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REGULATION BY OPTIMAL TAXATION OF AN OPEN

ACCESS SINGLE-SPECIES FISHERY CONSIDERING
ALLEE EFFECT ON RENEWABLE RESOURCE

ALEJANDRO ROJAS-PALMA
Instituto de Matemticas, Universidad Austral de Chile.
alejandro.rojas.p@mail.ucv.cl.
EDUARDO GONZLEZ-OLIVARES
Grupo de Ecologa Matemtica, Instituto de Matemticas,
Ponticia Universidad Catlica de Valparaso, Chile.
ejgonzal@ucv.cl
In this work, a bioeconomic model of an open access single-species shery is ana-
lyzed, using a catch-rate function suggested by W. C. Clark and considering Allee
eect in the exploited resource. The harvesting eort is considered to be a dynamic
variable (a function of time) and also it is assumed that the exploitation of the sh-
ery is regulated by an agency by imposing a tax per unit of landed biomass. The
main objectivesare to establish the maximization of the monetary social benet as
well as to prevent the extinction of the resource. i.e., a optimal control problems
is obtained, which is solved by means of the Pontryagins Maximum Pinciple.
1. Introduction
If harvesting by individuals of a region is causing severe damage of the
ecosystem of a determined region, in particular when a exploited population
can become to extinction, then the governing authority of this region should
plan a regulating policy which would keep the damage to the ecosystem
minimal
1
.
To avoid this the regulating authority levies a tax on the catch of the
harvesting agency. This acts as a deterrent to the sher and helps the
renewable resource to grow, which can be an incentive to the sher, when
the tax takes the form of a subsidy
15
.

This work was partially supported by DII-PUCV project number124720/2009

1
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2
In this work, a bioeconomic model of an open access single-species sh-
ery is analyzed using a catch-rate function suggested by Clark
4
. This catch-
rate function is more exible and realistic than the usual catch-per-unit-
eort-hypothess used in Schaefers model
4
.
The growth of the exploited population is aected by the Allee eect
5;18
or depensation
16
. The harvesting eort 1 is considered to be a dynamic
variable (a function of time), i.e., 1 = 1 (t) and also it is assumed that the
exploitation of the shery is regulated by an agency by imposing a tax t
per unit biomass of landed sh.
The net economic revenue to the shermen (perceived rent) is the dier-
ence between of incomes and the cost
4
and the gross rate at which capital
is invested at any time is assumed to be proportional to the "perceived
rent" at that time
9
.
Moreover, the net economic revenue to the society can be considered as
the sum of the net economic revenue to the shermen (perceived rent) plus
the economic revenue to the regulatory agency.
To establish the optimal taxation, rstly the positive steady state of
this system is determined and conditions for its existence and stability are
obtained. Lately, we nd the proper taxation policy which would give the
best possible benet through harvesting to the community while preventing
the extinction of the predator, which is studied invoking the Pontryagins
Maximum Principle of Control Theory
6;8
. This form of control is dierent
from the usual optimal harvesting policy trying the maximization of the
net economic revenue to the shermen.
Economists are particularly attracted to taxation because a competi-
tive sheries can be better maintained under taxation rather than other
regulatory methods. However, little attention has been paid to study the
dynamics of shery resources using taxation as a control instrument
2;9;13
.
2. Model construction
The populational dynamics of the shing resource is modeled by the equa-
tion
dx
dt
= 1 (r) /(r, 1) (1)
where r = r(t) represents the populational biomass in the time , 1 (r) is
the natural growth function and /(r, 1) represents the harvesting rate in
the time.
In this work we consider
1 (r) = r

1
x
K

(r :) r (2)
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a modication of the logistical equation with the factor (r :) represent-
ing the Allee eect. If : 0, we have the strong Allee eect, meanwhile if
: = 0, it has the weak Allee eect
20
.
The harvesting function is of the sigmoid form
19
given by
/(r, 1) =
qx
2
E
x
2
+a
2
(3)
where 1 = 1 (t) represents the shing eort in time and is the catchability
coecient. This function marks a dierence with the function commonly
used in the Schaefer hypothesis
4
, expressed by
/(r, 1) = 1r
since it implies that the capture is limited although the biomass is increased,
whenever the eort and is limited, that is to say, / ! 1 when r ! 1,
this function expresses eects of saturation with respect to the abundance
of the stock. Any function of realistic harvest must exhibit this behavior.
The harvesting agencys aim is to obtain as much revenue as possible
through its activity, whereas the community needs the food through har-
vesting and is also keen on protecting the resource from extinction. Thus,
the benet to the community consists of the revenue through the harvest
and the retained resource population.
Then, the problem of optimization of the communitys benet is a con-
ditional optimal control problem in the sense that the revenue is to be
maximized subject to the condition that the population is larger than a
positive quantity as t ! 1. In order to achieve this goal a regulating
agency has to curb arbitrary growth of harvesting. This is done by levying
a tax on the catch (which can also be a subsidy).
Tax (or subsidy) makes the harvesting eort a dynamic variable. The
net benet, from the harvesting, to the society is the revenue before the de-
duction of tax, obtained by the harvesting agency. The controlling agency,
like the government, levies a tax t on the harvesting agency. The purpose
of the tax (which may be a subsidy) is to regulate the harvesting eort.
The shing eort 1 is governed by the equations
1 (t) = cQ(t) 0 < c 1 (4)
dQ(t)
dt
= 1 (t) Q(t) (5)
where 1 (t) represents the rate of gross investment, Q(t) represents the
amount of capital inverted in the shery in the time and represents the
rate of depreciation of the capital, the shing eort 1 at any time t is
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assumed like a proportion of the instantaneous amount of inverted capital,
following the idea described in
9
.
If Q(t) is measured in standardized units of shing [o11], for example,
amount of vessels available by the shery, then, is reasonable to consider
that 1 (t) must be a proportion of Q(t) and the maximum capacity of eort
must be equal to the number of vessels available (c = 1).
The case in that c = 0 indicates the situation in which a shing ef-
fort is not developed, although vessels available exist. This can reect a
situation of shing over-exploitation, the shing eet are due to maintain
non-operative because the shing stock has been exhausted.
The economic revenue of the sherman (perceived rent) can be inter-
preted as the dierence between the incomes of the harvest, and the cost
of realizing the eort
G(r, 1) =

(p)qx
2
E
x
2
+a
2
c

1
where j represents the price by biomass unit, which will consider constant,
c represents the cost of harvest by biomass unit and the price by unit of
landed biomass is punished by the tax of the regulatory agency.
If it is assumed that the rate of gross investment is proportional to the
perceived rents, is obtained
1 = ,G(r, 1) 0 , 1 (6)
Equation (6) says that the rate of maximum investment at any time agrees
with the rents perceived for the case in that , = 1.
The case , = 0 can only happen when a situation of perceived rent
exists negative, that is to say, when he is not feasible to stop investing in
xed actives
4
. If the shery lost importance and the socials capitals are
manageable, the sole owner of the shery is beneciary, allowing a lost of
continuous investment of xed actives. in this case 1 < 0 and , 0 where
the negative values of investment are possible to be interpreted like lost of
investment.
Replacing the equation (6) in the equation (5) and deriving the equation
(4) the dierential equation obtained is
d1
dt
= c

,
(p)qx
2
x
2
+a
2
c

1 (7)
The sherman and the regulatory agency is two components dierent
from the society. Therefore the income obtained by them are income gained
from the society of the shery. The shery revenue, also call social revenue,
is the sum of the revenue of the sherman and the revenue obtained by