103-8 Franks, O. 1950 Decolonisation Documents Vol III p547-54 Louis, WM and Bull, H. Eds.1986, The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (Clarendon Press: London) Martel, Gordon. 2000, Decolonisation after Suez: Rationalisation or Retreat? Australian Journal of Politics and History Vol. 46, Issue 3